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REINSURANCE AND THE LAW OF AGGREGATION  
In excess of loss reinsurance, the reinsurer covers the amount of a loss exceeding the 
policy’s deductible but not piercing its cover limit. Accordingly, a policy’s 
quantitative scope of cover is significantly affected by the parties’ agreement of a 
deductible and a cover limit. Yet, the examination of whether a loss has exceeded 
deductible or cover limit necessitates an educated understanding of what constitutes 
one loss. In so-called aggregation clauses, the parties to (re-)insurance contracts 
regularly provide that multiple individual losses are to be added together for 
presenting one loss to the reinsurer when they arise from the same event, 
occurrence, catastrophe, cause or accident. Aggregation mechanisms are one of 
the core instruments for structuring reinsurance contracts. 
This book systematically examines each element of an aggregation mechanism, 
tracing the inconsistent usage of aggregation language in the markets and 
scrutinizing the tests developed by courts and arbitral tribunals. In doing so, it 
seeks to support insurers, reinsurers, brokers and lawyers in drafting aggregation 
clauses and in settling claims. 
Focusing on an analysis of primary sources, particularly judicial decisions, the 
book interprets each judicial decision to describe a system of inter-related rules, 
collating, organising and describing the English law of aggregation as applied by the 
courts and arbitral tribunals. It further draws a comparison between the English 
position and the corresponding rules in the Principles of Reinsurance Contract Law 
(PRICL).  
Oliver D. William is a senior lecturer and researcher at the University of 
Bern, an of-counsel at mbh ATTORNEYS AT LAW, Zurich, and a vice 
chair of the Dispute Resolution Working Party of the Association 
Internationale de Droit des Assurances (AIDA). 
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Carlos Estebenet and Christian Felderer  
Through ‘Reinsurance and the Law of Aggregation’, Oliver D William treats all the 
matters that we consider critical in the area of expertise. Besides approaching the 
main subject, he presents a deep analysis of many terms, concepts and practices that 
turn the work into a comprehensive piece. 
Reinsurance is a specialized business, very much driven by its international custom 
and practice. Over time it has seen a steady development of the legal principles, 
mainly in the form of court decisions reflecting legal practice in the key jurisdictions. 
Much of this development is based upon English case law, which is the legal basis for 
one of the centres of traditional insurance and reinsurance, the London Market. 
The question ‘how’ risks are reinsured in a non-proportional reinsurance contract, 
particularly in relation to the occurrence of multiple losses arising from a common 
cause or event, is essential and of vital importance for the structuring of the 
reinsurance contract. From a business perspective, it is perhaps the core element for 
the contracting parties, next to the definition of the subject matter of the reinsurance, 
and a key determinant for the price, the reinsurance premium. 
Given the inherent complexity of aggregation issues and the interests involved in 
case of disputes, court or arbitration cases dealing with aggregation issues are 
frequently time consuming, expensive and their resolution is paired with a 
considerable degree of uncertainty. Large past reinsurance disputes have 
demonstrated this, for instance the disputes around the reinsurance of World 
Trade Center risks. Similar questions may, perhaps, be emerging from the 
consequences of Covid-19, and the occurrence of multiple pandemic-related losses. 
Oliver embraces and tests the full landscape of the key aggregation cases in a 
comprehensive and interesting way for the reader. His research is a highly valuable 
contribution with practical relevance to both, the academia and the reinsurance 
practice. It provides an excellent overview and discussion of case law on 
‘aggregation’ and related subjects. Moreover, the research which has gone into 
this treatise is also an important contribution in the process of creating a uniform 
framework of reinsurance principles, including the ones of how aggregation should 
be applied to reinsurance. An initiative, which is targeted by an international project 
group offering a comprehensive framework of reinsurance contract law by way of the 
‘Principles of Reinsurance Contract Law’ (PRICL), in which he participates. 
Congratulations to Oliver for tackling a very demanding subject in a highly 
competent manner in this treatise. We would like to thank him for his contribution 
xiii 
to the legal practice, which, no doubt, sheds more light onto the long-standing debate 
on the concept of aggregation and its related areas. 
This is particularly of interest to organizations like AIDA with its Reinsurance 
Working Party and to AIDA Europe, which are dedicated to the furtherance and 
development of (re-)insurance and related law. 
Carlos Estebenet – Chairman AIDA Reinsurance Working Party  
and Member of the AIDA Presidential Council  
Christian Felderer – Chairman ADIA Europe and Member of the ADIA 




In 2016, Prof Dr Helmut Heiss (University of Zurich), Prof Dr Manfred Wandt 
(Goethe University Frankfurt) and Prof Dr Martin Schauer (University of Vienna) 
initiated a research project whose aim is to develop a set of uniform reinsurance 
contract law rules, the Principles of Reinsurance Contract Law, and to offer 
reinsurance markets a neutral choice of law that provides enhanced legal certainty. 
Academics from a variety of countries as well as experts from leading (re-)insurance 
companies joined the project. 
The project group identified the law of the aggregation of losses as one topic to be 
dealt with in the principles. It is beyond doubt that this area of the law presents 
substantial legal uncertainty which, particularly in England, triggered a considerable 
number of disputes. I had the privilege of becoming a research fellow in the project 
entrusted with the research into the English law of the aggregation of losses and to 
write my doctoral thesis on the subject. This book is an updated version of my 
doctoral thesis ‘(Re-)insurance and the Law of Aggregation’, which was submitted to 
the University of Zurich, Faculty of Law, in 2019 and awarded the distinction summa 
cum laude. 
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I Subject matter, scope and aim of the analysis 
Under excess of loss reinsurance agreements, a reinsurer is liable for the sum of the 
reinsured’s ultimate net loss exceeding the latter’s retention up to the policy cover 
limit.1 Establishing a schedule of retentions and cover limits for any particular loss 
allows any participant in the reinsurance market to (re-)insure a greater number of 
risks and to thereby diversify its risk portfolio so that no disproportionate amount 
of risk is borne by any one participant.2 
Yet, the ability of the (re-)insurance markets to absorb large losses will crucially 
depend on the mechanism used to calculate the monetary value of a loss to be tested 
against the reinsureds’ retention and the reinsurers’ cover limit.3 In their contracts of 
insurance and reinsurance,4 the parties often provide for so-called aggregation 
clauses, which specify that the relevant loss is to be determined on the basis of any 
one event or cause.5 
In excess of loss reinsurance, aggregation clauses are, therefore, of cardinal importance.6 
In fact, the construction of aggregation clauses contained in excess of loss reinsurances 
1 Klaus Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol 1 (Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft 
eV 1976) 143; Özlem Gürses, Reinsuring Clauses (Informa Law from Routledge 2010) paras 1.07, 6.182; 
cf Colin Edelman and Andrew Burns, The Law of Reinsurance (2nd edn, OUP 2013) para 1.61; Sieglinde 
Cannawurf and Andreas Schwepcke, ‘§ 8 Das Vertragsrecht der Rückversicherung’ in Dieter W Lüer 
and Andreas Schwepcke (eds), Rückversicherungsrecht (C.H. Beck 2013) paras 368 f; Andreas 
Schwepcke and Alexandra Vetter (eds), Praxishandbuch: Rückversicherung (VVW 2017) para 661.  
2 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP, Reinsurance Practice and the Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2009) 
para 1.15.  
3 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 2) para 4.54.  
4 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (1996) 1 WLR 1026 (HL); Robert Viney and William M Sneed, 
‘Aggregation of Reinsurance Claims in the UK and the US: Court Decisions’ (2000) 4 Andrews 
International Reinsurance Dispute Reporter.  
5 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 2) paras 28.7 ff, 28.37 ff; Rob Merkin, ‘The Christchurch Earthquakes 
Insurance and Reinsurance Issues’ (2012) 18 Canterbury Law Review 119, 145; Edelman and Burns 
(n 1) paras 4.55 ff, 4.59 ff.  
6 Cf Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 4) 1035 (Lord Mustill); Viney and Sneed (n 4). 
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often represents a multi-billion-dollar issue.7 As a consequence, in calculating reinsurance 
premiums, aggregation mechanisms must be taken into consideration.8 
The courts have stated that ‘[t]he choice of language by which the parties desig-
nated the unifying factor in an aggregation clause is (…) of critical importance and 
can be expected to be the subject of careful negotiation’.9 Moreover, Lord Hobhouse 
opined in one case that the points of aggregation under the House of Lord’s con-
sideration were all points of construction ‘which could easily have been avoided by 
the exercise of care in the preparation and drafting of the insurance contract’.10 
O’Neill and Woloniecki claim that Lord Hobhouse was too sanguine in thinking 
that uncertainties as to the correct construction of aggregation clauses could always 
be avoided.11 Early on, they argued that 
the richness of the English language, having so many words with different shades of 
meaning–loss, claim, accident, event, occurrence, cause, incident, peril–with the added 
ingredients of proximity and causation suggest that there may be more disputes over 
aggregation.12  
Their prognosis turned out to be true. In fact, since 1995, when the first major case on 
the subject matter was tried in Caudle v Sharp,13 disputes concerning aggregation were 
heard before English courts practically every year.14 O’Neill and Woloniecki note that 
there is now an ‘embarrassment of jurisprudential riches’ on the subject matter.15 In light 
of the fact that gigantic sums of money are often involved, they pose the question: ‘[h]ow 
are the underwriters to write their contracts in the future and achieve their objectives, 
when faced with unpredictable decisions of the courts?’16 Tompkinson adds that 
7 Darlene K Alt, Nathan Hull and James Killelea, ‘A Reinsurance Perspective: The Aggregation of 
Losses Following the Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami’ (2011) 22 Mealey’s Litigation Report 1, 2; 
Kristin Suga Heres and Patricia St. Peter, ‘The “Number of Occurrences” Dispute of the Century’ 
(2016) 46 Fall Brief 15.  
8 Cf Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd [2003] UKHL 
48, [2003] 4 All ER 43 [51] (Lord Hobhouse); Ken Louw and Deborah Tompkinson, ‘Curiouser and 
Curiouser: The Meaning of “Event”’ (1996) 4 International Insurance Law Review 6, 11; Barlow Lyde 
and Gilbert LLP (n 2) para 4.53.  
9 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 8) [17] (Lord 
Hoffmann). See also Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 4) 1035 (Lord Mustill).  
10 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK [1999] CLC 934, [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 803 (HL).  
11 PT O’Neill, JW Woloniecki and F Arnold-Dwyer, The Law of Reinsurance in England and Bermuda 
(5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 2019) para 7–015.  
12 O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 11) para 7–015. This point was first made in the first edition 
of their treatise.  
13 Caudle v Sharp [1995] CLC 642 (CA). For cases dealing with the subject matter before 1995, see for 
instance The South Staffordshire Tramways Co Ltd v The Sickness and Accident Assurance Association 
Ltd (1891) 1 QB 402 (CA); Allen v London Guarantee and Accident Co Ltd (1912) 28 TLR 254 (Comm); 
Forney v Dominion Insurance Co Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 928 (Comm).  
14 Some of the more recent ones are MIC Simmonds v Gammell [2016] EWHC 2515 (Comm), [2016] 
Lloyd’s Rep IR 693; AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman [2017] UKSC 18, [2018] 1 All ER 936; Spire 
Healthcare Ltd v Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance Plc [2018] EWCA Civ 317, [2018] Lloyd’s Rep 
IR 425.  
15 O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 11) para 7–013.  
16 O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 11) para 7–015. 
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[t]he history of reinsurance litigation in [England] is littered with the corpses of underwriters 
and brokers who found out too late, and to their disadvantage, that a word in common use and 
thought to be understood by everybody was not so understood by the Commercial Court. The 
spectre of carnage has once again raised its head over the definition of ‘event’ and 
‘occurrence’.17  
Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP consider questions relating to the aggregation of losses 
as ‘[o]ne of the most vexing issues facing the reinsurance market in recent years’.18 
The goal of this book is to provide a systematic analysis of the subject matter of 
aggregation under English law. It shall discuss terms that are adopted in aggregation 
clauses and identify words that are used inconsistently in the reinsurance market. The 
aim of this treatise is to clarify the concepts that are behind these words as well as to 
examine questions of causation and proximity that are linked to aggregation mechan-
isms. In this regard, tests that were developed by English courts to deal with questions of 
aggregation shall be scrutinised. In pursuing these goals, sources concerning the subject 
matter of aggregation in direct insurance, reinsurance and retrocession shall be analysed. 
It should be noted that contracts of reinsurance and retrocession are treated as contracts 
of insurance at common law.19 Further, judicial authorities dealing with aggregation in 
the context of reinsurance and retrocession refer to judicial decisions that were rendered 
in the context of primary insurance and vice versa.20 
Entire books could be dedicated to the analysis of aggregation mechanisms in dif-
ferent classes of insurance and reinsurance. Certainly, it would be interesting and 
worthwhile examining issues of aggregation in the fields of employer’s liability, product 
liability, errors and omissions, natural catastrophe, cyber risk reinsurance as well as the 
current Covid-19 pandemic. This would, however, exceed this treatise’s scope. Using 
examples and illustrations from different classes of insurance and reinsurance, the 
following analysis shall be limited to the English general law of aggregation as applied 
by the courts of England and Wales. Moreover, the analysis is limited to aggregation 
mechanisms that are based on a unifying concept of causation, ie to the aggregation of 
‘related losses’ as the Court of Appeal terms it.21 By contrast, aggregation concepts that 
are simply based on the losses that occurred during one policy period but are otherwise 
unrelated, so-called policies on an aggregate basis, will not be discussed. 
17 Deborah Tompkinson, ‘Jabberwocky: Recent Decisions on the Meaning of “Event” and “Occurrence” 
in the English Courts’ (1995) 3 International Insurance Law Review 82, 82.  
18 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 2) para 28.1.  
19 Explanatory Notes to the Insurance Act 2015, para 36; Delver, Assignee of Bunn v Barnes (1807) 1 
Taunt 48.  
20 See Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall [2002] EWHC 2082 (Comm), [2003] 1 All ER 237 [8] 
(Morison J); Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [2003] EWHC 1771 (Comm), [2004] 
Lloyd’s Rep IR 22 [75] (Steel J); Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group 
Insurance Co Ltd (n 8) [16] (Lord Hoffmann); Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and 
Advent Capital Ltd [2013] EWHC 154 (Comm), [2013] 2 All ER 231 [30] (Field J); AIG Europe Ltd v 
Woodman (n 14) [22] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
21 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 343 (CA), [1998] CLC 870, 880 
(Hobhouse LJ). Cf also Jacques Bourthoumieux, ‘La notion d’événement dans les traités de 
réassurance en excédent de sinistres’ (1969) 40 Revue générale des assurances terrestres 457, 461. 
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It may be noted that the English law of reinsurance contracts has significance 
internationally. For example, in 2014, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court stated that 
the English law of reinsurance contracts was of great importance in characterising 
reinsurance practice.22 Thus, even where a contract of reinsurance is not governed by 
English law, courts around the world may consult the English position for guidance. 
A number of states in the US have developed their own laws of aggregation which 
deviate from the English position.23 Yet, a detailed analysis of the tests developed by 
American courts is beyond the scope of this book. 
It is the author’s hypothesis that there is substantial legal uncertainty in the 
English law of aggregation. This can be briefly illustrated by way of a comparison of 
two24 cases following the terror attacks on the Twin Towers of the World Trade 
Center on 11 September 2001: 
The question before the courts was whether the terror attacks, which involved two 
aircraft, amounted to one single or multiple separate events. If the former was the case, all 
the individual losses that arose from the devastating attacks could be added together to 
form one big loss that would then be tested against the reinsured’s retention and the 
reinsurer’s cover limit. The reinsurer would be required to pay the amount of the 
aggregated loss that exceeded the reinsured’s retention up to its cover limit. By contrast, if 
the attacks were to be considered as more than one event, then only losses resulting from 
the same event could be added together, so that there would be one aggregated loss per 
event. Accordingly, the reinsurer would be liable for one loss per event. 
In Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd, 
the dispute concerned the wording of a whole account catastrophe excess of loss 
reinsurance. The Commercial Court was required to assess an arbitral tribunal’s 
award on the question of whether a plurality of losses arising under liability policies 
taken out by American Airlines as operator of the hijacked aircraft resulted from one 
single or two events for the purposes of applying policy limits and deductibles under 
four contracts of reinsurance.25 It was held by the Commercial Court that the 
arbitral tribunal made no error of law finding that ‘the insured losses caused by the 
attacks on the World Trade Center arose out of two events and not one’.26 
22 Judgment of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court of 17 January 2014, BGE 140 III 115 consideration 6.3.  
23 Viney and Sneed (n 4).  
24 There is a third case that is notable. See If P and C Insurance Ltd v Silversea Cruises Ltd [2003] EWHC 
473 (Comm), [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 217, where an insurance policy covering loss of income resulting 
from government warnings regarding terrorism per any one occurrence was disputed before the 
Commercial Court. Following 11 September 2001, the US Department of State had repeatedly warned 
US citizens that they were at risk of terrorist attacks. After these warnings, many people had cancelled 
their travel plans. The court was required to determine the relevant occurrence(s) that caused the 
substantial loss of income sustained by the assured cruise ship service provider. The court decided that 
an occurrence was the same thing as an event and that all the income loss that was caused by the 
happenings in New York and the warnings issued by the US government resulted from one single 
event, ie the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001.  
25 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 20) [2] (Field J).  
26 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 20) [40] (Field J). 
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MIC Simmonds v AJ Gammell was another case following the terror attacks on the 
World Trade Center. In this case, multiple claims had been filed against the owner of 
the land where the Twin Towers had stood. The claims fell into two categories: First, 
there were claims by employees (or their estates) of the landowner that were at the 
site at the time of the attacks and ‘were either struck by or became trapped under the 
debris’.27 Secondly, there were claims by ‘firemen, policemen, clean-up and con-
struction workers and volunteers engaged in the rescue and recovery operations’.28 
The question before the Commercial Court was whether the arbitral tribunal was 
right to decide that the terror attacks on the Twin Towers constituted one sole event 
and that all the individual losses arising from this event–no matter whether suffered 
by the landowner’s employees who were at the site at the time of the attacks or by the 
people involved in the clean-up operations following the attacks–were to be ag-
gregated. In this instance, the Commercial Court held that there was a clear and 
obvious causal connection between the attacks and the claims and that the attacks 
constituted one single event.29 
The reinsurance contracts in these two cases could undeniably be distinguished 
in a variety of aspects. Therefore, it might be argued that it is due to these 
variations that the arbitral tribunals and courts reached different conclusions 
when determining the number of events. This may partly be so. Yet, it is sub-
mitted that the differences in the arbitral tribunals’ and the Commercial Court’s 
conclusions are mainly due to the legal uncertainty inherent in the English law of 
aggregation.30 
In an unrelated case, the Court of Appeal noted that legal certainty and pre-
dictability was of paramount importance to the efficient conduct of business in 
the reinsurance market.31 Hence, if the hypothesis that there is substantial legal 
uncertainty in the English law of aggregation were confirmed, this would re-
present a severe inefficiency affecting the excess of loss reinsurance market. In 
this regard, a solution may be provided by chapter 5 of the Principles of 
Reinsurance Contract Law (PRICL 2019) as drafted by the PRICL Project 
Group, for which the present author acted as rapporteur in respect of the rules 
on the aggregation of related losses. Due to their potential to eliminate un-
certainty in this regard, the rules contained in the PRICL will be laid out and 
discussed briefly. However, there shall be no focus on these Principles. 
27 MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 14) [8] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
28 MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 14) [8] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
29 MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 14) [30] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
30 See paras 4.8 ff, 4.80 ff, 5.6 ff.  
31 Equitas Insurance Ltd v Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 718, [2020] 1 All ER 16 [91] 
(Males LJ). 
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II Plan and structure of the treatise 
This book will be divided into two parts. In the first part, the reader will be led 
through the subject matter of the aggregation of losses. In chapter 1, different types 
and methods of reinsurance will be discussed. It is to be examined for which re-
insurance products the aggregation of losses is relevant. In chapter 2, the concepts of 
‘individual loss’, ‘cover limit’ and ‘retention’ will be outlined. The different elements 
and concepts contained in an aggregation mechanism will be dealt with in chapter 3. 
It shall be demonstrated that the concept of causation lies at the heart of the 
aggregation mechanisms discussed in this book. In chapters 4 and 5, the focus will be 
placed on event-based and cause-based aggregation mechanisms, respectively. 
The relation between the concept of aggregation and other reinsurance-specific 
concepts will be addressed in the second part of the book. More specifically, 
the concepts of aggregation and the allocation of losses and their interplay will be 
compared and discussed, respectively, in chapter 6, followed by an examination of 
the relation between the concepts of aggregation and back-to-back coverage in 
chapter 7. Subsequently, in chapter 8, the interaction between the concepts of 




AGGREGATION OF RELATED CLAIMS  

CHAPTER 1 
Relevance of aggregation in various reinsurance products   
1.1 The aim of chapter 1 is to offer an overview of the reinsurance products in 
which the aggregation of losses based on causation may be an issue. It appears 
sensible to first concisely outline the idea of reinsurance. The basic distinctions of 
different types and forms of reinsurance shall then be discussed. Finally, the findings 
of the chapter will be presented in a summary. 
1.2 Hereafter, the distinction between different ‘forms’ of reinsurance will be used 
to differentiate between facultative and treaty reinsurance.1 Further, reinsurance 
contracts are divided into the ‘types and methods’ of proportional and non- 
proportional contracts.2 However, the terminology of ‘forms’ and ‘types and 
methods’ of reinsurance is not used consistently in legal literature.3 
1.3 Both distinctions are essential for the analysis of the subject matter of the 
aggregation of losses. The workings of the different forms and types of reinsurance 
contracts allow for a better understanding of the circumstances under which the 
aggregation of losses may become relevant. 
I Basic idea of reinsurance 
1.4 Just as individuals and businesses have an interest in protecting themselves 
against certain risks, insurance companies have a need to protect themselves against 
risks they accept under primary insurance contracts.4 Similarly, a reinsurer may need 
1 Andreas Schwepcke, Rückversicherung, Produktorientierte Qualifikationen (2nd edn, VVW 2004) 111; 
Sieglinde Cannawurf and Andreas Schwepcke, ‘§ 8 Das Vertragsrecht der Rückversicherung’ in Dieter 
W Lüer and Andreas Schwepcke (eds), Rückversicherungsrecht (C.H. Beck 2013) paras 264 ff; Andreas 
Schwepcke and Alexandra Vetter, Praxishandbuch: Rückversicherung (VVW 2017) paras 632 ff; Peter 
Liebwein, Klassische und moderne Formen der Rückversicherung (3rd edn, VVW 2018) paras 59 ff.  
2 Colin Edelman and Andrew Burns, The Law of Reinsurance (2nd edn, OUP 2013) paras 1.33 ff; 
Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 1) paras 270 ff. See also Schwepcke (n 1) para 111; Schwepcke and Vetter 
(n 1) paras 655 ff.  
3 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP, Reinsurance Practice and the Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2009) 
paras 4.1 ff, distinguish between the different types of facultative and treaty reinsurance and use the 
term ‘form’ for a multitude of different distinctions within the broad types of reinsurance; Özlem 
Gürses, Reinsuring Clauses (Informa Law from Routledge 2010) paras 1.04 ff, refers to different ‘forms’ 
of reinsurance when distinguishing between all four different categories, ie facultative, treaty, propor-
tional, non-proportional reinsurance. See also Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 1) n 456; Stefan Pohl and 
Joseph Iranya, The ABC of Reinsurance (VVW 2018) 8, differentiate between the different types of 
facultative and treaty reinsurance.  
4 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 3) para 1.4; Gürses (n 3) para 1.01. 
9 
to take out insurance for the risk it accepts under the reinsurance contract. A con-
tract reinsuring a reinsurer is termed a retrocession agreement.5 
1.5 By taking out reinsurance, a reinsured6 or retrocedent passes a share of the 
underlying risk onto a reinsurer or retrocessionaire.7 The reinsured party thereby 
safeguards its solvency and at the same time increases the volume or size of risk it 
can accept.8 
1.6 According to Kiln, ‘reinsurance’ is simply the insurance of an insurance com-
pany.9 In most national jurisdictions, there is no statutory definition of what con-
stitutes a reinsurance contract.10 On a European level, however, ‘reinsurance’ is 
defined in point 7(a) of Article 13 of Directive 2009/138/EC as ‘the activity consisting 
in accepting risks ceded by an insurance undertaking (…), or by another reinsurance 
undertaking (…)’.11 In Article 1.2.1 paragraph (1) PRICL,12 a contract of reinsurance 
is defined as ‘a contract under which one party, the reinsurer, in consideration of a 
premium, promises another party, the reinsured, cover against the risk of exposure to 
insurance or reinsurance claims’.13 As early as in 1807, Lord Mansfield provided a 
similar definition for contracts of reinsurance under English law. In Delver v Barnes, he 
suggested that reinsurance ‘consist of a new assurance, effected by a new policy, on the 
same risk which was before insured in order to indemnify the underwriters from their 
previous subscription (…)’.14 
1.7 These definitions suggest that a primary insurance contract must be in place 
before a reinsurance contract can be taken out.15 In practice, however, reinsurance 
contracts are often concluded with the prospect that a primary insurance contract 
to be reinsured will be concluded later in the process.16 This may be the case if a 
risk is of the quality that a primary insurer will only accept it after having ensured 
that reinsurance cover for this risk is in place.17 This is, however, not to say that a 
5 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 3) para 1.5; Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.18; Cannawurf and 
Schwepcke (n 1) para 202. 
6 Also referred to as ‘reassured’, ‘cedent’, ‘ceding company’, ‘direct insurer’, ‘original insurer’ or ‘pri-
mary insurer’.  
7 Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.09. Hereinafter, unless specifically indicated otherwise, any references 
to a reinsured or a reinsurer includes retrocedents or retrocessionaires, respectively.  
8 Gürses (n 3) para 1.01; Edelman and Burns (n 2) paras 1.10 f.  
9 Robert Kiln, Reinsurance in Practice (4th edn, Witherby 1991) 1. See also Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP 
(n 3) para 1.4; Gürses (n 3) para 1.01.  
10 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 3) para 1.6, highlighting an exemption in section 620 of the Californian 
Civil Code which defines a reinsurance contract as a contract ‘by which an insurer procures a third 
person to insure him against loss or liability by reason of such original insurance’.  
11 Parliament and Council Directive 2009/138/EC of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of 
the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) [2009] OJ L 335.  
12 For more details as to the PRICL 2019, see paras 4.123 ff.  
13 Article 1.2.1 PRICL.  
14 Delver, Assignee of Bunn v Barnes [1807] 1 Taunton 48, 51.  
15 Cf Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 3) para 1.7; Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.22.  
16 See, for instance, Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher [1989] AC 852 (HL) 893 (Lord Griffith).  
17 Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.22. 
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reinsurance contract would be effective if subsequently no primary insurance 
contract were concluded.18 
1.8 On a more functional level, a ‘reinsurance contract’ is a contract whereby a 
primary insurer takes out insurance with a reinsurer against the costs it may incur if it 
has to indemnify its primary insured for claims under a primary insurance policy is-
sued by it.19 Under such a contract, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify ‘the original 
insurer against the whole or against a specified amount or proportion (…) of the risk 
which the latter has himself insured’.20 In return, the reinsured promises the payment 
of a premium.21 
1.9 The reinsured’s insurable interest is to be identified by reference to the original 
insurance policy.22 Consequently, unless there is a primary insurance contract to be 
reinsured, there cannot be said to be a contract of reinsurance. In German legal litera-
ture, the term ‘accessoriness’ (Akzessorietät) is used to describe the dependence of a 
reinsurance contract on the primary insurance contract.23 Similarly, English legal com-
mentary suggests that ‘[t]he indemnity afforded by reinsurance is (…) against the dis-
charge of liability by the reinsured’ so that the reinsured could not make a profit out of 
the reinsurance.24 
II Different forms of reinsurance 
1.10 Reinsurance contracts are generally divided into two forms: treaty and 
facultative reinsurance.25 At the core of the distinction between the two categories 
lie the questions of whether the reinsured is bound to offer a specific risk and 
whether the reinsurer is bound to accept such a risk.26 The answers to these 
questions essentially determine the design and, hence, the form of the reinsurance 
contract. However, many hybrid forms of reinsurance contracts exist so that it 
may be too simplistic to regard there to be a dichotomy between facultative and 
treaty reinsurance.27 
18 Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 1) paras 4 f.  
19 Cf Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 3) para 1.4; Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 1) para 3; Pohl and 
Iranya (n 3) 7.  
20 Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher (n 16) 852, 908 (Lord Lowry).  
21 Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.29.  
22 Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Toomey [1994] 3 Lloyd’s Rep IR 1 (CA) 7 (Hobhouse LJ); Edelman and 
Burns (n 2) para 1.29.  
23 Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 1) para 4.  
24 Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.29.  
25 William Hoffman, ‘Facultative Reinsurance Contract Formation, Documentation, and Integration’ 
(2003) 38 Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Law Journal 763, 768; Pohl and Iranya (n 3) 8.  
26 Hoffman (n 25) 769.  
27 Hoffman (n 25) 769. 
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1 Treaty reinsurance 
1.11 A reinsurance treaty is a contract for reinsurance rather than a contract of 
reinsurance.28 More specifically, a reinsurance treaty is not used to transfer a portion 
of the reinsured’s risk to the reinsurer by itself. Rather, the parties to a reinsurance 
treaty agree that the reinsured cedes and the reinsurer accepts specified primary in-
surance risks to the extent that they are underwritten by the reinsured.29 
Consequently, a reinsurance treaty can be considered obligatory.30 
1.12 The reinsured is generally free to decide whether to accept primary in-
surance business. Where it chooses so, it is obliged to cede a certain amount or 
proportion of the risks to the reinsurer and the reinsurer is bound to accept such 
amount or proportion of the risk if it is within the scope of the reinsurance 
treaty.31 Commonly, a reinsurance treaty encompasses all or a substantial part of 
the primary insurance policies of a specified kind, ie potentially a whole book of 
business.32 
1.13 The transfer of risks from the reinsured to the reinsurer generally occurs 
automatically.33 In line with this, the High Court of Singapore in Hanwha Non-Life 
Insurance Co Ltd v Alba Pte Ltd held that a risk attaches to a reinsurance treaty as 
soon as the reinsured accepts it under the underlying insurance policy.34 
1.14 Treaty reinsurance is efficient because the reinsured does not have to apply 
for reinsurance cover in respect of each primary insurance policy underwritten by it. 
The reinsured has certainty that it will obtain appropriate reinsurance cover for a 
primary insurance risk that it wishes to accept.35 Moreover, the reinsured does not 
have to provide the reinsurer with detailed information regarding each and every 
ceded risk36 and the reinsurer does not assess each and every ceded risk.37 By doing 
away with these steps, the parties reduce their administrative costs of business.38 
28 Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.50; Graydon Shaw Staring and Dean Hansell, Law of Reinsurance 
(Thomson Reuters Westlaw 2020) s 1:1.  
29 Schwepcke and Vetter (n 1) para 642; Staring and Hansell (n 28) s 2:4.  
30 However, reinsurance treaties are not necessarily obligatory for both parties. In facultative obligatory 
treaty reinsurance, the reinsured is free to choose the risks it wishes to cede to the treaty, whereas the 
reinsurer is bound to accept any such risk. In obligatory facultative treaty reinsurance, the reinsured is 
bound to offer specified business, whereas the reinsurer is free to accept or decline it.  
31 Klaus Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol 1 (Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft 
eV 1976) 70; Klaus Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol 2 (Verlag 
Versicherungswirtschaft eV 1979) 1; Schwepcke and Vetter (n 1) para 642.  
32 Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol 2 (n 31) 2; Schwepcke and Vetter (n 1) 
para 641.  
33 Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 1) para 267; Schwepcke and Vetter (n 1) para 641.  
34 Hanwha Non-Life Insurance Co Ltd v Alba Pte Ltd [2011] SGHC 271, [2012] Lloyd’s Rep IR 505 [48] 
(Tan J); Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.51.  
35 Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.50; Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 1) para 268.  
36 Schwepcke and Vetter (n 1) para 643; Liebwein (n 1) 62.  
37 With regard to the latter point, Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.50.  
38 Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.50. 
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Another aspect is that treaty reinsurance can be effected proportionally or non- 
proportionally.39 
1.15 As reinsurance treaties often contain aggregation clauses, the subject matter 
of aggregation may be relevant in the context of treaty reinsurance.40 In fact, it is 
even possible that losses covered under different primary insurance policies within 
the portfolio may be aggregated under a reinsurance treaty if they result from the 
same event or cause.41 
2 Facultative reinsurance 
1.16 In the case of facultative reinsurance, a primary insurer, ie a reinsured, de-
cides whether it wishes to reinsure a specific risk.42 It is up to the reinsured to choose 
the right reinsurer for the deal.43 Yet, the reinsurer is equally free to accept the risk or 
to decline it.44 
1.17 Facultative reinsurance contracts generally cover individual primary in-
surance policies.45 However, this is not necessarily so. In fact, it is possible to re-
insure multiple primary insurance policies under one facultative contract.46 In either 
case, it is to be emphasised that facultative reinsurance entails a separate under-
writing for each risk transferred from the reinsured to the reinsurer.47 
1.18 The advantage of facultative reinsurance lies in the fact that the reinsurer is 
free to accept or decline any risk. The terms of a facultative reinsurance contract can, 
therefore, be negotiated with respect to a specific risk and, thus, be tailored to it.48 
Consequently, a prospective reinsurer will carefully evaluate the risk insured under 
the underlying primary insurance contract before deciding.49 This generally requires 
39 See paras 1.26 ff, 1.40 ff.  
40 See, for instance, Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (1996) 1 WLR 1026 (HL); IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v 
CX Reinsurance Co Ltd [2010] EWHC 974 (Comm), [2010] Lloyd’s Rep IR 560; Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance 
Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd [2013] EWHC 154 (Comm), [2013] 2 All ER 231.  
41 Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol 1 (n 31) 229; Schwepcke and Vetter 
(n 1) para 887; Liebwein (n 1) 190. See also Rob Merkin, ‘The Christchurch Earthquakes Insurance 
and Reinsurance Issues’ (2012) 18 Canterbury Law Review 119, 144 ff.  
42 Hoffman (n 25) 769; Liebwein (n 1) 62 f; Pohl and Iranya (n 3) 8.  
43 Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol. 2 (n 31) 1; Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 
3) para 4.8; Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.41; Pohl and Iranya (n 3) 8.  
44 Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol. 2 (n 31) 1; Hoffman (n 25) 769; 
Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 1) para 265; Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.41; Schwepcke and Vetter 
(n 1) para 704; Pohl and Iranya (n 3) 8; Liebwein (n 1) 62; Staring and Hansell (n 28) s 2:2.  
45 Cf Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol. 1 (n 31) 70; Gerathewohl, 
Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol. 2 (n 31) 1; Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 3) para 4.8; 
Gürses (n 3) para 1.08; Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 1) para 265; Schwepcke and Vetter (n 1) para 
645; Pohl and Iranya (n 3) 65.  
46 Hoffman (n 25) 769. See also Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.40; Terry O’Neill, Jan Woloniecki and 
Franziska Arnold-Dwyer, The Law of Reinsurance in England and Bermuda (5th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 2019) para 1–017.  
47 Hoffman (n 25) 769.  
48 Hoffman (n 25) 770; Liebwein (n 1) 63. Cf also Staring and Hansell (n 28) s 2:2.  
49 Cf Schwepcke and Vetter (n 1) para 645. 
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the prospective reinsured to make reasonably clear and correct information acces-
sible to the prospective reinsurer. More specifically, it involves a disclosure of in-
formation about any material circumstances, ie circumstances that ‘would influence 
the judgment of a prudent reinsurer in determining whether to take the risk and, if 
so, on what terms’.50 In providing such detailed information, the prospective re-
insured commonly incurs high administrative costs.51 A further disadvantage of 
facultative reinsurance may be seen in the fact that, when negotiating the primary 
insurance contract, the prospective reinsured has no certainty as to whether it will be 
able to obtain appropriate reinsurance cover for it.52 
1.19 Despite the disadvantages that come with it, facultative reinsurance is a 
sensible option under certain circumstances. For example, a prospective reinsured 
may seek facultative reinsurance where a risk exceeds the available treaty capa-
city53 or where it is not covered by the treaty.54 Furthermore, facultative re-
insurance may be justified if a reinsurance company wishes to specialise in 
reinsuring a certain unusual and complex risk.55 Generally, it may be said that 
reinsureds take out facultative reinsurance for unusual or particularly large risks.56 
Another aspect is that facultative reinsurance can be effected proportionally or 
non-proportionally.57 
1.20 As facultative reinsurance agreements often contain aggregation clauses, the 
subject matter of aggregation may be relevant in the context of facultative reinsurance.58 
III Different types and methods of reinsurance 
1.21 Reinsurance contracts are further divided into two types: proportional and 
non-proportional contracts.59 In both proportional and non-proportional reinsurance, 
a certain part of the risk is transferred from the reinsured to the reinsurer.60 
50 Insurance Act 2015, s 7(3), with regard to English law; Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 1) para 97, with 
regard to German law; Comments 6 ff to Article 2.2.1 PRICL, with regard to the PRICL.  
51 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 3) para 4.8; Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.42; Pohl and Iranya 
(n 3) 69.  
52 Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.42. Cf also Pohl and Iranya (n 3) 65.  
53 Liebwein (n 1) 62; Pohl and Iranya (n 3) 65. See also Hoffman (n 25) 770.  
54 Liebwein (n 1) 62; Pohl and Iranya (n 3) 66. See also Hoffman (n 25) 770.  
55 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 3) para 4.8.  
56 Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.42. See also Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 3) para 4.8; Liebwein 
(n 1) 62.  
57 See paras 1.24 f, 1.37 ff.  
58 See for instance Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd [1998] EWCA Civ 546, [1998] 
CLC 957; Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd [2014] EWHC 2105 
(Comm), [2014] Lloyd’s Rep IR 638.  
59 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 3) paras 1.11 f; Gürses (n 3) paras 1.06 f; Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 
1.33; Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 1) paras 270 ff; Schwepcke and Vetter (n 1) paras 655 ff, 661 ff; 
Liebwein (n 1) 69 ff; Pohl and Iranya (n 3) 13 ff, 27 ff.  
60 Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.33; Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 1) para 270. 
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The distinction between proportional and non-proportional reinsurance lies in the 
definition of the part of the risk to be ceded61 as well as the way the premiums are 
shared.62 However, it should be noted that proportional and non-proportional re-
insurance can each be subdivided into smaller categories.63 
1 Proportional reinsurance 
1.22 In proportional reinsurance,64 the reinsured and the reinsurer agree to 
proportionally share both the primary insurance risk or risks and the primary in-
surance premium or premiums.65 The terms ‘risk’ and ‘risks’ in this context refer to 
the risk of incurring liability resulting from insurance cover under an underlying 
insurance policy or multiple underlying insurance policies respectively.66 
1.23 Proportional reinsurance can be taken out either on an obligatory or a 
facultative basis.67 Basically, three different types of proportional reinsurance con-
tracts are to be distinguished: proportional facultative reinsurance contract, quota 
share treaty and surplus treaty. 
1.1 Proportional facultative reinsurance contract 
1.24 Under a proportional facultative reinsurance contract, the reinsurer re-
insures a single risk, ie a single primary insurance policy on a proportional 
basis.68 Whenever the reinsured is liable under the primary insurance contract, it 
is entitled to be reimbursed for the relevant portion of the liability by the re-
insurer under the reinsurance contract.69 In return, the reinsurer has a right to be 
paid the relevant portion of the primary insurance premium as a reinsurance 
premium.70 It is presumed that the underlying policy and the reinsurance policy 
61 Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.33; Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 1) para 270; Schwepcke and Vetter 
(n 1) para 655.  
62 Pohl and Iranya (n 3) 13.  
63 In proportional reinsurance, a distinction is made between quota share and surplus reinsurance, 
whereas non-proportional reinsurance is divided into excess of loss and stop loss reinsurance.  
64 Proportional reinsurance is also termed ‘proportionate’ or ‘pro rata’ reinsurance.  
65 The primary insurance premium is shared proportionally after deduction of the costs the reinsured 
incurs in acquiring the business (so-called commissions).  
66 Cf Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan [1996] AC 313 (HL) 341, where Mance J’s first instance 
decision is transcribed; Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol. 1 (n 31) 102; 
Marcel Grossmann, Rückversicherung – Eine Einführung (2nd edn, Institut für Versicherungswirtschaft 
an der Hochschule St Gallen 1982) 75; Kiln (n 9) 1; Robert M Merkin, A Guide to Reinsurance Law 
(Informa Law by Routledge 2007) 8; Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 3) para 1.11; Gürses (n 3) para 
1.06; Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.34; Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 1) paras 271 f; Schwepcke and 
Vetter (n 1) paras 656 ff; Pohl and Iranya (n 3) 13; O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 46) 
para 1–015.  
67 Edelman and Burns (n 2) paras 1.43 ff, 1.52 ff; Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 1) para 275; Liebwein 
(n 1) 63; O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 46) paras 1–017, 1–019.  
68 Gürses (n 3) para 1.25; Schwepcke and Vetter (n 1) para 719.  
69 Gürses (n 3) para 1.25.  
70 Schwepcke and Vetter (n 1) para 719. 
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are designed to be back-to-back, ie provide for identical or closely matching 
cover.71 
1.25 Proportional facultative reinsurance contracts generally do not provide for a 
retention, a limit per event or a limit per cause.72 Consequently, the issue of ag-
gregation based on causation is irrelevant in respect of purely proportional 
facultative reinsurance contracts.73 
1.2 Quota share treaty 
1.26 The reinsured agrees to cede and the reinsurer agrees to accept a fixed per-
centage of each risk, ie of each primary insurance policy, that is within the scope of the 
reinsurance treaty.74 Usually, primary insurance risks are ceded to the treaty on 
identical terms.75 In any case, the reinsurer is entitled to be paid the relevant per-
centage of the primary insurance premium as a reinsurance premium.76 In return, 
whenever a reinsured is liable for a loss under a primary insurance policy forming part 
of the reinsured portfolio, the reinsurer is required to pay its percentage of that loss. 
1.27 The parties often agree to limit the reinsurer’s liability per risk. This is to 
say that the parties agree to limit the reinsurer’s liability to a maximum monetary 
amount for losses arising under one single primary insurance policy.77 In such a 
case, the reinsurer is only bound to pay his percentage of a loss up until the per 
risk limit, ie the limit for losses under one single primary insurance policy, 
is exceeded.78 
1.28 Particularly in case of a natural catastrophe, multiple primary insurance 
policies in the portfolio may be triggered. This may lead to a large-scale liability on 
the part of the reinsurer under the quota share treaty. The parties, therefore, reg-
ularly agree on a limit per event to ease the situation for the reinsurer.79 It is only 
71 Gürses (n 3) para 1.25; Edelman and Burns (n 2) paras 1.43 ff; regarding the presumption of back-to- 
back cover in proportional reinsurance, see Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 40) 1033 f (Lord 
Mustill).  
72 If they do, they are not entirely proportional.  
73 Cf Ken Louw and Deborah Tompkinson, ‘Curiouser and Curiouser: The Meaning of “Event”’ (1996) 
4 International Insurance Law Review 6, 6 f.  
74 Merkin, A Guide to Reinsurance Law (n 66) 15; Gürses (n 3) para 1.11; O’Neill, Woloniecki and 
Arnold-Dwyer (n 46) para 1–019. See also Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, 
vol. 1 (n 31) 102; Kiln (n 9) 31; Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 1) para 275.  
75 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 3) para 4.25.  
76 Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol. 1 (n 31) 102; Merkin, A Guide to 
Reinsurance Law (n 66) 16 f; Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 3) para 4.25; Gürses (n 3) para 1.11; 
Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.54; O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 46) para 1–019.  
77 Merkin, A Guide to Reinsurance Law (n 66) 15; Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 3) para 4.28; Gürses (n 
3) para 1.11. It may be noted that, in this context, ‘one risk’ does not refer to an insured asset but 
rather to a reinsured original policy; Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.54.  
78 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 3) para 4.25; Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.54; Cannawurf and 
Schwepcke (n 1) para 271; O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 46) para 1–109.  
79 Liebwein (n 1) 71. This means introducing a non-proportional element into an otherwise proportional 
type of reinsurance. 
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where the quota share treaty contains a limit per event80 that the topic of aggregation 
of losses based on causation may become relevant. 
1.3 Surplus treaty 
1.29 In a surplus treaty, the parties agree that the reinsured’s retention is a fixed 
sum per risk rather than a percentage of all the risks in the portfolio.81 The reinsurer 
accepts the surplus liability, ie the part of the risk that exceeds the reinsured’s 
retention.82 This means that the reinsurer agrees to cover the difference between the 
reinsured’s retention and the cover limit of the underlying insurance policy. 
1.30 The relevant loss need not exceed the reinsured’s retention in order for the 
reinsurer’s liability to be triggered. Rather, the ratio between the cover limit under the 
ceded primary insurance policy and the reinsured’s retention under the reinsurance 
treaty regarding one specific risk equals the percentage according to which the parties 
share the risk under the reinsurance treaty. Consequently, the parties share the liability 
and the premiums according to that percentage from the first pound on.83 
1.31 This is perhaps better understood by way of example. Imagine that a reinsured 
has a portfolio of primary insurance policies. Primary insurance policy A has a cover 
limit of £1million, whereas primary insurance policy B has a cover limit of £500,000. 
Both primary insurance policies are ceded to the surplus treaty. The parties agree that 
the reinsured retains liability to the amount of £200,000 with regard to policy A and 
£250,000 in respect of policy B. Therefore, the reinsured retains a maximum of 20% of 
the losses under policy A and 50% of the losses under policy B. Under primary in-
surance policy A, losses totalling £800,000 have occurred. The reinsured covers 20% of 
these losses, ie £160,000, whereas the reinsurer is liable for £640,000. Under primary 
insurance policy B, losses totalling £200,000 have occurred. The reinsured covers 50% 
of these losses, ie £100,000, whereas the reinsurer is liable for the remaining £100,000. 
1.32 This example illustrates that the parties may agree on a different retention with 
regard to each ceded risk and the cover limit of each underlying policy may be different. 
Consequently, the relevant percentages of liability may differ for each risk.84 
1.33 Particularly in case of a natural catastrophe, cover under multiple primary 
insurance policies in the portfolio may be triggered. This may translate into a 
massive liability on the part of the reinsurer under the surplus treaty. The parties, 
therefore, regularly agree on a limit per event to ease the situation for the reinsurer.85 
80 Or per another unifying factor.  
81 Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.56; Schwepcke and Vetter (n 1) para 823; O’Neill, Woloniecki and 
Arnold-Dwyer (n 46) para 1–020.  
82 This is not so by definition. Rather, it is possible that the difference between the cover limit under the 
primary insurance policy and the reinsured’s retention is not fully covered by the reinsurer, see 
Schwepcke and Vetter (n 1) para 827.  
83 Cf Schwepcke and Vetter (n 1) para 826.  
84 Schwepcke and Vetter (n 1) para 822.  
85 Liebwein (n 1) 78. This means introducing a non-proportional element into an otherwise proportional 
type of reinsurance. 
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It is only where the surplus treaty contains a limit per event that the topic of ag-
gregation of losses based on causation, as discussed henceforth, may become relevant. 
2 Non-proportional reinsurance 
1.34 In non-proportional reinsurance, the reinsurer provides cover for the amount of a 
loss exceeding the reinsured’s deductible up to a maximum limit.86 This is to say that the 
reinsured retains a layer of liability which is generally expressed in a monetary amount.87 
The reinsured covers any losses that do not exceed this retained layer.88 In contrast to 
surplus reinsurance,89 the reinsurer’s liability is triggered only if the reinsured’s liability 
exceeds the deductible agreed in the non-proportional reinsurance contract. 
1.35 Consequently, the reinsurance premium is not calculated on a pro rata 
basis.90 Rather, it is based on the probability that a loss or losses that attach the 
reinsurance contract, ie exceed the reinsured’s deductible, will occur.91 
1.36 In excess of loss reinsurance, provisions relating to deductibles and cover 
limits, such as aggregation clauses, are said to be of cardinal importance.92 With 
respect to the calculation of the reinsured’s deductible and the reinsurer’s maximum 
cover limit under a reinsurance contract, different methods of non-proportional 
reinsurance are to be distinguished:93 facultative excess of loss reinsurance contract, 
per risk excess of loss treaty, per event excess of loss treaty and stop loss treaty. 
2.1 Facultative excess of loss reinsurance contract 
1.37 In facultative excess of loss reinsurance, the reinsured is free to cede and 
the reinsurer is free to accept any risk.94 As the reinsurance is non-proportional, the 
underlying risk and premium are not shared on a pro rata basis between the reinsured 
and the reinsurer.95 Rather, the parties agree that the reinsured is liable for any loss 
that does not exceed its deductible. Once the amount of a loss exceeds the reinsured’s 
deductible, the reinsurer’s liability up to a specified cover limit will be triggered.96 
Generally, both the reinsured’s deductible and the reinsurer’s cover limit are expressed 
in a monetary amount.97 
86 Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol. 1 (n 31) 143; Gürses (n 3) paras 1.07, 
6.182; Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.61; Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 1) paras 368 f; Schwepcke 
and Vetter (n 1) para 661.  
87 Cf Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.61.  
88 Cf Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.61; Schwepcke and Vetter (n 1) para 663.  
89 See paras 47 f.  
90 Schwepcke and Vetter (n 1) para 665.  
91 Cf Merkin, A Guide to Reinsurance Law (n 66) 42.  
92 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 40) 1035.  
93 Schwepcke and Vetter (n 1) para 666.  
94 Kiln (n 9) 17; Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.49.  
95 Kiln (n 9) 17.  
96 Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 1.49.  
97 Kiln (n 9) 17. Cf also Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 1) para 368. 
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1.38 A facultative reinsurance contract may provide for a per event excess of loss 
mechanism.98 Where a facultative excess of loss contract provides for an aggregation 
mechanism using a unifying factor, such as an event or a cause, the aggregation of 
losses based on causation may become relevant. 
1.39 This is so, because it is possible that a facultative excess of loss contract 
provides cover for multiple individual risks99 or assets.100 Accordingly, multiple 
individual losses may occur as the result of one event or one cause so that a corre-
sponding aggregation mechanism would require the aggregation of any individual 
losses that arose from the same event or cause. 
2.2 Per risk excess of loss treaty 
1.40 In per risk excess of loss reinsurance, the reinsured’s deductible is applied 
on a per risk basis. This is to say that reinsurance cover is taken out for single losses 
which exceed the reinsured’s deductible on any one risk.101 A risk may refer to a 
single primary insurance policy or to an asset that is insured under a primary in-
surance policy, such as a vehicle or a building.102 
1.41 In pure per risk excess of loss treaties, multiple losses that occur under one 
or multiple primary insurance policies are, therefore, not aggregated. Rather, the 
reinsured’s deductible and the reinsurer’s cover limit are tested against the loss that 
occurs to one single risk, such as a vehicle or a building.103 
1.42 However, multiple primary insurance policies in the portfolio may be 
triggered by one event. One event may, in fact, translate into a massive liability 
on the part of the reinsurer if the loss on each risk exceeds the per risk deductible. 
In such situations, the reinsurer may wish to additionally limit its liability on a 
per event basis.104 In such cases, the reinsurance treaty contains both a per risk and 
98 Cf Kiln (n 9) 24. Of course, any unifying factor other than ‘event’ may equally be used to aggregate a 
plurality of losses; see for instance the facultative excess of loss reinsurance contracts discussed in 
Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 58), which contained aggregation clauses 
using the unifying factor of ‘original cause’.  
99 O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 46) para 1–017. In this context, ‘one risk’ refers to one 
underlying policy.  
100 Robert Kiln, Reinsurance in Practice (Witherby 1981) 194. Cf also Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait 
Insurance Co SAK [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 664 (Comm), [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 687 (CA), [1999] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 252 (HL) where multiple aircraft were insured under one policy.  
101 Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol. 1 (n 31) 209; Liebwein (n 1) 183; Pohl 
and Iranya (n 3) 32.  
102 Schwepcke and Vetter (n 1) para 910. See also Kiln (n 9) 194; Amlin Corporate Member Ltd v Oriental 
Assurance Corp [2012] EWCA Civ 1341, [2013] Lloyd’s Rep IR 131 [6] (Longmore LJ). This case 
concerned a marine cargo primary insurance liability policy under which multiple different vessels 
(risks) were insured. However, the limit was per risk and per event.  
103 Schwepcke and Vetter (n 1) para 909.  
104 Cf Kiln (n 9) 24. Of course, any unifying factor other than ‘event’ may equally be used to aggregate a 
plurality of losses. See for instance the facultative excess of loss reinsurance contracts discussed in 
Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 58), which contained aggregation clauses 
using the unifying factor of ‘original cause’. 
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a per event limit.105 Where the reinsurance treaty provides for such a per event ele-
ment, an aggregation of individual losses may become relevant. 
2.3 Per event excess of loss treaty 
1.43 Per event excess of loss reinsurance protects the reinsured in cases where 
multiple single losses on multiple different risks or primary insurance policies in the 
same portfolio arise out of one single event.106 The reinsured’s deductible is applied 
on a per event basis.107 The reinsured’s deductible and the reinsurer’s cover limit are 
both tested against the aggregate of any individual losses that result from any one 
event.108 Hence, losses arising under different primary insurance policies within the 
portfolio, possibly covering multiple different risks, are to be aggregated if they are 
provoked by the same event.109 
1.44 As individual losses on the basis of an event are aggregated in per event 
excess of loss reinsurance, it is fundamental that the parties clearly define what they 
mean by the term ‘event’.110 It is generally said that the term ‘event’ is defined by 
three different dimensions: a causal, a spatial as well as a temporal dimension.111 
Some commentators believe that defining the term ‘event’ by these three dimensions 
will not by itself bring clarity to the matter. Bourthomieux argues, for instance, that 
there is a significant need for clarification and systematisation as regards the op-
eration of per event excess of loss reinsurance agreements.112 
1.45 However, the parties to a reinsurance contract do not always use the unifying 
factor of event in order to aggregate individual losses based on causation. In practice, 
further terms such as ‘occurrence’,113 ‘disaster’,114 ‘calamity’,115 ‘accident’116 or 
‘cause’117 are regularly used. Irrespective of the term used, such insurance products 
are often classified as ‘per event excess of loss’ reinsurance agreements. 
105 Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol. 1 (n 31) 209; Cannawurf and Schwepcke 
(n 1) para 276; Liebwein (n 1) 185.  
106 Liebwein (n 1) 190. An excess of loss treaty may certainly also use a unifying factor other than ‘event’.  
107 Grossmann (n 66) 121; Liebwein (n 1) 190.  
108 Liebwein (n 1) 190.  
109 Cf Liebwein (n 1) 190 f.  
110 Grossmann (n 66) 122; Liebwein (n 1) 194.  
111 Pohl and Iranya (n 3) 33. 
112 Jacques Bourthoumieux, ‘La notion d’événement dans les traités de réassurance en excédent de si-
nistres’ (1969) 40 Revue générale des assurances terrestres 457, 473.  
113 Caudle v Sharp [1995] CLC 642 (CA) 644.  
114 Caudle v Sharp (n 113) 644.  
115 Caudle v Sharp (n 113) 644.  
116 Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co v Edward Wesolowski (1973) 33 NY2d 169 (Court of Appeals of 
New York) dealing with primary insurance; National Liability and Fire Insurance Co v Itzkowitz 
(2015) 624 FedAppx 758 (United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) 759 f, dealing with 
primary insurance.  
117 Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd [1995] CLC 671 (CA) 680 (Sir Thomas Bingham), dealing with 
primary insurance; Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 58) 966 
(Hobhouse LJ). 
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1.46 Per event excess of loss reinsurance is the most important type of reinsurance 
with regard to the aggregation of losses based on causation. In fact, it is even possible 
that losses covered under different primary insurance policies within the portfolio may 
be aggregated under a reinsurance treaty if they result from the same event or cause.118 
2.4 Stop loss treaty 
1.47 Stop loss policies are used to protect the reinsured’s solvency. However, the 
reinsured cannot increase the volume or size of primary insurance risks it is able 
to accept by entering into a stop loss treaty.119 In Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v 
Toomey,120 Hobhouse LJ, therefore, found that under English law stop loss policies 
cannot be considered contracts of reinsurance; a view that was later upheld by Lord 
Mance in Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co.121 By 
contrast, Lord Steyn stated in Society of Lloyd’s v Robinson that ‘stop loss insurance 
cover is a form of reinsurance’.122 Moreover, a number of English commentators are 
sceptical about denying stop loss policies the quality of reinsurance.123 Equally, 
commentators from other jurisdictions generally regard stop loss policies as a type of 
reinsurance.124 
1.48 Irrespective of these uncertainties, it is clear that stop loss reinsurance comes 
in two different types:125 excess of loss ratio and aggregate excess of loss. The dif-
ference between the two lies in the way the reinsured’s deductible and the reinsurer’s 
cover limit are defined. 
a Excess of loss ratio 
1.49 Where an excess of loss ratio applies, this means that the parties to the re-
insurance treaty agree on a certain percentage as the reinsured’s deductible and the 
reinsurer’s cover limit, say 50% excess of 100%. Subsequently, the ratio between the 
annual losses under the primary insurance policies in the portfolio and the net re-
tained premium income is determined and expressed in a percentage. This ratio is 
then tested against the percentages agreed upon as the reinsured’s deductible and the 
reinsurer’s cover limit. 
118 Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol. 1 (n 31) 229; Schwepcke and Vetter 
(n 1) para 887; Liebwein (n 1) 190. Cf also Merkin, ‘The Christchurch Earthquakes Insurance and 
Reinsurance Issues’ (n 41) 144 ff.  
119 Gürses (n 3) para 1.13.  
120 Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Toomey (n 22) 8 (Hobhouse LJ).  
121 Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co [2009] UKHL 40, [2009] 4 All ER 909 
[33] (Lord Mance).  
122 Society of Lloyd’s v Robinson [1999] 1 WLR 756 (HL) 763 (Lord Steyn).  
123 Merkin, A Guide to Reinsurance Law (n 66) 63; Gürses (n 3) para 1.13; Edelman and Burns (n 2) paras 
1.66 ff; O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 46) para 1–023.  
124 Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol. 1 (n 31) 107 ff; Cannawurf and 
Schwepcke (n 1) para 276; Liebwein (n 1) 201 ff; Pohl and Iranya (n 3) 35 f.  
125 Sometimes, aggregate excess of loss is not regarded as a subset of stop loss reinsurance. However, 
aggregate excess of loss policies operate very similarly to excess of loss ratio policies. 
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1.50 This is perhaps better understood by way of example: Imagine that the parties in 
their stop loss treaty agree that the reinsurer covers 50% excess of 100%. 50% applies to 
the reinsurer’s cover limit, whereas the 100% applies to the reinsured’s deductible. The 
reinsured’s net premium income in the relevant year was £800,000. It covered losses in 
the amount of £2,000,000. Hence, the loss/income ratio equals 250% (£2,000,000/ 
£800,000). The reinsured’s loss/income ratio is then tested against the deductible and the 
cover limit. In this case, 250% exceeds the deductible of 100% by 150%, so that the 
reinsurance is triggered. However, the latter 150% also exceeds the cover limit of 50%. 
Hence, the reinsurer covers 50% of the reinsured’s net premium income, ie £400,000 
(50% of the net premium income). The reinsured bears its deductible of 100% as well as 
the amount of the loss exceeding the cover limit, ie further 100% (150% of the loss 
exceeding the retention – 50% cover limit). This amounts to £1,600,000 (200% of the net 
premium income).126 
1.51 Consequently, in the case of stop loss treaties that apply an excess of loss ratio, 
multiple individual losses are aggregated on the basis of a specific period of time. By 
contrast, they are not aggregated based on causal links between each of them and a 
unifying factor of some kind. Therefore, this type of reinsurance treaty is irrelevant 
where the aggregation of losses based on causation is concerned. 
b Aggregate excess of loss 
1.52 Under an aggregate excess of loss treaty, the reinsured is covered for the 
aggregate of any losses that occur within a defined period of time, usually one 
year.127 Where an aggregate excess of loss applies, the parties agree on the reinsured’s 
deductible and the reinsurer’s cover limit and express both in a monetary amount, 
say £500,000 in excess of £100,000. The aggregate of the annual losses under the 
reinsured primary insurance portfolio is then tested against these figures. If the ag-
gregate exceeds £100,000, the reinsurance treaty is triggered; if it also exceeds 
£600,000, the reinsurer’s liability is capped.128 
1.53 Accordingly, in the case of stop loss treaties that apply an aggregate excess 
of loss method, multiple individual losses that occur under the primary insurance 
policies in the portfolio are aggregated. This is done, however, on the basis of a 
specific period of time, not on a causal basis. Therefore, this type of reinsurance 
treaties is irrelevant where the aggregation of losses based on causation is con-
cerned. The exception is where the treaty additionally provides for an aggregation 
clause on the basis of any one event or cause, in which case the subject matter of 
aggregation may become relevant. 
IV Summary of the chapter 
1.54 Insurance companies regularly have a need to protect themselves against 
the risks that they accept in the course of their insurance business. Taking out 
126 For an example, see Pohl and Iranya (n 3) 35.  
127 Pohl and Iranya (n 3) 36.  
128 For an example, see Pohl and Iranya (n 3) 36. 
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reinsurance safeguards their compliance with solvency requirements and corre-
spondingly increases the volume or size of risk that they can accept. 
1.55 Reinsurance can be taken out in different forms. In treaty reinsurance, the re-
insured cedes multiple insurance policies, the portfolio, to the reinsurance treaty and the 
reinsurer accepts all the risks ceded under one sole reinsurance contract. In facultative 
reinsurance, the reinsured generally cedes a single risk or policy to the reinsurer so that the 
terms and conditions of reinsurance can be tailored to each cession. 
1.56 Moreover, different types and methods of reinsurance can be distinguished. 
In proportional reinsurance, the parties agree to share both the underlying risk and 
the underlying premium on a proportional basis. Three kinds of proportional re-
insurance can be taken out. In proportional facultative reinsurance contracts, the 
aggregation of losses based on causation is generally not an issue. The same is true 
for quota share and surplus treaties. However, the parties may provide for a per 
event or per catastrophe limit in quota share and surplus policies, particularly when 
it comes to reinsuring natural hazards. Where this is the case, the aggregation of 
losses based on causation may become an issue. 
1.57 In non-proportional reinsurance, the parties do not share the underlying risk 
on a proportional basis. Rather, the reinsurer provides cover for the amount of a loss 
exceeding the reinsured’s deductible. Non-proportional reinsurance can be divided 
into facultative excess of loss, per risk excess of loss, per event excess of loss and stop 
loss reinsurance. In stop loss reinsurance, individual losses occurring within a specified 
period of time are aggregated. Hence, the aggregating factor is a period of time rather 
than causation. Thus, aggregation based on causation is irrelevant in stop loss re-
insurance. Similarly, in per risk excess of loss reinsurance, individual losses resulting 
from the same risk may be aggregated based on the unifying factor of risk rather than 
on a causal basis. Generally, the aggregation of losses based on causation is irrelevant 
in such policies. However, the parties to a per risk excess of loss treaty sometimes 
additionally agree on a per event element. In such cases, the aggregation of losses 
based on causation may become relevant. 
1.58 Further, the aggregation of losses based on causation is most important in 
per event or per cause excess of loss reinsurance, whether in the form of a treaty or a 
facultative arrangement. Policies of this kind provide that any losses resulting from 
any one event or a single cause may be considered as one single loss for the purposes 
of the reinsured’s deductible and the reinsurer’s cover limit.  




Context in which the aggregation of losses takes place   
2.1 In Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holding Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance 
Co Ltd, it was stated that the purpose of an aggregation clause was ‘to enable two or 
more separate losses covered by the policy to be treated as a single loss for deductible 
or other purposes when they are linked by a unifying factor of some kind’.1 In Scott v 
Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd, it was noted that the function of an ag-
gregation clause was ‘to police the imposition of a limit by treating a plurality of 
linked losses as if they were one loss’.2 
2.2 In line with this, the significance of aggregation clauses is twofold. First, where the 
policy of reinsurance provides that a deductible applies to the aggregate of all individual 
losses, which arise from a unifying factor of some kind, the aggregation clause will de-
termine the number of deductibles to be borne by the reinsured.3 Secondly, as the re-
insurance cover limit or sublimit may apply to any one loss, a mechanism of adding 
together multiple individual losses to form one single aggregate loss is essential in de-
termining whether the policy’s financial ceiling has been exceeded.4 
2.3 This chapter shall not be dedicated to the question how different aggregation 
mechanisms operate. Rather, the concepts of ‘aggregated loss’ and ‘individual losses 
to be aggregated’ shall be discussed. Furthermore, as the aggregated loss is to be 
tested against a deductible and a cover limit, the concepts of ‘deductible’, ‘cover 
limit’ and ‘reinstatement of cover’ shall be outlined. In doing so, the inconsistent 
terminology regarding some of these concepts is to be pointed out. 
I Ultimate net loss and losses to be aggregated 
2.4 The concepts of ultimate net loss and individual loss shall be described below. 
The terminology for these two concepts is not uniform. In fact, the parties sometimes 
1 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd [2003] UKHL 48, 
[2003] 4 All ER 43 [14] (Lord Hoffmann). See also Francis J Maloney III, ‘The Application of “per- 
Occurrence” Deductible Provisions in First-Party Property Claims’ (2002) 37 Tort and Insurance Law 
Journal 921, 921; Kristin Suga Heres and Patricia St. Peter, ‘The “Number of Occurrences” Dispute of 
the Century’ (2016) 46 Fall Brief.  
2 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 688, [2003] 2 All ER 190 [12] 
(Rix LJ).  
3 Robert M Merkin, Laura Hodgson and Peter J Tyldesley, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (5th edn, Sweet 
& Maxwell 2019) para 11–319; John Butler and Robert Merkin, Butler and Merkin’s Reinsurance Law, 
vol 2 (Looseleaf, Sweet & Maxwell) para C–0221.  
4 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 3) para 11–319; Butler and Merkin (n 3) para C–0221. 
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refer to them as claim and individual claims or occurrence and individual occur-
rences, respectively. Therefore, the specific meanings of these terms in the context of 
aggregation shall be examined. 
1 The notion of ‘loss’ in general 
2.5 In insurance and reinsurance, the notion of loss has a variety of different 
meanings.5 In the Dawson’s Field Arbitration, the arbitral tribunal noted that it 
was difficult and dangerous to attempt to define the term ‘loss’ in the context of 
insurance.6 
2.6 As a general rule, it may be said, however, that a (re)insurer is only liable for 
losses proximately caused by the materialisation of a peril (re)insured against7 that 
leaves it financially poorer than it was before.8 In this sense, the word ‘loss’ bears the 
wider meaning of a financial detriment suffered by the insured or reinsured.9 In 
indemnity insurance, the assured or reinsured is entitled to recover from the insurer 
or reinsurer the amount of its actual financial detriment.10 
2.7 In non-marine insurance,11 the insured or reinsured subject matter12 may be 
totally or partially lost.13 In either case, a court would determine the value of the 
insured or reinsured subject matter and put the insured or reinsured in the financial 
position it would have been in, had no loss occurred.14 These rules apply in the 
context of primary insurance and reinsurance.15 
2.8 Consequently, the insured is entitled to recover a sum of money that corre-
sponds to the amount of its financial detriment.16 More specifically, if the insured 
suffers a total loss, the amount recoverable corresponds to the value the insured 
subject matter had before the loss occurred. Where the loss is only partial, the 
amount recoverable is the difference between the value the insured subject matter 
had before the loss occurred and the value it has after the loss has occurred.17 
5 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 3) para 11–340. Cf also Butler and Merkin (n 3) para C–0202.  
6 Quoted by Rix J in Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 664 (Comm).  
7 John Birds, Ben Lynch and Simon Paul, MacGillivray on Insurance Law (14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2018) para 21–001.  
8 Malcolm A Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts (6th edn, Informa Law from Routledge 2009) para 
16-2A.  
9 Clarke (n 8) para 16–2A.  
10 Clarke (n 8) para 28–1.  
11 In marine insurance, there is the additional concept of ‘constructive total loss’.  
12 Birds, Lynch and Paul (n 7) para 35–026, where they note that ‘[t]he subject-matter of a contract of 
reinsurance is in many cases the subject-matter of the underlying contract of insurance (…)’.  
13 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 3) para 11–001.  
14 Clarke (n 8) para 28–2.  
15 Birds, Lynch and Paul (n 7) paras 35–080 ff.  
16 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 3) para 11–051. A distinction is to be drawn between valued and 
unvalued policies. In the case of valued policies, the insured is entitled to recover a predefined sum of 
money whereas an unvalued policy entitles the insured to recover the actual loss suffered.  
17 Birds, Lynch and Paul (n 7) para 21–015. 
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2.9 By contrast, sometimes the term ‘loss’ refers to the deprivation of the in-
sured subject matter.18 In this regard, a loss consists in the insured’s dispossession 
of a good19 rather than in the insured’s financial detriment.20 In cases such as 
these, the insured or reinsured also merely has a right to be indemnified with a 
certain sum of money. 
2.10 Yet, in the context of aggregation in excess of loss reinsurance, there are at 
least two different notions of loss, which are to be distinguished: ultimate net loss 
and individual losses to be aggregated. 
2 The notion of ‘ultimate net loss’ in excess of loss reinsurance 
2.11 In line with the House of Lords’ decision in Hill v Mercantile and General 
Reinsurance Co Plc, the reinsurer’s obligation to indemnify the reinsured arises if two 
conditions are met: first, the reinsured must prove that it is obliged to indemnify its 
original assured; secondly, the reinsured is required to prove that the reinsurer is 
liable under the contract of reinsurance.21 
2.12 In this regard, the reinsured incurs a loss under the reinsurance agreement 
when its obligation to indemnify the original assured arises. This is the case 
when the reinsured’s liability under the underlying contract has been 
established and quantified by judgment, arbitral award or binding settlement.22 
The term ‘loss’ in this sense refers to a financial detriment sustained by 
the reinsured. 
2.13 Under an excess of loss reinsurance contract, the reinsurer covers the re-
insured’s loss ‘only on a sum in excess of a particular figure on the risk’.23 The 
reinsurer affords cover for the part of the loss that exceeds this particular figure.24 
To achieve this, the parties generally include a so-called ‘liability clause’ in which 
they define what a loss is and what deductible shall be applied to it.25 Traditionally, 
18 Clarke (n 8) para 16–2B.  
19 Clarke (n 8) para 16–2B.  
20 Cf Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 6) where Rix J held that when a party was 
deprived of an aircraft, the latter was only lost after a period of ‘wait and see’; Scott v The Copenhagen 
Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 2) [73]–[77] (Rix LJ).  
21 Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc (1996) 1 WLR 1239 (HL) 1251 (Lord Mustill). It is to 
be noted, however, that ‘the parties are free to agree on ways of proving whether these requirements 
are satisfied’. More specifically, the parties may do so by agreeing on a follow the settlements clause in 
their contract of reinsurance.  
22 Re Eddystone Marine Insurance Co [1892] 2 Ch 423 (Comm) 427 f (Stirling J); Stephen Lewis, ‘“Pay as 
Paid” and the Ultimate Net Loss Clause’ (1995) 3 International Insurance Law Review 308, 308; 
Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 3) para 18–062.  
23 Colin Edelman and Andrew Burns, The Law of Reinsurance (2nd edn, OUP 2013) para 1.49.  
24 Edelman and Burns (n 23) para 1.49.  
25 Regularly, they also define a cover limit. As pointed out in Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall 
[2002] EWHC 2082 (Comm), [2003] 1 All ER 237 [13] (Morison J), multiple individual losses do not 
have to be aggregated the same way for the purposes of applying the deductible and the cover limit. 
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the reinsured’s loss under the contract of reinsurance is referred to as ‘ultimate net 
loss’.26 Such a clause may read: 
The Reinsurers shall only be liable if and when the Ultimate Net Loss sustained by the Reinsured 
in respect of interest coming within the scope of the Reinsuring Clause exceeds £3,000,000 or 
U.S. or Can. $6,000,000 each and every loss (…) arising out of one event (…).27  
2.14 The term ‘ultimate net loss’ may be defined as 
(…) the sum actually paid by the Reinsured in settlement of losses or liability after making 
deductions for all recoveries, (…) and shall include all adjustment expenses arising from the 
settlement of claims (…).28  
2.15 As is obvious from these clauses, the term ‘ultimate net loss’ refers to the loss 
that is tested against the deductible as defined in the contract of reinsurance.29 Since 
the clause contains aggregation language, the reinsured’s ultimate net loss may be 
composed of multiple individual losses ‘arising out of one event’.30 
2.16 It appears to be imprecise, however, to say that the reinsured’s ultimate net 
loss corresponds with ‘the sum it actually paid in settlement of losses’. In fact, the 
reinsured’s relevant loss under the contract of reinsurance, ie the loss to be tested 
against the deductible and the cover limit, depends on the aggregation mechanism 
contained in the reinsurance agreement.31 As the aggregation mechanism in the 
underlying contract may differ from the one in the reinsurance policy,32 the reinsured 
may pay more33 in settling its inward claims than the amount of the loss to be tested 
26 Klaus Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol 2 (Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft 
eV 1979) 904, 912, 921; Marcel Grossmann, Rückversicherung – Eine Einführung (2nd edn, Institut für 
Versicherungswirtschaft an der Hochschule St Gallen 1982) 128; Lewis (n 22) 309; Jacquetta Castle, 
‘Reinsurance: Net Loss Clause’ (1996) 4 International Insurance Law Review 133; Barlow Lyde 
and Gilbert LLP, Reinsurance Practice and the Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2009) para 18.23; 
Andreas Schwepcke and Alexandra Vetter, Praxishandbuch: Rückversicherung (VVW 2017) paras 957, 
962, 991; Peter Liebwein, Klassische und moderne Formen der Rückversicherung (3rd edn, VVW 2018) 
295; Stefan Pohl and Joseph Iranya, The ABC of Reinsurance (VVW 2018) 28; Butler and Merkin 
(n 3) paras C–0199 ff.  
27 This liability clause was discussed in Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan [1996] AC 313 (HL) 382 
(Lord Mustill).  
28 This definition of ‘ultimate net loss’ was considered in Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan (n 27) 382 
(Lord Mustill).  
29 Cf Butler and Merkin (n 3) para C–0202.  
30 Schwepcke and Vetter (n 26) para 957; Butler and Merkin (n 3) paras C–0219, C–0221. Additionally, 
the ultimate net loss may include costs related to the reinsured’s efforts to settle the claims under the 
underlying contract. The reinsured’s recoveries and all salvages as well as all claims upon other re-
insurers may be deducted from that sum.  
31 Cf Rob Merkin, ‘The Christchurch Earthquakes Insurance and Reinsurance Issues’ (2012) 18 
Canterbury Law Review 119, 145, who states that ‘[a] typical XL reinsuring clause will indemnify the 
reinsured in respect of its “ultimate net loss”, defined as the sum paid by the reassured in settlement of 
each and every loss (…). The key point is nevertheless the basis of aggregation, because that determines 
which losses can be added together to determine whether the trigger point for cover has been reached’.  
32 Cf paras 7.21 ff.  
33 Due to the principle of indemnity, the ultimate net loss in the reinsurance may not, however, be greater 
than the sum paid by the reinsured in the underlying contract. 
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against the deductible and the cover limit under the reinsurance agreement, ie the 
ultimate net loss. 
2.17 In summary, the ultimate net loss is a financial loss that may be the product 
of aggregation, ie an aggregated loss. It is a loss that is incurred by the reinsured as 
opposed to the original assured.34 
3 Individual losses to be aggregated 
2.18 Where the contract of reinsurance contains an aggregation clause providing 
for the aggregation of losses based on causation,35 the ultimate net loss incurred 
by the reinsured may be calculated by aggregating all the multiple individual losses 
arising from a unifying factor. First, it will be demonstrated that the relevant 
individual losses are suffered by the primary insured and not by the reinsured or 
the retrocessionaire in paying for the losses under their respective contracts of 
reinsurance. Second, two different approaches for determining an individual loss 
will be discussed. 
3.1 Individual loss suffered by the primary insured 
2.19 The individual losses are determined pursuant to the primary insurance 
relationship and not the reinsurance relationship.36 To this effect, in Caudle v Sharp, 
the Court of Appeal held that ‘[t]he losses (…) in question are those affecting 
the original insured, rather than the ‘loss’ suffered by the insurer when he pays the 
claims’.37 
2.20 The same is true when it comes to retrocession agreements. In order to 
determine the individual losses to be aggregated, it is necessary to look at the 
relationship between the primary assured and the primary insurer as opposed to the 
one between the retrocedent and the retrocessionaire.38 This was confirmed by the 
Court of Appeal’s judgment in Mann v Lexington Insurance Co.39 This case con-
cerned a chain of Indonesian supermarkets that were insured under one first-party 
insurance policy. This policy was reinsured and retroceded in the London Market. In 
the retrocession agreement, the parties provided for a deductible as well as a cover 
limit per occurrence.40 
34 Cf Butler and Merkin (n 3) para C–0202. For the individual loss suffered by the original assured, see 
paras 2.19 ff.  
35 This is in contrast to the aggregation of unrelated losses as in reinsurance contracts that operate on an 
aggregate basis, see for instance para 1.53.  
36 Cf Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 4.54, who state that it was the ‘smaller original claims’ 
that are aggregated into ‘one reinsurance loss’; Terry O’Neill, Jan Woloniecki and Franziska Arnold- 
Dwyer, The Law of Reinsurance in England and Bermuda (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 
2019) para 5–117, observe that the aggregation of multiple claims under a primary insurance policy are 
also relevant for contracts of reinsurance.  
37 Caudle v Sharp [1995] CLC 642 (CA) 648, 652 (Evans LJ).  
38 Cf Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd [2009] EWHC 2787 (Comm), [2009] 2 CLC 706 
[11] (Gross J).  
39 Mann v Lexington Insurance Co [2000] EWCA Civ 256, [2000] CLC 1409, 1422 f (Waller LJ).  
40 Mann v Lexington Insurance Co (n 39) 1414 (Waller LJ). 
ULTIMATE NET LOSS AND LOSSES TO BE AGGREGATED 
29 
2.21 In the course of civil unrest, which preceded the Indonesian president’s 
resignation, 22 of the insured stores were damaged. The primary insurers as well as 
the reinsurers paid separate claims in relation to each of the stores. By contrast, the 
retrocessionaire argued that the individual losses at the 22 stores were to be treated 
as one single loss that arose out of one occurrence. 
2.22 It was undisputed that the relevant individual losses to which the aggregation 
clauses in the reinsurance and the retrocession contracts applied were suffered by the 
primary assureds, ie the owners of the supermarkets.41 
2.23 The fact that the individual losses relevant in the context of aggregation are 
suffered by the primary insured is further confirmed in Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd 
v Field.42 In his speech, Lord Mustill noted that where both the underlying contract 
and the reinsurance contract contain aggregation language, the parties do not 
necessarily intend the two clauses to have the same effect.43 If the respective clauses 
have different effects, an aggregation gap will arise.44 This means that the mode of 
adding together individual losses in the underlying contract differs from the mode 
of adding together individual losses in the reinsurance policy. If ‘the parties in-
tended the provisions for aggregation in the direct policy and in the reinsurance 
[contract] to be the same’ they should, Lord Mustill explained, ‘make sure that the 
aggregation clauses are the same’.45 
2.24 If identical aggregation clauses in the direct policy and the reinsurance 
contract produce the same effect, they must add together the same individual losses. 
These can only be individual losses suffered by the original insured as only losses 
sustained by the primary assured–as opposed to losses sustained by a reinsured–exist 
under a policy of primary insurance. 
2.25 In summary, the individual losses to be aggregated are losses affecting the 
original assured, rather than losses suffered by reinsureds or retrocedents when they 
pay out insurance or reinsurance money. 
3.2 Determination of what constitutes an individual loss 
2.26 In order to aggregate multiple individual losses, it is necessary to define and 
delimit one individual loss. In English law, different approaches for determining an 
individual loss have been adopted: insured unit and peoples’ actions. 
41 Mann v Lexington Insurance Co (n 39).  
42 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (1996) 1 WLR 1026 (HL).  
43 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 42) 1033 f (Lord Mustill). 
44 As to the notion of ‘aggregation gap’ and the different means to deal with the adverse effects asso-
ciated with such a gap, see paras 7.32 ff, 7.41 ff.  
45 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 42) 1034 (Lord Mustill). 
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a Insured Unit as The Basis of an Individual Loss 
2.27 In the Dawson’s Field Arbitration, the hijacking of four aircraft in 1970 was 
considered. One of the aircraft was destroyed in Cairo and the remaining were flown 
to Dawson’s Field, where they were ultimately set on fire and destroyed.46 
2.28 The case involved an excess of loss reinsurance agreement covering each 
and every loss arising out of one event in the excess of a particular sum. In this 
context, the arbitral tribunal was, first, required to determine the number of in-
dividual losses. It argued that if multiple aircraft were insured under one policy, 
the destruction of each insured unit, ie of each aircraft, was to be considered an 
individual loss.47 Hence, the tribunal based its findings on one insured unit, ie on 
one risk.48 
2.29 Depending on the type of cover, each insured unit is listed in the policy.49 
Often, the insured unit is, however, not defined in detail. In this regard, Kiln notes 
that providing a definition of one risk is a difficult task. He elaborates that ‘[i]n 
simpler times a single building within four walls, separated by a firebreak from other 
properties, was one risk. Now a large warehouse with a party wall trough the room 
may be two risks’.50 The determination of an insured unit is, thus, a matter of 
contract construction.51 
2.30 In Mitsubishi Electric UK Ltd v Royal London Insurance (UK) Ltd, an 
insurance policy relating to extensive building works in the City of London was 
to be construed. The deductibles provision stated that ‘[t]he first £250,000 of 
each and every loss in respect of any component part’ shall be retained by the 
assured. Hence, the policy in question defined the relevant individual loss by 
reference to a ‘component part’. Determining the relevant loss under this spe-
cific policy, thus, hinged upon the definition of what a ‘component part’ in a 
toilet module was.52 
46 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 6).  
47 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 6). Then a 
further question arose as to whether these individual losses all resulted from one single event and 
therefore were to be aggregated.  
48 Cf also Klaus Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol 1 (Verlag 
Versicherungswirtschaft eV 1976) 128. It is to be noted that in this context, the notion of ‘risk’ is not 
used to refer to an uncertainty about whether the insured peril will materialise. Nor is it used to 
indicate one reinsured original policy. Rather, the word refers to each insured unit; Grossmann (n 26) 
121; Liebwein (n 26) 190.  
49 See, for instance, Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 6), where the policy contained a 
schedule listing the 23 insured aircraft with their agreed values.  
50 Robert Kiln, Reinsurance in Practice (4th edn, Witherby 1991) 194.  
51 Cf Schwepcke and Vetter (n 26) para 916. It should be noted that if the contract of reinsurance 
contains a definition of ‘loss’, this definition does generally not determine what an individual loss is. 
Rather, as individual losses are suffered by the primary insured, determining the meaning of an in-
dividual loss should be undertaken based on the insured units described in the primary insurance 
policy.  
52 Mitsubishi Electric UK Ltd v Royal London Insurance (UK) Ltd [1994] CLC 367 (CA) 371 (Sir Thomas 
Bingham MR). 
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2.31 The fact that what constitutes an individual loss is to be determined based 
on the insured unit does not mean that the individual loss is not financial in 
nature. On the contrary, each individual loss constitutes a financial detriment. 
Aggregation clauses provide for a mechanism to add together the financial det-
riments incurred through each individual loss for the purposes of determining the 
ultimate net loss.53 
b Peoples’ Action as The Basis of an Individual Loss 
2.32 However, it is not always possible to express the insured subject matter as an 
insured unit. In both the contexts of first- and third-party insurance, there are often 
no insured units listed in the insurance policies. 
2.33 In cases concerning aggregation clauses, the individual losses subject to ag-
gregation are usually not explicitly determined.54 In order to understand what an 
individual loss is, it, therefore, appears appropriate to analyse decisions concerning 
the definition of what constitutes one loss under insurance contracts that do not 
contain any aggregation clause. Whenever there is no aggregation clause in a con-
tract of insurance, an individual loss must be the relevant loss.55 
2.34 In Glencore International AG v Alpina Insurance Co Ltd, for instance, the 
Commercial Court was required to construe a policy providing cover against any 
risks of loss and damage to oil in which Glencore acquired an interest.56 
2.35 After one of Glencore’s business partners, MTI, misappropriated large 
quantities of oil over a period of many months, mainly by drawing without authority 
on stocks held to the order of Glencore, the Commercial Court was required to 
determine the number of losses. It expressly noted that the policy did not contain any 
aggregation language. Consequently, the court was required to determine the 
number of individual losses that had occurred. 
2.36 The Commercial Court held that where ‘goods are stolen on several occasions 
from the same location by the same person using the same method’ a separate loss 
occurred on each occasion.57 In the case in question, this meant that Glencore suffered 
a separate loss ‘each time MTI drew oil from the bulk and disposed of it without 
authority’.58 Rather than determining the individual losses by reference to insured 
units, the Commercial Court defined the individual losses by reference to the actions of  
53 For the notion of ‘ultimate net loss’, see paras 2.11 ff.  
54 An exception is the Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co 
SAK (n 6).  
55 In fact, in the absence of an aggregation clause, individual losses are not to be aggregated, see Mabey 
and Johnson Ltd v Ecclesiastical Insurance Office Plc [2000] CLC 1570 (Comm). See also Merkin, 
Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 3) para 11–321.  
56 Glencore International AG v Alpina Insurance Co Ltd [2003] EWHC 2792 (Comm), [2004] 1 All ER 766 
[11] (Moore-Bick J).  
57 Glencore International AG v Alpina Insurance Co Ltd (n 56) [293] (Moore-Bick J).  
58 Glencore International AG v Alpina Insurance Co Ltd (n 56) [304] (Moore-Bick J). 
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those who caused the losses. As there were multiple separate acts of drawing oil from 
Glencore’s stock, multiple separate individual losses had occurred.59 
2.37 On a closer look and considering what the Commercial Court had stated 
obiter, this is remarkable. In fact, it noted obiter that where several losses were re-
lated, determining the number of losses was a complicated matter. For example, 
‘where an arsonist sets fire to two adjacent tanks in the course of a single attack’, this 
might constitute one single loss. Similarly, the Commercial Court noted, ‘if thieves 
enter a warehouse containing bagged goods which they remove using a number of 
different vehicles, (…) it is difficult to see how that could be regarded as more than 
one loss’. In both examples, the court stated that ‘the loss occurred on one occasion 
in the course of a single enterprise’.60 
2.38 This could mean one of two things: Either the Commercial Court may have 
decided that, despite the absence of aggregation language, multiple individual losses 
aggregate based on the unifying factor that they occurred on the same occasion in the 
course of a single enterprise.61 Considering the decision in Mabey and Johnson Ltd v 
Ecclesiastical Insurance Office Plc, this would represent quite a conflicting approach. 
In fact, in the latter case, the Commercial Court expressly held that in the absence of 
an aggregation clause one cannot simply imply an aggregation mechanism.62 
2.39 Alternatively, the Commercial Court may have decided that because the loss 
occurred on one occasion in the course of one enterprise, there was but one single big 
individual loss. Yet, this approach might be subject to a logical fallacy. If all the 
financial detriment incurred by the primary assured in the course of one action or 
one enterprise is to be considered one single individual loss, then it would never be 
possible to aggregate a number of losses resulting from the same act or event.63 As 
there would be only one individual loss, there would be nothing to be aggregated. 
Determining an individual loss by reference to the actions out of which a claim arises 
undermines the concept of aggregation because those actions64 are generally the 
factors upon which multiple individual losses are aggregated. 
2.40 There are other English cases in which the issue of the number of losses under 
insurance agreements without aggregation clauses is discussed. In these cases, the 
courts held that if damage had been inflicted by the same person in multiple un-
related acts, each act causes a separate loss. More specifically, in Pennsylvania Co for 
Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities v Mumford, the insurance policy before 
the court provided cover for all losses incurred because any securities as described in 
59 Glencore International AG v Alpina Insurance Co Ltd (n 56) [304] (Moore-Bick J).  
60 Glencore International AG v Alpina Insurance Co Ltd (n 56) [292] (Moore-Bick J).  
61 Cf Glencore International AG v Alpina Insurance Co Ltd (n 56) [293] (Moore-Bick J).  
62 Mabey and Johnson Ltd v Ecclesiastical Insurance Office Plc (n 55) 1573 f (Morison J). For more 
information on this aspect, see paras 3.5 ff.  
63 This would at least be the case where so-called event-based aggregation is concerned. For more details 
as to the subject matter of event-based aggregation, see paras 3.27 ff and 4.1 ff.  
64 In aggregation clauses, such an action is often referred to as an act, an event, an occurrence, an 
accident, etc. For more information regarding the unifying factors commonly used in aggregation 
clauses, see paras 3.25 ff. 
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the policy were stolen, misappropriated or made away with.65 In this case, one of the 
assured’s employees misappropriated securities belonging to four women on 41 
different occasions. The court held that there was a separate loss for each of the 41 
instances of misappropriation.66 Accordingly, the Court of Appeal seems to have 
determined the number of individual losses by reference to the actions of those who 
have caused loss and damage. 
2.41 Similarly, in Dornoch Ltd v Mauritius Union Assurance Co Ltd, a bank employee 
had drawn down client funds from their bank accounts on multiple instances without 
the clients’ knowledge. The deductible clause referred to ‘any one loss’. The Commercial 
Court stated that each transfer of money ‘was a separate conscious act (…) against one 
or other of a range of different accounts’.67 Hence, it held that each transfer represented 
a separate individual loss. In this instance, the Commercial Court determined an in-
dividual loss by reference to the actions of the person who caused loss and damage. 
2.42 In summary, it is sometimes not possible to determine an individual loss by 
reference to an insured unit. On repeated occasions, English courts have defined one 
individual loss by reference to the actions of those who had caused the loss and damage. 
In this regard, it can be noted that legal uncertainty arises as to whether the actions or 
acts of those who cause loss and damage define one single loss or whether they constitute 
a unifying factor upon which multiple individual losses are to be aggregated. 
4 The notion of ‘claim’ 
4.1 The term ‘claim’ in general 
2.43 The notion of ‘claim’ is often used for multiple different purposes in a single 
insurance or reinsurance contract.68 Therefore, where the parties provide for a de-
finition of the term in their contract of reinsurance, this definition is rarely suitable 
for every use of the term:69 
2.44 As elaborated by Merkin, insurance policies only cover claims that relate to 
losses arising from the materialisation of an insured peril.70 In West Wake Price 
and Co v Ching, the Commercial Court considered ‘the primary meaning of the word 
‘claim’–whether used in a popular sense or in a strict legal sense is such as to attach it 
to the object that is claimed (…)’.71 This meaning is confirmed by an entry in the 
65 Pennsylvania Co for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities v Mumford [1920] 2 KB 537 (CA) 537. 
The policy in question was a Lloyd’s Banks’ and Trust Companies’ Policy.  
66 Pennsylvania Co for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities v Mumford (n 65) 547 (Warrington LJ).  
67 Dornoch Ltd v Mauritius Union Assurance Co Ltd (No 2) [2007] EWHC 155 (Comm), [2007] Lloyd’s 
Rep IR 350 [33] (Steel J).  
68 See for instance Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Oak Dedicated Ltd [2008] EWHC 222 (Comm), [2008] 2 
All ER 916 [97] (Tomlinson J); Butler and Merkin (n 3) para C–0242.  
69 Haydon v Lo and Lo (1997) 1 WLR 198 (PC) 205 (Lord Lloyd); Clarke (n 8) para 17–4D; Merkin, 
Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 3) para 11–336.  
70 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 3) para 11–336.  
71 West Wake Price and Co v Ching [1957] 1 WLR 45 (QB) 55 (Devlin J). 
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Oxford English Dictionary, according to which the term ‘claim’ means ‘[a] demand 
for something due; an assertion of a right to something’.72 
2.45 Another context is where an insurance or reinsurance policy is written on a 
claims-made basis and the insurer’s or reinsurer’s liability is triggered only if a claim is 
made against the primary assured within the policy period.73 In this sense, the term 
‘claim’ refers to a demand against the primary assured. Yet, in this instance, the focus 
does not lie on whether something is due but rather on whether the claim against the 
assured has been made within the currency of the policy. 
2.46 The third option is that the term ‘claim’ may be used in the context of ag-
gregation. In fact, an aggregation clause may provide for adding together individual 
claims into one single claim for the purposes of testing the latter against a deductible 
or a cover limit.74 
4.2 The term ‘claim’ in aggregation clauses 
2.47 For the purposes of this analysis, it is this third use of the term ‘claim’ that is 
of importance. For example, in Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd, the House of Lords interpreted the following 
aggregation clause: 
If a series of third party claims shall result from any single act or omission (…) then, 
irrespective of the total number of claims, all such third party claims shall be considered to be a 
single third party claim for the purposes of the application of the deductible.75  
2.48 In Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd, Waller J at first 
instance noted that ‘the question whether claims are separate or single must depend on 
the facts of the particular case and (…) on the words of the policy with which one is 
dealing’.76 Stating this, Waller J did not try to determine what an individual claim was 
but rather to distinguish individual claims from an aggregated claim, which is com-
posed of multiple individual claims. To this effect, he quoted from the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment in Thorman v New Hampshire Insurance Co (UK) Ltd: 
An architect has separate contracts with separate building owners. The architect makes the same 
negligent mistakes in relation to each. The claims have a factor in common, namely the same 
negligent mistake, and to this extent they are related, but clearly they are separate claims (…).77  
72 Oxford English Dictionary (100th edn, 2020), ‘Claim’. See also West Wake Price and Co v Ching 
(n 71) 55 (Devlin J); O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 36) para 5–115.  
73 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 3) para 11–336; Butler and Merkin (n 3) para C–0243.  
74 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 3) para 11–336. Cf also Butler and Merkin (n 3) para C–0247.  
75 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 1) [12] (Lord 
Hoffmann), [33] (Lord Hobhouse) (emphasis added). It should be noted that this case concerned a 
primary insurance policy. As the subject matter of aggregation appears to be the same in primary 
insurance and reinsurance, the case nevertheless bears relevance in the context of reinsurance.  
76 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd [1996] CLC 1515 (Comm) 1521 (Waller J) 
(emphasis added).  
77 Thorman v New Hampshire Insurance Co (UK) Ltd [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 7 (CA) 11 f (Sir John 
Donaldson MR). 
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2.49 It appears as if aggregation clauses referring to ‘claims’ instead of ‘losses’ are 
mostly used where third-party risks are insured or reinsured, as the case may be.78 
Professional liability policies in particular regularly contain aggregation clauses on an 
‘each and every claim’ basis.79 The reason for this is almost certainly that where third- 
party risks are concerned, a primary assured suffers a loss only if a third party has 
made a claim against the primary assured and the assured’s liability for that loss has 
been established and quantified by judgment, arbitral award or binding settlement.80 
2.50 Yet, it is important to note that aggregation clauses do not always use the 
term ‘claim’ instead of the term ‘loss’ where third-party risks are insured or re-
insured. On the contrary, where third-party liability risks are involved, aggregation 
clauses often provide for an aggregation of multiple individual losses rather than 
multiple individual claims.81 
2.51 In the context of aggregation, the relevant claim generally is a claim by the 
third party against the primary assured.82 The term ‘claim’ refers to the sum of 
money sought by the third party.83 The question of whether there is one or mul-
tiple claims must be determined based on the underlying facts and not the for-
mulation of a claim by the third party.84 Furthermore, the number of causes of 
action is not determinative for the number of claims.85 For instance, where a third 
78 Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 25) [3] (Morison J); Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings 
Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 1) [8]–[10] (Lord Hoffmann); Standard Life Assurance Ltd v 
Oak Dedicated Ltd (n 68) [14] (Tomlinson J); Beazley Underwriting Ltd v Travelers Co Inc [2011] EWHC 
1520 (Comm) [1] (Clarke J); AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman [2017] UKSC 18, [2018] 1 All ER 936 [9] (Lord 
Toulson SCJ); Spire Healthcare Ltd v Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance Plc [2018] EWCA Civ 317, [2018] 
Lloyd’s Rep IR 425 [1] (Simon LJ); O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 36) para 5–117. It is to be 
noted that some of these cases concern aggregation clauses in primary insurance contracts. Yet, they are 
also relevant in respect of the subject matter of aggregation in cases of reinsurance.  
79 O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 36) para 5–117.  
80 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 3) para 21–081.  
81 See for instance Caudle v Sharp (n 37); Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 42); Brown (RE) v GIO 
Insurance Ltd [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 201 (CA); Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co 
Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 [1998] 
Lloyd’s Rep IR 343 (CA), [1998] CLC 870; IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd [2010] 
EWHC 974 (Comm), [2010] Lloyd’s Rep IR 560; MIC Simmonds v Gammell [2016] EWHC 2515 
(Comm), [2016] Lloyd’s Rep IR 693.  
82 Cf Butler and Merkin (n 3) para C–0243; Australia and New Zealand Bank Ltd v Colonial and Eagle 
Wharves Ltd [1960] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 241 (Comm).  
83 In Citibank NA v Excess Insurance Co Ltd [1999] Lloyd’s Rep IR 122 (Comm) 127 (Thomas J), it was stated 
that the underlying facts of a case were determinative of the question as to whether there was one claim or 
multiple claims and not the formulation of the claim by the third party. However, the Commercial Court 
clarified that it did not follow from this that there was a separate claim for each separate cause of action; 
West Wake Price and Co v Ching (n 71) 57 (Devlin J); Butler and Merkin (n 3) para C–0244.  
84 Haydon v Lo and Lo (n 69) 204 (Lord Lloyd); Citibank NA v Excess Insurance Co Ltd (n 83) 127 
(Thomas J).  
85 In Citibank NA v Excess Insurance Co Ltd (n 83) 127 (Thomas J), it was stated that the underlying facts 
of a case were determinative of the question of whether there was one claim or multiple claims and not 
the formulation of the claim by the third party. However, the Commercial Court clarified that it did 
not follow from this that there was a separate claim for each separate cause of action; Haydon v Lo 
and Lo (n 69) 204 (Lord Lloyd); West Wake Price and Co v Ching (n 71) 57 (Devlin J); Butler and 
Merkin (n 3) para C–0244. 
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party brings a claim against a primary assured for misappropriating funds on a 
number of occasions, there is one single claim rather than one claim per act of 
misappropriation.86 
2.52 As has been mentioned, aggregation clauses in reinsurance policies concerning 
third party liability sometimes contain references to individual losses rather than to 
individual claims.87 In this context, it is unclear whether one individual claim can be 
equated with one individual loss. For instance, in Glencore International AG v Alpina 
Insurance Co Ltd, the cover limit of an insurance policy was defined by reference to ‘any 
one loss’. In determining the number of individual losses, it was distinguished from the 
insurance policy before the Privy Council in Haydon v Lo and Lo which defined its 
cover limit by reference to ‘any one claim’. In the former case, it was held that the 
insured incurred a separate loss with each act misappropriating his oil,88 whereas it was 
determined in the latter case that multiple instances of misappropriating funds caused 
one single loss.89 However, it must be noted that Glencore International AG v Alpina 
Insurance Co Ltd was not distinguished from Haydon v Lo and Lo on the grounds of a 
difference in the concepts of ‘claim’ and ‘loss’, but rather due to the fact that the former 
case concerned an all-risks property insurance agreement and the latter concerned a 
professional liability contract.90 
2.53 In IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd, it was stated that the 
‘witness gave detailed evidence regarding the nature and history of the losses, the 
basis on which the original insured settled the claims with the US third party clai-
mants (…)’.91 In this instance, the terms ‘loss’ and ‘claim’ appear to have been used 
synonymously. Similarly, an aggregation clause discussed by the Commercial Court 
in Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall92 seems to have used the terms ‘claim’ 
and ‘loss’ synonymously. It read: ‘“ANY CLAIM” or “ANY LOSS” shall mean one 
occurrence or all occurrences of a series consequent upon or attributable to one 
source or originating cause’.93 
86 Haydon v Lo and Lo (n 69) 204 ff (Lord Lloyd). This appears particularly notable because English 
courts have repeatedly held that where several unrelated acts of misappropriation cause loss and 
damage, each act of misappropriation causes a separate ‘loss’. See for instance Glencore International 
AG v Alpina Insurance Co Ltd (n 56). In this case, Haydon v Lo and Lo was not distinguished based on 
the terms ‘loss’ and ‘claim’ but rather by reference to the fact that the former was ‘an all risk policy on 
goods’ and not ‘a “claims made” professional indemnity policy’.  
87 See para 2.50.  
88 Glencore International AG v Alpina Insurance Co Ltd (n 56) [304] (Moore-Bick J).  
89 Haydon v Lo and Lo (n 69) 206 (Lord Lloyd).  
90 Glencore International AG v Alpina Insurance Co Ltd (n 56) [300]–[302] (Moore-Bick J). Cf also 
Australia and New Zealand Bank Ltd v Colonial and Eagle Wharves Ltd (n 82), where it seems to have 
been held that every act that causes a loss constitutes a separate claim. However, the case was dis-
tinguished from Haydon v Lo and Lo (n 69) as the former concerned an all-risks policy whereas the 
latter concerned a professional liability insurance.  
91 In this context, see also IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 81) [29] (Burton J), 
where it was stated that the ‘witnesses gave detailed evidence regarding the nature and history of the 
losses, the basis on which the original insured settled the claims with the US third party claimants (…)’. 
It seems that the Commercial Court equated the terms ‘losses’ and ‘claims’.  
92 Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 25).  
93 Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 25) [2] (Morison J). 
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2.54 Yet, it is impossible to conclusively say that an aggregation clause providing 
for adding together multiple individual claims produces the same effect as one that 
provides for a mechanism to aggregate multiple individual losses. 
5 The notion of ‘occurrence’ 
2.55 The term ‘occurrence’ is not used consistently in the context of aggregation 
clauses.94 In fact, it may be said that the inconsistent usage of the word leads to 
misunderstandings as to the operation of aggregation mechanisms. A clarification of 
the meaning of the term shall be attempted below. 
5.1 Misleading usage of the term ‘occurrence’ 
2.56 Reinsurance contracts are often taken out on an ‘occurrence’ basis or on a 
‘losses occurring during’ basis.95 If a contract of reinsurance provides cover on such a 
basis, the reinsurer ‘is liable to indemnify the [reinsured] in respect of loss and da-
mage which occurs within the period of cover (…)’.96 The losses occurring during 
basis provides a mechanism to allocate individual losses to a specific period of 
cover.97 In this context, the term ‘occurrence’ focuses on the timing of a loss. As the 
time when the loss happens or occurs is paramount, the parties sometimes simply 
speak of ‘occurrence’ when in fact they mean ‘loss’. 
2.57 It appears that the terminology used in the context of allocating losses has 
sometimes also been used when it comes to the aggregation of losses. This may be 
illustrated well with the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Seele Austria GmbH 
and Co KG v Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd. In this case, the parties to an 
insurance contract98 provided that ‘(…) the Insurer hereby agrees to indemnify 
the Insured (…) in respect of any occurrence of loss or damage or liability during 
the period of insurance’99 and that the insured retained liability for ‘[t]he first 
£100,000 of each and every occurrence or series of occurrences of loss or damage 
arising out of any one event’.100 
2.58 The parties used the term ‘occurrence’ to indicate ‘loss’ both in their loss 
allocation provision and in their aggregation clause. Using the parties’ language, the 
Court of Appeal stated that ‘[o]ne must start by identifying the occurrences of 
94 Cf Butler and Merkin (n 3) para C–0223.  
95 Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co [2009] UKHL 40, [2009] 4 All ER 909 
[74] (Lord Collins); Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 27.19; Schwepcke and Vetter (n 26) 
paras 548 ff; Liebwein (n 26) 274 ff; O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 36) paras 5–126 f.  
96 Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co (n 95) [74] (Lord Collins).  
97 For more details on the subject matter of allocating losses to the correct reinsurance period, see paras 
6.5 ff.  
98 The Court of Appeal was concerned with a primary insurance policy. However, it is equally relevant 
in the context of reinsurance.  
99 Seele Austria GmbH Co v Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 441 [3] (Waller LJ) 
(emphasis added).  
100 Seele Austria GmbH Co v Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd (n 99) [3] (Waller LJ) (emphasis added). 
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damage in respect of which the insured is entitled to be indemnified, since it is to 
these that the aggregation provisions apply’.101 
2.59 Hence, the notion of ‘occurrence’ was used to designate the individual losses 
to be aggregated. Similarly, in Caudle v Sharp, the Court of Appeal interpreted an 
aggregation clause which appears to equate the terms ‘loss’ and ‘occurrence’ to some 
extent.102 The clause read: ‘For the purpose of this reinsurance the term “each and 
every loss” shall be understood to mean each and every loss and/or occurrence (…) 
arising out of one event’.103 
2.60 In this case, the reinsurance contract provided that each and every occurrence that 
arises from the same event shall be aggregated. The individual units to be aggregated were 
termed ‘occurrences’.104 Again, the term ‘occurrence’ was used to indicate ‘loss’. 
5.2 Regular meaning of the term ‘occurrence’ in aggregation clauses 
2.61 In the context of aggregation, however, the term ‘occurrence’ generally has a 
different meaning.105 In fact, despite the contract clause used in Caudle v Sharp 
distinguishing between occurrences and events,106 the Court of Appeal held that 
‘[l]oss’ in the reinsurance context means at first sight the loss suffered by the reinsured by reason 
of his liability to the original insured, falling within his ‘ultimate net loss’ as defined in the contract. 
The relevant occurrence, strictly, is the making of a claim or the discovery of a loss by the original 
insured, but the word more readily means the occurrence out of which a claim arises, for loss 
suffered by the original insured, such as storm damage, flood damage or the like, or in the case of 
professional indemnity losses, the negligent act or omission of the insured.107  
2.62 In this passage, the Court of Appeal clarifies that in the context of aggregation the 
term ‘occurrence’ should not be used to indicate ‘loss’ but rather to denote a happening 
out of which one or multiple losses arise.108 In line with this, the Commercial Court in 
Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK, stated that ‘[a]n ‘occurrence’ (…) is not 
the same as a loss, for one occurrence may embrace a plurality of losses’.109 
101 Seele Austria GmbH Co v Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd (n 99) [54] (Moore-Bick LJ). It is to be 
noted that the relevant aggregation clause read ‘[t]he first £100,000 of each and every occurrence or 
series of occurrences of loss or damage arising out of any one event’ [3]. Consequently, the termi-
nology used by the Court of Appeal was based on the parties’ language.  
102 See Caudle v Sharp (n 37) 648, where Evans LJ noted that the terms ‘loss’ and ‘occurrence’ were 
equivalent.  
103 Caudle v Sharp (n 37) 644 (Evans LJ).  
104 As to the subject matter of individual losses to be aggregated, see paras 2.18 ff.  
105 Cf Butler and Merkin (n 3) para C–0293, where they state that the term ‘event’ had a dual function: 
first, it determined whether or not the required event had occurred during the policy period. Secondly, 
it operated as a unifying factor. The same is true with regard to the term ‘occurrence’.  
106 Cf Clarke (n 8) para 17-4C3.  
107 Caudle v Sharp (n 37) 648 (Evans LJ) (emphasis added).  
108 Butler and Merkin (n 3) para C–0234.  
109 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 6). 
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2.63 In the same vein, it has repeatedly been held that the term ‘occurrence’ is 
interchangeable with the word ‘event’.110 More specifically, aggregation clauses 
usually provide that multiple individual losses be added together for the pur-
poses of applying them to the deductible and the cover limit ‘when they are 
linked by a unifying factor of some kind’.111 An occurrence or an event can be 
such a unifying factor.112 Therefore, it is of fundamental importance to distin-
guish between ‘loss’ and ‘occurrence’. 
2.64 In light of the aforementioned, it should be borne in mind that the parties 
to a reinsurance contract generally use the word ‘occurrence’ as a synonym for the 
term ‘event’ in terms concerning aggregation. In these cases, the parties agree that 
the unifying factor upon which individual losses shall be aggregated is an occur-
rence, a happening or an event.113 Sometimes, however, the parties refer to the 
individual losses to be aggregated as ‘individual occurrences’. Where this is the 
case, an occurrence is not to be understood as a unifying factor. Rather, the same 
rules apply as would have if the parties had used the term ‘losses’ to refer to the 
individual units to be aggregated.114 It is, therefore, important to emphasise that 
the term ‘occurrence’ must be construed in the context of the contract in 
question.115 
II Retention, deductible, excess point, attachment point 
2.65 According to Pohl and Iranya, ‘[t]he backbone of every reinsurance program 
in a proportional or non-proportional treaty arrangement is the [c]edant’s chosen 
retention’.116 In the section below, the significance of the general concept of retention 
will be discussed. Thereafter, the terminology used in relation to the reinsured’s 
retention in excess of loss reinsurance contracts as well as the relation between ag-
gregation clauses and the reinsured’s retention will be set out. Furthermore, the fact 
that the reinsured’s retention may be variable will be addressed. 
110 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, as quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 6); 
American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd [1996] 1 LRLR 407 (Comm) 413 (Moore-Bick J); 
Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 28.6; Kiran Soar, ‘Interpretation of Wordings Key to 
Settling Aggregation Claims’ [2010] LLID 7; Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 3) para 11–324. See 
also Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd [2013] EWHC 154 
(Comm), [2013] 2 All ER 231 [20] (Field J); Clarke (n 8) para 17-4C3; Edelman and Burns (n 23) 
paras 4.55 ff.  
111 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 1) [14]–[15] 
(Lord Hoffmann); also quoted in: Spire Healthcare Ltd v Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance Plc (n 78) 
[23] (Simon LJ).  
112 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 1) [15] (Lord 
Hoffmann); Edelman and Burns (n 23) paras 4.52 ff.  
113 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 3) para 11–325.  
114 For the meanings of ‘loss’ and ‘individual losses’ and their relation, see paras 2.5 ff, 2.11 ff, 2.18 ff.  
115 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 6); Mann v Lexington Insurance Co (n 39) 1421 
(Waller LJ); Butler and Merkin (n 3) para C–0237.  
116 Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 160. 
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1 The concept of deductibles in general 
2.66 Often, reinsureds cede a certain part of their risk to their reinsurer and retain 
the remaining part.117 The portion of the risk that a reinsured does not cede to the 
reinsurer is termed ‘retention’. In proportional reinsurance, the reinsured’s retention 
is generally indicated as a percentage of the risk it assumed under the inward con-
tract.118 In non-proportional reinsurance, the reinsurer agrees to cover the part of a 
loss in excess of a particular figure on the risk.119 The part of the loss below this 
figure is retained by the reinsured alone120 or the reinsured together with another 
reinsurer.121 
2.67 The reinsurer has a certain interest in knowing whether the reinsured retains 
a portion of the risk.122 In Kingscroft Insurance Co Ltd v Nissan Fire and Marine 
Insurance Co Ltd, an expert witness stated that he regarded the ‘retention as of 
considerable importance because it provides a measure of the reinsured’s confidence 
in the business [it] is writing and provides a continuing incentive to underwrite re-
sponsibly’.123 
2.68 The size of a retention is relevant for a number of reasons. First, as 
mentioned previously, the risk covered by the reinsured may represent more or 
less of an incentive to responsibly underwrite inward contracts.124 Similarly, the 
reinsured will also behave differently in settling claims depending on the risk 
involved. In fact, the less exposure a reinsured has, the smaller is its incentive to 
defend claims made by the underlying assureds.125 Secondly, the part of the risks 
retained by the reinsured is directly linked to its capital requirements as well as its 
liquidity.126 Thirdly, depending on the size of the reinsured’s retention, the extent 
of the reinsurer’s liability varies. Consequently, the reinsurance premium is 
generally determined by taking into account the reinsured’s retention.127 
117 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 18.21.  
118 Liebwein (n 26) 71.  
119 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 4.45; Edelman and Burns (n 23) paras 1.49, 1.62.  
120 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 1) [30] (Lord 
Hobhouse). Cf also Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 4.50; Edelman and Burns (n 23) para 
1.36; Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 28.  
121 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 1) [30] (Lord 
Hobhouse); Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) paras 18.21, 18.24.  
122 Cf Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 160.  
123 Kingscroft Insurance Co Ltd v Nissan Fire and Marine Insurance Co Ltd [1999] CLC 1875 (Comm) 
1893 f (Moore-Bick J). See also Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 18.20, who state that ‘[t]he 
presence and size of a retention is one way for the reinsurer to gauge exactly what the reinsured really 
thinks of the business originally accepted’.  
124 Kingscroft Insurance Co Ltd v Nissan Fire and Marine Insurance Co Ltd (n 123) 1893 f (Moore-Bick J). 
See also Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 18.20, who state that ‘[t]he presence and size of a 
retention is one way for the reinsurer to gauge exactly what the reinsured really thinks of the business 
originally accepted’.  
125 Cf O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 36) para 5–001.  
126 Cf Gerathewohl (n 48) 143; Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 27, 161.  
127 Gerathewohl (n 48) 174 ff. 
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2.69 Yet, despite the fact that it is quite common that the reinsured retains a 
certain part of its risk, the reinsured generally has a right to cede the entirety of it to 
one or multiple reinsurers.128 In fact, under English law, there is no presumption and 
no term implied to the effect that the reinsured must retain any part of its risk.129 In 
Phoenix General Insurance Co of Greece SA v Halvanon Insurance Co Ltd, Hobhouse 
J noted that there was ‘no inconsistency between the idea of reinsurance and a nil 
retention’.130 Consequently, the reinsured is only bound to retain a part of its risk if 
the contract of reinsurance contains an express warranty to this effect.131 In 
Assicurazioni Generali SpA v Arab Insurance Group (BSC), it was held that if it were 
stated in a line slip that the reinsured retained a certain percentage of the risk, this 
was merely a statement of fact and did not constitute a continuing warranty.132 
2.70 By contrast, for example, under German and Swiss law, the reinsured’s duty to 
retain a certain part of its risk is considered a trade usage.133 Commentators argue that 
if the reinsured does not bear any of the risk it cannot be said to be ‘insuring’. Thus, 
from a German perspective, the reinsured in such instances is considered to be a re-
insurance intermediary rather than a primary insurer and reinsured.134 Nevertheless, it 
is also the case under German law that the reinsured may cede the entirety of the risk if 
the reinsurer agrees.135 
2.71 In the context of aggregation, the concept of retention is essential. The operation 
of the concept and its relation to the aggregation of losses shall, therefore, be addressed. 
2 Terminology in excess of loss reinsurance and aggregation 
2.72 Attempts are sometimes made to distinguish similar concepts in proportional 
and non-proportional reinsurance by using different terminology. However, such 
distinctions are not consistently observed in practice.136 As the subject matter of ag-
128 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 18.21; Sieglinde Cannawurf and Andreas Schwepcke, 
‘§ 8 Das Vertragsrecht der Rückversicherung’ in Dieter W Lüer and Andreas Schwepcke (eds), 
Rückversicherungsrecht (CH Beck 2013) paras 44 f; O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 36) 
para 6–035.  
129 Phoenix General Insurance Co of Greece SA v Halvanon Insurance Co Ltd [1988] QB 216 (CA) 236, 
where Hobhouse J’s first instance decision is transcribed; Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 
18.21; Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 128) para 94; Schwepcke and Vetter (n 26) para 456; O’Neill, 
Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 36) para 6–035.  
130 Phoenix General Insurance Co of Greece SA v Halvanon Insurance Co Ltd (n 129) 236, where 
Hobhouse J’s first instance decision is transcribed. See also Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 139.  
131 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 18.21; Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 128) para 94; O’Neill, 
Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 36) para 6–035.  
132 Assicurazioni Generali SpA v Arab Insurance Group (BSC) [2002] CLC 164 (Comm) 164, 171 f 
(Morison J).  
133 Gerathewohl (n 48) 534; Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 128) paras 93 f; Schwepcke and Vetter 
(n 26) paras 453 ff. Cf also Judgment of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, BGE 107 II 196 con-
sideration 2, for the Swiss perspective.  
134 Gerathewohl (n 48) 535; Schwepcke and Vetter (n 26) para 453; Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 160.  
135 Gerathewohl (n 48) 537; Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 128) para 93; Schwepcke and Vetter (n 26) 
para 454.  
136 Birds, Lynch and Paul (n 7) para 35–016. 
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gregation is primarily an issue in excess of loss reinsurance, the reinsured’s retention is 
described in light of the non-proportional business. Yet, some of the terms to be 
discussed may equally be used in proportional reinsurance and may bear the same or a 
slightly different meaning in the latter context. 
2.73 In both facultative excess of loss reinsurance137 and treaty excess of loss re-
insurance,138 the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the reinsured for the part of a loss that 
exceeds a predefined minimum figure,139 ie a certain amount of money.140 In Charter 
Reinsurance Co Ltd (in Liquidation) v Fagan, it was held that this minimum figure marked 
an excess point which triggered the reinsurer’s liability.141 The excess point is sometimes 
termed ‘attachment point’.142 The part of the loss that is below the excess or attachment 
point is the reinsured’s retention,143 deductible144 or priority.145 The part of the loss ex-
ceeding it is sometimes termed ‘excess’.146 
2.74 The reinsurer’s ultimate net loss is generally tested against the excess or 
attachment point.147 Regularly, this loss does not refer to a loss on an individual 
risk but rather to all losses arising out of a unifying factor of some kind.148 In such 
a case, the part of the risk retained by the reinsured is sometimes referred to as a per 
event retention.149 
2.75 To say that the reinsured must bear one deductible or retention per event is the 
equivalent of saying that all the individual losses arising out of one event are to be added 
137 Edelman and Burns (n 23) para 1.49.  
138 Edelman and Burns (n 23) para 1.62.  
139 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 4.45; Edelman and Burns (n 23) paras 1.36, 1.49, 1.62; 
Birds, Lynch and Paul (n 7) para 35–015; Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 3) para 18–004.  
140 Cf Edelman and Burns (n 23) para 1.61.  
141 Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd (in Liquidation) v Fagan (n 27) 341, where Mance J’s first instance judgment 
was transcribed. See also Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 4.45; Edelman and Burns (n 23) 
para 1.36.  
142 Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd (in Liquidation) v Fagan (n 27) 390 (Lord Mustill); Munich Reinsurance 
America Inc, Re-In-Sur-Ance: A Basic Guide to Facultative and Treaty Reinsurance (2010) 22; O’Neill, 
Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 36) para 7–014.  
143 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 18.23; Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 27.  
144 See, for instance, Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd 
(n 1) [14], where Lord Hoffmann referred to a statement made by Moore-Bick J at first instance; AIG 
Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 78) [14] (Lord Toulson); Spire Healthcare Ltd v Royal and Sun Alliance 
Insurance Plc (n 78) [22]–[23] (Simon LJ); Edelman and Burns (n 23) para 1.62; Birds, Lynch and Paul 
(n 7) para 30–060; Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 27.  
145 Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 27.  
146 See, for instance, Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 81) 202 (Waller LJ); Countrywide Assured 
Group Plc v Marshall (n 25) [13] (Morison J).  
147 Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan (n 27) 390; Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 28. For more information 
regarding the reinsurer’s ultimate net loss, see paras 2.11 ff.  
148 Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 31 f, where they refer to ‘per event excess of loss’; Edelman and Burns (n 23) 
para 1.62. For more information regarding the difference between the reinsured’s ultimate net loss 
and the individual losses to be aggregated, see paras 2.11 ff, 2.18 ff.  
149 Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 161, depending on the unifying factor chosen by the parties, this may, of 
course, also be a per cause retention or per accident retention. Cf also Butler and Merkin (n 3) 
para C–021. 
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together to form one aggregated loss, which is then tested against the reinsured’s de-
ductible.150 This means that, initially, the values of multiple individual losses are added 
together. Once this sum has been calculated, further expenses incurred by the reinsured 
in settling the inward claims are added to it and deductions for all recoveries are made, 
amounting to the reinsured’s ultimate net loss.151 The next step is to test whether the 
reinsured’s deductible is exceeded and consequently the reinsurer’s liability is triggered. 
This involves applying the reinsured’s deductible to its ultimate net loss.152 
2.76 This is perfectly summarised in Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd, where Lord Hobhouse explained the re-
lationship between the reinsured’s deductible and the concept of aggregation with the 
following words: 
The (…) policy deductible, [is] the provision which states the level up to which the assured 
must self-insure (or insure elsewhere) before [it] has the right to recovery under the relevant 
policy. This provision may be qualified by an aggregation clause which enables the assured to 
aggregate self-insured losses together so as to exceed in aggregate the deductible and give a 
right of recovery.153  
3 Variable excess 
2.77 Contracts of reinsurance may provide that the reinsured’s deductible is 
variable. In fact, the latter may vary depending on the reinsured’s premium income. 
Further, the parties may provide that different deductibles apply with respect to 
different risks or perils. 
3.1 Variation of deductible in relation to the net premium income 
2.78 Instead of setting a predefined monetary sum as the applicable deductible,154 
the parties may provide for a more flexible mechanism. In particular, they may agree 
that the deductible applicable to a specific loss depends on factors such as the re-
insured’s premium income. 
2.79 In North Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Bishopsgate Insurance Ltd, the 
Commercial Court dealt with a variable excess clause which provided that the re-
insured’s deductible was to be increased if its net premium income exceeded the 
estimated income.155 
150 Cf Gerathewohl (n 48) 170 f; Edelman and Burns (n 23) para 4.52.  
151 See, for instance, the clause discussed in Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan (n 27) 382 f (Lord 
Mustill); Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 28.  
152 Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan (n 27) 390 (Lord Mustill); Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 28. For more 
information as to the reinsurer’s ultimate net loss, see paras 2.11 ff.  
153 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 1) [30] (Lord 
Hobhouse).  
154 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 4.45; Edelman and Burns (n 23) paras 1.36, 1.49, 1.62; 
Birds, Lynch and Paul (n 7) para 35–015; Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 3) para 18–004.  
155 North Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Bishopsgate Insurance Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 459 (Comm). See 
also Edelman and Burns (n 23) para 4.90. 
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2.80 If the monetary amount of the reinsured’s deductible is flexible, this 
generally has no bearing on the aggregation mechanism. This is because the ag-
gregation mechanism provides the mode of adding together multiple individual 
losses but does not itself define the figure against which the aggregated loss 
is tested. 
3.2 Variation of deductible in relation to the reinsured risk or the peril 
reinsured against 
2.81 It is equally possible that a reinsurance contract provides for different de-
ductibles with respect to losses arising from different reinsured perils or with respect 
to different reinsured risks.156 This may be appropriate where a variety of different 
risks or perils are reinsured and the probability of corresponding losses occurring 
differs from risk to risk or peril to peril.157 
2.82 In 1976, Gerathewohl noted that, while it was uncommon, it sometimes 
happened that reinsurance contracts provided for different deductibles with respect 
to different risks or perils.158 This was–he argued–because the compilation of sta-
tistics in this regard as well as the pricing of the reinsurance while taking into account 
different deductibles was utterly difficult.159 
2.83 It may well be that this has changed with the increasing digitalisation of the 
insurance and reinsurance sector. In fact, it appears that it must be possible or at 
least become possible to provide for different deductibles depending on the re-
insured risks and perils. This seems to be the equivalent of providing cover sub-
limits in relation to losses that occur to different risks or arise from different 
perils.160 
2.84 If the parties to a contract of reinsurance agree on different deductibles with 
regard to different risks or perils, they may certainly also provide for different ag-
gregation mechanisms with respect to these different deductibles.161 
2.85 In such a case, the parties’ agreement may be regarded as an indication that 
they do not intend for individual losses occurring to different groups of risks or 
arising from different perils162 to be aggregated. If the contract of reinsurance is to be 
understood in this manner, the aggregation of individual losses will be undertaken 
separately for each deductible. 
156 The term ‘risk’, in this sense, refers to the reinsured subject matter rather than the abstract danger of 
the materialisation of a peril.  
157 Cf Gerathewohl (n 48) 157 ff.  
158 Gerathewohl (n 48) 161.  
159 Gerathewohl (n 48) 161.  
160 See paras 2.91 ff. 
161 Cf paras 2.94 f, where different aggregation mechanisms with regard to different sublimits are dis-
cussed. 
162 Depending on whether different deductibles are agreed upon with respect to different risks or dif-
ferent perils. 
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III Cover, limit, cover limit 
2.86 Excess of loss reinsurance policies may contain an overall cover limit as well 
as sublimits. In relation to both, the aggregation of losses is relevant. 
1 Overall cover limit 
2.87 The reinsurer’s cover under an excess of loss reinsurance contract is regularly 
limited.163 In Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group 
Insurance Co Ltd, it was noted that reinsurance ‘[p]olicies (…) normally contain 
clauses which limit the liability of the insurer (…)’.164 More specifically, such clauses 
may confine the reinsurer’s liability to a certain monetary amount, the ‘cover’.165 The 
upper limit of the reinsurance cover is termed ‘limit’ or ‘cover limit’.166 In Axa 
Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field, Lord Mustill noted that provisions relating to limits 
were of cardinal importance in excess of loss reinsurance.167 
2.88 Cover limits are generally applied to the reinsurer’s ultimate net loss.168 
Frequently, the ultimate net loss does not refer to a loss on an individual risk but 
rather to an aggregated loss that consists of multiple individual losses.169 In Lloyd’s 
TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd, Lord 
Hobhouse observed that (re-)insurance policies might provide ‘a limit by reference to 
individual losses or claims but give the insurer the right to aggregate losses or claims so 
as to enable [it] to apply the limit to the aggregate’.170 
2.89 To say that the individual losses may be aggregated to form one single loss, to 
which the cover limit applies, is the equivalent of saying that the cover limit in the 
contract of reinsurance applies per unifying factor, such as an event.171 
2.90 Basically, this means that, first, the values of multiple individual losses are added 
together in accordance with the aggregation mechanism contained in the reinsurance 
contract.172 Expenses incurred by the reinsured in settling its claims are then added to the 
163 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 34.31; Edelman and Burns (n 23) para 4.52.  
164 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 1) [30] (Lord 
Hobhouse). It may be noted that the case dealt with a primary insurance policy rather than a re-
insurance policy. Yet, the statement is equally applicable to contracts of reinsurance.  
165 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 28.2; Edelman and Burns (n 23) para 4.52; Pohl and Iranya 
(n 26) 27.  
166 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 1) [30] (Lord 
Hobhouse); Gerathewohl (n 48) 208 ff, 241 ff; Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 28.2; 
Edelman and Burns (n 23) para 4.52; Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 128) para 369; Schwepcke and 
Vetter (n 26) para 858; Liebwein (n 26) 184, 192; Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 32.  
167 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 42) 1035 (Lord Mustill).  
168 Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 28. For more information as to the reinsurer’s ultimate net loss, see paras 
2.11 ff.  
169 Cf Schwepcke and Vetter (n 26) para 957.  
170 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 1) [30] (Lord 
Hobhouse).  
171 Or, for that matter, to any unifying factor the aggregation clause may provide.  
172 Cf Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 34.32. 
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resulting sum of money. This new total amounts to the reinsured’s ultimate net loss.173 It is 
apparent that the reinsured’s ultimate net loss hinges on the aggregation mechanism 
provided for in the reinsurance agreement. Second, it is to be tested whether the re-
insured’s ultimate net loss pierces the cover limit.174 The reinsurer’s liability is ultimately 
confined to the part of the ultimate net loss which exceeds the reinsured’s retention but 
does not pierce the cover limit. 
2 Sublimit 
2.91 Reinsurance contracts often not only provide for overall cover limits but also 
for sublimits. If a reinsurance contract is taken out against a plurality of different 
perils, the parties may agree on a sublimit with respect to one particular peril. For 
instance, in a reinsurance contract taken out against the perils of earthquake and fire, 
the parties may agree on an overall cover limit as well as a sublimit for fire losses. 
2.92 Similarly, multiple different assets or groups of assets may be reinsured under a 
contract of reinsurance. Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK was concerned 
with reinsurance cover that had been bought for two different groups of assets. On the one 
hand, reinsurance was taken out for losses that occurred to the Kuwait Airways fleet of 
aircraft; on the other, losses to aircraft spares were reinsured.175 
2.93 The reinsurance agreement provided for a cover limit of any one aircraft of ‘US 
$300,000,000–any one occurrence, any one location’. By contrast, the policy provided 
for a cover limit with regard to the aircraft spare parts of ‘US$10,000,000 any one item, 
US$30,000,000 any one sending and US$150,000,000 any one location’.176 As can be 
seen from the clause discussed in Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK, 
sublimits may also refer to losses that occur at any one location or in any one sending. 
2.94 It has been discussed above that cover limits may apply to the aggregate of 
multiple individual losses.177 This is equally true for sublimits. In fact, it is even 
possible that the mechanisms of aggregating individual losses differ in respect of 
different sublimits.178 
2.95 An example is provided in the PRICL where a reinsured has taken out re-
insurance for the perils of fire and tsunami. The overall cover limit is defined on the 
basis of the aggregate of all individual losses originating in one single cause. Further, 
the contract of reinsurance provides a specific sublimit for fire losses as well as a 
sublimit for tsunami losses.179 
173 Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan (n 27); Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 28.  
174 Cf Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 28. For more information as to the reinsurer’s ultimate net loss, see paras 
2.11 ff.  
175 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 6).  
176 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 6).  
177 See paras 2.88 ff.  
178 See comments 23 f and illustrations 28 f to Article 5.2 PRICL and comments 24 f and illustrations 12 
f to Article 5.3 PRICL.  
179 See illustration 12 to Article 5.3 PRICL. 
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2.96 In such a case, the first step is to test whether the sublimits are exhausted. This is 
to say that the individual losses arising from the tsunami are added together and tested 
against the sublimit for tsunami losses. If the aggregated tsunami loss pierces the sublimit 
for tsunami losses, the part of the aggregated loss exceeding the sublimit is excluded from 
cover. Similarly, the individual losses arising from the fire are to be aggregated and tested 
against the sublimit for fire losses. The reinsurer is under no obligation to indemnify the 
reinsured for the part of the aggregated loss exceeding the sublimit for fire losses. 
2.97 The second step is that the part of the aggregated tsunami loss and the part of 
the aggregated fire loss falling within their corresponding sublimits for tsunami and fire 
losses, respectively, may then be aggregated if both losses originate in the same cause, eg 
an earthquake. The resulting aggregated loss is to be tested against the overall cover limit. 
3 Reinstatement of cover 
2.98 Excess of loss reinsurance generally provide cover for a certain period of 
time, often one year.180 Typically, full reinsurance cover is in place for any loss or 
aggregate loss that can be allocated to the relevant policy year.181 The parties may, 
however, agree that the losses to be paid by the reinsurer exhaust the reinsurance 
cover, which is to the reinsurer’s benefit.182 Excess of loss reinsurance treaties reg-
ularly contain an annual aggregate limit183 as well as a per loss limit.184 Depending 
on the agreement, either limit may be exhausted.185 
2.99 If a policy’s cover is exhausted, the reinsured is left with no reinsurance 
cover for further losses during the relevant policy period. In order to avoid such a gap 
in cover, the parties may agree–sometimes in return for an additional premium186–on a 
reinstatement of the cover.187 More specifically, a reinstatement of cover reactivates 
the reinsurance cover so that the reinsurer remains bound to indemnify the reinsured 
for further losses that exceed the deductible and remain within the cover limit.188 
180 Robert M Merkin, A Guide to Reinsurance Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2007) 42.  
181 Merkin (n 180) 58; Cannawurf and Schwepcke (n 128) para 371. Some authors appear to be of 
the opinion that the default rule is that claims paid by the reinsurer exhaust the reinsurance 
cover, see Liebwein (n 26) 285; Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 41. Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) 
para 34.31, argue that the parties may agree on a limit per loss as well as a limit per aggregate. 
Only if the latter is exhausted, will the reinsurer cease to be liable for any further losses that are 
to be allocated to the relevant policy period.  
182 Merkin (n 180) 56 ff; Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 34.31; Liebwein (n 26) 285; Pohl and 
Iranya (n 26) 41.  
183 Cf Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe 
Ltd v Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 81) 879 f (Hobhouse LJ), where an excess of loss 
reinsurance contract taken out on an aggregate basis is discussed.  
184 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 34.31.  
185 Grossmann (n 26) 131; Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 34.31; Schwepcke and Vetter 
(n 26) para 877; Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 41.  
186 Gerathewohl (n 48) 360; Merkin (n 180) 41 ff; Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 34.34; 
Schwepcke and Vetter (n 26) para 878; Liebwein (n 26) 288 ff; Pohl and Iranya (n 26) 41 f.  
187 Liebwein (n 26) 286.  
188 Liebwein (n 26) 286. Cf Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 26) para 34.34. 
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IV Different aggregation mechanisms for the purposes of deductible  
and cover limit 
2.100 If a reinsurance policy contains an aggregation clause, multiple individual 
losses are to be added together for the purposes of applying deductible and cover 
limit to the ultimate net loss. Commonly, the mechanism of adding together in-
dividual losses to form one single aggregated loss is the same for the purposes of 
applying deductibles and cover limits to the ultimate net loss.189 
2.101 Yet, as the parties may freely agree upon the structure of the reinsurance 
cover, they may provide for different aggregation mechanisms with regard to the 
reinsured’s deductible and the reinsurer’s cover limit.190 Hence, whether individual 
losses are to be added together following the same rules essentially depends on the 
construction of the reinsurance agreement, ie ‘upon the wording of the policy, and 
the circumstances which surrounded it being underwritten’.191 
V Summary of the chapter 
2.102 Aggregation clauses provide that multiple individual losses be treated as one 
single loss, which is then tested against the reinsured’s deductible as well as the re-
insurer’s cover limit.192 In this chapter, there has been no discussion of the question 
concerning the circumstances in which multiple individual losses are aggregated. 
Rather, the context in which the aggregation of losses takes place has been outlined. 
2.103 First, a distinction has been drawn between an ultimate net loss and the in-
dividual losses to be aggregated. The former is incurred by the reinsured, whereas the 
latter are suffered by the primary assureds. What constitutes an individual loss is often 
determined on the basis of an insured unit under the primary insurance contract and 
consequently depends on the construction of the policy. Yet, English courts have re-
peatedly determined one loss by reference to the actions of those who caused the loss. 
This approach may, however, create legal uncertainty regarding the question of whether 
the actions of those who cause loss and damage represent one single loss or whether they 
constitute a unifying factor upon which multiple individual losses are to be aggregated. 
2.104 Insurance and reinsurance agreements regularly provide for the aggregation 
of claims instead of losses. In this regard, it appears uncertain whether an ag-
gregation clause providing for the adding together of multiple individual claims 
produces the same effect as one that provides for a mechanism to aggregate multiple 
individual losses. Further, the parties sometimes agree to aggregate individual 
189 Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 25) [13] (Morison J).  
190 Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 25) [13] (Morison J); Butler and Merkin (n 3) para 
C–0223. For policies where the aggregation mechanisms for the purposes of applying the deductible 
and cover limit to the ultimate net loss differed, see AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 78); Spire 
Healthcare Ltd v Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance Plc (n 78).  
191 Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 25) [13] (Morison J).  
192 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 1) [15] (Lord 
Hoffmann); Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 2) [12] (Rix LJ). See also Spire 
Healthcare Ltd v Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance Plc (n 78) [23] (Simon LJ); Edelman and Burns (n 
23) para 4.52. 
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occurrences. This may lead to confusion because the term ‘occurrence’ has a special 
meaning in the context of aggregating losses. In fact, it refers to a happening or event 
out of which multiple individual losses originate. Therefore, it appears unfavourable 
to use the term to designate the individual units to be added together. 
2.105 Second, the concept of the reinsured’s deductible and its heterogeneous 
terminology have been discussed. Reinsurance contracts sometimes refer to the re-
insured’s retention or priority instead of its deductible. However, it can be assumed 
that all three terms have the same meaning. Further, it has been analysed that the 
deductible applies to the reinsured’s ultimate net loss which may be composed of 
multiple individual original losses as well as further costs. 
2.106 Third, the concepts of ‘overall cover limit’, ‘sublimit’ and the ‘reinstatement 
of cover’ have been discussed and related to the aggregation of losses. 
2.107 Finally, it has been set out that normally reinsurance contracts provide for 
one single aggregation mechanism that is applicable with regard to both the re-
insured’s deductible and the reinsurer’s cover limit. However, the parties may deviate 
from what is normal and agree on different aggregation mechanisms for the purposes 
of deductible and cover limit.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Features of aggregation clauses and causal requirements   
3.1 In this chapter, it will first be demonstrated that aggregation mechanisms are 
impartial features. At the time the reinsurance contract is negotiated, it is generally 
not predictable to whose benefit they will work. Secondly, it will be outlined that 
multiple individual losses will not be aggregated unless the parties have explicitly 
provided for an aggregation mechanism in their contract. Finally, in the main part 
of the chapter, the unifying concept of causation will be analysed. The effects of the 
different terms used in aggregation clauses on causal requirements, in particular, 
will be examined. It will be argued that the ‘jurisprudential riches’1 on the point 
have not fostered legal certainty regarding the causal requirements in aggregation 
mechanisms. 
I Aggregation clause as an impartial feature 
3.2 An aggregation of losses cannot generally be said to be beneficial to the re-
insured or the reinsurer. Rather, the party in whose interest it is to add together 
multiple individual losses depends on the profile of the losses and the structure of the 
cover.2 In this vein, Lord Mustill noted that ‘the favourable or unfavourable effect of 
[an aggregation] clause (…) may be impossible to determine in advance of the actual 
claims experience’.3 
3.3 Aggregation clauses principally will operate in favour of the reinsured if the 
values of the individual losses fall below the deductible, whereas the aggregate of 
multiple individual losses exceeds the reinsured’s retention and thereby triggers the 
reinsurer’s liability.4 By contrast, an aggregation of losses will be to the reinsurer’s 
benefit if the aggregated loss pierces the cover limit and consequently caps the re-
insurer’s liability.5 Thus, if the aggregation clause ‘qualifies both a deductible clause 
1 Terry O’Neill, Jan Woloniecki and Franziska Arnold-Dwyer, The Law of Reinsurance in England and 
Bermuda (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 2019) para 7–013.  
2 Colin Edelman and Andrew Burns, The Law of Reinsurance (2nd edn, OUP 2013) para 4.53.  
3 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (1996) 1 WLR 1026 (HL) 1035 (Lord Mustill).  
4 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd [1998] EWCA Civ 546, [1998] CLC 957, 967 
(Hobhouse LJ); AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman [2017] UKSC 18; [2018] 1 All ER 936 [14] (Lord Toulson 
SCJ); Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 4.53; O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 1) para 5–096. See 
also Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP, Reinsurance Practice and the Law (Informa Law from Routledge 
2009) para 28.2.  
5 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 4) 967 (Hobhouse LJ); AIG Europe Ltd v 
Woodman (n 4) [14] (Lord Toulson SCJ); Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 4.53; O’Neill, Woloniecki and 
Arnold-Dwyer (n 1) para 5–096. See also Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 4) para 28.2. 
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and a limit clause, it may at times work in favour of the [reinsured] and at other times 
in favour of the [reinsurer]’.6 
3.4 In Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group 
Insurance Co Ltd, Lord Hobhouse, therefore, concluded that the construction of 
aggregation clauses should not be influenced by any need to protect the one party or 
the other. They were, instead, to be construed ‘in a balanced fashion giving effect to 
the words used’.7 
II The parties’ agreement upon an aggregation clause 
3.5 The parties to a reinsurance contract are free to decide whether they want to 
insert an aggregation clause into their agreement. If they omit to expressly provide 
for such a clause, no aggregation will be possible.8 
3.6 More specifically, in Mabey and Johnson Ltd v Ecclesiastical Insurance Office 
Plc, the Commercial Court held that an implication of an aggregation clause was 
impossible because even in the absence of aggregation language the policy was 
‘clear and certain’.9 Further, the parties cannot be taken to have intended to 
‘change the nature of the insurance’ by implicitly agreeing on an aggregation 
clause. Moreover, there exists a variety of different aggregation clauses ‘all of 
which are broadly designed to achieve the same result but which differ con-
siderably in their detail’.10 Hence, even if an implication were generally possible, it 
would by no means be clear what mechanism should be implied.11 Similarly, the 
Commercial Court noted that it was sheer impossible to imply an aggregation 
clause by trade usage or market practice due to the number of different possible 
aggregation mechanisms.12 
6 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd [2003] UKHL 48, 
[2003] 4 All ER 43 [30] (Lord Hobhouse).  
7 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [30] (Lord 
Hobhouse); Mark Cannon, ‘When Two Become One: Aggregation of Claims in Professional 
Indemnity Insurance’ (IMC Insurance Market Conferences 2012) para 24 <http://imc-seminars.com/ 
uploads/papers/Mark%20Cannon%20QC%20Paper.pdf> accessed 24 March 2020.  
8 Mabey and Johnson Ltd v Ecclesiastical Insurance Office Plc [2000] CLC 1570 (Comm) 1573 f (Morison 
J), where professional indemnity insurance was concerned and it was held that no ‘series provision’ was 
to be implied. It is notable that the suggested series provision read: the insurer’s liability was limited in 
the aggregate during that policy year to £2m in respect of ‘all claims arising out of the same act of 
negligent omission or error or a series of such acts consequent upon or attributable to the same cause 
or original source (…)’. The clause under scrutiny appears to be a series provision as well as an 
aggregation clause; John Birds, Ben Lynch and Simon Paul, MacGillivray on Insurance Law (14th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2018) para 30–060; Robert M Merkin, Laura Hodgson and Peter J Tyldesley, 
Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (Sweet & Maxwell 2019) para 11–321.  
9 Mabey and Johnson Ltd v Ecclesiastical Insurance Office Plc (n 8) 1573 f (Morison J). It has been 
repeatedly held that a term may only be implied into a contract if without it the contract would not be 
workable, see for instance Associated Japanese Bank (International) Ltd v Credit Du Nord SA [1988] 1 
WLR 255 (Comm) 263 (Steyn J); Concord Trust v The Law Debenture Trust Corp Plc [2005] UKHL 27, 
[2005] 1 WLR 1591 [37] (Lord Scott).  
10 Mabey and Johnson Ltd v Ecclesiastical Insurance Office Plc (n 8) 1574 (Morison J).  
11 Mabey and Johnson Ltd v Ecclesiastical Insurance Office Plc (n 8) 1574 (Morison J).  
12 Mabey and Johnson Ltd v Ecclesiastical Insurance Office Plc (n 8) 1574 (Morison J). 
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3.7 Likewise, where the contract of reinsurance expressly provides for an ag-
gregation clause based on which a series of losses are to be aggregated, ‘the nature 
of the unifying factor’, ie the ‘factors which make them (…) a series must [generally] 
be expressed (…)’.13 In this context, ‘it may sometimes be necessary to imply a 
unifying factor’.14 
3.8 However, in Glencore International AG v Alpina Co Ltd, it was held obiter 
that the simple word ‘loss’ may itself be an indication that the contract provides 
for an aggregation mechanism. The Commercial Court suggested that where 
‘several losses are related–as, for example, where an arsonist sets fire to two 
adjacent tanks in the course of a single attack’ even in the absence of aggregation 
language, these losses may have to be regarded as one single loss.15 The court 
explained that such losses might have to be aggregated based on ‘the unifying 
factor (…) that the loss occurred on one occasion in the course of a single en-
terprise’.16 In light of Mabey and Johnson Ltd v Ecclesiastical Insurance Office 
Plc,17 this is remarkable.18 
3.9 Butler and Merkin seem to support the view expressed by the Commercial 
Court’s in Glencore International AG v Alpina Co Ltd. They opine that where a 
policy of insurance or reinsurance contained no aggregation clause, ‘the overall 
structure of the agreement [would] determine’ whether multiple individual losses 
were to be aggregated.19 In their opinion, aggregation language is not ne-
cessarily required to provide for an aggregation mechanism in a contract of 
reinsurance. 
3.10 In summary, the parties to a reinsurance contract cannot generally be taken 
to have agreed on an aggregation mechanism if they have not expressly provided for 
an aggregation clause in their reinsurance contract. By contrast, if they have pro-
vided for an aggregation clause, the aggregation clause’s exact mode of operation, ie 
the workings of the mechanism, may–depending on the circumstances–be implied 
into a contract of reinsurance. Furthermore, even if a reinsurance policy initially 
does not appear to contain aggregation language, courts might unexpectedly identify 
an aggregation agreement. 
13 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [26] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
14 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [26] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
15 Glencore International AG v Alpina Insurance Co Ltd [2003] EWHC 2792 (Comm), [2004] 1 All ER 766 
[292] (Moore-Bick J).  
16 Glencore International AG v Alpina Insurance Co Ltd (n 15) [293] (Moore-Bick J).  
17 Mabey and Johnson Ltd v Ecclesiastical Insurance Office Plc (n 8) 1570 (Morison J), where the policy in 
question was an ‘each and every claim’ policy. In fact, if the word ‘loss’ is capable of containing an 
aggregation mechanism, the word ‘claim’ might equally be.  
18 Instead of arguing that the word ‘loss’ itself incorporated an aggregation mechanism into the contract, 
the Commercial Court could have argued that the attack only produced one single loss so that nothing 
had to be aggregated. For more details as to the what constitutes one single loss, see paras 2.26 ff.  
19 John Butler and Robert Merkin, Butler and Merkin’s Reinsurance Law, vol 2 (Looseleaf, Sweet & 
Maxwell) para C–0251. 
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III Aggregation and the concept of causation 
3.11 In Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd, Rix LJ stated that 
aggregation mechanisms determined whether it was appropriate to regard multiple 
individual losses as constituting a single loss for the purposes of aggregation under a 
specific policy.20 This largely depended on whether they each are sufficiently linked 
to a unifying factor by being causally connected with it.21 
3.12 The concept of causation and its role in the subject matter of aggregation is 
analysed below. 
1 Causation in general 
3.13 The concept of causation has stimulated much philosophical literature.22 It is 
a complex concept that, in law as in life, is contextually variable.23 In fact, causation 
is not one single, static concept ‘to be mechanically applied without regard to the 
context in which the question arises’.24 As Lord Hoffmann underlines, causal re-
quirements are ‘creatures of the law’ and the causal requirement of one rule may 
differ from that of another.25 
3.14 In Environment Agency (formerly National Rivers Authority) v Empress Car 
Co (Abertillery) Ltd, Lord Hoffmann, therefore, stated that ‘one cannot give a 
common sense answer to a question of causation for the purpose of attributing re-
sponsibility under some rule without knowing the purpose and scope of the rule’.26 
As a consequence, he said, it was necessary to first identify the scope of the relevant 
rule before answering questions about causation.27 Determining the relevant stan-
dard of causation in a specific case ‘is not a question of common sense fact’ but 
rather one of law.28 
3.15 Determining causal requirements in the context of the aggregation of mul-
tiple individual losses, therefore, depends on the purpose and the scope of an ag-
gregation clause.29 
20 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 688, [2003] 2 All ER 190 [68] 
(Rix LJ).  
21 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [68] (Rix LJ).  
22 For further references, see O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 1) para 7–015.  
23 US v Oberhellmann (1991) 946 F2d 50 (United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit) 53.  
24 Regina v Kennedy (No 2) [2007] UKHL 38, [2007] 1 AC 269 [15].  
25 Rt Hon Lord Hoffmann, ‘Causation’ in Richard Goldberg (ed), Perspectives on Causation (Hart 
Publishing 2011) 9.  
26 Environment Agency (formerly National Rivers Authority) v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd [1999] 2 
AC 22 (HL) 31 (Lord Hoffmann).  
27 Environment Agency (formerly National Rivers Authority) v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd (n 26) 
31 (Lord Hoffmann).  
28 Environment Agency (formerly National Rivers Authority) v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd (n 26) 
31 (Lord Hoffmann).  
29 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [68] (Rix LJ). 
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2 Purpose and scope of an aggregation clause 
3.16 In Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group 
Insurance Co Ltd, the House of Lords endorsed the Commercial Court’s observation 
that the purpose of an aggregation clause was ‘to enable two or more separate losses 
covered by the policy to be treated as a single loss for deductible or other purposes 
when they are linked by a unifying factor of some kind’.30 
3.17 In Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd, the Court of Appeal 
noted that the function of an aggregation clause was ‘to police the imposition of a 
limit by treating a plurality of linked losses as if they were one loss. For this purpose 
the losses [had] to be identified by a unifying concept (…)’.31 
3.18 As a synthesis of these two judicial observations, it may be said that aggregation 
clauses provide a mechanism to add together multiple individual losses to form one single 
aggregated loss. This mechanism is primarily characterised by a ‘unifying factor’ or 
‘unifying concept’ agreed upon by the parties.32 The unifying concept inherent in event-33 
and cause-based34 aggregation mechanisms is one of causation. 
3.19 It should be noted that there is not just one single unifying concept. Rather, 
the parties to a contract of reinsurance may tailor a unifying concept to their needs. 
Varying unifying concepts generally differ in their causal requirements.35 
3.20 In Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co Ltd, Rix LJ observed that the scope 
and purpose of the specific event-based aggregation clause concerned was defined by 
its wording and particularly the phrase ‘arising out of one event’. He elaborated that a 
plurality of losses was to be aggregated only if they could be sufficiently linked to a 
single unifying event by being casually connected with it. From this, he inferred that ‘[t] 
he aggregation function of such a clause is antagonistic to a weak or loose causal 
relationship between the losses and the required unifying single event’.36 
3.21 Consequently, ‘[t]he choice of language by which the parties designate the 
unifying [concept] in an aggregation clause is (…) of critical importance and can 
be expected to be the subject of careful negotiation’.37 
30 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [14] (Lord 
Hoffmann). See also Spire Healthcare Ltd v Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance Plc [2018] EWCA Civ 
317, [2018] Lloyd’s Rep IR 425 [23] (Simon LJ).  
31 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [12] (Rix LJ).  
32 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [14] (Lord 
Hoffmann); Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [12] (Rix LJ).  
33 See, for instance, Caudle v Sharp [1995] CLC 642 (CA) 648 (Evans LJ).  
34 See, for instance, American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd [1996] 1 LRLR 407 (Comm) 414 
(Moore-Bick J).  
35 Cf Ken Louw and Deborah Tompkinson, ‘Curiouser and Curiouser: The Meaning of “Event”’ (1996) 
4 International Insurance Law Review 6, 11. Cf also American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd 
(n 34) 414 (Moore-Bick J).  
36 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [68] (Rix LJ).  
37 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [17] (Lord 
Hoffmann). 
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3.22 The factors determining the causal requirements in a specific case are dis-
cussed below. 
IV Factors determining causal requirements 
1 Starting point 
3.23 Typically, aggregation clauses define the relevant loss for making a claim 
under the contract of reinsurance. They define the term ‘loss’ as the sum of each and 
every loss ‘arising out of one event’38 or ‘consequent on or attributable to one source 
or original cause’.39 It can be inferred from this that aggregation clauses generally 
consist of four elements.  
1. First, they mention ‘each and every loss’ and thereby refer to the individual 
losses to be aggregated.40  
2. Secondly, they mention a unifying factor, such as ‘event’ or ‘original cause’, 
which provokes the individual losses to be aggregated.  
3. Thirdly, they contain linking phrases41 such as ‘arising out of’ or ‘consequent 
on or attributable to’. Linking phrases indicate the relation between the 
unifying factor (no 2) and each individual loss to be aggregated (no 1).  
4. Finally, they provide that the ‘loss’ as defined in the contract of reinsurance 
is the product of aggregating individual losses in accordance with the 
defined aggregation mechanism. The notion of ‘loss’ refers to the reinsured’s 
so-called ‘ultimate net loss’.42 
3.24 The unifying factors43 and linking phrases44 both contribute to the 
determination of the causal requirements inherent in an aggregation mechanism.45 
2 Unifying factors 
3.25 If the parties to a reinsurance contract agree to provide for an ag-
gregation mechanism, they will generally also agree on a unifying factor of some  
38 For instance, Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 644.  
39 For instance, Spire Healthcare Ltd v Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance Plc (n 30) [3] (Simon LJ).  
40 See paras 2.18 ff.  
41 The term ‘linking phrase’ has been chosen in accordance with Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace 
European Group [2012] EWHC 104 (Comm), [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 655 [262] (Eder J), where it is 
termed ‘description of the link’; Clyde and Co, ‘Aggregation Words’ (The Insurance Hub, 26 April 
2016) 1 ff <https://clydeco.com/uploads/Blogs/employment/Aggregation_Words_-_Clyde__Co.pdf> 
accessed 24 March 2020, refer to the link as ‘connecting words’.  
42 See paras 2.11 ff; it is to be noted that the reinsured’s ‘ultimate net loss’ generally comprises expenses 
incurred in settling a claim under the underlying contract.  
43 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1035 (Lord Mustill); Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 648 (Evans LJ); 
Louw and Tompkinson (n 35) 11.  
44 Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace European Group (n 41) [262] (Eder J); Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance 
Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd [2013] EWHC 154 (Comm), [2013] 2 All ER 231 [21] 
(Field J); Cannon (n 7) para 49.  
45 James Roberts, ‘Aggregation Triggers: The Wait Continues’ (The Insurance Hub, 20 April 2016) <https:// 
clydeco.com/blog/insurance-hub/article/aggregation-triggers-the-wait-continues> accessed 24 March 2020; 
Clyde and Co (n 41). 
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kind.46 In Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance 
Co Ltd, Lord Hoffmann observed that ‘[t]he choice of language by which the parties 
designate the unifying factor in an aggregation clause is (…) of critical importance and 
can be expected to be the subject of careful negotiation’.47 In the same vein, Lord Mustill 
in Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field stated that he believed that when construing an 
aggregation clause, ‘the only safe course is to fall back on the words actually used, and 
to read them as they stand’.48 Yet, Merkin notes that it should not be assumed that a 
single one of the terms used to describe unifying factors bore a consistent meaning across 
multiple policies or even within the same policy as there was a tendency by those who 
drafted insurance policies to use different words interchangeably and the same word in 
different ways.49 
3.26 In any case, it is said that the words chosen to designate an aggregation 
clause’s unifying factor have a significant bearing on the causal requirements 
between the individual losses to be aggregated and the unifying factor. 
Classically, contracts of (re-)insurance provide for unifying factors such as 
‘event’,50 ‘originating cause’ or ‘original cause’51, respectively.52 A variety of 
46 Cf Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 4.52.  
47 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [17] (Lord 
Hoffmann). See also Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 4.54.  
48 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1036 (Lord Mustill).  
49 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 8) para 11–320.  
50 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 644 (Evans LJ); American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd (n 34) 412 ff 
(Moore-Bick J); Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1031 f (Lord Mustill); Brown (RE) v GIO 
Insurance Ltd [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 201 (CA) 202 (Waller LJ); Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star 
Insurance Co Ltd [2003] EWHC 1771 (Comm), [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 22 [13] (Steel J). See Appendix to 
Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 343 (CA), [1998] CLC 870; Scott v 
The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [6]–[7] (Rix LJ); Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance 
Co (UK) Ltd [2009] EWHC 2787 (Comm), [2009] 2 CLC 706 [30] (Gross J); IRB Brasil Resseguros SA 
v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd [2010] EWHC 974 (Comm), [2010] Lloyd’s Rep IR 560 [11] (Burton J); Aioi 
Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 44) [2] (Field J); MIC 
Simmonds v Gammell [2016] EWHC 2515 (Comm), [2016] Lloyd’s Rep IR 693 [7] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
51 Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd [1995] CLC 671 (CA) 679 (Sir Thomas Bingham); Municipal 
Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 4) 959 (Hobhouse LJ); Countrywide Assured Group Plc 
v Marshall [2002] EWHC 2082 (Comm), [2003] 1 All ER 237 [3] (Morison J); Lloyd’s TSB General 
Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [12] (Lord Hoffmann); Standard 
Life Assurance Ltd v Oak Dedicated Ltd [2008] EWHC 222 (Comm), [2008] 2 All ER 916 [14] 
(Tomlinson J); Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace European Group (n 41) [255] (Eder J); Tokio Marine 
Europe Insurance Ltd v Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd [2014] EWHC 2105 (Comm), [2014] Lloyd’s 
Rep IR 638 [8] (Field J); AIG Europe Ltd v OC320301 LLP [2016] EWCA Civ 367, Lloyd’s Rep IR 289 
[8] (Longmore LJ); Spire Healthcare Ltd v Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance Plc (n 30) [3] (Simon LJ).  
52 Deborah Tompkinson, ‘Reinsurance: “Originating Cause” and “Event”’ (1995) 3 International 
Insurance Law Review 82; Louw and Tompkinson (n 35) 6 ff; Jonathan Wright, ‘Defining the Word 
“Event” in a Reinsurance Policy’ (1997) 5 International Insurance Law Review 361; Barlow Lyde 
and Gilbert LLP (n 4) paras 28.7 ff, 28.37 ff; Kiran Soar, ‘Interpretation of Wordings Key to Settling 
Aggregation Claims’ [2010] LLID 7; Darlene K Alt, Nathan Hull and James Killelea, ‘A Reinsurance 
Perspective: The Aggregation of Losses Following the Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami’ (2011) 22 
Mealey’s Litigation Report 1, 2; Rob Merkin, ‘The Christchurch Earthquakes Insurance and 
Reinsurance Issues’ (2012) 18 Canterbury Law Review 119, 145; Edelman and Burns (n 2) paras 4.52 
ff, 4.59 ff; Clyde and Co (n 41) 8 ff, 10 ff; Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 8) paras 11–324 ff, 
11–335. 
FACTORS DETERMINING CAUSAL REQUIREMENTS 
57 
other terms such as ‘occurrence’,53 ‘accident’,54 ‘act or omission’,55 ‘cata-
strophe’,56 ‘disaster’57 and ‘calamity’58 are also sometimes mentioned in the 
context of aggregation. Therefore, the meanings associated with these terms in the 
context of aggregation are discussed below. 
2.1 Event 
3.27 It may be noted that the term ‘event’ is used in a variety of different contexts. 
The meaning of the word may change depending on the purpose it has in a given 
context.59 In the following examination, focus is placed on the meaning of the term 
for aggregation purposes. 
3.28 In Caudle v Sharp, Evans LJ stated that ‘[t]he Second World War, the One 
Hundred Years War and even the Ice Age’ could all properly be said to be ‘events’. 
He pointed out, however, that these were not ‘relevant events’ as it could not 
realistically be said that this kind of events was referred to in the aggregation clause 
concerned.60 
3.29 Evans LJ opined that a relevant event comprised three elements: First, there 
needed to be a common factor which could properly be described as an event. 
Secondly, a causal link between the individual losses to be aggregated and this 
common factor was required. Thirdly, the said event should not be too remote from 
the individual losses, ie the causative link between the individual losses and the re-
levant event should not be too weak.61 
53 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 664 (Comm); Mann v 
Lexington Insurance Co [2000] CLC 1409 (CA).  
54 The South Staffordshire Tramways Co Ltd v The Sickness and Accident Assurance Association Ltd 
[1891] 1 QB 402 (CA). For an American policy using the unifying factor of ‘accident’, see National 
Liability and Fire Insurance Co v Itzkowitz [2015] 624 FedAppx 758 (United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit) 759 f.  
55 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [12] (Lord 
Hoffmann); Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Oak Dedicated Ltd (n 51) [14] (Tomlinson J); Standard Life 
Assurance Ltd v Ace European Group (n 41) [255] (Eder J); AIG Europe Ltd v OC320301 LLP (n 51) [8] 
(Longmore LJ); AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [1] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
56 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 644 (Evans LJ); Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1031 f (Lord Mustill); 
Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 50) 873 (Hobhouse LJ); IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX 
Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 50) [11] (Burton J).  
57 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 644 (Evans LJ); Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1031 f (Lord Mustill); 
Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 50) 873 (Hobhouse LJ); IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX 
Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 50) [11] (Burton J).  
58 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 644 (Evans LJ); Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1031 f (Lord Mustill); 
Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 50) 873 (Hobhouse LJ); IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX 
Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 50) [11] (Burton J).  
59 Butler and Merkin (n 19) para C–0230.  
60 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 648 (Evans LJ).  
61 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 648 (Evans LJ). 
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a Proper description of what can be described as event 
3.30 If the only unifying factor available is something that cannot properly be 
described as an event, then the individual losses are not to be aggregated under an 
event-based aggregation mechanism.62 It is, therefore, important to consider what 
can properly be termed an ‘event’. 
3.31 In Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field, Lord Mustill famously characterised an 
event as ‘something which happens at a particular time, at a particular place, in a parti-
cular way’.63 In the context of natural disasters, tsunamis,64 earthquakes65 and hurri-
canes66 may constitute events. Events may, however, also be man-made. In fact, the 
hijacking of an aircraft,67 a terror attack,68 an invasion of a country and seizure of its 
property,69 the negligent underwriting of an insurance policy,70 the destruction of property 
belonging to a third party,71 the issuance of a speed restriction on a railway network72 as 
well as a faulty installation of a window73 have been considered events. In light of these 
cases, an event is something which of itself provokes one or multiple losses.74 
3.32 By contrast, it has been held that a plan,75 a decision,76 a state of 
affairs,77 a state of ignorance,78 the lack of proper training of selling personnel,79 the 
62 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [62] (Rix LJ). See also Caudle v Sharp 
(n 33) 648 f (Evans LJ); Butler and Merkin (n 19) para C–0221.  
63 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1035 (Lord Mustill).  
64 See, for instance, Alt, Hull and Killelea (n 52).  
65 See, for instance, Alt, Hull and Killelea (n 52); Merkin (n 52) 147. For a case to this extent, see Moore v 
IAG New Zealand Ltd [2019] NZHC 1549, [2020] Lloyd’s Rep IR 167.  
66 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 648 f (Evans LJ).  
67 See, for instance, Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 44).  
68 MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 50).  
69 See, for instance, Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 53).  
70 See, for instance, Caudle v Sharp (n 33).  
71 See, for instance, Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK 
(n 53); Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 4); Mann v Lexington Insurance Co (n 53).  
72 Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (n 50).  
73 Seele Austria GmbH Co v Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd [2009] EWHC 255 (TCC), [2009] 
BLR 261.  
74 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 649 (Evans LJ); American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd (n 34). It is to 
be noted, however, that the reinsurance agreement in question was only concerned with events ‘af-
fecting’ underlying policies; Butler and Merkin (n 19) para C–0235.  
75 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 53); 
Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (n 50) [97] (Steel J); Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance 
Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 44) [20] (Field J).  
76 Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (n 50) [97] (Steel J). It may be noted, however, that in 
the Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 53), the 
arbitral tribunal considered the carrying out of a decision to blow up three aircraft one event. Similarly, in 
IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 50) [46] (Burton J), it has been held that the 
determination each year to carry out its installation activities using asbestos was to be considered an event.  
77 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1035 (Lord Mustill); Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star 
Insurance Co Ltd (n 50) [98] (Steel J); Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 8) para 11–326.  
78 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 649 (Evans LJ).  
79 Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 51) [15] (Steel J). 
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misunderstanding as to the results of a discussion80 or the failure of putting in place 
an adequate system to protect stored goods81 could not properly be described as 
events for the purposes of aggregation. 
3.33 Furthermore, it appears to be controversial whether an omission can be 
considered an event.82 In Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co Ltd, referring to 
Caudle v Sharp, Rix LJ stated that ‘a negligent omission could not be an “event”’.83 
A closer look at the judgment in Caudle v Sharp reveals, however, that this general 
proposition is not supported by the Court of Appeal’s decision. In Caudle v Sharp, 
the Court of Appeal held that an underwriter’s ‘blind spot’ or ‘his failure to conduct 
the necessary research and investigation’ into a risk did not constitute an event as ‘it 
did not constitute a negligent omission until [he] underwrote a relevant policy of 
insurance’. His liability was only triggered once he entered into a contract of in-
surance and no event had occurred until he became liable.84 
3.34 Yet, a negligent omission may, in certain circumstances, directly trigger 
liability. In Forney v Dominion Insurance Co Ltd, Donaldson J considered a case 
where a solicitor was liable towards two clients. Each of his clients had claims 
against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor. It was the solicitor’s duty to issue a 
writ or writs and initiate proceedings on their behalf against the estate of the 
deceased within a certain deadline. Yet, the solicitor had failed to so do. The 
question before the court was whether the solicitor’s omissions to begin pro-
ceedings on behalf of each client against the estate of the deceased constituted 
one or two occurrences. As the solicitor could have issued one single writ for 
both clients, Donaldson J stated that the failure to issue a writ for the clients 
constituted a single occurrence.85 In this respect, Louw and Tompkinson sug-
gest that there were two different types of omissions. First, there was a pure 
omission which itself and without any further requirement of positive action 
caused harm. The failure to issue a writ was an omission of this type.86 
Secondly, there was a dormant omission which did not itself cause harm but 
rather required some further positive act or event in order to trigger the harm. 
An underwriter’s failure to conduct the necessary research before entering into a  
80 Cf Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 650, where Evans LJ stated, obiter, that the misinformation of an underwriter 
as to the scale of the asbestosis problem could be regarded as a causative event. It was, however, not a 
relevant event because it was too remote from the individual losses; American Centennial Insurance Co 
v INSCO Ltd (n 34) 414 (Moore-Bick J). Contrast, Seele Austria GmbH Co v Tokio Marine Europe 
Insurance Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 441 [56], where Moore-Bick LJ seems to have suggested, obiter, that 
‘giving the workman wrong instructions’ could be considered a single relevant event.  
81 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 4) 967 (Hobhouse LJ).  
82 Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 4.55, argue that an omission cannot be an event; Louw and 
Tompkinson (n 35) 10, opine that an omission may–under certain circumstances–be considered an 
event.  
83 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [59] (Rix LJ).  
84 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 649 (Evans LJ).  
85 Forney v Dominion Insurance Co Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 928 (QB) 933 (Donaldson J).  
86 Louw and Tompkinson (n 35) 11. 
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contract does not itself cause harm. However, by taking the further action of 
entering into an insurance contract in his state of ignorance, the underwriter 
may cause harm.87 Thus, Louw and Tompkinson argue that a pure omission can 
be an event for the purposes of aggregation, whereas a dormant omission 
cannot.88 This approach seems to be more nuanced than the one promoted in 
Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co Ltd.89 
3.35 Whether one or two events can be said to have occurred in a given case 
essentially depends on the viewpoint of the observer.90 This was illustrated by the 
arbitral tribunal in the Dawson’s Field Arbitration: 
The crews of a submarine and of ships which are attacked and sunk in a convoy would no doubt 
regard each attack and sinking as a separate occurrence. An admiral at Naval Headquarters 
might regard the whole attack and its results as one occurrence; a historian almost certainly 
would.91  
3.36 In Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK, this proposition was 
refined. It was held that ‘the matter must be scrutinised from the point of view of an 
informed observer placed in the position of the assured’.92 Hence, Rix J clarified and 
the Commercial Court in Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and 
Advent Capital Ltd confirmed that it was not the viewpoint of any observer but the 
one of the involved primary insured that had to be considered in determining the 
number of events in a given case.93 
3.37 In any case, not every event may be a relevant event for the purposes of 
aggregation.94 In the search for a relevant event, one is to move back on the 
chains of causation culminating in the individual losses to be aggregated. Yet, 
for the purposes of aggregation, the ‘infinite reach of the workings of causation’ 
needs to be limited.95 Evans LJ’s second and third element deal with this 
limitation.96 
87 Louw and Tompkinson (n 35) 11.  
88 Louw and Tompkinson (n 35) 11.  
89 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [59] (Rix LJ).  
90 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 53).  
91 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 53).  
92 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 53).  
93 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 53); Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v 
Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 44) [31] (Field J). It is to be noted, however, that Barlow 
Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 4) para 28.6, seem not to make a distinction between the viewpoint of an 
ordinary observer and the point of view of an observer placed in the shoes of the primary insured.  
94 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 648 (Evans LJ); Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [63] 
(Rix LJ). Cf also American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd (n 34) 413, where Moore-Bick J held 
that an event ‘is not necessarily a relevant event for the purposes of art. VIII (…) which is concerned 
only with events, which affect policies issued by the reinsured’.  
95 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [63] (Rix LJ).  
96 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 648 (Evans LJ). 
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b Causative link and lack of remoteness 
3.38 As to the second and third element of the concept of event, Evans LJ explained 
that an event did not have to be the proximate cause of individual losses.97 He opined 
that ‘[s]ome wider test of causation’ was to be applied.98 Yet, the relevant event should 
not be too remote from the individual losses to be aggregated.99 
3.39 In Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd, it was held that the 
function of the concept of remoteness was to separate relevant events from the irre-
levant ones.100 Rix LJ acknowledged, however, that ‘the use of this tool is somewhat 
opaque’.101 He elaborated that even though the causal requirements were looser than 
those of proximate cause, courts should ‘look for a nearer and more relevant cause 
[rather] than for a more distant one’.102 In other words, he suggested that the causative 
links between the individual losses to be aggregated and the relevant event had to be ‘a 
significant rather than a weak one’.103 In the same vein, he declared that the function 
of an event-based aggregation clause was ‘antagonistic to a weak or loose causal re-
lationship between the losses and the required unifying single event’.104 
3.40 Yet, describing the required causal link as a significant rather than a 
weak or loose one still appears to be very vague and inappropriate for a clear 
standard of causal requirements in event-based aggregation mechanisms. In Scott v 
The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co Ltd, the Court of Appeal seems to have shared this 
view when it attempted to gain more precision in formulating the following rule: 
The relevant event is the one event which should be regarded as the cause of [the individual 
losses to be aggregated] so as to make it appropriate to regard these losses as constituting for 
the purposes of aggregation under this policy one loss.105 
97 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 648 (Evans LJ). It is to be noted, however, that by contrast to the predominant 
view, the Court of Appeal did not consider the notions of ‘event’ and ‘occurrence’ to be inter-
changeable. On the contrary, it noted that because the term ‘occurrence’ was capable of meaning the 
operation of the insured peril and, thus, could be said to be the individual losses’ proximate cause and 
that this occurrence had itself arisen out of the relevant ‘event’, the causal relationship between the 
individual losses to be aggregated and the relevant event could not be one of proximate cause.  
98 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 648 (Evans LJ). In Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 53), it 
was consequently held that an event was not the same thing as a peril.  
99 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 648 (Evans LJ); Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 53).  
100 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [63] (Rix LJ). See also Barlow Lyde 
and Gilbert LLP (n 4) para 28.13.  
101 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [63] (Rix LJ).  
102 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [63] (Rix LJ).  
103 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [63] (Rix LJ). See also MIC Simmonds v 
Gammell (n 50) [30] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
104 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [68] (Rix LJ).  
105 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [68] (Rix LJ). In MIC Simmonds v Gammell 
(n 50) [29], Sir Jeremy Cooke held that the so-called unities test was ‘an aid in determining whether 
the circumstances of the losses involve[d] such a degree of unity as to justify their being described as 
“arising out of one occurrence”’. More specifically, in Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co 
SAK (n 53), Rix J stated that the losses’ circumstances must be scrutinised to see whether they involve 
such a degree of unity as to justify their being described as, or as arising out of, one occurrence. ‘In 
assessing the degree of unity’, he held that ‘regard may be had to such factors as cause, locality and 
time and the intentions of human agents’. Yet, the unities test also involves a great deal of judgment 
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3.41 However, this rule appears to be circular. In fact, the assessment of whether 
the aggregation of multiple losses is appropriate should not be used to determine the 
standard of causation required in a specific case. The standard of causal require-
ments should be informative as to whether it is appropriate to aggregate multiple 
individual losses in a given case. 
3.42 In Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK, the Commercial Court 
exemplified the question of appropriateness. Rix J noted that an event was ‘not the 
same thing as a peril’ but that in determining the relevant event ‘one may properly 
have regard to the context of the perils insured against’.106 He elaborated that when 
the insured peril was the peril of war it was appropriate to describe the relevant event 
in broader terms.107 Hence, the appropriateness of aggregating a plurality of individual 
losses may depend on the description of the peril (re-)insured against in the policy. 
3.43 Yet, determining the relevant event by assessing the appropriateness of 
adding together multiple individual losses lowers any meaningful standard of causal 
requirements and exposes causal requirements in event-based aggregation mechan-
isms to pure exercises of judgment.108 
3.44 In summary, it appears undisputed that the unifying factor of event contributes 
towards defining the causal requirements in event-based aggregation mechanisms. A 
meaningful standard of causal requirements can, however, not be deduced from the 
decisions on that point.109 Consequently, there seems to be no legal certainty as to the 
causal requirements associated with the unifying factor of event.110 
2.2 ‘Originating cause’ and ‘original cause’ 
3.45 Contracts of reinsurance sometimes aggregate on the basis of an ‘originating 
cause or source’ or ‘one source or original cause’.111 There appears to be no 
difference between the two variations of the unifying factor.112 
and cannot offer any legal certainty as to the causal requirements in event-based aggregation me-
chanisms. The unities test is discussed in greater detail below, see paras 4.14 ff.  
106 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 53).  
107 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 53).  
108 Cf Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [81] (Rix LJ); MIC Simmonds v Gammell 
(n 50) [28], [33], [36], [39] (Sir Jeremy Cooke). For more details on whether determining an event 
comes down to an exercise of judgment, see paras 4.81 ff. 
109 According to Merkin (n 52) 146, ‘[t]he cases on “event” are borderline and often give rise to dis-
agreements between first instance and appellate judges’.  
110 Cf Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [68] (Rix LJ).  
111 In respect of the term ‘originating cause or source’, see Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1032 
(Lord Mustill); Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd (n 51) 679 (Sir Thomas Bingham); Standard Life 
Assurance Ltd v Oak Dedicated Ltd (n 51) [14] (Tomlinson J); Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace 
European Group (n 41) [255] (Eder J). For the phrase ‘one source or original cause’, see Municipal 
Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd [1996] CLC 1515 (Comm) 959 (Hobhouse LJ); 
Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 51) [3] (Morison J). See also generally Robert M 
Merkin, A Guide to Reinsurance Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2007) 282; Barlow Lyde 
and Gilbert LLP (n 4) paras 28.37 ff; Edelman and Burns (n 2) para 4.59; Merkin, Hodgson and 
Tyldesley (n 8) para 11–335.  
112 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 4) 967 (Hobhouse LJ). Cf also 
Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 51) [15] (Morison J); Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP 
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3.46 In a similar fashion to the discussion about the unifying factor of event, it 
will first be dealt with what can properly be described as a cause in the context of 
cause-based aggregation mechanisms.113 Thereafter, causal requirements asso-
ciated with the unifying factors of ‘originating cause’ and ‘original cause’ will be 
analysed. 
a Proper description of what can be described as cause 
3.47 In Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field, Lord Mustill famously compared the 
unifying factors of event and cause. He explained that 
[t]he contrast is between ‘originating’ coupled with ‘cause’ (…) and ‘event’ (…). In [his] 
opinion these expressions are not at all the same (…). In ordinary speech, an event is 
something which happens at a particular time, at a particular place, in a particular way (…). 
A cause is to [his] mind something altogether less constricted. It can be a continuing state of 
affairs; it can be the absence of something happening.114  
3.48 In Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall, for instance, the 
Commercial Court dealt with a case where an insurance company had become 
liable to its customers for misselling pensions. As a preliminary issue, it was to be 
determined ‘whether on the proper construction of the [insurance policy], all the 
misselling claims (…) fall to be treated as one claim for the purposes of applying 
the limit of indemnity (…)’.115 Morison J opined that a cause was ‘not just 
“something altogether less constricted”’ than an event as Lord Mustill had sug-
gested. Rather, the term ‘cause’ fulfilled a different function. More specifically, he 
argued that the term ‘event’ described what had happened, whereas the word 
‘cause’ described why something had happened.116 The reason for the cases of 
misselling, he declared, was ‘the lack of proper training of the selling agents and 
employees’.117 Accordingly, Morison J concluded that the original cause, based 
on which an aggregation of all the misselling losses was possible, consisted of a 
lack of training. 
3.49 In Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd, the reinsured, 
Municipal Mutual Insurance, insured the Port of Sunderland. One of the latter’s 
customers stored cranes at the port. Over a period of some three years, the cranes 
were vandalised in a succession of individual acts of pilferage for which the port was 
held liable.118 Among the issues before the court was the question whether the losses 
resulting from these individual acts of pilferage could be aggregated and presented to 
the reinsurers as one single loss. Hobhouse LJ held that the individual losses resulted 
from one original cause, which was the port’s lack of an ‘adequate system to protect 
(n 4) para 28.49; Edelman and Burns (n 2) paras 4.59 ff. See also Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 8) 
para 11–335.  
113 For a discussion of the unifying factor of ‘source’, see paras 3.81 f.  
114 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1035 (Lord Mustill).  
115 Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 51) [5] (Morison J).  
116 Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 51) [15] (Morison J). See also Merkin (n 52) 145.  
117 Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 51) [15] (Morison J).  
118 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 4) 961 (Hobhouse LJ). 
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the goods from pilferage and vandalism’.119 Consequently, the lack of an adequate 
system to protect the goods from pilferage was the original cause based on which all 
the individual losses that occurred within one policy period were to be aggregated. 
3.50 In the same vein, in American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO, the 
Commercial Court stated, obiter, that ‘where several people reach a common culp-
able misunderstanding as the result of discussions between them on which they all 
subsequently act it might be possible, depending on the facts of the case, to find in 
their discussions a single originating cause’ of multiple negligent acts.120 In other 
words, if the misunderstanding of multiple people has one single origin such as a 
discussion, this origin may be considered the originating cause for all the negligent 
acts and omissions that are committed based on the misunderstanding. 
3.51 As an originating or original cause can lie in a state of affairs,121 it might 
arguably also consist in a plan,122 a decision123 or a state of ignorance.124 Generally, 
original or originating causes can be seen in any common origin of multiple in-
dividual losses to be aggregated.125 It has even been suggested that the ‘susceptibility 
of New Zealand to earthquakes could potentially be an originating cause’.126 This is 
supported by Lord Mustill’s analysis that the word ‘originating’ ‘opens up the widest 
possible search for a unifying factor in the history of the losses which it is sought to 
aggregate’.127 
3.52 Although the unifying factor of cause may be considered a lot wider than the 
unifying factor of event,128 the Court of Appeal held in Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance 
Ltd that in some circumstances the terms ‘event’ and ‘cause’ may well refer ‘precisely 
to the same thing, or at least to no different conclusion so far as aggregation is 
concerned’.129 In fact, any event from which multiple individual claims arise can be 
considered their cause. Conversely, not every cause can be considered a relevant 
event for the purposes of aggregation.130 For instance, each act of misselling may 
constitute a relevant event. At the same time, each act may also be considered the 
119 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 4) 967 (Hobhouse LJ).  
120 American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd (n 34) 414 (Moore-Bick J).  
121 Louw and Tompkinson (n 35) 11. Cf also Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1035 (Lord 
Mustill); O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 1) para 11–326; Butler and Merkin (n 19) para 
C–0239.  
122 Cf Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 53); 
Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (n 50) [97] (Steel J); Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance 
Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 44) [20] (Field J).  
123 Cf Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (n 50) [97] (Steel J).  
124 Cf Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 649 (Evans LJ).  
125 Cf Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace European Group (n 41) [259] (Eder J).  
126 Merkin (n 52) 145 f. Cf also Moore v IAG New Zealand Ltd (n 65).  
127 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1035 (Lord Mustill).  
128 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1035 (Lord Mustill); Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea 
Insurance Co Ltd (n 4) 967 (Hobhouse LJ); Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 51) [15] 
(Morison J). Cf also American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd (n 34) 413 f (Moore-Bick J).  
129 Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 50) 204 (Waller LJ).  
130 Cf Louw and Tompkinson (n 35) 9; Merkin (n 52) 146. 
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cause of the corresponding loss. By contrast, although the lack of proper training of 
the selling personnel may constitute the losses’ originating cause, it cannot be con-
sidered an event for the purposes of aggregation.131 
b Causative link and limit of remoteness 
3.53 In American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd, the Commercial Court 
clarified that although the unifying factor of cause was one of ‘a remote kind (…) it is 
still necessary for there to be some causative link between the originating cause and 
the loss and there must also be some limit to the degree of remoteness that is accep-
table’.132 
3.54 In Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field, Lord Mustill explained that ‘the word 
“originating” was in [his] view consciously chosen to open up the widest possible search 
for a unifying factor in the history of the losses which it is sought to aggregate’.133 
3.55 Moreover, the words ‘or source’134 in an aggregation clause constitute an 
explicit alternative to the word ‘cause’ and further emphasise that the aggregation 
mechanism is wide and that multiple individual losses may be aggregated based on a 
remote factor.135 
3.56 From these cases, it becomes clear that it is possible to ‘look further back’ and 
‘to use a remoter common fact’ with the unifying factor of cause than it is with the 
unifying factor of event.136 Yet, to borrow the words of Louw and Tompkinson, 
English courts have not given ‘much assistance in determining where in the landscape 
between here and the infinity of remoteness’137 a relevant cause may lie. Consequently, 
there appears to be no legal certainty as to the causal requirements associated with the 
unifying factor of originating or original cause. 
2.3 Other unifying factors 
a ‘Occurrence’ 
3.57 As has been mentioned above, the notion of ‘occurrence’138 is not con-
sistently used in the context of reinsurance contracts. 
3.58 In some aggregation clauses, the term ‘occurrence’ refers to one of the in-
dividual units to be aggregated, ie to an individual loss.139 For instance, it was held in 
Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd that the 
131 Cf Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 51) [15] (Morison J).  
132 American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd (n 34) 414 (Moore-Bick J).  
133 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1035 (Lord Mustill).  
134 For more information on the unifying factor of ‘source’, see paras 3.81 f.  
135 Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace European Group (n 41) [259] (Eder J).  
136 Louw and Tompkinson (n 35) 11. Cf also Butler and Merkin (n 19) para C–0241.  
137 Louw and Tompkinson (n 35) 8. It is to be noted that these words have been used in the context of 
determining what can be considered a relevant event for the purposes of aggregation.  
138 See paras 2.55 ff.  
139 See paras 2.56 ff. 
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phrase ‘loss occurrence’ used in a retrocession agreement was to be construed the 
same way as the word ‘occurrence’ in the underlying contract of reinsurance. The 
Commercial Court elaborated that in the case at hand, the term ‘occurrence’ was 
defined to mean ‘any one Occurrence or any series of Occurrences consequent upon 
or attributable to one source or original cause’.140 Apparently, the court considered 
that the words ‘occurrence’ and ‘loss occurrence’ referred to the individual losses and 
that under the aggregation clause these losses were to be aggregated if they were 
attributable to the same source or cause.141 In its reasoning, the Commercial Court 
held that the word ‘loss occurrence’ was not used in the sense of the unifying factor 
of event.142 
3.59 As has been demonstrated above, however, the term ‘occurrence’ generally 
designates a unifying factor in the context of aggregation.143 Where the term 
identifies a unifying factor, it is said to be interchangeable with the term ‘event’.144 
Hence, the legal uncertainties associated with what can properly be considered an 
event145 and the vagueness of the standard of the causal links146 required between 
the individual losses to be aggregated and the unifying factor equally exist where 
the unifying factor is termed ‘occurrence’.147 
3.60 Thus, the meaning of the term ‘occurrence’ depends on the contractual 
context in which it is used. 
140 Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd [2013] EWHC 3362 
(Comm), [2014] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 490 [51], [59] (Hamblen J).  
141 Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd (n 140) [51]–[65] (Hamblen J).  
142 Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd (n 140) [62] (Hamblen J).  
143 See paras 2.61 ff.  
144 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 53); 
American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd (n 34) 413 (Moore-Bick J); Mann v Lexington 
Insurance Co (n 53) 1411, where Walker J’s first instance judgment is transcribed; Aioi Nissay Dowa 
Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 44) [20] (Field J); Barlow Lyde 
and Gilbert LLP (n 4) para 28.6; Malcolm A Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts (6th edn, 
Informa 2009) para 17–4C3; Soar (n 52); Edelman and Burns (n 2) paras 4.55 ff; Merkin, Hodgson 
and Tyldesley (n 8) para 11–324; Butler and Merkin (n 19) para C–0222. For an American authority 
in this regard, see Newmont Mines Ltd v Hanover Insurance Co (1986) 784 F2d 127 (United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) 135.  
145 See paras 3.30 ff.  
146 See paras 3.38 ff.  
147 Cf Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [68] (Rix LJ). In Caudle v Sharp (n 33), 
the Court of Appeal dealt with the following aggregation clause: ‘For the purpose of this reinsurance 
the term “each and every loss” shall be understood to mean each and every loss and/or occurrence 
(…) arising out of one event’. At first sight, one might think that the terms ‘loss’ and ‘occurrence’ are 
equivalents under this aggregation clause. The Court of Appeal found, however, that the term ‘oc-
currence’ was ‘at least capable of meaning the operation of the insured peril out of which the original 
loss arose, and that occurrence has itself arisen out of the relevant “event” (…)’. Accordingly, in light 
of this aggregation clause, the Court of Appeal considered it possible that the words ‘event’ and 
‘occurrence’ had not been used interchangeably. This further complicates the question of the causal 
requirements as the required causal link between the ‘event’ and the ‘occurrence’ is not clear nor is the 
one between the ‘occurrence’ and the ‘original loss’. 
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b ‘Accident’ 
3.61 The parties sometimes use the term ‘accident’ in the context of clauses 
describing the applicable deductible or cover limit. Particularly in English law, 
the notion of ‘accident’ has, however, repeatedly been held not to operate as a 
unifying factor. 
3.62 In The South Staffordshire Tramways Co Ltd v The Sickness and Accident 
Assurance Association Ltd, the courts dealt with a clause limiting the insurer’s lia-
bility ‘in respect of any one accident’.148 The insured, a tramcar company, was held 
liable for personal injury to forty persons after one of its tramcars was overturned. 
At first instance, Day J considered that an accident was simply an event and that the 
tramcar’s overturning constituted such an event which resulted in injuries to a large 
number of persons.149 Consequently, all 40 losses resulting from the injuries were to 
be aggregated and the policy limit applied one single time to this aggregate. The 
Court of Appeal, however, overturned Day J’s judgment. It held that each person 
suffered a separate accident so that there was no basis for an aggregation of the 40 
individual losses.150 
3.63 Similarly, in Allen v London Guarantee and Accident Co Ltd, the 
Commercial Court dealt with a clause providing that the insurer’s cover limit was 
£300 for all claims ‘in respect of or arising out of any one accident or occur-
rence’.151 The insured’s car struck one person, causing the latter to crash into a 
second person and left both injured. Phillimore J held that as two persons were 
injured, two separate accidents had befallen. However, he went on to state that 
there was, nevertheless, only one occurrence that took place. Hence, Phillimore J 
considered that an accident was not the same thing as an occurrence. The in-
dividual losses that arose from the injuries were to be aggregated on the basis that 
they arose out of the same occurrence.152 By contrast, the term ‘accident’ did not 
operate as a unifying factor. 
3.64 The term ‘accident’ was further considered in Tioxide Europe Ltd v CGU 
International Insurance Plc. Tioxide’s product liability policy provided that ‘[t]he 
word loss wherever used in this policy, means an accident, including continuous or 
repeated exposure to the same general harmful conditions’.153 
3.65 Tioxide manufactured two grades of white titanium dioxide pigments. The 
pigments were supplied for use in the manufacture of u-PVC compounds which in 
148 The South Staffordshire Tramways Co Ltd v The Sickness and Accident Assurance Association Ltd 
(n 54).  
149 The South Staffordshire Tramways Co Ltd v The Sickness and Accident Assurance Association Ltd (n 
54) 405, where Day J’s first instance decision is transcribed.  
150 The South Staffordshire Tramways Co Ltd v The Sickness and Accident Assurance Association Ltd (n 
54) 407 f (Bowen LJ).  
151 Allen v London Guarantee and Accident Co Ltd (1912) 28 TLR 254 (Comm).  
152 Allen v London Guarantee and Accident Co Ltd (n 151).  
153 Tioxide Europe Ltd v CGU International Insurance Plc [2004] EWHC 216 (Comm), [2005] Lloyd’s 
Rep IR 114 [34] (Langley J). 
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turn were to be used in the manufacture of doors and window frames. The pigments 
manufactured by Tioxide caused discolouration of the doors and window frames in 
which they were used. One of the questions before the Commercial Court was 
whether there was one single accident from which multiple individual losses had 
arisen.154 The court held that each instance of discolouration constituted a separate 
accident and, hence, a separate loss.155 Thus, the term ‘accident’ was not considered 
a unifying factor that justified adding together the losses associated with the in-
dividual cases of discolouration.156 
3.66 In line with this, Merkin noted that an accident was ‘the individual mani-
festation of a loss rather than the state of affairs which gave rise to those losses’.157 
The aforementioned decisions suggest that the notion of ‘accident’ is not to be 
considered a unifying factor for the purposes of aggregation. 
3.67 Yet, in Tioxide Europe Ltd v CGU International Insurance Plc, the 
Commercial Court noted, obiter, that–depending on the circumstances–the term 
‘accident’ could operate as unifying factor. More specifically, it stated that an ‘an 
explosion or escape giving rise to a multiplicity of claims’ may be considered an 
accident.158 
3.68 In summary, it may be said that English courts have been reluctant to 
recognise the term ‘accident’ as a unifying factor. The Commercial Court sug-
gested, however, that–depending on the circumstances–it could indeed operate as 
a unifying factor. The causal requirements associated with the unifying factor of 
‘accident’ remain unclear. 
154 Tioxide Europe Ltd v CGU International Insurance Plc (n 153) list of split issues following [83] 
(Langley J).  
155 Tioxide Europe Ltd v CGU International Insurance Plc (n 153) [54] (Langley J).  
156 Tioxide Europe Ltd v CGU International Insurance Plc (n 153) [53]–[54] (Langley J).  
157 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 8) para 11–323. Yet, in Butler and Merkin (n 19) para C–0219, the 
authors argue that an ‘accident’ may constitute a unifying factor.  
158 Tioxide Europe Ltd v CGU International Insurance Plc (n 153) [53] (Langley J). The case Re Deep Vein 
Thrombosis Litigation [2003] EWCA Civ 1005, [2004] QB 234, deals with the term of ‘accident’ within 
the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of certain rules relating to 
international carriage by air. The issue before the Court of Appeal was not one of aggregation. 
Remarkably, the Court of Appeal considered that when determining the meaning of the term ‘ac-
cident’, Lord Mustill’s definition in Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1035, of what constitutes 
an event in the context of aggregation can be applied. It is further to be noted that a number of 
American courts have held that the terms ‘accident’ and ‘occurrence’ were synonymous so that the 
term ‘accident’ operated as a unifying factor for the purposes of aggregation, see The Arthur A 
Johnson Corp v Indemnity Insurance Co of North America (1958) 6 AD2d 97 (Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division, First Department, New York) 101 f; Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co v 
Edward Wesolowski (1973) 33 NY2d 169 (Court of Appeals of New York) [6]; Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co v Aetna Casualty and Surety Co (2001) 255 Conn 295 (Supreme Court of Connecticut) 
14, 20. Some insurance policies even define the term ‘occurrence’ as an ‘accident’, see, for instance, 
Stonewall Insurance Co v Asbestos Claims Management Corp (1995) 73 F3d 1178 (United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit) 1213. 
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c ‘Act or omission’ 
3.69 In some aggregation clauses, the parties designate ‘one act or omission’159 or 
‘any single act or omission’160 as ‘the’ or ‘one of the’ unifying factors for the purposes 
of aggregation. 
3.70 In Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance 
Co Ltd, the House of Lords found that the phrase ‘act or omission’ was 
to be construed the same way in the aggregation provision as it was in the 
liability clause.161 The latter insured against ‘a breach “in respect of which civil liability 
arises on the part of the assured”’.162 Hence, the relevant ‘act or omission’ was the 
conduct which triggered the primary insured’s liability and not any ‘act or omission 
which [was] causally more remote’.163 Lord Hoffmann expressly stated that not ‘“any 
act or omission”, but only and specifically an act or omission which [gave] rise to the 
civil liability in question’ was to be considered a unifying factor for the purposes of 
aggregation.164 The House of Lords, therefore, concluded that, in this instance, the 
required causal link between the individual losses to be aggregated and the unifying 
factor of ‘act or omission’ corresponded with the standard of proximate cause.165 Lord 
Hoffmann noted that ‘[a]n act or omission could qualify as a unifying factor in respect 
of more than one loss only if it gave rise to civil liability in respect of both losses’.166 
3.71 Although the House of Lords held that the causal link between the unifying 
factor of ‘act or omission’ and each of the individual losses corresponded with the 
standard of proximate cause, a careful reading of the decision renders it impossible to 
conclude that the unifying factor of ‘act or omission’ generally corresponds with the 
standard of proximate cause. Lord Hoffmann made clear that where the contract 
provides that ‘any acts or omissions’, rather than only acts or omissions giving rise to 
civil liability, may operate as unifying factors, causal requirements might be different.167 
159 AIG Europe Ltd v OC320301 LLP (n 51) [8] (Longmore LJ); AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [1] 
(Lord Toulson SCJ). Cf also Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Oak Dedicated Ltd (n 51) [14] (Tomlinson 
J) and Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace European Group (n 41) [255] (Eder J), where the aggregation 
clauses used the unifying factor of ‘any one act, error, omission (…)’.  
160 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [12] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
161 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [43] (Lord 
Hobhouse).  
162 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [20] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
163 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [20] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
164 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [25] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
165 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [43] (Lord 
Hobhouse). In respect of the fundamental principle of ‘insurance law that the insurer is only liable for 
losses proximately caused by the peril’ covered, see Birds, Lynch and Paul (n 8) para 21–001.  
166 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [23] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
167 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [25] (Lord 
Hoffmann). 
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3.72 In AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman, the Supreme Court considered an ag-
gregation clause containing a variety of different unifying factors one of which was 
‘one act or omission’.168 It held that the words ‘one act or omission’ ‘requires no 
further explanation’.169 It seems that the unifying factor of ‘one act or omission’ was 
not the pertinent one in the case before the Supreme Court, which, therefore, de-
clined to discuss it in detail. In light of Lord Hoffmann’s speech in Lloyd’s TSB 
General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd,170 it should, 
however, not be assumed that the causal requirements associated with the phrase ‘act 
or omission’ were clear and undisputed. 
3.73 In summary, depending on the context of the aggregation clause, the 
unifying factor of ‘act or omission’ might be associated with the causative stan-
dard of proximate cause. In such a case, the causal link between the unifying 
factor and each of the individual losses must be even stronger than where the 
parties use the unifying factor of event.171 Yet, it might well be that the causative 
requirements associated with the unifying ‘act or omission’ are less strict in other 
circumstances. 
d ‘Catastrophe’, ‘disaster’, ‘calamity’ 
3.74 A further type of aggregation provisions contains the terms ‘catastrophe’, 
‘disaster’ and ‘calamity’.172 They read: 
For the purpose of this reinsurance the term ‘each and every loss’ shall be understood to mean 
each and every loss and/or occurrence and/or catastrophe and/or disaster and/or calamity (…) 
arising out of one event.173  
3.75 On its face, the wording of the clause suggests that a ‘catastrophe’, a ‘dis-
aster’ or a ‘calamity’ assumes the same function as a loss or an occurrence. It is 
notable that not all of these terms operate as unifying factors. The unifying factor 
provided for in this clause is ‘one event’.174 
3.76 In Caudle v Sharp, where this clause was discussed, Evans LJ stated that 
‘on a strict reading of the clause, the “catastrophe and/or disaster and/or cala-
mity” [was] treated as equivalent to the “loss and/or occurrence” and must itself 
have arisen out of one event’.175 He noted, however, that in his view ‘a strictly 
168 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [1] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
169 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [15] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
170 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [25] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
171 For the causative link required in respect of the unifying factor of ‘event’, see paras 3.38 ff.  
172 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 644; Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field [1995] CLC 1504 (CA) 1505 f, where 
Phillips J’s first instance decision is transcribed; Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1029 (Lord 
Mustill); Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of 
Europe Ltd v Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 50) 873 (Hobhouse LJ); IRB Brasil 
Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 50) [11] (Burton J).  
173 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 644 (Evans LJ).  
174 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 648 (Evans LJ).  
175 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 648 (Evans LJ). 
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literal meaning of the clause [was] not sufficient to give effect to the intentions of 
the parties (…)’.176 By so saying, Evans LJ was presumably suggesting that the 
terms ‘catastrophe’, ‘disaster’ and ‘calamity’ operated as unifying factors, just like 
the term ‘event’, rather than as equivalents to the term ‘loss’. If this was the case, 
it seems that multiple individual losses were to be aggregated if they all arose out 
of the same catastrophe, disaster or calamity. 
3.77 Similarly, Merkin appears to regard the notions of ‘catastrophe’,177 
‘occurrence’ and ‘event’ as synonymous, which he conceives as being used as unifying 
factors.178 More precisely, he equated the phrases ‘catastrophic occurrence’ and 
‘catastrophic event’.179 Merkin opines that there was room for argument as to 
whether a catastrophe such as an earthquake was an event or an occurrence for 
excess of loss treaty purposes.180 
3.78 By contrast, Tompkinson seems to have a different understanding of the 
roles attributed to terms such as ‘catastrophe’, ‘disaster’ and ‘calamity’. She affords 
the example of a hurricane damaging multiple different houses. In this scenario, she 
argues, each harmed house might constitute a separate occurrence, ie a separate 
‘incident of damage (loss)’.181 Tompkinson does not explicitly state that each in-
dividual loss also constitutes a catastrophe, disaster or calamity. She notes, how-
ever, that the terms ‘occurrence’, ‘catastrophe’, ‘disaster’ and ‘calamity’ were 
alternative phrases that are meant to assume the same role within the aggregation 
mechanism.182 
3.79 In any case, it appears doubtful whether the distinction between the terms 
‘event’, ‘occurrence’, ‘catastrophe’, ‘disaster’ and ‘calamity’ is useful.183 In fact, ‘if 
each word is to be afforded a separate and distinct meaning, much splitting of hairs 
will be required’.184 Furthermore, there is no authority for the proposition that these 
different terms each come with a distinguishable concept of causation. In line with 
what has been previously discussed, the term ‘occurrence’, in the context of ag-
gregation, generally refers to a unifying factor and is interchangeable with the term 
‘event’.185 Arguably, the terms ‘catastrophe’, ‘disaster’ and ‘calamity’ are to be 
176 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 648 (Evans LJ).  
177 This is presumably also true with regard to the terms ‘calamity’ and ‘disaster’.  
178 Merkin (n 52) 144 f.  
179 Merkin (n 52) 144 f.  
180 Merkin (n 52) 147. Cf also Moore v IAG New Zealand Ltd (n 65) where Dunningham J held that the 
original earthquake was the ‘cause’ of two aftershocks, both of which were considered to be ‘events’ 
for the purpose of the aggregation clause under consideration.  
181 Deborah Tompkinson, ‘Jabberwocky: Recent Decisions on the Meaning of “Event” and 
“Occurrence” in the English Courts’ (1995) 3 International Insurance Law Review 82, 82.  
182 Tompkinson (n 181) 82.  
183 Tompkinson (n 181) 82. 
184 Tompkinson (n 181) 82, views the terms ‘occurrence’, ‘catastrophe’, ‘disaster’ and ‘calamity’ as sy-
nonymous, but distinguishes them from the term ‘event’.  
185 See paras 2.61 ff, 3.59. 
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equated with the terms ‘event’ and ‘occurrence’.186 If so, all these terms would be 
used to designate an aggregation mechanism’s unifying factor. 
3.80 In summary, there appear to be different views as to the roles terms such as 
‘catastrophe’, ‘disaster’ and ‘calamity’ assume in aggregation mechanisms. The 
Court of Appeal has noted that a strictly literal reading of typical aggregation clauses 
equating such terms with the term ‘loss’ would not reflect the parties’ intention. 
Furthermore, there appears to be no legal authority that attributes different mean-
ings to the notions of ‘occurrence’, ‘catastrophe’, ‘disaster’ and ‘calamity’ in the 
context of aggregation. Hence, the proliferation of terms does not foster legal cer-
tainty but rather further dispels it. 
e ‘Source’ 
3.81 Particularly in the context of cause-based aggregation, the parties sometimes 
agree to aggregate individual losses on the basis that they stem from the same ‘source’.187 
In Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace European Group, it was observed by the 
Commercial Court that the word ‘source’ was an ‘explicit alternative to “cause”’.188 
3.82 Commonly, the unifying factor of ‘source’ is coupled with the unifying factor 
of ‘cause’. There seem to be no legal authorities distinguishing the causative 
potencies of the two unifying factors. They are, instead, to be read in combination so 
that one standard of causation results from the phrases ‘originating cause or source’ 
and ‘one source or original cause’.189 
2.4 The special case of series clauses 
3.83 Aggregation clauses sometimes use the unifying factors of a ‘related series of 
acts or omissions’,190 a ‘series of related acts or omissions’191 or a ‘series of related 
matters or transactions’.192 Aggregation clauses using unifying factors of this kind 
are referred to as series clauses.193 
186 It may be noted, however, that a sub-group of the International Underwriting Association considered 
that the word ‘catastrophe’ provided more flexibility than the word ‘event’, see ‘IUA 01–033 
Definition of Loss Occurrence (Hours Clause) – Commentary’ para 4.2 <http://iuaclauses.co.uk/site/ 
cms/contentDocumentLibraryView.asp?chapter=5> accessed 24 March 2020.  
187 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 4) 959, 961 (Hobhouse LJ); Countrywide 
Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 51) [3] (Morison J); Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Oak Dedicated 
Ltd (n 51) [14] (Tomlinson J); Beazley Underwriting Ltd v Travelers Co Inc [2011] EWHC 1520 
(Comm) [28] (Clarke J); Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace European Group (n 41) [255] (Eder J); 
Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd (n 140) [51] (Hamblen J); 
Spire Healthcare Ltd v Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance Plc (n 30) [3] (Simon LJ).  
188 Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace European Group (n 41) [259] (Eder J).  
189 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 4) 967 (Hobhouse LJ). Cf also Butler and 
Merkin (n 19) para C–0240.  
190 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [12] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
191 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [1] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
192 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [1] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
193 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 4) paras 28.75 ff; Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 8) paras 
11–341 ff. For cases from other jurisdictions dealing with the term ‘series’, see The Distillers Co 
Biochemicals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Ajax Insurance Co Ltd (1974) 130 CLR 1 (HCA); Bank of 
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3.84 Where the parties agree on a series clause, they deem that multiple individual 
losses are to be aggregated if they result from events, acts, omissions, transactions or 
matters that are related and form a series.194 Yet, it is important to note that series 
clauses are not to be read in isolation.195 In Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings 
Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd, Lord Hoffmann pointed out that ‘[w]hen 
one speaks of events being “related” or forming a “series”, the nature of the unifying 
[element] which makes them related or a series must be expressed or implied by the 
sentence in which the words are used’.196 Thus, series clauses are always to be 
construed in light of the wider context of the aggregation clause and other related 
provisions.197 
3.85 Therefore, it seems impossible to attribute an established meaning to phrases 
such as ‘related series of acts or omissions’, ‘series of related acts or omissions’ and 
‘series of related matters or transactions’. From the fact that the parties use a series 
clause, no inference can be made as to the broadness of the aggregation mechanism. 
Any of the phrases mentioned are capable of forming part of a very broad or a very 
narrow aggregation mechanism. In fact, the broadness of the aggregation mechanism 
entirely depends on the unifying element that makes multiple events, acts, omissions, 
transactions or matters related or a series.198 Series clauses regularly fail, however, to 
expressly describe this element. 
3.86 Moreover, although it has been held in Lloyd’s TSB General 
Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd that sometimes it 
might ‘be necessary to imply [the] unifying [element] from the general context,199 
it appears to be utterly difficult to so. Consequently, the insurance and 
reinsurance markets are left with no legal certainty as to the operation of 
unifying factors that are based on series of events, acts, omissions, transactions 
or matters. 
a Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group 
Insurance Co Ltd 
3.87 In Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group 
Insurance Co Ltd, the House of Lords dealt with a case where salesmen sold personal 
pension schemes without adequate advice about the risks, advantages and 
Queensland Ltd v AIG Australia Ltd [2019] NSWCA 190, [2019] Lloyd’s Rep IR 639; Moore v IAG 
New Zealand Ltd (n 65).  
194 Cannon (n 7) para 38. It is to be noted that Merkin (n 52) n 106, argues that the series clause is the 
professional indemnity equivalent of an hours clause.  
195 Cannon (n 7) para 40.  
196 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [26] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
197 Cannon (n 7) para 40.  
198 Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 51) [14], where Morison J stated the following: ‘When is 
an occurrence part of a series of occurrences? To form part of a series there must be some connecting 
factor which links occurrences which would otherwise be separate’.  
199 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [26] (Lord 
Hoffmann). 
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disadvantages to a number of employees. The underlying reason for these cases of 
misselling was primarily ‘the inadequacy of the training and monitoring’ of the 
salesmen by the companies employing them.200 By failing to provide adequate 
training to their salesmen and monitoring them, the company breached the 
LAUTRO rules. As a breach of the LAUTRO rules was actionable under the 
Financial Services Act 1986,201 22,000 persons who invested in the personal pension 
schemes filed action against the company.202 Most of the claims were for relatively 
small amounts. None of the claims exceeded £35,000. In total, however, the company 
paid out more than £125 million in compensation.203 
3.88 The question before their Lordships was ‘whether the (…) companies [could] 
recover any part’ of the damages paid under their contract of insurance.204 As the 
relevant deductible amounted to £1 million, ‘each and every claim’205and the in-
dividual losses did not exceed £35,000, the issue at hand primarily revolved around 
the construction of the aggregation clause contained in the contract of insurance: 
If a series of third party claims shall result from any single act or omission (or related series of 
acts or omissions) then, irrespective of the total number of claims, all such third party claims 
shall be considered to be a single third party claim for the purposes of the application of the 
deductible.206  
3.89 The question pertained to the meanings of ‘act or omission’ and ‘(related series 
of acts or omissions)’.207 Lord Hoffmann and Lord Hobhouse both agreed with the 
Court of Appeal that the phrase ‘act or omission’ in the aggregation clause had the 
same meaning as the phrase ‘act or omission’ in the insuring clause.208 It was stated 
that ‘an “act or omission” must be something which constitutes the investor’s cause of 
action. It cannot mean an act or omission which is causally more remote’.209 
Consequently, ‘[a]n act or omission could qualify as a unifying factor in respect of 
more than one loss only if it gave rise to civil liability in respect of both losses’.210 Lord 
200 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [5] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
201 The Financial Services Act 1986 has since been repealed and replaced by the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000.  
202 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [6] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
203 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [7] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
204 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [8] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
205 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [11] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
206 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [12] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
207 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [18] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
208 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [20] (Lord 
Hoffmann), [43] (Lord Hobhouse).  
209 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [20] (Lord 
Hoffmann). 
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Hoffmann clarified that the act or omission which gave rise to the company’s civil 
liability was each salesman’s failure to give best advice. Hence, it was not possible to 
aggregate multiple individual losses on the basis of an ‘act or omission’.211 
3.90 The House of Lords then turned to the question of whether an aggregation 
of the individual losses was possible on the basis of the unifying factor of ‘(related 
series of acts or omissions)’. In this regard, Lord Hoffmann criticised the Court of 
Appeal that had ruled that acts or omissions could be considered a ‘related series’ 
if they had a ‘single underlying cause’, a ‘common origin’ or if they were ‘the same 
omission’ which had occurred on more than one occasion.212 More specifically, 
Lord Hoffmann analysed that by designating ‘an act or omission which gives rise 
to the civil liability in question’ as unifying factor, the parties had chosen a 
unifying factor which is even narrower than ‘any one event’.213 Lord Hoffmann 
and Lord Hobhouse regarded it as unlikely that the parties intended to abrogate 
this narrow aggregation basis and produce ‘a clause in which the unifying factor 
is as broad as one could possibly wish’ by adding a series language in par-
enthesis.214 
3.91 Lord Hobhouse stated that under the unifying factor of ‘(related series of acts 
or omissions)’ the individual losses ‘still [had] to result from something done or 
omitted as between the relevant “consultant” and the relevant third party’. He found 
that the fact that the company employing the salesmen failed to ‘ensure’ that the 
salesmen were properly trained and monitored did not relate the separate acts of 
misselling.215 With a view to making sense of the unifying factor, Lord Hobhouse gave 
the example of a consultant who prepared a document which misrepresented the 
merits of the pension scheme he was endeavouring to sell and gave that document to a 
number of interested people. His Lordship concluded that each act of giving the 
misleading document to an investor would be a distinct act. However, the acts could be 
considered a ‘related series’ from which ‘a series of third party claims’ had resulted.216 
As no such document was handed out to the investors in the case before the House of 
Lords, Lord Hobhouse rejected the idea that the individual acts of misselling con-
stituted ‘a related series of acts’ due to which an aggregation of the individual losses 
was not possible. 
210 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [23] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
211 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [23] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
212 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [24] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
213 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [25] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
214 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [25] (Lord 
Hoffmann), [51] (Lord Hobhouse).  
215 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [46] (Lord 
Hobhouse).  
216 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [46] (Lord 
Hobhouse). 
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3.92 Lord Hoffmann noted that ‘the nature of the unifying factor or factors which 
makes them related or a series must be expressed or implied’ by the aggregation 
clause.217 Analysing the aggregation language, his Lordship concluded that the only 
unifying element ‘which the clause itself provide[d] for describing the acts or omissions in 
the parenthesis as “related” and a “series” [was] that they “result[ed]” in a series of third 
party claims. In other words, the unifying element [was] a common causal relation-
ship’.218 It was not enough that one act resulted in one individual loss and another act in 
another loss, as there would be no causal element relating the different acts.219 
3.93 Lord Hoffmann, however, reserved his opinion as to the example given by Lord 
Hobhouse. He would not be inclined to accept, he stated, that multiple acts of handing 
out a document misrepresenting the merits of the pension scheme were to be considered 
a series simply because these acts were very similar.220 Lord Hoffmann concluded that 
the series clause under consideration could ‘only mean that the acts or events form[ed] a 
related series if they together resulted in each of the claims’.221 In fact, this was the case 
if ‘liability under each of the aggregated [losses] [could not] be attributed to a single act 
or omission but [could] be attributed to the same acts or omissions acting in combi-
nation’.222 He illustrated the unifying factor of ‘(related series of acts or omissions)’ by 
amending the example afforded by Lord Hobhouse: a person distributed a document 
misrepresenting the merits of a pension scheme to multiple people. The person dis-
tributing the document did not act in negligence, but someone else who ought to have 
corrected him did. It was a person’s distribution of the documents and another person’s 
failure to correct him together that caused each of the individual losses.223 His Lordship 
concluded that the individual losses in the case at hand did not arise from a combination 
of different acts and/or omissions and were, thus, not to be aggregated.224 
3.94 In summary, the meaning of the unifying factor of ‘(related series of acts or 
omissions)’ depends on what makes the acts and omissions a related series. Lord 
Hoffmann and Lord Hobhouse agreed that the plurality of individual losses in the case 
at hand was not to be aggregated as the acts and omissions leading to these losses did 
not form a related series. By contrast, their Lordships differed in their opinions as to 
what constitutes a related series. In Lord Hobhouse’s view, multiple acts or omissions 
217 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [26] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
218 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [27] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
219 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [27] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
220 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [28] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
221 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [27] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
222 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [27] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
223 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [29] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
224 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [29] (Lord 
Hoffmann). 
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formed a series if they originated in a common mistake such as the formulation of a 
document. Lord Hoffman considered multiple acts or omissions to be a related series 
only if they had jointly caused all of the individual losses to be aggregated. 
3.95 In AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman, it was held that professional indemnity in-
surers, in particular, had slightly amended their series clauses in the aftermath of the 
House of Lords’ decision in Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s 
Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd. However, this amendment did not render the point of 
difference between Lord Hobhouse and Lord Hoffmann academic.225 Depending on 
whether Lord Hobhouse or Lord Hoffmann is followed, the operation of the re-
spective series clause will be fundamentally different. This leaves the market with 
substantial legal uncertainty with regard to the unifying factor of a ‘(related series of 
acts or omissions)’. 
b Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall 
3.96 Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall represents another case of mis-
selling of pensions. In this case, the Commercial Court was required to interpret the 
phrase ‘(…) all occurrences of a series consequent upon or attributable to one source 
or originating cause’.226 More specifically, the case before the Commercial Court 
revolved around the issue whether an insurer was liable where multiple individual 
losses arose as a result of the misselling of pensions between 1988 and 1994. As a 
preliminary issue, the following question was tried: ‘Whether on the proper con-
struction of the [policy] all the misselling claims (…) fall to be treated as one claim for 
the purposes of applying the limit of indemnity (…)’.227 
3.97 In relation to the aggregation clause under consideration in Countrywide 
Assured Group Plc v Marshall, the question was whether multiple occurrences formed 
a series.228 Yet, this question was not of paramount importance, as multiple in-
dividual losses were not simply to be aggregated because they formed a series. 
Rather, an aggregation was only possible if the series of losses was consequent upon 
or attributable to one source or originating cause. Therefore, the question as to 
whether multiple individual losses formed a series was dealt with only briefly. 
3.98 Morison J held that, to form part of a series, there must have been a connecting 
element which links the occurrences that would otherwise be separate.229 Referring to the 
Australian case of The Distillers Co Biochemicals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Ajax Insurance Co 
Ltd,230 Morison J found that multiple occurrences formed one series if they were of a 
225 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [16] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
226 Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 51) [3] (Morison J).  
227 Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 51) [5] (Morison J).  
228 Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 51) [14] (Morison J). It may be noted that the terms 
‘occurrence’ and ‘loss’ had been conflated to some degree in the aggregation clause in question.  
229 Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 51) [14] (Morison J). It may be noted that Morison J 
used the word ‘occurrence’ instead of ‘loss’. Arguably, he did so because these terms had been 
conflated to some degree in the aggregation clause concerned.  
230 The Distillers Co Biochemicals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Ajax Insurance Co Ltd (1974) 130 CLR 1 (HCA). 
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sufficiently similar kind.231 As all the individual losses resulted from the misselling of 
pensions, Morison J regarded them as sufficiently similar to qualify as forming a series.232 
3.99 Thus, in Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall, the mere fact that each 
individual loss was the result of an act of misselling made them a series. This is in 
contrast to the conclusion reached in Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd where Lord Hoffmann expressly held that the 
fact that the breaches of duty were the same was not sufficient for the individual acts 
to form a series.233 It should, however, be noted that Lord Hoffmann came to this 
conclusion by considering the wider context of the aggregation clause which was 
substantially different from the one before the Commercial Court in Countrywide 
Assured Group Plc v Marshall. 
3.100 The conclusion that may be drawn from this is, again, that it is impossible to 
determine whether multiple acts form a series without having regard to the wider 
context of the aggregation clause under consideration. 
c AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman 
3.101 In 2012, Cannon discussed the phrase ‘the same act or omission in a series of 
related matters or transactions’.234 He argues that the term ‘related’ had ‘an entirely 
different function’ in this phrase than in the series clause under consideration in Lloyd’s 
TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd. 
More specifically, it is not a number of separate acts or omissions that are required 
to be related under such a clause, but rather a number of different transactions or 
matters.235 
3.102 In analysing how the matters and transactions have to be related to each 
other for the purposes of the series clause, Cannon notes that ‘related’ did not mean 
‘similar’ but ‘connected’.236 For instance, Cannon argues, a contract to purchase 
land and the loan, secured by mortgage, of the money to fund the purchase could be 
said to be related matters or transactions.237 By contrast, where a firm of engineers 
had re-hashed the same flawed design for a number of different clients under dif-
ferent contracts, those contracts were not ‘related matters or transactions’ merely 
231 Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 51) [14] (Morison J).  
232 Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 51) [14] (Morison J). For the meaning of the term 
‘series’ cf also Ritchie v Woodward [2016] NSWSC 1715 [587] where Emmet AJA stated that ‘[t]he use 
of the word “series” […] suggests a number of events of a sufficiently similar kind following each 
other in temporal succession’; Moore v IAG New Zealand (n 65) [31] where Dunningham J held that 
‘one may speak of there being a series when more than one event of the same or similar type happens 
within a limited time period. There need be no greater connection between the events than that they 
are, in some way, similar’; Bank of Queensland Ltd v AIG Australia Ltd (n 193) [85]–[94] 
(Macfarland JA).  
233 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [25] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
234 Cannon (n 7) para 46.  
235 Cannon (n 7) para 46.  
236 Cannon (n 7) para 47.  
237 Cannon (n 7) para 47. 
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because the same defective design was at the root of all the losses that occurred to the 
different clients.238 In such a case, the various individual losses might have resulted 
from the same cause, but not from the same or similar acts in a series of related 
matters or transactions.239 
3.103 In 2017, the exact phrase discussed by Cannon in 2012 came before the 
Supreme Court. In AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman, 214 investors in a project to develop 
holiday resorts on a plot near Izmir, Turkey, and in a similar project at Marrakech, 
Morocco, brought actions against a defunct firm of solicitors.240 The solicitors de-
vised a legal mechanism for the financing of foreign developments by private in-
vestors who would have security over the developed land.241 The investors would 
either grant loans to the developers of the holiday resort or alternatively purchase 
holiday properties. The funds advanced by the investors would initially be held by 
the solicitors in an escrow account. The solicitors were instructed not to release the 
funds to the developers unless and until the value of the assets protecting the in-
vestments was sufficient to cover them.242 Although the developers had not been able 
to buy the site in Izmir where the holiday resort was planned to be built nor to 
purchase the shares of the company that owned the site where the Marrakech resort 
was to be constructed, the solicitors had released all the investors’ funds to the de-
velopers.243 
3.104 In AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman, the question was whether the solicitors’ 
professional indemnity insurance was liable for the losses that resulted from the 
solicitors’ mistakes. The solicitors’ professional indemnity insurance was limited to 
£3 million in respect of each claim. The investors’ claims amounted to over £10 
million in total. Therefore, the insurers argued that all the individual losses suffered 
by the 214 investors were to be aggregated so that its own liability was limited to £3 
million in total.244 More specifically, the insurers’ case was that all the investors’ 
claims arose from ‘similar acts or omissions in a series of related matters or trans-
actions’.245 
3.105 At first instance,246 Teare J found that the investors’ losses did arise from 
similar acts or omissions but rejected the argument that they formed ‘a series of 
related matters or transactions’. In his view, ‘a series of related matters or transac-
tions’ referred to a number of transactions or matters which were conditional or 
dependent on each other. In the case at hand, he argued, there were separate 
238 Cannon (n 7) para 48.  
239 Cannon (n 7) para 48.  
240 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [3] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
241 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [4] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
242 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [4] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
243 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [7] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
244 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [9] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
245 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [10] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
246 AIG Europe Ltd v OC320301 LLP [2015] EWHC 2398 (Comm), [2016] Lloyd’s Rep IR 147 [31], [42] 
(Longmore LJ). 
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contracts with the developers and each of the investors and those contracts were not 
mutually conditional nor mutually dependent.247 
3.106 Upon appeal, the Court of Appeal criticised Teare J. It held that for the 
purposes of the aggregation clause, it was not required for the various transactions to 
have a relationship with some outside connecting factor.248 The Court of Appeal found 
that the series clause required an ‘intrinsic’ relationship between the transactions. The 
court further stated that what would be ‘intrinsic’ depended on the circumstances of the 
release of the funds by the solicitors to the developers. 
3.107 The Supreme Court clarified that, under the unifying factor of ‘a series of 
related matters or transactions’, aggregation was not possible simply on the basis 
that the individual losses arose from repeated similar negligent acts or omissions. 
Rather, the losses were to be aggregated only ‘if there [was] a real connection 
between the transactions in which they occurred’.249 Moreover, it distinguished 
the unifying factor of ‘(related series of acts or omissions)’ under consideration in 
Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co 
Ltd from the unifying factor of ‘a series of related matters or transactions’ with 
which the Supreme Court was concerned in the case at hand.250 The Supreme 
Court noted that the Court of Appeal’s requirement that there be an ‘intrinsic’ 
relationship between the matters or transactions was too vague.251 Rather, the 
individual losses suffered by the investors were to be aggregated if the matters or 
transactions that resulted in the losses were somehow interconnected.252 
Determining whether a number of transactions or matters were related was a fact 
sensitive exercise of judgment.253 
3.108 The Supreme Court first held that it was necessary to identify the relevant 
matters or transactions. The Court of Appeal had considered the release of funds 
from the escrow account to the developers as relevant transactions. In contrast, the 
Supreme Court regarded the ‘investment[s] in a particular development scheme 
under a contractual agreement’ as the relevant transactions.254 The Supreme Court 
then determined whether the relevant transactions were related. It concluded that the 
transactions of the investors who participated in the Izmir project and those of 
the investors participating in the Marrakech project were related, respectively.255 The 
transactions were considered related because they shared the common underlying 
objective of the execution of a particular development project.256 Hence, all the 
247 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [11] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
248 AIG Europe Ltd v OC320301 LLP (n 51) [19] (Longmore LJ).  
249 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [18] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
250 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [19] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
251 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [21] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
252 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [22] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
253 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [22] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
254 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [23] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
255 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [24] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
256 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [26] (Lord Toulson SCJ). 
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losses suffered by the investors in the Izmir project and all the losses suffered by 
the investors in the Marrakech project were to be aggregated, respectively. 
3.109 By contrast, the losses suffered by the investors in the Izmir project were not 
to be aggregated with the losses suffered by the investors in the Marrakech project. 
The Supreme Court noted that the projects bore a striking similarity but considered 
this not to suffice for an aggregation under the series clause.257 The two development 
projects were separate and unconnected as they related to different sites and different 
groups of investors. 
3.110 In summary, there appear to be multiple factors contributing to substantial 
legal uncertainty with regard to the operation of aggregation mechanisms that are 
based on the unifying factor of ‘a series of related matters or transactions’. First, the 
meaning of the term ‘transaction’ in a specific case appears to be disputable. 
Secondly, the Supreme Court considered the question of whether a number of 
transactions were related to be a fact sensitive exercise of judgment. It is, therefore, 
impossible to label an aggregation mechanism using the unifying factor of ‘a series of 
related matters or transactions’ as either broad or narrow. 
3 Linking phrases 
3.111 In addition to unifying factors, linking phrases258 also contribute to the 
determination of the causal requirements inherent in an aggregation mechanism.259 
Common linking phrases are ‘arising out of’, ‘arising from’, ‘consequent upon’, 
‘attributable to’, ‘in connection with’ and ‘resulting from’. It is important to note 
that phrases such as these are also used in contexts other than that of aggregating 
losses.260 
3.112 As has already been mentioned, English courts have repeatedly held that it 
is impossible ‘to give an informed answer to a question of causation without knowing 
the purpose and the scope of the rule’.261 For example, using the words ‘arising out 
of’ in one context provides for the causal requirement of ‘proximate cause’,262 
whereas it refers to a ‘somewhat weaker causal connection’, rather than ‘dictate a 
proximate cause test, in other circumstances’.263 Similarly, depending on the context, 
the phrase ‘attributable to’ sometimes describes a wider causal requirement than 
257 AIG Europe Ltd v Woodman (n 4) [27] (Lord Toulson SCJ).  
258 Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace European Group (n 41) [262] (Eder J); Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance 
Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 44) [21] (Field J); Cannon (n 7) para 49.  
259 Roberts (n 45); Clyde and Co (n 41) 1 ff.  
260 Beazley Underwriting Ltd v Travelers Co Inc (n 187) [120]–[127] (Clarke J). The Cultural Foundation v 
Beazley Furlonge Ltd [2018] EWHC 1083 (Comm), [2018] WLR (D) 289 [163] (Andrew 
Henshaw QC).  
261 Environment Agency (formerly National Rivers Authority) v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd (n 26) 
31 (Lord Hoffmann); Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [68] (Rix LJ); Beazley 
Underwriting Ltd v Travelers Co Inc (n 187) [125], [127] (Clarke J); The Cultural Foundation v Beazley 
Furlonge Ltd (n 260) [163] (Andrew Henshaw QC).  
262 Coxe v Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp Ltd [1916] 2 KB 629 (Comm) 634 (Scrutton J).  
263 Beazley Underwriting Ltd v Travelers Co Inc (n 187) [128] (Clarke J). 
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‘proximate cause’, whereas it refers precisely to the causal requirement of ‘proximate 
cause’264 at other times. 
3.113 Consequently, only case law discussing phrases such as ‘arising out 
of’ or ‘attributable to’ in the context of aggregation may have a bearing on 
the determination of the effect a linking phrase has on an aggregation 
mechanism.265 
3.1 ‘Arising out of’ and ‘arising from’ 
3.114 The linking phrases of ‘arising out of’ and ‘arising from’ are used in com-
bination with both the unifying factors of ‘event’ and ‘cause’.266 In Axa Reinsurance 
(UK) Ltd v Field, Lord Mustill distinguished two aggregation mechanisms respec-
tively containing the causal connectors of ‘arising out of’ and ‘arising from’. 
However, the distinction drawn between the two aggregation clauses was based on 
the different unifying factors rather than on the linking phrases.267 
3.115 In the Dawson’s Field Arbitration, the arbitral tribunal noted that its view 
about the meaning of ‘arising out of’ might have been coloured by its understanding of 
the notion of ‘occurrence’, ie of the unifying factor concerned.268 Thus, the meaning of 
the linking phrase of ‘arising out of’269 and the causative effect it affords to an ag-
gregation mechanism may depend on the unifying factor with which it is coupled.270 
3.116 In Caudle v Sharp, the Court of Appeal held that an aggregating event does 
not have to be ‘the direct and proximate cause of the original insured loss’. Evans LJ 
considered that the phrase ‘arising out of’ did not indicate the same causal re-
quirement as the one of ‘proximate cause’ but that ‘some wider test of causation’ was 
to be applied.271 Evans LJ went on to hold that ‘[t]here [was] no express, restriction 
on remoteness, provided the loss [could] be said to have “arisen out of” the event, 
but, some restriction must be inferred (…)’.272 
3.117 In Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co Ltd, Rix LJ stated that ‘the 
causative link inherent in the words “arising from”, when coupled with the 
264 Beazley Underwriting Ltd v Travelers Co Inc (n 187) [126]–[127] (Clarke J), explicitly drawing this 
distinction.  
265 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [68] (Rix LJ); Beazley Underwriting Ltd v 
Travelers Co Inc (n 187) [127] (Clarke J); The Cultural Foundation v Beazley Furlonge Ltd (n 260) [163] 
(Andrew Henshaw QC).  
266 Cf Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1031 f (Lord Mustill).  
267 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1035 (Lord Mustill). In fact, the aggregation clause contained 
in the primary insurance contract stated that all individual losses ‘arising from one originating cause’ 
were to be aggregated. By contrast, the aggregation clause in the reinsurance contract provided that 
all individual losses ‘arising out of one event’ were to be aggregated.  
268 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [52] 
(Rix LJ).  
269 Arguably, the same is true for the causal connector of ‘arising from’.  
270 This is also suggested in Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [65] (Rix LJ).  
271 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 648 f (Evans LJ).  
272 Caudle v Sharp (n 33) 649 (Evans LJ). 
FACTORS DETERMINING CAUSAL REQUIREMENTS 
83 
expression “one event”, should be regarded as a relatively strong and significant link 
(…)’.273 Accordingly, even though the causative requirement may be weaker than the 
one of ‘proximate cause’, the causative link between the individual losses and the 
unifying factor ‘has to be a significant rather than a weak one’.274 
3.118 It may be deduced from these cases that the linking phrases of ‘arising out 
of’ and ‘arising from’ play a substantial role in determining an aggregation me-
chanism’s causal requirements. However, it appears to be impossible to deduce ab-
stract and meaningful implications as to the linking phrases’ actual and precise 
causative potencies. Consequently, their roles in and effects on an aggregation me-
chanism remain vague and unpredictable. 
3.2 ‘Consequent upon or attributable to’ 
3.119 Particularly in cause-based aggregation mechanisms, the parties regularly 
provide for the linking phrase of ‘consequent (up)on or attributable to’.275 However, 
there seem to be no case authorities regarding the effect such a linking phrase has on 
an aggregation mechanism. Rather, judicial discussions about causal requirements of 
aggregation mechanisms containing such phrasing generally focus on the unifying 
factor’s causative effect.276 
3.120 In Beazley Underwriting Ltd v Travelers Co Inc, the Commercial Court 
touched on the causative effect of the phrase ‘attributable to’.277 In fact, one of the 
parties involved in this case referred to Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd 
v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd278 where Lord Hoffmann discussed the 
aggregation mechanism dealt with in Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea 
Insurance Co Ltd.279 However, rather than having determined the causative effect 
of the linking phrase of ‘attributable to’, Lord Hoffman seems to have discussed 
the causative potency of the unifying factor of ‘cause’. 
3.121 Thus, the role in and effects of the linking phrase of ‘consequent upon or 
attributable to’ on an aggregation mechanism remain unclear. 
273 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [65] (Rix LJ).  
274 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 20) [63] (Rix LJ); Beazley Underwriting Ltd v 
Travelers Co Inc (n 187) [125] (Clarke J); The Cultural Foundation v Beazley Furlonge Ltd (n 260) [163] 
(Andrew Henshaw QC).  
275 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 4) 959, 966 (Hobhouse LJ); Countrywide 
Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 51) [3] (Morison J); Spire Healthcare Ltd v Royal and Sun Alliance 
Insurance Plc (n 30) [3] (Simon LJ); Clyde and Co (n 41) 4. Cf also Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace 
European Group (n 41) [255] (Eder J); AIG Europe Ltd v OC320301 LLP (n 51) [21], [51] (Longmore 
LJ). For a case under New York law, see World Trade Center Properties LLC v Hartford Fire 
Insurance Co (2003) 345 F 154 (United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) 180.  
276 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 4) 967 (Hobhouse LJ); Countrywide 
Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 51) [15] (Morison J).  
277 Beazley Underwriting Ltd v Travelers Co Inc (n 187) [126] (Clarke J).  
278 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [15]–[16] 
(Lord Hoffmann).  
279 Beazley Underwriting Ltd v Travelers Co Inc (n 187) [126] (Clarke J); Clyde and Co (n 41) 4. For the 
aggregation mechanism referred to, see Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 4) 
966 (Hobhouse LJ). 
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3.3 ‘In connection with’ 
3.122 In Standard Life Assurance Ltd v ACE European Group, the Commercial 
Court discussed the causative effect of the following aggregation language: ‘All 
claims (…) arising from or in connection with or attributable to any one act, error, 
omission or originating cause or source (…) shall be considered to be a single third 
party claim (…)’.280 
3.123 Eder J specifically referred to the linking phrase of ‘in connection with’. He 
stated that 
[n]ot only does the clause in the Policy use the expression ‘originating cause or source’, but the 
description of the link required between the ‘originating cause or source’ and the claims which 
it is sought to aggregate is worded in the broadest possible terms (…). The phrase ‘in 
connection with’ is extremely broad and indicates that it is not even necessary to show a direct 
causal relationship between the claims and the state of affairs identified as their ‘originating 
cause or source’, and that some form of connection between the claims and the unifying factor 
is all that is required.281  
3.124 Eder J notes that aggregation mechanisms using the liking phrase of ‘in 
connection with’ did not require a direct causal relationship between the individual 
losses to be aggregated and the unifying factor. Aggregation would be possible if 
there were some other form of connection between the individual losses and the 
unifying factor.282 It is not entirely clear, however, whether Eder J intended to 
suggest that the required connection is to consist of an indirect causal relationship 
between the individual losses and the unifying factor or whether the unifying concept 
is not based on causation altogether in such a case. 
3.125 Therefore, the linking phrase of ‘in connection with’ certainly provides for a 
very broad aggregation of losses. If a causative link between the individual losses to 
be aggregated and the unifying factor were required, a very loose link would be 
sufficient. However, the precise effect of such a linking phrase on an aggregation 
mechanism remains obscure. 
3.4 ‘Shall result from’ 
3.126 In Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group 
Insurance Co Ltd, the House of Lords dealt with the following aggregation clause: 
If a series of third party claims shall result from any single act or omission (or related series of 
acts or omissions) then, irrespective of the total number of claims, all such third party claims 
shall be considered to be a single third party claim for the purpose of the application of the 
deductible.283  
280 Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace European Group (n 41) [255] (Eder J).  
281 Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace European Group (n 41) [262] (Eder J; emphasis added).  
282 Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace European Group (n 41) [262] (Eder J); Clyde and Co (n 41) 4 f. See 
also O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 1) para 5–087.  
283 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [12] (Lord 
Hoffmann; emphasis added). 
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3.127 This aggregation clause provides for different unifying factors. Both ‘any single 
act or omission’ and ‘(related series of acts or omissions)’ figure as unifying factors.284 
3.128 In his speech, Lord Hoffmann examined the factors which make acts or 
omissions related or a series.285 He noted that ‘the only unifying [concept] which the 
clause itself provide[d] for describing the acts or omissions (…) as “related” and a 
“series” [was] that they “resulted” in a series of third party claims’.286 He went on to 
state that the linking phrase of ‘shall result from’ provided for a ‘common causal 
relationship’.287 In Lord Hoffmann’s view, as long as each of the individual losses 
could be attributed to multiple ‘acts or omissions acting in combination’, they were 
to be aggregated.288 
3.129 By contrast, Lord Hoffmann did not assess the required strength of 
the causal relationship between the acts and each of the losses. Consequently, the 
causative effect that the linking phrase of ‘shall result from’ affords to an aggregation 
mechanism remains unclear. 
V Summary of the chapter 
3.130 This chapter began with two general features of aggregation mechanisms. 
First, it has been demonstrated that aggregation mechanisms are impartial. As one 
cannot predict in whose benefit an aggregation mechanism will ultimately operate 
before an actual claims experience, there is no reason to construe an aggregation 
clause in favour of one party or the other. Secondly, it has been set forth that ag-
gregation is not something that is inherent in every reinsurance contract. If the 
parties wish to add together certain individual losses to form one single loss for the 
purposes of deductible and cover limit, they must expressly provide for an ag-
gregation clause in their contract. 
3.131 The main part of the chapter deals with the concept of causation and its role 
in the subject matter of aggregation. In this regard, it has been noted that the causal 
requirements inherent in an aggregation mechanism essentially depend on the words 
used in the aggregation clause. More specifically, aggregation clauses generally refer 
to so-called unifying factors and use linking phrases. Unifying factors and linking 
phrases are both said to be determinative of an aggregation mechanism’s causal 
requirements. 
3.132 Most frequently, aggregation clauses designate either an ‘event’ or an 
‘originating cause’ as the relevant unifying factor. Courts have held that the term 
284 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [26] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
285 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [26] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
286 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [26]–[27] 
(Lord Hoffmann).  
287 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [27] (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
288 Lloyd’s TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd (n 6) [27], [29] 
(Lord Hoffmann). 
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‘event’ was much narrower than the phrase ‘originating cause’. Consequently, so- 
called event-based aggregation mechanisms call for a stronger causal link between 
the individual losses to be aggregated and the unifying factor than cause-based ag-
gregation mechanisms. However, courts have never succeeded in deriving a clear 
standard of causation from the respective unifying factors. 
3.133 Similarly, linking phrases have been used to describe causal requirements in 
certain cases. However, courts have never succeeded in deducing a clear standard of 
causation from different linking phrases. Rather, it appears that the effect a specific 
linking phrase has on an aggregation mechanism’s causal requirements mostly depends 
on the judgment of the person construing the relevant aggregation clause. 
3.134 Therefore, even when the profile of the individual losses and the structure 
of the reinsurance cover is known, it is practically impossible to predict how an 
aggregation clause will operate. In other words, aggregation clauses are surrounded 
by considerable legal uncertainty.  




Event-based aggregation in focus   
4.1 In the last chapter, it was identified that the unifying concept in event-based 
aggregation mechanisms is one of causation.1 It has been explained that the uni-
fying factor as well as the linking phrase provided for in an aggregation clause 
together determine an aggregation mechanism’s causal requirements. In this 
chapter, it will be demonstrated that substantial legal uncertainty revolves around 
causal requirements of event-based aggregation mechanisms under English law. To 
reduce the legal uncertainty which is inherent in event-based aggregation, courts 
have developed the so-called ‘unities test’ which itself is a further source of legal 
uncertainty. It will be argued that the determination of whether a plurality of losses 
aggregates under an event-based aggregation mechanism purely comes down to an 
exercise of judgment. 
4.2 Moreover, two instruments created to avoid this legal uncertainty shall be 
examined. So-called ‘hours clauses’ and ‘sole judge clauses’ shall be put under 
scrutiny. It will be argued that while hours clauses are meant to reduce the legal 
uncertainty concerning event-based aggregation mechanisms, they lack legal cer-
tainty themselves. By contrast, sole judge clauses may–to some degree–reduce legal 
uncertainty. Yet, particularly reinsurers will be reluctant to accept such clauses, as 
they place them at the mercy of the reinsureds. 
4.3 Thereafter, the event-based aggregation mechanism provided for in the 
recently developed PRICL 2019 will be summarised. As the PRICL are a brand-new 
legal instrument, courts and arbitral tribunals have had no opportunity to discuss the 
mechanism yet. Therefore, the presentation of the relevant provision, Article 5.2 
PRICL, shall be limited to outlining the goals the PRICL Project Group seeks to 
achieve with the rule. 
I Event-based aggregation in English law 
4.4 Event-based aggregation clauses seem to be common in reinsurance contracts 
concluded in the UK. As demonstrated above, the causative requirements inherent in 
event-based aggregation mechanisms depend on the unifying factor as well as the 
linking phrase contained in the aggregation clause.2 
1 See paras 3.38 ff.  
2 See paras 3.24, 3.111 ff. 
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1 Typical unifying factors and linking phrases 
4.5 Typically, event-based aggregation clauses provide for the unifying factor of 
‘event’.3 As has been discussed,4 the term ‘occurrence’ is generally used inter-
changeably with the term ’event’ in the context of aggregating losses.5 If so, the term 
‘occurrence’ used in an event-based aggregation mechanism operates as a unifying 
factor. 
4.6 Similarly, it has been observed that there seems to be no legal authority 
for the proposition that the terms ‘occurrence’, ‘catastrophe’, ‘disaster’ and ‘ca-
lamity’ each come with a distinguishable concept of causation.6 As the term ‘oc-
currence’ is used interchangeably with the term ‘event’, this may also be true of the 
terms ‘catastrophe’, ‘disaster’ and ‘calamity’. In fact, any catastrophe, disaster or 
calamity can easily be described as an event.7 In direct insurance policies, the 
terms ‘accident’ and ‘happening’ are often used interchangeably with the term 
‘event’.8 This might also be appropriate in the context of reinsurance.9 
4.7 Moreover, the unifying factor of ‘event’ is typically coupled with the linking 
phrases of ‘arising from’ or ‘arising out of’ in event-based aggregation clauses.10 
3 Caudle v Sharp [1995] CLC 642 (CA) 644 (Evans LJ); Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (1996) 1 WLR 
1026 (HL) 1031 f (Lord Mustill); Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 201 (CA) 207 
(Chadwick LJ); Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of 
Europe Ltd v Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 343 (CA), [1998] CLC 
870, 873 (Hobhouse LJ); Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 688, 
[2003] 2 All ER 190 [6] (Rix LJ); IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd [2010] EWHC 974 
(Comm), [2010] Lloyd’s Rep IR 560 [11] (Burton J); Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd 
and Advent Capital Ltd [2013] EWHC 154 (Comm), [2013] 2 All ER 231 [7] (Field J); MIC Simmonds v 
Gammell [2016] EWHC 2515 (Comm), [2016] Lloyd’s Rep IR 693 [10] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
4 See paras 2.63, 3.59.  
5 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK [1996] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 664 (Comm); American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd [1996] 1 LRLR 407 (Comm) 413 
(Moore-Bick J). Cf also Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) 
[20] (Field J); Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP, Reinsurance Practice and the Law (Informa Law from 
Routledge 2009) para 28.6; Malcolm A Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts (6th edn, Informa Law 
from Routledge 2009) para 17-4C3; Kiran Soar, ‘Interpretation of Wordings Key to Settling Aggregation 
Claims’ [2010] LLID 7; Colin Edelman and Andrew Burns, The Law of Reinsurance (2nd edn, OUP 2013) 
paras 4.55 ff; Robert M Merkin, Laura Hodgson and Peter J Tyldesley, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (5th 
edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2019) para 11–324. For an American authority in this regard, see Newmont 
Mines Ltd v Hanover Insurance Co [1986] 784 F2d 127 (United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit) 135.  
6 See para 3.79.  
7 Not just any event may be considered a ‘catastrophe’, a ‘disaster’ or a ‘calamity’. Yet, if an aggregation 
clause designates its unifying factor with one of these terms, it must be assumed that the parties intended to 
aggregate multiple individual losses following an event-based aggregation mechanism. It may be noted, 
however, that a sub-group of the International Underwriting Association considered that the word ‘cat-
astrophe’ provided more flexibility than the word ‘event’, see ‘IUA 01–033 Definition of Loss Occurrence 
(Hours Clause) - Commentary’ para 4.2 <http://iuaclauses.co.uk/site/cms/contentDocumentLibraryView. 
asp?chapter=5> accessed 24 March 2020.  
8 John Butler and Robert Merkin, Butler and Merkin’s Reinsurance Law, vol 2 (Looseleaf, Sweet & 
Maxwell) para C–0223.  
9 Butler and Merkin (n 8) para C–0223, who seem to doubt that it is appropriate to use these terms 
interchangeably.  
10 Caudle v Sharp (n 3) 644 (Evans LJ); Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1031 f (Lord Mustill); 
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2 Lack of legal certainty as to the causal requirements in event-based aggregation 
4.8 It has been established that unifying factors and linking phrases both con-
tribute to the determination of causal requirements associated with aggregation 
mechanisms.11 It has also been discussed that the unifying factor of ‘event’12 and the 
linking phrases of ‘arising out of’ or ‘arising from’13 are both insufficiently certain to 
define the causative link required. 
4.9 In respect of event-based aggregation, courts have held that multiple in-
dividual losses are to be aggregated even if the event is remoter than the proximate 
cause.14 In Caudle v Sharp, Evans LJ noted that ‘[t]here is no express restriction of 
remoteness, provided the loss or occurrence can be said to have “arisen out of” the 
event (…)’.15 
4.10 Yet, not everything that can be described as an event can realistically be said 
to be the kind of event referred to in aggregation clauses.16 For this reason, Evans LJ 
held that ‘some restriction [of remoteness] must (…) be inferred’ into the aggregation 
mechanism in order to reflect the parties’ intentions.17 In this regard, Rix LJ noted in 
Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd that the concept of remoteness 
was used ‘as a tool to limit the otherwise infinite reach of the workings of causa-
tion’.18 He elaborated that if a ‘merely weak causal connection is required, there is in 
principle no limit to the theoretical possibility of tracing back to the causes of 
causes’.19 
4.11 In Caudle v Sharp, Evans LJ did not offer much assistance in determining 
where in the landscape between the proximate cause and the infinity of remoteness 
the applicable standard of causation comes to lie.20 In Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait 
Insurance Co SAK, it has been held that, in determining this standard, the peril (re-) 
insured against is to be taken into account.21 Further, the causative potencies of the 
Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5); Brown 
(RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 3) 207 (Chadwick LJ); Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance 
Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 3) 
873 (Hobhouse LJ); Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [6] (Rix LJ); IRB Brasil 
Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 3) [11] (Burton J); Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v 
Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [7] (Field J); MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 3) [10] (Sir 
Jeremy Cooke).  
11 See para 3.24.  
12 See paras 3.38 ff.  
13 See paras 3.114 ff.  
14 Caudle v Sharp (n 3) 648 f (Evans LJ); Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [63] (Rix 
LJ); MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 3) [35] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
15 Caudle v Sharp (n 3) 649 (Evans LJ).  
16 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) para 28.13.  
17 Caudle v Sharp (n 3) 649 (Evans LJ).  
18 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [63] (Rix LJ).  
19 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [68] (Rix LJ).  
20 Ken Louw and Deborah Tompkinson, ‘Curiouser and Curiouser: The Meaning of “Event”’ (1996) 4 
International Insurance Law Review 6, 8.  
21 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5). 
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linking phrase ‘arising out of’ and the unifying factor of ‘event’ may be inter-
dependent.22 Finally, in Scott v The Copenhagen Re Co (UK) Ltd, Rix LJ found that 
there was ‘a significant rather than a weak’ causal link between the event and the 
individual losses inherent in an event-based aggregation mechanism.23 
4.12 As discussed previously,24 one can probably not deduce a meaningful standard 
of causation from these case authorities. In fact, the concept of a significant rather 
than a weak causal link taking into account the peril (re-)insured against appears to be 
extremely vague. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to abstractly define a standard of 
causation that allows for pinpointing the relevant events on the chain of causation.25 It 
is perhaps for this reason that Rix LJ stated in his judgment that the question became: 
‘Is there one event which should be regarded as the cause of [a plurality of losses] so as 
to make it appropriate to regard these losses as constituting for the purposes of ag-
gregation (…) one loss?’26 
4.13 Rix LJ admitted that the question whether multiple individual losses arose 
out of one event could ‘only be answered by finding and considering all the relevant 
facts carefully, and then conducting an exercise of judgment’.27 Accordingly, it is 
essentially a question of judgment as to whether it is appropriate to aggregate a 
plurality of losses. In an attempt to dispel at least some legal uncertainty in the 
context of event-based aggregation mechanisms, Rix LJ noted that this exercise of 
judgment could be assisted by the unities test.28 
3 Unities test and its shortcomings 
4.14 Presumably aware of the legal uncertainty inherent in event-based aggrega-
tion mechanisms, some arbitral tribunals and English courts have used the unities 
test to assess whether multiple individual losses were to be aggregated.29 
4.15 The unities test was developed in the course of the Dawson’s Field 
Arbitration.30 In the Dawson’s Field Arbitration, it was held that the question 
‘[w]hether or not something which produce[d] a plurality of loss or damage [could] 
properly be described as one occurrence (…) involve[d] the question of degree of 
22 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [52] 
(Michael Kerr QC).  
23 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [63] (Rix LJ).  
24 See paras 3.38 ff.  
25 Cf Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) para 28.39.  
26 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [68] (Rix LJ). It has been discussed above that 
this seems to be a circular rule, see para 3.41.  
27 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [81] (Rix LJ).  
28 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [81] (Rix LJ).  
29 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5); Mann v Lexington Insurance Co [2000] CLC 1409 
(CA) 1423 (Waller LJ); Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) 
[9], [18]–[23], [28]–[32] (Field J). Cf also MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 3) [29] (Sir Jeremy Cooke); Barlow 
Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) paras 28.16; Edelman and Burns (n 5) paras 4.56 ff; Sieglinde Cannawurf and 
Andreas Schwepcke, ‘§ 8 Das Vertragsrecht der Rückversicherung’ in Dieter W Lüer and Andreas 
Schwepcke (eds), Rückversicherungsrecht (CH Beck 2013) para 363; Butler and Merkin (n 8) para C–0222.  
30 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5). 
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unity in relation to cause, locality, time and, if initiated by human action, the cir-
cumstances and purposes of the persons responsible’.31 In other words, the ‘losses’ 
circumstances must be scrutinised to see whether they involve such a degree of unity as 
to justify their being described as, or arising out of, one occurrence’.32 In determining 
whether there was sufficient unity, ‘such factors as cause, locality and time and the 
intentions of the human agents’ are to be taken into account.33 
4.16 The following analysis will examine whether the unities test is capable of 
determining a standard of causation inherent in event-based aggregation mechan-
isms. It will further explore whether it may assist in determining whether the ag-
gregation of a plurality of losses is appropriate in a given case. 
3.1 Scope and significance of the unities test 
4.17 In the Dawson’s Field Arbitration where the unities test was developed,34 the 
arbitral tribunal dealt with an aggregation of losses for ‘any one occurrence’.35 
Likewise, in Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK, where Rix J revisited 
the test, the aggregation mechanism concerned was per ‘any one occurrence’.36 
Consequently, the unities test was first applied in the context of aggregation me-
chanisms using the unifying factor of occurrence. 
4.18 In Scott v The Copenhagen Re Co (UK) Ltd, one of the parties argued that it 
was inappropriate to apply the unities test in relation to aggregation clauses pro-
viding for an aggregation of losses ‘arising out of one event’. More specifically, the 
party argued that, in construing the phrase ‘arising out of one event’, ‘a more tra-
ditional causal approach’ than a test by reference to the ‘unities’ was to be taken.37 
The Court of Appeal disagreed and held that whether multiple losses arose from one 
event could only be determined by ‘considering all the relevant facts carefully’ and 
that the unities test could be of assistance to do so.38 Irrespective of whether the 
unifying factor is ‘any one occurrence’ or ‘one event’, it is the unities test that is 
commonly applied in the context of event-based aggregation mechanisms.39 By 
31 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5).  
32 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5).  
33 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5). Cf also Butler and Merkin (n 8) para C–0222.  
34 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5); Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) para 28.17; 
Edelman and Burns (n 5) para 4.57.  
35 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5); likewise 
quoting Dawson’s Field Arbitration, Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [51]–[53] 
(Michael Kerr QC).  
36 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5).  
37 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [29] (Rix LJ).  
38 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [81] (Rix LJ).  
39 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5); Kuwait 
Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5); Mann v Lexington Insurance Co (n 29) 1422 f (Waller 
LJ); Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [81]–[82] (Rix LJ); Midland Mainline Ltd v 
Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [2003] EWHC 1771 (Comm), [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 22 [99]–[100] (Steel J); 
IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 3) [46] (Burton J); Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance 
Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [19]–[23] (Field J); MIC Simmonds v Gammell 
(n 3) [29] (Sir Jeremy Cooke). 
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contrast, the unities test appears to have never been applied in the context of cause- 
based aggregation mechanisms.40 
4.19 It is to be noted, however, that arbitral tribunals and English courts have not 
always applied the unities test in dealing with event-based aggregation mechanisms.41 
It appears to be uncertain in which cases the unities test can be considered the right 
test for the determination of an aggregation problem. 
4.20 Furthermore, even if the unities test is considered by an arbitral tribunal or 
a court, it is by no means certain what its significance is in determining whether 
multiple individual losses are to be aggregated. In Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co 
Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd, the Commercial Court reported that 
the arbitral tribunal had ‘accepted that the unities test was the correct way’ to 
determine whether the individual losses had resulted from one or two events42 
and held that the tribunal ‘accurately summarised the law relating to the uni-
ties’.43 By contrast, Rix LJ stated in Scott v The Copenhagen Re Co (UK) Ltd 
that, in determining whether multiple losses arose out of one event, ‘all the 
relevant facts’ were to be considered carefully but the decision involved an 
exercise of judgment. He elaborated that this exercise of judgment could be 
assisted by the unities test.44 It seems as though the Court of Appeal did not apply 
the unities test to conclusively determine questions of aggregation in this case. 
In the same vein, the Commercial Court explicitly stated in MIC Simmonds v 
Gammell that 
[t]he ‘unities’ are merely an aid in determining whether the circumstances of the losses 
involved such a degree of unity as to justify their being described as ‘arising out of one 
occurrence’.45  
4.21 It further held that the arbitrators ‘fully understood the test that they 
had to apply in deciding on the question of aggregation’.46 They had to 
determine whether a sufficient causal link between the individual losses to be 
aggregated and the event existed.47 In the event that such a sufficient causal 
connection could be identified, the conduct of the unities test became legally 
superfluous.48 
40 See, for instance, Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd [1995] CLC 671 (CA); Municipal Mutual 
Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd [1996] CLC 1515 (Comm); American Centennial Insurance Co v 
INSCO Ltd (n 5); Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall [2002] EWHC 2082 (Comm), [2003] 1 All 
ER 237; Spire Healthcare Ltd v Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance Plc [2018] EWCA Civ 317, [2018] 
Lloyd’s Rep IR 425.  
41 Caudle v Sharp (n 3); Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3). Cf also Seele Austria GmbH Co v Tokio 
Marine Europe Insurance Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 441, [2009] 1 All ER 171.  
42 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [18] (Field J).  
43 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [37] (Field J).  
44 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [81] (Rix LJ).  
45 MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 3) [29] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
46 MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 3) [27] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
47 MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 3) [28]–[36] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
48 MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 3) [29] (Sir Jeremy Cooke). 
EVENT-BASED AGGREGATION IN FOCUS 
94 
4.22 In summary, the unities test bears relevance only in the context of event- 
based aggregation mechanisms. However, the unities test was not deemed relevant 
and applicable by the courts in all the cases where event-based aggregation 
mechanisms were concerned. Furthermore, in the cases where the unities test was 
considered relevant, the same importance has not always been attached to it. 
Consequently, there exists substantial uncertainty regarding the unities test’s 
significance in event-based aggregation mechanisms. 
3.2 Purpose of the unities test 
4.23 In chapter 3, it was set forth that, in Evans LJ’s view, an event-based ag-
gregation mechanism presupposes three different requirements. First, there must be 
something that can properly be described as an event. Secondly, there must be a 
causal connection between the event and each of the individual losses to be ag-
gregated. Thirdly, the event should not be too remote from the individual losses. 
Hence, an event can be considered a relevant event only if the causal links between it 
and each of the individual losses are not too weak.49 
4.24 In the Dawson’s Field Arbitration, where the unities test was developed, it was 
held that 
[w]hether or not something which produces a plurality of loss or damage can properly be 
described as one occurrence (…) involves the question of degree of unity in relation to cause, 
locality, time and, if initiated by human action, the circumstances and purposes of the persons 
responsible.50  
4.25 The phrase ‘properly be described as’ calls to mind Evan LJ’s first requirement. 
The unities test appears to have been used to determine whether the circumstances from 
which the individual losses arose can be considered one single as opposed to two or 
multiple events.51 In the same vein, Rix LJ noted in Scott v The Copenhagen Re Co (UK) 
Ltd that the unities were reminiscent of Lord Mustill’s description that an event was 
‘something which happens at a particular time, at a particular place, in a particular 
way’.52 However, the determination that something can properly be described as one 
single event cannot solve the issue. Even if the application of the unities test results in 
establishing that one sole event produced all the individual losses, it is still not clear 
whether this event is a relevant one.53 As Evans LJ mentioned, not every event is a 
relevant event for the purposes of aggregation. Rather, it is only where a certain causal 
49 Caudle v Sharp (n 3) 648 (Evans LJ). For more details, see paras 3.29, 3.38 ff. 
50 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5) (em-
phasis added).  
51 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) para 28.6, who state that ‘[w]hether or not something which 
produces a plurality of loss or damage can be described as an event/occurrence depends on the position 
and viewpoint of the observer and involves an examination of the degree of unity among the losses in 
relation to their cause, locality, time and, intention (commonly known as the “unities”)’; Darlene K 
Alt, Nathan Hull and James Killelea, ‘A Reinsurance Perspective: The Aggregation of Losses 
Following the Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami’ (2011) 22 Mealey’s Litigation Report 1, 2.  
52 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [65] (Rix LJ). For Lord Mustill’s description 
of an event, see Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1035.  
53 See para 3.39. 
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link between the event and each individual loss exists that it may be considered a relevant 
event.54 In other words, if the unities test only helps determine whether Evans LJ’s first 
requirement has been met, his second and third requirement would still have to be ad-
dressed by another test. 
4.26 Yet, it is sometimes opined that the unities test is used to test the causative re-
quirements between the individual losses to be aggregated and the unifying event.55 Hence, 
according to some commentators, the unities test actually serves to determine whether 
Evans LJ’s second and third requirement have been fulfilled and is used as a means to 
determine whether the causal connections between the event and each individual loss 
justify an aggregation in a specific case. However, it appears rather unclear how the re-
levant causative standard should be determined by applying the unities test. 
4.27 More specifically, it is not possible to define the standard of causation re-
quired nor to determine whether the required standard of causation is met in a 
given case due to the fact that the circumstances of the individual losses (or for that 
matter the losses themselves56) involve spatial and temporal proximity.57 For in-
stance, it is impossible to deduce the required standard of causation from the fact 
that three aircraft were destroyed in consecutive explosions in close proximity more 
or less simultaneously.58 Further, the concept of ‘unity of cause’59 seems to only 
require that there are causative links between the event and each of the individual 
losses but does not concern the strength of these links. This requirement is, 
therefore, not capable of determining the required standard of causation that 
justifies an aggregation of a plurality of losses. Nor does it assist in determining 
whether the required standard has been met in a given case. Lastly, the criterion of 
‘unity of intent’60 also cannot assist in defining the standard of causation in an 
aggregation mechanism. More specifically, the fact that a hijacker has made a 
single decision to blow up three aircraft61 does not afford any insight as to the 
strength of the causative link between each of the individual losses and the event of 
destroying the aircraft. 
4.28 It would perhaps be more straightforward to admit that it is very hard, 
maybe impossible, to define an abstract test which is capable of determining a 
standard of causation for event-based aggregation mechanisms. In fact, it was ad-
mitted in Scott v The Copenhagen Re Co (UK) Ltd that the relevant question was 
whether there was ‘one event which should be regarded as the cause [of a plurality of] 
losses so as to make it appropriate to regard [them] as constituting for the purposes 
54 Caudle v Sharp (n 3) 648 (Evans LJ).  
55 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) para 28.16; Edelman and Burns (n 5) para 4.56.  
56 See, for instance, Edelman and Burns (n 5) para 4.58, where it is said that the unities test assesses the 
proximity of the individual losses rather than the circumstances of the losses.  
57 Rather, the fact that the losses’ circumstances involved unity of location and time reflects a certain 
correlation among a set of common circumstances and multiple individual losses.  
58 Cf the Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5).  
59 See paras 4.57 ff.  
60 See paras 4.65 ff.  
61 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5). 
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of aggregation (…) one loss’.62 Rix LJ held that this determination involved an 
exercise of judgment in which the unities test could be of assistance.63 Consequently, 
Evans LJ’s test as set forth in Caudle v Sharp64 has been replaced rather than con-
cretised by applying the unities test. 
4.29 It is to be noted that replacing Evans LJ’s test with the unities test means 
testing whether there are causal links between the event and the individual losses. 
The strength of the causal links is, however, not assessed using the unities test. 
Instead, it assesses whether the losses’ circumstances involve a certain degree of 
correlation, ie proximity in time, location, and intention. Where a court or arbitral 
tribunal considers the correlation strong enough, it will hold that an aggregation of 
the losses is justified. 
4.30 In summary, the unities test’s task does not appear to be undisputed.65 
According to judicial authority, the unities test does not aim at determining a standard of 
causation inherent in an event-based aggregation mechanism but rather at determining 
whether something can properly be described as an event.66 By contrast, some scholars 
purport that the unities test is actually used to determine the standard of causation 
associated with an event-based aggregation mechanism.67 In any case, it appears to be 
unclear how the unities test should be capable of achieving this. 
3.3 Operation of the unities test 
a Subject matter of the unities test 
4.31 Developing the unities test in the Dawson’s Field Arbitration, the arbitral tribunal 
held that whether a plurality of losses could properly be described as one occurrence 
‘involve[d] the question of degree of unity in relation to cause, locality, time and, if 
initiated by human action, the circumstances and purposes of the persons responsible’.68 
This statement leaves open, however, the subject matter that should be in unity. 
4.32 The Dawson’s Field Arbitration arose out of the hijacking of four aircraft in 
1970 by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. One aircraft 
was flown to Cairo and destroyed there; the other three were flown to Dawson’s Field, 
a remote airstrip in Jordan, and blown up there. The question before the arbitrator 
was whether the three losses, ie the destruction of the three aircraft at Dawson’s Field, 
arose out of one single or multiple events.69 The arbitral tribunal concluded that the 
62 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [68] (Rix LJ).  
63 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [81] (Rix LJ).  
64 Caudle v Sharp (n 3) 648 (Evans LJ).  
65 This is well illustrated by Barlow, Lyde and Gilbert (n 5) paras 28.6, 28.16, who argue in one instance 
that the unities test aims at determining what can be considered an event and, in another instance, 
propound that the causal link between the event and the individual losses is tested by reference to the 
‘unities’.  
66 See para 4.25.  
67 See para 4.26.  
68 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5).  
69 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5). 
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destruction of the different aircraft constituted one single event as they were blown up 
‘in close proximity more or less simultaneously, within the time span of a few minutes, 
and as a result of a single decision to do so (…)’.70 Consequently, the arbitral tribunal 
focused on whether the acts that had caused the loss of the individual aircraft occurred 
in spatial, temporal and intentional proximity. By contrast, it did not test whether the 
individual losses themselves occurred in spatial, temporal and intentional proximity. 
4.33 Rix J applied the unities test in Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co 
SAK. In this case, the question before the Commercial Court was whether the seizure 
of 15 Kuwaiti aircraft by Iraqi forces and the fact that the aircraft were subsequently 
flown to Iraq constituted one single or multiple events. Rix J stated that it was the 
circumstances surrounding the losses that must be scrutinised to see whether they 
involved the degree of unity required.71 In his ‘findings of fact regarding the cir-
cumstances of the aircraft’s loss’ he held, for example, that ‘the aircraft were [all] lost 
on 2 August’ and that therefore there was unity of time.72 Consequently, according 
to Rix J, the unities test did not consist of assessing whether the acts that had caused 
the losses involved a certain degree of unity, but rather whether the individual losses 
occurred in temporal, spatial and intentional proximity to one another. In the same 
vein, the Commercial Court in Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd 
and Advent Capital Ltd could not find an error of law in the arbitral tribunal ap-
plying the unities test and, for the purposes of unity of time, assessing when the 
individual losses occurred.73 
4.34 Similarly, referring to Mann v Lexington Insurance74 where the Court of 
Appeal was faced with the question whether the deliberate orchestration of a civil 
unrest which resulted in riot damage to 22 supermarket stores constituted one single 
event, Edelman and Burns argue that since the individual losses occurred at different 
locations and at different times there was no unity of location or unity of time.75 
Hence, they also appear to be of the view that the unities test examines whether the 
individual losses rather than the acts that resulted in these losses involve unity. 
4.35 However, it may be noted that the Court of Appeal was not very explicit in 
Mann v Lexington Insurance. In fact, Waller LJ at first held that ‘[w]hat caused the 
losses [were] acts of rioters over a wide area, at different locations, and over two 
days’.76 The Court of Appeal appears to have focused on the question whether the 
acts that caused the losses were at the core of the unities test rather than the losses 
themselves. In the next paragraph of the judgment, however, Waller LJ stated that it 
‘seem[ed] to [him] difficult to conceive of a situation in which if the [damaged] 
properties were some distance apart, and if there was lack of unity of time, there 
70 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5).  
71 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5).  
72 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5).  
73 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [22] (Field J).  
74 Mann v Lexington Insurance Co (n 29).  
75 Edelman and Burns (n 5) para 4.58.  
76 Mann v Lexington Insurance Co (n 29) 1423 (Waller LJ). 
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could still be one occurrence (…)’.77 Here, Waller LJ’s unities test shifted its focus 
from whether the acts leading to the losses occurred in spatial and temporal proxi-
mity to whether the losses themselves occurred in spatial and temporal proximity. 
4.36 Admittedly, it will not make any difference in many cases whether the acts 
that caused the losses or the losses themselves are examined for unity. Taking the 
case of the Dawson’s Field Arbitration,78 it seems to be irrelevant to distinguish the 
question of whether the three acts of blowing up three aircraft at Dawson’s Field 
involved spatial, temporal and intentional proximity from the one of whether the 
individual losses of the aircraft at Dawson’s Field occurred in spatial, temporal and 
intentional proximity. The acts of destroying the aircraft as well as the losses of the 
aircraft occurred simultaneously, in spatial proximity and as the result of one deci-
sion to do so. 
4.37 However, in some cases, the acts that result in the individual losses may not be 
conducted at the same place and time as the occurrence of the individual losses. For 
instance, a cyber attack launched in the UK might result in numerous losses at different 
locations throughout China and at different times. If the unities test is applied to determine 
whether the cyber attack constitutes one single event from which a plurality of losses arose, 
it is very important to know whether the unities test focuses on whether all the acts of 
hacking occurred in the UK during a certain period of time or whether it aims at de-
termining whether the individual losses sustained by the hacked entity throughout China 
took place in spatial and temporal proximity. Self-evidently, these two different approaches 
may lead to substantially different results. 
4.38 In summary, it is not entirely clear what the subject matter is of the unities 
test. More specifically, it is unclear whether the unities test focuses on the acts that 
lead to multiple individual losses or on the losses themselves. This results in a lack of 
legal certainty, in particular, in cases where acts that provoke multiple losses are not 
undertaken at the same place and time as the losses’ occurrence. 
b Unity of time 
4.39 One aspect of the unities test is ‘unity of time’. If the circumstances of a plurality 
of losses involve unity of time, this is an indication that it might be appropriate to regard 
the individual losses as constituting one loss for the purposes of aggregation.79 
4.40 Unity of time means that the circumstances of the individual losses involve 
temporal proximity. However, the concept of unity of time or temporal proximity is 
extremely vague and provides courts and arbitral tribunals with ample opportunity 
to reach result-oriented judgments. In fact, an analysis of judicial authorities dealing 
with the matter suggests that it is equally possible to find that there is unity of time or 
to hold that there is no unity of time regardless of the circumstances of a case. 
77 Mann v Lexington Insurance Co (n 29) 1423 (Waller LJ).  
78 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5).  
79 Cf Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5); Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v 
Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [22] (Field J). 
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4.41 As has been mentioned previously, in the Dawson’s Field Arbitration, three 
aircraft were hijacked, flown to Dawson’s Field and later blown up one after the 
another ‘more or less simultaneously, within the time span of a few minutes’.80 It is 
interesting to note that when conducting the unities test, the arbitral tribunal con-
sidered the time span between the first and third explosion of the aircraft relevant in 
assessing whether there was unity of time. As the explosions took place within a few 
minutes of each other, the arbitrators held that they involved unity of time. 
Consequently, it did not deem important at what time the aircraft were hijacked and 
flown to Dawson’s Field. 
4.42 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd 
was a case dealing with the consequences of the terror attack on the World Trade 
Center on 11 September 2001. The question before the Commercial Court was whether 
the arbitral award holding that the attack consisted of two separate events rather than 
one single event was correct in law. In application of the unities test, the arbitrators 
took the view that ‘it was right to look at the whole period from check-in and pas-
senger scrutiny to the collapse of each Tower and not just from the time each flight 
took off’.81 The Tribunal concluded that, although ‘there were clearly similarities in 
the timing of the events from the commencement of the flights to contact with the 
Towers’, there was no unity of time.82 The Commercial Court affirmed this arbitral 
finding. In contrast to the Dawson’s Field Arbitration, the arbitral tribunal deemed 
even the time before the hijackings of the aircraft, and not merely when the aircraft 
and properties were finally destroyed and people were killed, as relevant in the conduct 
of the unities test.83 
4.43 The comparison between the Dawson’s Field Arbitration and Aioi Nissay Dowa 
Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd reveals that the unities test 
essentially depends on the definition of the period of time under scrutiny. If, in Aioi 
Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd, the relevant 
period of time had been deemed the time from the impact of the first aircraft in one 
tower to the impact of the second aircraft in the other tower–which was 16 
minutes–one could arguably have found unity of time. 
4.44 Further, Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd was a case 
following the derailment of a passenger train in 2000, where four passengers were 
killed and a number of others were seriously injured.84 In the aftermath of the 
80 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5).  
81 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [22] (Field J).  
82 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [22] (Field J).  
83 It may be noted, however, that the losses arising in respect of the three aircraft in the Dawson’s Field 
Arbitration were the individual losses to be aggregated, whereas the individual losses in Aioi Nissay 
Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd consisted of property damage, 
personal injury and third party liability claims and that the ‘infliction of personal injury and death 
started in the case of each aircraft shortly after they were hijacked and continued until at least the 
collapse of each of the Towers’, see Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent 
Capital Ltd (n 3) [22] (Field J); Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait 
Insurance Co SAK (n 5).  
84 Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (n 39) [5] (Steel J). 
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disaster, the operator of the railway network repeatedly imposed emergency speed 
restrictions on its network. These measures caused disruptions for the train- 
operating companies which resulted in losses in revenue and increased working 
costs.85 The question before the Commercial Court was ‘whether there was one 
occurrence or event in the form of the overall impact of the implementation of the 
[emergency speed restrictions over a period of 36 months] or whether the imposition 
of each individual emergency speed restriction was a separate occurrence or event’.86 
As the emergency speed restrictions were consistently imposed over a period of 36 
months, the Commercial Court held that there could not be said to have been unity 
of time87 so that each instance of an emergency speed restriction constituted a se-
parate event. 
4.45 By contrast, one of the questions before the Commercial Court in IRB Brasil 
Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd was whether the installation of insulation 
material containing asbestos for many years and resulting in more than 318,000 
claims constituted one single event.88 The Commercial Court upheld the arbitral 
tribunal’s finding that ‘the loss each year stemmed from a single [event], being [the 
company’s] liability arising from their installation activities’.89 More specifically, the 
Commercial Court found that ‘the Arbitrators were entitled to conclude that the 
determination of [the company] each year to carry out its installation activities was 
an annual “aggregating” event (…) and met the test of unity in the citation from 
Kuwait’.90 In IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd, the Commercial 
Court went so far as to decide that a substantial number of different acts of in-
stallations throughout a year involved a degree of unity of time so as to justify their 
being described as arising out of one event. 
4.46 Comparing Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd with IRB 
Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd reveals that there is no determinable 
standard of unity of time. Rather, courts and arbitral tribunals will be able to find 
arguments to justify why the losses’ circumstances involve unity of time as well as 
reasons for why there cannot be said to be unity of time in a certain case. 
4.47 Consequently, it may be concluded that the concept of unity of time does not 
provide any legal certainty in the subject matter of event-based aggregation me-
chanisms. This is so, firstly, because the test largely depends on the period of time 
deemed relevant and, secondly, because there cannot be said to be an objective 
standard of temporal proximity that provides legal certainty. 
85 Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (n 39) [10] (Steel J).  
86 Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (n 39) [73] (Steel J).  
87 Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (n 39) [99] (Steel J).  
88 IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 3) [26] (Burton J).  
89 IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 3) [46] (Burton J), quoting the arbitration 
award.  
90 IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 3) [46] (Burton J). 
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c Unity of location 
4.48 Another aspect of the unities test is ‘unity of location’. If the circumstances 
surrounding a plurality of losses’ involve unity of location, this is an indication that it 
might be appropriate to regard all the corresponding individual losses as constituting 
one loss for the purpose of event-based aggregation.91 Unity of location means that the 
individual losses’ circumstances involve spatial proximity. 
4.49 In a number of cases, the circumstances of the losses have not been deemed to 
involve unity of location. For instance, it has been held that there was no unity of 
location where 22 stores in Indonesia were damaged by rioters as the stores ‘were at 
locations some distance apart’.92 When dealing with the question whether the cir-
cumstances of the losses involved unity of location, Waller LJ, in this case, further 
discussed the hypothetical case that a plurality of stores ‘were damaged by the same 
typhoon at their different locations (…)’.93 Even in this case, he argued, there would be 
a strong argument that there was ‘a lack of unity of place’, and that each store as it was 
damaged would constitute a separate occurrence.94 In another matter, it has been held 
that the imposition of emergency speed restrictions at different locations in a railway 
network did not involve unity of location.95 
4.50 By contrast, there are cases where courts and arbitral tribunals have concluded 
that there was unity of location. For example, it has been held that the destruction of 
three different aircraft in close proximity involved unity of location.96 In a further case, 
it was held that each year’s installation of insulation material at a variety of different 
places constituted one aggregating event and met the unities test.97 
4.51 On the basis of these authorities, it appears difficult to identify an abstract 
rule governing the test of whether there is unity of location in a specific case. As with 
the concept of unity of time, the concept of unity of location is, in fact, extremely 
flexible and provides courts and arbitral tribunals with extensive opportunity to 
reach result-oriented decisions. A more detailed comparison of two cases may il-
lustrate this finding well. 
4.52 In Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital 
Ltd, the Commercial Court discussed the arbitral tribunal’s finding that the attacks 
on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 involved no unity of location. The 
91 Cf Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5); Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v 
Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [23] (Field J).  
92 Mann v Lexington Insurance Co (n 29) 1423 (Waller LJ).  
93 Mann v Lexington Insurance Co (n 29) 1422 (Waller LJ).  
94 Mann v Lexington Insurance Co (n 29) 1422 (Waller LJ).  
95 Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (n 39) [99] (Steel J).  
96 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5). It may 
be noted that the arbitral tribunal stated that the aircraft did not become total losses by virtue of the 
hijacking. Hypothetically, however, if they had become total losses by hijacking, then the losses could 
not be aggregated, because the aircraft were hijacked at widely separated localities.  
97 IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 3) [46] (Burton J). It is to be noted, however, 
that the Commercial Court did not specifically address the question of whether there was unity of 
location in this case. Instead, it generally stated that the unities test was met. 
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arbitral tribunal had argued that although ‘the Twin Towers were located in close 
proximity to one another and were part of a single property complex’, the circum-
stances of the losses did not involve unity of location. The arbitral tribunal elabo-
rated that ‘[e]ach Tower was a separate building, albeit connected by a single mall’.98 
The Commercial Court ruled that the arbitral tribunal was entitled to find that there 
was no sufficient unity of location.99 
4.53 In this regard, it is notable that the arbitral tribunal dealt exclusively with the 
question whether the Twin Towers were located in spatial proximity. By contrast, it 
did not assess whether the locations at which the hijackers had boarded the aircraft 
before the attacks or where passengers had died during the flights involved spatial 
proximity.100 
4.54 In Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK, the Commercial Court 
had to decide whether the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces, bringing Kuwait 
airport under their control and finally flying 15 Kuwaiti aircraft to Iraq constituted 
one event. All the aircraft were seized at and flown away from Kuwait airport. Rix J 
noted that the parties rightly agreed that whatever happened at Kuwait airport in-
volved unity of location.101 
4.55 At the time, however, Kuwait airport was not contained in one single 
building. It consisted of a complex of buildings, a variety of aircraft stands and 
airfields. Further, the airport site consisted of an area at least as big as the land where 
the World Trade Center was situated. Yet, by contrast to Aioi Nissay Dowa 
Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd, the spaciousness of the 
relevant area or the number of buildings were not deemed determinative in Kuwait 
Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK. 
4.56 Consequently, as with the concept of unity of time, the concept of unity of 
location is so vague that it must be concluded to be incapable of providing any legal 
certainty. It appears that it is possible to find arguments for and against a finding of 
unity of location irrespective of the facts of a case. 
98 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [23] (Field J).  
99 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [38] (Field J).  
100 Cf Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [23] (Field J). 
This seems particularly notable because in their assessment of whether there was unity of time, the 
arbitrators deemed the time from passenger scrutiny to the collapse of the towers relevant as ‘the 
infliction of personal injury and death started in the case of each aircraft shortly after they were 
hijacked and continued until at least the collapse of each of the Towers’. 
101 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5). It is to be noted, however, that the ag-
gregation clause in question provided for losses in ‘any one occurrence, any one location’. In this 
regard, the parties agreed that Kuwait airport was to be regarded as ‘one location’. In fact, the 
parties’ agreement did not relate to the unifying factor of ‘any one occurrence’ but rather to the 
unifying factor of ‘any one location’. There does not seem to be any legal authority that deems 
the unities test applicable in cases where the unifying factor is ‘any one location’. Yet, when Rix J 
subsequently applied the unities test to deal with the unifying factor of ‘any one occurrence’, he 
assumed that the parties had agreed that there was but one single location (unity of location) for the 
purpose of the unities test as well. 
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d Unity of cause 
4.57 A further aspect of the unities test is ‘unity of cause’. Referring to the 
Dawson’s Field Arbitration and Caudle v Sharp, the Court of Appeal stated in 
Scott v The Copenhagen Re Co (UK) Ltd that in the context of an event-based 
aggregation mechanism, ‘a plurality of losses is to be regarded as a single ag-
gregated loss if they can be sufficiently linked to a single unifying event by being 
causally connected with it’.102 The concept of unity of cause incorporates the need 
for a causal relationship between the aggregating event and the individual losses 
into the unities test. 
4.58 In Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital 
Ltd, the arbitral tribunal simplistically stated that by assessing whether there was 
unity of cause, it was to be asked ‘what was the cause of the losses’.103 Yet, it has 
been pointed out, both in Caudle v Sharp and in Scott v The Copenhagen Re Co (UK) 
Ltd, that not every event that is causative for all the individual losses can be con-
sidered a relevant event for the purposes of aggregation.104 Consequently, it is the 
purpose of a standard of causation ‘to separate out relevant from irrelevant’ 
events.105 
4.59 It is uncertain whether the concept of ‘unity of cause’ merely aims at de-
termining whether there are causative links between an event and each of the in-
dividual losses or whether the concept is further directed at separating the relevant 
event from irrelevant ones. 
4.60 In Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK, Rix J stated in the 
context of the appropriation of 15 Kuwaiti aircraft by Iraqi forces that there was ‘unity 
of cause, for, whichever of the insured perils [was] the appropriate one, it operate[d] 
alike in respect of all aircraft’.106 Hence, the relevant event was not specifically iden-
tified. Rather, Rix J stated that it was irrelevant which of the insured perils was the 
appropriate one, as in each case there were causative connections with the individual 
losses. Thus, the concept of ‘unity of cause’ was apparently merely used to determine 
whether there were causal links between the event and each of the 15 lost aircraft. 
However, the test was not used to determine which of multiple candidates was the 
relevant event for the purposes of aggregation. 
4.61 By contrast, the arbitral tribunal found in Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd 
v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd that the terror attacks on the World Trade 
Center constituted ‘two separate causes (…) because there were two separate 
102 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [68] (Rix LJ).  
103 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [21] (Field J).  
104 Caudle v Sharp (n 3) 648 (Evans LJ); Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [63] 
(Rix LJ).  
105 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [63]. It may be noted that Rix LJ considered 
that the concept of ‘remoteness’ is a tool used to separate out relevant from irrelevant events. In this 
analysis, the concept of remoteness is considered a part of the concept of causation. In fact, it de-
termines the required strength of a causal link.  
106 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5). 
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hijackings of two separate aircraft’.107 It further elaborated that it was not satisfied 
that ‘there was any basis, at least in the context of analysing unity of cause, for 
concluding that there was any factor amounting to an event of sufficient causative 
relevance to override the conclusion that two separate hijackings caused the separate 
loss and damage’.108 In the course of the assessment of whether there was unity of 
cause, the arbitral tribunal apparently analysed different possible events as well as the 
strength of its causal links with the individual losses. It concluded that the hijackings of 
the two aircraft were to be considered the relevant events and that there was no other 
‘event of sufficient causative relevance to override this conclusion’.109 Consequently, 
the concept of unity of cause was used in this case to test whether there were causal 
links between an event and the individual losses to be aggregated and it seems to also 
have been used to determine which of multiple candidates was the relevant event. 
4.62 In any case, the arbitral tribunal’s analysis in determining the relevant event 
has not been disclosed. More specifically, the arbitral tribunal did not disclose why it 
considered the individual hijackings rather than the coordinated attack or the kill-
ings of individual people on the aircraft as the relevant events. Nevertheless, the 
Commercial Court ruled that the arbitral tribunal was entitled to so find.110 
4.63 Further, the Commercial Court noted in Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star 
Insurance Co Ltd that the ‘implementation of instructions’ to impose emergency speed 
restrictions after a passenger train had derailed, was to some degree causative for the 
losses of revenue and increased working costs suffered by the train-operating compa-
nies. More specifically, however, the discoveries of the individual damage to different 
parts of the rails were considered causative for emergency speed restrictions being is-
sued. The restrictions were not imposed as a unitary programme to the entire railway 
network.111 In this case, the concept of unity of cause was undoubtedly used to de-
termine whether there was a causative link between the implementation of instructions 
and the losses that arose out of the emergency speed restrictions. It remains unclear, 
however, whether the concept of unity of cause was also used to test the strength of the 
causative links in question with a view to separating relevant from irrelevant events. 
4.64 Consequently, the purpose of the unity of cause as an element of the unities 
test is uncertain. In at least one instance, the concept of unity of cause was merely 
used to determine whether there were causative links between an event and a plur-
ality of losses. In at least one other case, the concept was used to determine which of 
multiple candidates was to be considered the relevant event for the purposes of 
aggregation due to sufficient causal relevance. In any case, there is no judicial au-
thority discussing how the concept of unity of cause would operate in separating 
relevant from irrelevant events. Thus, the concept of unity of cause does not provide 
any legal certainty; instead, it creates additional uncertainty. 
107 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [21] (Field J).  
108 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [21] (Field J).  
109 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [21] (Field J).  
110 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [37] (Field J).  
111 Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (n 39) [100] (Steel J). 
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e Unity of intent 
4.65 As was held in the Dawson’s Field Arbitration, if a plurality of losses have 
been ‘initiated by human action, the circumstances and purposes of the persons re-
sponsible’ form a further aspect of the unities test.112 Rix J reformulated the pro-
position by stating that ‘[i]n assessing the degree of unity regard may be had to such 
[a factor as] (…) the intentions of the human agents’.113 
4.66 The concept of ‘unity of intent’, too, seems to be a rather vague concept. It 
does not appear to be entirely clear what the human agents’ intentions must be in 
order to form unity of intent. More specifically, does the unity of intent require that 
the human agents intend to cause multiple individual losses? Alternatively, is it 
sufficient that they intend to commit an act which can be considered an event and 
thereby run the risk of causing losses? 
4.67 In respect of the appropriation of 15 Kuwaiti aircraft by Iraqi forces, the 
Commercial Court found that it was President Saddam Hussein’s goal, from the outset, 
to deprive Kuwait of its dominion over the aircraft and ‘to take Kuwait’s wealth by 
force’. The act of depriving Kuwait by force directly amounted to a number of losses.114 
Consequently, it may be said that President Saddam Hussein directly intended to in-
duce a plurality of losses which amounted to unity of intent. In the Dawson’s Field 
Arbitration, the arbitral tribunal similarly found that the hijackers had made one single 
decision to blow up three hijacked aircraft.115 Hence, it was the hijackers’ intention to 
induce multiple individual losses. 
4.68 In Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd, by contrast, the 
owner of a railway network issued instructions to impose emergency speed restric-
tions on various parts of its network following the derailment of a passenger train. 
These emergency speed restrictions resulted in losses in revenue and increased 
working costs for the train-operating companies. The Commercial Court held that 
‘[t]he justification for the [emergency speed restrictions] was the discovery of in-
dividual incidents of [gauge corner cracking, a defect in the rails] of sufficient severity 
to call for action (…)’.116 It appears evident that neither the instructions to issue 
emergency speed restrictions nor the issuing of such restrictions were intended to 
induce losses to the train-operating companies. Rather, these measures were taken to 
prevent further derailments. Consequently, the owner of the railway network cannot 
be said to have intended to induce a plurality of losses to the train-operating com-
panies. The Commercial Court nevertheless concluded that there was unity of 
intent.117 
112 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5).  
113 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5).  
114 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5).  
115 Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5).  
116 Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (n 39) [100] (Steel J).  
117 Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (n 39) [100]. Steel J expressly held that ‘there is a 
degree of unity of (…) intent’. 
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4.69 Considering the aforementioned judicial authorities, it may be said that there 
is substantial uncertainty as to what human agents must intend in order for there to 
be unity of intent. 
4.70 Further, in applying the unities test in Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v 
Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd, the arbitral tribunal considered the 
‘circumstances and purposes of the persons responsible’ in the attacks on the World 
Trade Center.118 In other words, the arbitral tribunal assessed whether there was unity of 
intent. In this regard, the arbitrators acknowledged ‘that the hijackings were the result of 
a co-ordinated plot paid for by Al Qaeda but observed that it was clear from the judicial 
authorities that a conspiracy or plan [could not] of itself constitute an occurrence or an 
event (…)’.119 In so finding, the arbitral tribunal seems to have lost sight of the fact that 
although human agents’ intentions and decisions can never properly be described as an 
event,120 the concept of unity of intent forms part of the unities test and is used to 
determine whether it is justified to aggregate a plurality of losses. By stating that there 
was no unity of intent because a plot can simply not constitute an event, the arbitral 
tribunal denied the concept of unity of intent its role within the unities test. 
4.71 As with the other elements of the unities test, the concept of unity of intent is, 
consequently, also far from clear and fosters substantial uncertainty in the 
construction of event-based aggregation mechanisms. 
3.4 Summary of the unities test’s shortcomings 
4.72 This analysis has shown that the unities test–as known today–is incapable of 
assessing whether it is justified to aggregate a plurality of losses in a specific case. In 
fact, the test itself suffers from a variety of different shortcomings. 
4.73 First, not all courts that dealt with event-based aggregation mechanisms 
deem the unities test relevant and applicable. There does not appear to be any 
guidance from judicial authority as to where it is applicable and where it is not. 
4.74 Secondly, it appears to be disputed whether the unities test merely aims at 
determining whether a certain happening can properly be described as an event or 
whether it aims at determining the standard of causation inherent in a specific ag-
gregation mechanism. Even if the latter were the case, it is not evident how the unities 
test would determine such a standard by considering factors such as locality, time 
and the intentions of human agents. Indeed, these factors are rather aspects of 
correlation than aspects of causation. 
4.75 Thirdly, it is uncertain whether the test assesses the unity of acts in 
order to determine whether they constitute one event or whether it assesses if the 
resulting losses are in unity. This shortcoming causes substantial uncertainty, in 
118 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [20] (Field J).  
119 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [20] (Field J).  
120 Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (n 39) [97] (Steel J). It may be noted, however, 
that in the Dawson’s Field Arbitration, quoted in: Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 
5), the arbitral tribunal considered the carrying out of a decision to blow up three aircraft one event. 
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particular, in cases where the acts that provoke multiple losses are not undertaken 
at the same place and time as the occurrence of the losses. 
4.76 Fourthly, the concept of unity of time largely depends on the period of time 
under scrutiny. Further, it cannot be said that there is an objective standard of 
what constitutes unity of time. Hence, the concept is too vague to provide legal 
certainty. 
4.77 Fifthly, the concept of unity of location largely depends on the spatial area 
under scrutiny. Further, it cannot be said that there is an objective standard of what 
constitutes unity of location. Therefore, substantial legal uncertainty exists around 
the concept of unity of location. 
4.78 Sixthly, it is not clear whether the concept of unity of cause is merely used to 
determine whether there are causal links between an event and a plurality of losses or 
whether the concept aims at separating the relevant from irrelevant events for the 
purposes of aggregation. 
4.79 Seventhly, it is uncertain what unity of intent means. It is unclear whether 
human agents must intend to cause multiple individual losses or whether it is 
sufficient that they intend to commit a certain act which constitutes an event. 
4.80 Therefore, the unities test–as it is known today–seems to be incapable of 
determining whether it is justified to aggregate a plurality of individual losses in a 
certain case. Rather than reducing legal uncertainty in the subject matter, it appears 
to create even more. 
4 Exercise of judgment 
4.81 As it is very difficult to precisely determine the causal requirements on which 
an aggregation mechanism is based,121 ‘cases on “event” are borderline and often 
give rise to disagreement between first instance and appellate judges’.122 In any case, 
courts have recognised that assessing whether multiple losses are to be aggregated 
involves an exercise of judgment.123 
4.82 More specifically, determining whether something can properly be described 
as an event124 as well as where on the chain of causation culminating in the in-
dividual losses to be aggregated a relevant event125 must lie in order to justify an 
aggregation of the losses is very difficult and depends to a large degree on the 
121 See paras 4.8 ff.  
122 Rob Merkin, ‘The Christchurch Earthquakes Insurance and Reinsurance Issues’ (2012) 18 
Canterbury Law Review 119, 146.  
123 In Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (n 39) [82], Steel J held that the assessment of 
whether there was one event ‘was to be made both analytically and as a matter of intuition and 
common sense’; Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [81] (Rix LJ). In Aioi Nissay 
Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [37], Field J noted that de-
termining the different unities involved an exercise of judgment; MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 3) [36], 
[39] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
124 See paras 3.30 ff.  
125 See paras 3.38 ff. 
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judgment of the person interpreting the aggregation clause.126 The unities test is said 
to assist in exercising this judgment.127 While the unities test aims at determining 
whether the circumstances of a plurality of losses justify their aggregation,128 it ul-
timately merely constitutes a set of guidelines,129 which itself requires an exercise of 
judgment.130 Hence, the unities test is incapable of guiding the process of exercising 
judgment. In fact, rather than dispelling legal uncertainty, the unities test causes 
additional unpredictability. The fact that questions of event-based aggregation are 
mostly decided in an exercise of judgment may further be illustrated by two examples 
of the reinsurance litigation following the attacks on the World Trade Center on 11 
September 2001. 
4.83 In MIC Simmonds v Gammell, an arbitral tribunal dealt with a case in which 
the owner of the land where the Twin Towers were situated became subject of two 
sets of claims. In one set of claims, the owner became liable towards the relatives of 
employees who had been at the site of the World Trade Center at the time of the 
terror attacks and had been struck by or became trapped under the debris (Workers 
Compensation Claims).131 In the other set of claims, persons involved in the clean-up 
operations following the attacks had claimed to have suffered personal injury which 
the owner of the land could have averted by providing adequate protective equip-
ment such as respirators and adequate training (Respiratory Claims).132 The dispute 
centred on whether the individual workers’ compensation claims and the respiratory 
claims were to be aggregated because they all arose out of one single event.133 
4.84 The arbitral tribunal concluded that the attack on the World Trade Center 
constituted one single event.134 Once the attack had been identified as an event, the 
tribunal discussed whether there was sufficient causal connection between the event and 
each individual loss.135 The arbitral tribunal found that there were significant causal 
links. Thus, it considered an aggregation of all the individual losses–whether Workers 
Compensation Claims or Respiratory Claims–as justified.136 In an appeal against the 
arbitral award, the Commercial Court found no error of law on the part of the arbi-
trators and thus affirmed their arbitral award.137 
4.85 By contrast, in further legal proceedings following the attacks on the World 
Trade Center, an arbitral tribunal had to decide whether a large number of claims, 
126 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [81] (Rix LJ).  
127 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [81] (Rix LJ).  
128 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5).  
129 MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 3) [29] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
130 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [37] (Field J).  
131 MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 3) [8] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
132 MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 3) [8] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
133 MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 3) [6] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
134 MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 3) [27]–[28], [30] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
135 MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 3) [30] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
136 MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 3) [30] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
137 MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 3) [38] (Sir Jeremy Cooke). 
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such as personal injury claims, wrongful death claims, property and business inter-
ruption claims, directly resulting from the attacks were to be aggregated. In Aioi 
Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd, the 
Commercial Court held that the arbitrators had not committed an error of law when 
deciding that the attacks did not constitute one single but rather two distinct events 
as there were two successful hijackings of two separate aircraft.138 
4.86 In both cases, the respective tribunals were required to decide whether 
multiple individual losses resulting from the attacks on the World Trade Center were 
to be aggregated. Both tribunals discussed their cases in light of the ‘essential re-
levant authorities on the point of aggregation’.139 Yet, their conclusions were dia-
metrically opposed. It is submitted that this is evidence of the fact that determining 
what can properly be described as an event and whether there is a sufficient causal 
link between an event and the individual losses is an exercise of pure judgment. 
5 Approaches to avoid legal uncertainty 
4.87 Depending on the class of insurance, the parties to reinsurance contracts have 
sought different means to reduce the legal uncertainty inherent in event-based ag-
gregation mechanisms. In property excess of loss reinsurance contracts, the parties 
have provided for so-called hours clauses. In other instances, the parties have sought 
to avoid the legal uncertainty existing around event-based aggregation mechanisms 
by providing for a so-called sole judge clause in their contract of reinsurance.140 
5.1 Hours clauses 
a Purpose of hours clauses 
4.88 Hours clauses are often used in property excess of loss reinsurance con-
tracts141 reinsuring against natural catastrophes142 or terrorism and political 
138 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [40] (Field J).  
139 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd (n 3) [3] (Field J); MIC 
Simmonds v Gammell (n 3) [20] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
140 It may be noted that the excess of loss reinsurance contracts before the Court of Appeal in Brown 
(RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 3) had been concluded before 1988. At that time, the parties to the 
contract could not have been aware of the legal uncertainties that resulted from court rulings and 
arbitral awards that were decided later. Accordingly, they could not have intended to dispel legal 
uncertainty created by these later decisions.  
141 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) para 28.84.  
142 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) para 28.84; Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 5) para 11–356; 
Butler and Merkin (n 8) para C-0248/4; ‘IUA 01–018 Hours Clause (NP61)’ <http://www.iuaclauses.co. 
uk/site/cms/contentDocumentLibraryView.asp?chapter=9&category=59> accessed 1 March 2019; 
‘IUA 01–023 United Kingdom Hours Clause (NP65)’ <http://www.iuaclauses.co.uk/site/cms/ 
contentDocumentLibraryView.asp?chapter=9&category=59> accessed 1 March 2019; ‘IUA 01–033 
Definition of Loss Occurrence (Hours Clause) - Commentary’ <http://www.iuaclauses.co.uk/site/cms/ 
contentDocumentLibraryView.asp?chapter=5> accessed 1 March 2019; ‘IUA 01–034 Definition of Loss 
Occurrence (Hours Clause)’ <http://www.iuaclauses.co.uk/site/cms/contentDocumentLibraryView.asp? 
chapter=5> accessed 1 March 2019; ‘LMA5223 Definition of Loss Occurrence (with Freeze Aggregate 
Extension)’ (London Market Association 2015) <http://www.lmalloyds.com/LMA/Underwriting/Non- 
Marine/Property_Reinsurance/LMA/Underwriting/Non-Marine/PRBP/Property_Reinsurance.aspx? 
hkey=c34153bf-b969-4e53-a433-012644640a4a> accessed 1 March 2019; ‘LMA5224 Definition of Loss 
Occurrence (Risk)’ (London Market Association 2015) <http://www.lmalloyds.com/LMA/Underwriting/ 
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violence.143 According to Soar, hours clauses were developed to dispel un-
certainties concerning aggregation mechanisms.144 They aim at more closely 
describing the unifying factor upon which a plurality of individual losses is to be 
aggregated.145 More specifically, hours clauses determine that multiple individual 
losses aggregate if they–subject to a specified period of time–all result from one 
single catastrophe.146 
4.89 Multiple different wordings147 that are based on different unifying factors 
exist. There are, eg, hours clauses using an ‘event’,148 an ‘act’,149 a ‘manifestation of a 
peril’150 or a ‘catastrophe’151 as their basis. 
4.90 In 2012, the International Underwriting Association’s Hours Clause Drafting 
Sub-Group presented its model hours clause, IUA 01–033, accompanied by a 
commentary. This hours clause was further developed and revised in February 2018. 
The work culminated in model clause IUA 01–034. This model clause focuses on the 
aggregation of losses following a natural disaster but also provides for a rule in 
respect of riots, civil commotions and malicious damage. Model clause IUA 01–034 
reads as follows: 
The words ‘Loss Occurrence’ shall mean all individual losses arising out of and directly 
occasioned by one catastrophe. However, the duration and extent of any ‘Loss Occurrence’ so 
defined shall be limited to:  
a. [72] consecutive hours as regards a hurricane, a typhoon, a cyclone, 
windstorm; 
N o n - M a r i n e / P r o p e r t y _ R e i n s u r a n c e / L M A / U n d e r w r i t i n g / N o n - M a r i n e / P R B P /  
Property_Reinsurance.aspx?hkey=c34153bf-b969-4e53-a433-012644640a4a> accessed 1 March 2019.  
143 ‘Hiscox War, Terrorism and Political Violence Insurance’ <https://www.awris.com/Clauses/S& 
T%20andor%20PV%20business/Hiscox%20WTPV%20180507.pdf> accessed 4 March 2019; ‘LMA 
3030 - Terrorism Insurance - Physical Loss or Physical Damage Wording’ <https://www.lmalloyds. 
com/LMA/Wordings/lma3030.aspx> accessed 4 March 2019; ‘LMA 3092 - Physical Loss or Physical 
Damage - Riots, Strikes, Civil Commotion, Malicious Damage, Terrorism and Sabotage Insurance’; 
Andreas Schwepcke and Alexandra Vetter, Praxishandbuch: Rückversicherung (VVW 2017) para 918, 
who opine that hours clauses appear ‘to be workable in the case of reinsurance of property against 
named perils, but, it is difficult to draft an hours clause which accommodates such diverse human 
loss-causative agents as negligent Lloyd’s underwriters and aggressive Iraqi dictators’.  
144 Soar (n 5).  
145 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) para 28.84. Cf also Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 5) para 
11–356.  
146 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) para 28.85.  
147 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) para 28.87.  
148 ‘Hiscox War, Terrorism and Political Violence Insurance’ (n 143); ‘LMA 3092 - Physical Loss or Physical 
Damage - Riots, Strikes, Civil Commotion, Malicious Damage, Terrorism and Sabotage Insurance’ (n 143).  
149 ‘LMA 3030 - Terrorism Insurance - Physical Loss or Physical Damage Wording’ (n 143).  
150 ‘IUA 01–018 Hours Clause (NP61)’ (n 142); ‘IUA 01–019 Loss Occurrence (NP64)’ <http://www. 
iuaclauses.co.uk/site/cms/contentDocumentLibraryView.asp?chapter=9&category=59> accessed 1 
March 2019; ‘IUA 01–023 United Kingdom Hours Clause (NP65)’ (n 142).  
151 ‘IUA 01–033 Definition of Loss Occurrence (Hours Clause) - Commentary’ (n 142); ‘IUA 01–034 
Definition of Loss Occurrence (Hours Clause)’ (n 142); ‘LMA5223 Definition of Loss Occurrence 
(with Freeze Aggregate Extension)’ (n 142); ‘LMA5224 Definition of Loss Occurrence (Risk)’ (n 142). 
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b. [72] consecutive hours as regards earthquake, seaquake, tsunami, tidal 
wave and/or volcanic eruption;  
c. [72] consecutive hours as regards pluvial flood due to heavy precipitation;  
d. [168] consecutive hours as regards fluvial flood due to the overflowing of 
one or several rivers or one or several rivers together with other waterbodies;  
e. [72] consecutive hours as regards flooding due to storm surge;  
f. [72] consecutive hours and within the limits of one city, town or village as 
regards riots, civil commotions and malicious damage;  
g. [168] consecutive hours as regards any ‘Loss Occurrence’ of whatsoever 
nature which does not consist of or include individual loss or losses from 
any of the perils previously stated; 
and no individual loss from whatever insured peril, which occurs outside of these periods or 
areas, shall be included in that ‘Loss Occurrence’. 
Where such a Loss Occurrence consists of or includes losses from two or more insured perils, 
the duration of each insured peril contributing losses to such a ‘Loss Occurrence’ shall not 
exceed the relevant period of consecutive hours specified herein for that peril. Only one such 
period of consecutive hours for each insured peril may contribute to each Loss Occurrence so 
designated. The maximum number of consecutive hours for the entire Loss Occurrence 
consisting of or including a combination of insured perils shall be the number of consecutive 
hours specified for the applicable insured peril with the highest number of consecutive hours. 
The Reinsured may choose the date and time when any such period of consecutive hours 
commences and if any catastrophe is of greater duration than the above periods, the Reinsured 
may divide that catastrophe into two or more ‘Loss Occurrences’, provided no two periods 
overlap and provided no period commences earlier than the date and time of the happening of 
the first recorded individual loss to the Reinsured in that catastrophe. 
This clause shall not extend coverage beyond the business specified as covered by this 
{Response} and shall not replace, override or modify any other terms, clauses or conditions in 
this {Response}.152  
4.91 In the following section, the operation of hours clauses and problems associated 
with such clauses will be discussed on the basis of the IUA 01–034 model hours clause. 
b Operation of hours clauses 
4.92 Clause IUA 01–034 defines the term ‘Loss Occurrence’. It provides that one loss 
occurrence is composed of all individual losses that arise from one catastrophe. In other 
words, the term ‘Loss Occurrence’ corresponds with what has been termed as the re-
insured’s ultimate net loss (minus the reinsured’s expenses for settling the claims).153 
The clause specifies that the duration of one loss occurrence shall be limited to a certain 
number of hours. The applicable hourly limit depends on the peril that caused the 
plurality of losses.154 All individual losses that result from a catastrophe and occur 
within the applicable period of time are to be aggregated. 
152 ‘IUA 01–034 Definition of Loss Occurrence (Hours Clause)’ (n 142) quoted with permission from the 
International Underwriting Association.  
153 See paras 2.11 ff.  
154 ‘IUA 01–034 Definition of Loss Occurrence (Hours Clause)’ (n 142). 
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4.93 The hours clause does not determine the reinsured perils. Only if the contract 
of reinsurance covers losses resulting from a specific peril will the time limit with 
regard to this peril in the hours clause operate. The clause’s closing paragraph 
specifically clarifies that the hours clause is not intended to extend cover in any 
way.155 Furthermore, the list of perils provided for in the hours clause is not an 
exhaustive one.156 Rather, point (g) of the first paragraph of IUA 01–034 provides a 
time limit for the aggregation of losses resulting from insured perils that are not 
specifically named in the hours clause.157 
4.94 The unifying factor used in this clause is ‘one catastrophe’. It is important to 
note, however, that a peril named in the hours clause is not the same thing as a 
catastrophe.158 It is, namely, possible that a catastrophe ‘includes losses which result 
from one or more named perils’.159 By contrast to its predecessor IUA 01–033, IUA 
01–034 contains language dealing with loss occurrences consisting of a combination 
of insured perils.160 
4.95 Moreover, for the purposes of IUA 01–033, the International Underwriting 
Association’s Hours Clause Drafting Sub-Group considered whether it should use 
the unifying factor of ‘event’ in place of ‘catastrophe’ as the former term was often 
used in aggregation clauses in the London market. Yet, it decided to use the term 
‘catastrophe’ because in contrast to the term ‘event’ the former term provided ad-
ditional flexibility.161 IUA 01–034 abided by that decision.162 
4.96 Only losses that are attributable to one and the same catastrophe are ag-
gregated. Thus, losses resulting from two different catastrophes, which both occur at 
the same time, are not to be aggregated.163 For instance, if two or more separate 
windstorms occur in quick succession, only those losses resulting from the same 
windstorm may be aggregated, whereas losses that arise from different windstorms may 
not.164 
155 ‘IUA 01–034 Definition of Loss Occurrence (Hours Clause)’ (n 142). Cf also ‘IUA 01–033 Definition 
of Loss Occurrence (Hours Clause) - Commentary’ (n 142) para 14.1.  
156 Cf ‘IUA 01–033 Definition of Loss Occurrence (Hours Clause) - Commentary’ (n 142) para 16, which 
is still relevant for IUA 01–034.  
157 ‘IUA 01–034 Definition of Loss Occurrence (Hours Clause)’ (n 142).  
158 Anthony Dickinson, ‘Hours Clause: Definition of Loss Occurrence’ (2009) IUA Circular 116/09 3 <http:// 
www.iuaclauses.co.uk/site/cms/contentDocumentView.asp?chapter=5> accessed 1 March 2019.  
159 Dickinson (n 158) 3.  
160 See ‘IUA 01–034 Definition of Loss Occurrence (Hours Clause)’ (n 142), which provides that 
‘[w]here a loss occurrence consists of (…) losses from two or more insured perils, the duration of each 
insured peril contributing losses to such a “Loss Occurrence” shall not exceed the relevant period of 
consecutive hours specified (…) for that peril. The maximum number of consecutive hours for the 
entire Loss Occurrence consisting of or including a combination of insured perils shall be the number 
of consecutive hours specified for the applicable insured peril with the highest number of consecutive 
hours’.  
161 ‘IUA 01–033 Definition of Loss Occurrence (Hours Clause) - Commentary’ (n 142) para 4.2.  
162 ‘IUA 01–034 Definition of Loss Occurrence (Hours Clause)’ (n 142).  
163 Dickinson (n 158) 3.  
164 Dickinson (n 158) 3. 
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4.97 In any case, under model clause IUA 01–034, it is up to the reinsured to choose 
when–for the purposes of defining a loss occurrence–the indicated period of time starts 
to run.165 If a catastrophe is of longer duration than the period of time indicated in the 
hours clause, the reinsured may present two aggregated losses to its reinsurer. It may, 
for that matter, divide the unifying factor of catastrophe into two or more instances. All 
the individual losses that arose from the catastrophe within one indicated period of time 
may be aggregated. Individual losses that occur after the elapse of this period of time 
may be aggregated if they, in turn, occurred during another period of time of the same 
length. Furthermore, the first and second period of time may not overlap and the first 
period of time may not be chosen to start before the occurrence of the first recorded 
individual loss.166 
c Problems with hours clauses 
4.98 The International Underwriting Association has deemed one of its model 
clauses preceding IUA 01–034 ‘very successful’.167 It considered, however, that ‘over 
the years there ha[d] inevitably been losses which ha[d] prompted questions about its 
operation’.168 Since then, it has refined its model clauses repeatedly. 
4.99 There is no English authority dealing with hours clauses in detail.169 In fact, 
there appears to be substantial uncertainty as to their interpretation. 
4.100 First and foremost, it has been set forth that ‘a catastrophe is not the same thing 
as a peril’ and that only losses from one and the same catastrophe are aggregated.170 This 
begs the question of what constitutes one catastrophe. Barlow Lyde and Gilbert write 
that the purpose of the hours clause was ‘to address one of the most persistent difficulties 
encountered in handling property excess of loss catastrophe claims, namely, how to 
define clearly (…) the basis upon which the reinsured may aggregate losses arising from 
one occurrence’.171 Insofar as the hours clause does not provide for a clear definition of 
what constitutes one catastrophe, this specific difficulty is not even addressed. Irrespective 
of the time periods indicated in the hours clause, the vexing question of whether there 
were one or multiple catastrophes which caused the individual losses, hence, remains. 
4.101 Secondly, the meaning of the phrase ‘directly occasioned by’ appears unclear.172 
In fact, this phrase seems to provide that a specific causal link between the unifying 
catastrophe and each individual loss is required. Yet, the hours clause remains silent as to 
the applicable standard of causation. In its circular 116/09, the International 
Underwriting Association explains that there must be a direct causal relationship. The 
165 ‘IUA 01–034 Definition of Loss Occurrence (Hours Clause)’ (n 142). See also Barlow Lyde 
and Gilbert LLP (n 5) para 28.89.  
166 ‘IUA 01–034 Definition of Loss Occurrence (Hours Clause)’ (n 142).  
167 Dickinson (n 158) 1.  
168 Cf Dickinson (n 158) 1.  
169 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) para 28.86; Dickinson (n 158) 9.  
170 Dickinson (n 158) 3.  
171 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) para 28.84; Soar (n 5), states that ‘the “hours clause” was 
developed to remove the uncertainties surrounding the application of cause and event wording’.  
172 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) para 28.86. 
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purpose of this was to ‘ensure that a claim could not be made for losses that [were] so far 
down a chain of events as to be considered too remote from the cause’.173 It is certainly 
possible that multiple individual losses occur in temporal proximity while the causative 
connections between the catastrophe and each of the individual losses differ substantially. 
For instance, an earthquake may be a catastrophe that causes multiple individual losses. 
A number of individual losses may directly arise from the earthquake. At the same time, 
the earthquake may provoke a tsunami which, in turn, causes further individual losses. 
The force of the tsunami may, in turn, provoke a short circuit that also results in in-
dividual losses. Although the individual earthquake losses, the tsunami losses and the fire 
losses all occurred in temporal proximity, they cannot be said to involve the same degree 
causal proximity to the seismic catastrophe, ie the earthquake. 
4.102 It may be deduced from this that both event-based aggregation mechanisms 
using an hours clause and those not providing for an hours clause come with an un-
certain standard of causation. The temporal limitation provided for in the hours clause 
does not aim at and is not capable of overcoming the difficulties associated with the 
required degree of causation inherent in event-based aggregation mechanisms. The fact 
that the aggregation of a plurality of individual losses is temporally limited is, thus, 
merely to be considered an addition to the causal requirements that narrows down the 
aggregation mechanism. 
4.103 Thirdly, when dealing with the question whether a specific individual loss oc-
curred within the applicable period of time, a problem of timing may arise.174 This is 
particularly so when the reinsured divides the catastrophe into two or multiple in-
stances.175 In fact, it will not always be easy to identify when exactly an individual loss 
occurred and, thus, to which period of time it relates.176 For instance, if a windstorm 
moves over Europe and causes individual losses over a period of 100 hours, the re-
insured may, under the model clause IUA 01–034, aggregate all individual losses that 
occurred during a period of 72 hours. After this period has elapsed, a second period of 
72 hours starts to run. It may be difficult to identify at what time each individual loss 
occurred and thus whether it relates to the first or the second instance.177 
4.104 In summary, hours clauses have not yet been fully tested by English courts. 
Irrespective of this, they do not seem to be capable of fully dispelling legal un-
certainties associated with event-based aggregation mechanisms. 
d Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v Novae Corporate 
4.105 Hours clauses generally define the term ‘occurrence’ or ‘loss occurrence’ and 
use unifying factors such as ‘catastrophe’,178 ‘event’,179 ‘act’ or ‘manifestation of an 
173 Dickinson (n 158) 6.  
174 Cf Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) para 28.91.  
175 See para 4.97.  
176 Cf Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) para 28.91.  
177 Cf Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) para 28.91.  
178 See, for instance, IUA01–033; IUA 01–034; LMA 5223; LMA 5224.  
179 See, for instance, LMA 3092. 
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original insured peril’.180 Hence, they are mostly used in the context of event-based 
aggregation mechanisms.181 
4.106 By contrast, hours clauses appear to be used rather seldomly in cause-based 
aggregation mechanisms. Yet, it may be that a reinsurance contract contains a cause- 
based aggregation clause as well as an event-based hours clause.182 This begs the 
question of the relation between the hours clause and the aggregation clause.183 In 
Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd, the 
Commercial Court touched upon this question.184 In this case, the following ag-
gregation clause was incorporated into the retrocession agreement between the retro-
cedent TMEI and the retrocessionaire Novae: ‘Occurrence’ means ‘any one Occurrence 
or any series of Occurrences consequent upon or attributable to one source or original 
cause’.185 
4.107 Further, the retrocession agreement also contained the following hours 
clause: 
All loss, destruction or damage … caused by inundation from the sea or the rising, 
overflowing or breaking of boundaries of any lake, pond, reservoir, river, stream or other 
body of water, all whether or not driven by wind, and occurring during a period of 
seventy two consecutive hours … shall be deemed to have been caused by a single 
Occurrence.186  
4.108 Hence, the aggregation mechanism contained in this retrocession agreement is 
composed of a cause-based aggregation clause as well as an event-based hours clause. It 
is worth noting two aspects of this aggregation mechanism. First, both the hours clause 
and the aggregation clause use the term ‘occurrence’ but define it differently. Secondly, 
the term ‘occurrence’ is not designated as the unifying factor in the aggregation clause. 
It is, instead, ‘one source or original cause’ that is the unifying factor. By contrast, the 
term ‘occurrence’ may be understood to operate as the unifying factor in the hours 
clause.187 Consequently, there are potentially at least two different unifying factors in 
the aggregation mechanism. 
4.109 It is not surprising that the parties to the retrocession agreement favoured 
different interpretations of the aggregation mechanism.188 The retrocessionaire, 
Novae, argued that the hours clause overrides the aggregation clause to the effect 
that the individual losses should be aggregated on the basis of any one occurrence as 
180 See, for instance, IUA 01–018 (NP61); IUA 01–019 (NP64); IUA 01–023 (NP65).  
181 Cf paras 2.61 ff, 3.59.  
182 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 5) para 11–357.  
183 Cf Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd [2013] EWHC 3362 
(Comm), [2014] Lloyd’s Rep IR 490 [100] (Hamblen J).  
184 Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd (n 183) [99]–[104] 
(Hamblen J).  
185 Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd (n 183) [51], [53] 
(Hamblen J).  
186 Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd (n 183) [102] (Hamblen J).  
187 Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd (n 183) [102] (Hamblen J).  
188 Butler and Merkin (n 8) para C-0248/4. 
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defined in the hours clause.189 The retrocedent, TMEI, on the other hand, contended 
that the hours clause is overridden by the aggregation clause and that the individual 
losses should be aggregated if they are consequent upon or attributable to one source 
or original cause.190 
4.110 The Commercial Court was not required to and did not decide whether the 
hours clause prevailed over the aggregation clause or vice versa.191 This is a question of 
constructing the retrocession agreement, which appears quite challenging, because there 
is one aggregation mechanism using conflicting unifying factors. The parties to re-
insurance contracts are well advised to avoid using multiple incompatible unifying 
factors in one aggregation mechanism as this adds even more legal uncertainty as to the 
operation of the aggregation mechanism. 
5.2 Sole judge clauses 
4.111 It has been demonstrated that aggregation mechanisms based on ‘each and 
every loss and/or series of losses arising out of one event’ may be controversial.192 
There is, in fact, often considerable debate about the definition of an ‘event’ and the 
causal requirements associated with it. 
4.112 With a view to dispel the legal uncertainties inherent in event-based aggregation 
mechanisms and ‘to save endless litigation about the point’,193 so-called sole judge clauses 
have been developed. A typical sole judge clause might read as follows: ‘The Reassured 
shall be the sole judge as to what constitutes each and every loss and/or one event’.194 
4.113 A sole judge clause does not modify the event-based aggregation mechanism 
itself. It complements the aggregation provision with an agreement to leave it to the 
reinsured to decide whether a plurality of losses can properly be said to arise out of 
any single event.195 By so doing, the parties confer the right to the reinsured to decide 
mixed questions of fact and law.196 
4.114 Whether and to what extent this is permitted by the law was considered in 
Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd.197 This was one of the legal proceedings following 
Deeny v Gooda Walker198 and Arbuthnot v Feltrim.199 In these cases Lloyd’s Members’ 
189 Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd (n 183) [103] (Hamblen J).  
190 Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd (n 183) [101], [104] 
(Hamblen J).  
191 Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd (n 183); Merkin, Hodgson 
and Tyldesley (n 5) para 11–357.  
192 See paras 4.4 ff. In respect of problems associated with series clauses, see paras 3.83 ff.  
193 Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 3) 206 (Waller LJ).  
194 Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 3). Another wording that has been used is: ‘The Reassured’s 
definition of each and every loss and/or event shall be final and binding on the Reinsurers hereon’.  
195 Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 3) 208 (Chadwick LJ).  
196 Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 3) 208 (Chadwick LJ).  
197 Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 3).  
198 Deeny v Gooda Walker Ltd [1994] CLC 1224 (Comm).  
199 Arbuthnot v Feltrim Underwriting Agencies Ltd [1995] CLC 437. 
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Agents were held liable for negligently underwriting insurance policies. The Members’ 
Agents were covered for their liability under E&O insurance policies underwritten by, 
among others, Syndicate 702. Syndicate 702, in turn, bought excess of loss reinsurance 
cover for losses resulting from their E&O insurance policies.200 With ‘the commercial 
objective of avoiding unnecessary cost and expense in the settlement of reinsurance 
claims’, Syndicate 702 complemented the aggregation provisions with sole judge 
clauses.201 
4.115 First, the Court of Appeal noted that the sole judge rule was to be construed to 
the effect that ‘as a matter of fact and construction of the reinsurance contract’ the re-
insured was given the power to decide whether multiple losses arose from one or multiple 
events for the purposes of aggregation.202 It observed that a sole judge clause was an 
agreement to leave to the reinsured the decision as to what the facts were in a specific case 
and whether, from ‘the combination of [these] facts’, it may be concluded that multiple 
losses arose out of one single event.203 The Court of Appeal held that, in principle, such 
agreements were valid. More specifically, it held that ‘a sensible commercial bargain, 
made between parties experienced in their field’ should not be vitiated unless ‘there [was] 
some clearly identifiable element of public policy which require[d] that to be done’.204 As 
long as the reinsured was bound to use his decision-making power in a reasonable 
fashion, sole judge clauses were not contrary to public policy and, thus, were valid.205 
4.116 The Court of Appeal further considered the question of whether the re-
insured’s decision was unreasonable. Waller LJ noted that where a decision upon 
fact and construction had been left to one of the parties, this decision could not be 
considered unreasonable simply because the reinsurer could show that a court would 
have decided differently. A decision was unreasonable, according to Waller LJ, only 
if it could not even be argued that multiple losses arose from one single event when 
the matter came to be considered by a court.206 
200 It may be noted that the primary insurance contract was taken out on the basis of ‘any one occurrence 
(…) arising from one originating cause’, whereas the reinsurance contracts provided for an aggregation 
on the basis of ‘each and every loss (…) arising out of one event’, see Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd 
(n 3). In Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd (n 40), it was held that each underwriter’s negligent 
approach to the underwriting constituted one originating cause. In Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field 
[1995] CLC 1504 (CA), the Court of Appeal held that an originating cause was essentially the same 
thing as an event. This is why in Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 3), the Commercial Court at first 
instance held that the reinsured’s decision to view the negligent approach to the overall underwriting as 
one single event was correct. Subsequently, however, the House of Lords overturned the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment in Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) and clarified that an originating cause 
was something altogether less constricted than an event and that a state of mind could not constitute an 
event. It is for this reason that the reinsurers before the Court of Appeal in Brown (RE) v GIO 
Insurance Ltd (n 3) argued that the negligent approach to the overall process of underwriting might 
constitute an originating cause but not one single event; see also Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) 
paras 28.80 ff.  
201 Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 3) 208 (Chadwick LJ).  
202 Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 3) 206 (Waller LJ).  
203 Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 3) 209 (Chadwick LJ).  
204 Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 3) 208 f (Chadwick LJ).  
205 Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 3) 206 (Waller LJ), 209 (Chadwick LJ).  
206 Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 3) 207 (Waller LJ). 
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4.117 In applying the sole judge clause, the reinsured had decided that the ‘overall 
underwriting of an individual underwriter caused by his negligent approach’ was one 
single event which resulted in multiple instances of negligent underwritings.207 The 
reinsurer argued that it had been held in Axa Reinsurance Plc v Field208 and in Caudle 
v Sharp209 that, as a matter of law, a state of mind could not constitute an event 
within the meaning of aggregation clauses so that the reinsured’s decision was to be 
considered unreasonable.210 
4.118 The Court of Appeal stated that its finding that a negligent approach to the 
process of underwriting constituted one event does not mean that ‘the state of mind 
of each individual underwriter was an “event”’.211 Furthermore, in Waller LJ’s 
opinion, it was a reasonable view ‘that the overall underwriting of an individual 
underwriter caused by his negligent approach was an event from which all the losses 
arose’.212 The Court of Appeal accordingly concluded that the reinsured’s relevant 
decision was not unreasonable.213 
4.119 Where a sole judge clause is used, the pertinent question becomes whether the 
reinsured’s decision is reasonable.214 It appears difficult to grasp the extent of the right 
conferred upon the reinsured to exercise his own judgment. As Butler and Merkin state, 
there is legal uncertainty as to whether the reinsured is required to take the reinsurer’s 
interest into consideration when making its decision.215 
4.120 Consequently, a sole judge clause may be an effective tool to dispel some of 
the legal uncertainty inherent in an event-based aggregation mechanism and, thus, to 
avoid endless legal proceedings about the question of correct aggregation.216 
However, as the extent of the reinsured’s right to exercise his own judgment seems to 
be unclear, some legal uncertainty persists. Furthermore, sole judge clauses largely 
put the reinsurers at the reinsureds’ mercy. Clearly, the decision as to whether to use 
a sole judge clause is a commercial decision, weighing up the risks of costly litigation 
about the correct aggregation of multiple losses and those of paying more re-
insurance claims because the reinsured–not unreasonably–interpreted the aggrega-
tion clause in its own favour. 
207 Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 3) 207 (Waller LJ).  
208 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3).  
209 Caudle v Sharp (n 3).  
210 Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 3) 205 (Waller LJ).  
211 Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 3) 206 (Waller LJ).  
212 Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 3) 207 (Waller LJ).  
213 Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 3) 207 (Waller LJ), 210 (Chadwick LJ). It may be noted that in 
IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 3) the annual decision to carry out installations 
using asbestos was considered one single event. Consequently, it might be argued that the negligent 
planning of underwriting activities equally constituted one single event.  
214 Butler and Merkin (n 8) para C–0250.  
215 Butler and Merkin (n 8) para C–0250.  
216 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) para 28.83. 
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6 Summary of event-based aggregation under English law 
4.121 Causal requirements inherent in event-based aggregation mechanisms are 
said to be determined by both the unifying factor and the linking phrase used in the 
aggregation clause. Courts have held that the causal link between an event and each 
individual loss to be aggregated must be a strong rather than a weak one. However, 
no meaningful standard of causation can be deduced from legal authorities so that 
substantial legal uncertainty exists around event-based aggregation mechanisms. In 
line with this, courts have held that deciding a question of aggregation involved an 
exercise of judgment. 
4.122 With the aim of structuring this exercise of judgment, it has been held that 
the unities test may assist in determining whether it is justified to aggregate a plur-
ality of losses in a specific case. Yet, the unities test appears to be incapable of this. It 
is so vague that it actually provides arbitral tribunals and courts with ample op-
portunity to reach result-oriented judgments. In any case, the unities test has not 
dispelled any of the legal uncertainty concerning event-based aggregation mechan-
isms. The reinsurance market has further tried to avoid legal uncertainty by devel-
oping hours clauses and sole judge clauses. The former, again, come with a lot of 
room for interpretation. The latter appear to be capable of reducing the legal un-
certainty inherent in event-based aggregation mechanisms to some extent. Yet, this 
comes at the price of putting the reinsurer at the reinsured’s mercy to a certain 
degree. 
4.123 Consequently, ‘there is now an embarrassment of jurisprudential riches’ as 
O’Neill and Woloniecki call it,217 substantial legal uncertainty with regard to event- 
based aggregation exists under English law. In awareness of the existence of such 
uncertainty, Article 5.2 PRICL was drafted to provide the reinsurance market with 
more legal certainty in this field. This article will be discussed in greater detail below. 
II Event-based aggregation under Article 5.2 PRICL 
1 What the PRICL are 
4.124 The reinsurance industry is genuinely international.218 More often than not, 
reinsurance contracts regulate cross-border transactions.219 There is, however, no 
uniform reinsurance contract law. The current balance of power in the reinsurance 
markets enables the party seeking reinsurance cover to choose the law applicable to 
the reinsurance contract. The reinsured or, for that matter, the reinsurance broker 
often chooses the law of the country or federal state where the reinsured is based.220 
217 Terry O’Neill, Jan Woloniecki and Franziska Arnold-Dwyer, The Law of Reinsurance in England and 
Bermuda (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 2019) para 7–013.  
218 Robert M Merkin, A Guide to Reinsurance Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2007) 380; Barlow 
Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) para 3.1; Dieter Looschelders, ‘§ 9 Das IPR der Rückversicherung’ in 
Dieter W Lüer and Andreas Schwepcke (eds), Rückversicherungsrecht (CH Beck 2013) para 68.  
219 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 5) para 20.1.  
220 Helmut Heiss, ‘From Contract Certainty to Legal Certainty for Reinsurance Transactions: The 
Principle of Reinsurance Contract Law (PRICL)’ [2018] Scandinavian Studies of Law 92, 99. 
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Hence, the meaning of the contractual terms will regularly be determined in light of 
the law of the country or federal state where the reinsured has its place of business. 
4.125 On the European mainland and in Scandinavia, national insurance contract 
acts often exclude reinsurance contracts from their scopes of application.221 In these 
countries, reinsurance contracts are governed by general contract law rules which ty-
pically do not address reinsurance-specific issues.222 As these jurisdictions often do not 
regulate reinsurance-specific questions, substantial legal uncertainty exists. 
4.126 By contrast, the scope of respective insurance legislation in England and the US 
generally extend to reinsurance contracts.223 Yet, many aspects of English (re-)insurance 
contract law do not correspond to, for example, New York (re-)insurance contract law. 
For instance, aggregation clauses are construed differently in England and the US.224 
According to Staring and Hansell, a number of states use the so-called ‘proximate cause’ 
test, whereas the state of New York, for example, applies the ‘unfortunate event’ test to 
determine questions of aggregation.225 Both of these tests are unknown under English 
law. Consequently, an underwriter who uses the same wording in contracts that are 
subject to different governing laws must conclude that his words have substantially dif-
ferent meanings depending on the applicable law.226 Due to the fact that reinsurance 
companies generally do business with primary insurers from a variety of different 
countries,227 it is virtually impossible for them to assess the meanings of their contracts of 
reinsurance under the respective governing laws. Hence, the laws applicable to reinsurance 
contracts entail substantial legal uncertainty for one or both parties to the contract.228 
4.127 With a view to offering the reinsurance industry a set of uniform reinsurance 
contract law rules, the Universities of Zurich, Frankfurt am Main and Vienna in-
itiated the development of the PRICL.229 The Principles are elaborated by academics 
from a large variety of countries.230 The drafting committee is advised by leading 
primary insurers, reinsurers, reinsurance brokers as well as special advisors who 
221 See, for instance, section 186 of the Austrian Insurance Contract Act; Article 54 of the Belgian 
Insurance Contract Act; Article 7:927 of the Dutch Civil Code; section 1(3) of the Finnish Insurance 
Contract Act; Article L 111-1 of the French Insurance Contract Act; section 209 of the German 
Insurance Contract Act; Article 63 of the Liechtenstein Insurance Contract Act; Article 4 of the 
Luxembourg Insurance Contract Act; Article 101(1) of the Swiss Insurance Contract Act. Contrast 
Articles 1928 ff of the Italian Civil Code and Articles 77 ff of the Spanish Insurance Contract Act.  
222 See, for instance, Judgment of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court of 17 January 2014, BGE 140 III 115 
consideration 6.3.  
223 Explanatory Notes to the Insurance Act 2015, para 36. Cf also Graydon Shaw Staring and Dean 
Hansell, Law of Reinsurance (Thomson Reuters Westlaw 2018) para 1:2.  
224 Staring and Hansell (n 223) para 15:4.  
225 Staring and Hansell (n 223) para 15:4.  
226 Heiss (n 220) 99.  
227 Heiss (n 220) 99.  
228 Heiss (n 220) 95 ff.  
229 Heiss (n 220) 101 f.  
230 Austria, Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom and United States of America. 
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consult the drafters in relation to specific matters, such as arbitration, internationally 
mandatory law and the unification of private law.231 
4.128 Moreover, the development of the Principles is conducted in cooperation with 
the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), which is 
one of the leading institutions in the field of the unification of law.232 Over many years, 
UNIDROIT has developed and refined its Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts (PICC), a new version of which was published in 2016. The PICC contain 
‘general rules for international commercial contracts’.233 
4.129 Under Article 1.1.2 PRICL, issues that are not settled by the PRICL shall be 
settled in accordance with the PICC. In other words, the PRICL refer to the PICC for 
issues that are not specific to reinsurance contracts.234 Together, the PRICL and the 
PICC form a comprehensive set of uniform rules dedicated to foster legal certainty in 
the reinsurance industry.235 It is the PRICL Project Group’s goal to provide the market 
with a package of neutral rules that are available to all industry participants. In pur-
suing this goal, both the PRICL and the PICC are accompanied by an official com-
mentary as well as illustrations.236 
4.130 It is important to note that the PRICL are not intended to be enacted as an 
international treaty, nor are they intended to be implemented in national legisla-
tion.237 Rather, the PRICL may be classified as soft law comprised of a set of non- 
binding legal rules.238 Consequently, if the parties to a contract of reinsurance wish 
their agreement to be governed by the PRICL, they have to agree on the applicability 
of the PRICL.239 
4.131 In chapter 5 of the PRICL, there are three provisions dealing with the 
aggregation of losses. Article 5.1 PRICL sets the foundation for the Principles’ event- 
based aggregation mechanism provided for in Article 5.2 as well as their cause-based 
aggregation mechanism described in Article 5.3.240 
2 The general concept of Article 5.2 PRICL 
4.132 Article 5.2 PRICL reads as follows:    
1. Where the parties agree on an event-based aggregation in a contract 
reinsuring first-party insurance policies, all losses that occur as a direct 
231 Heiss (n 220) 101.  
232 Heiss (n 220) 102.  
233 Preamble of the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016.  
234 Article 1.1.2 PRICL. See also Heiss (n 220) 103.  
235 Cf Heiss (n 220) 101 f.  
236 Heiss (n 220) 103.  
237 Heiss (n 220) 105.  
238 Heiss (n 220) 108.  
239 Heiss (n 220) 105 f.  
240 See paras 4.132 ff, 5.11 ff. 
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consequence of the same materialization of a peril reinsured against shall be 
considered as arising out of one event.  
2. Where the parties agree on an event-based aggregation in a contract reinsuring 
third-party liability insurance policies, all losses that occur as a direct consequence 
of the same act, omission or fact giving rise or allegedly giving rise to the primary 
insured’s liability shall be considered as arising out of one event.  
4.133 This provision only operates if the parties have agreed on an event-based 
aggregation mechanism in their contract of reinsurance.241 Article 5.2 PRICL basically 
offers simple and abstract rules for determining whether multiple separate losses are to 
be aggregated under an event-based aggregation mechanism. More specifically, it de-
scribes what can be considered the relevant event.242 It further provides that if such an 
event is directly causative for each of the multiple individual losses, they are to be 
aggregated.243 
4.134 Accordingly, the PRICL recognise that an aggregation is only possible if the 
aggregating event is causally linked to each of the separate losses to be aggregated.244 
However, Article 5.2 PRICL is based on the finding that it is utterly difficult, probably 
impossible, to abstractly define a standard of causation that allows moving back on the 
chain of causation and objectively identifying the relevant unifying event.245 In the 
PRICL, an attempt has been made to simplify Evans LJ’s test of determining whether 
something can properly be described as an event and if so whether it can be considered a 
relevant event satisfying a rather vague246 test of causation.247 
4.135 As set out above, English judicial authorities have repeatedly acknowledged 
that the unifying factors ‘event’ and ‘occurrence’ are used interchangeably in the con-
text of the aggregation of losses.248 Moreover, it has further been demonstrated that 
there is no legal authority distinguishing the terms ‘catastrophe’, ‘disaster’ and ‘cala-
mity’ from the term ‘occurrence’.249 In fact, Tompkinson has pointed out that ‘[i]f each 
word is to be afforded a separate and distinct meaning, much splitting of hairs will be 
required’.250 For this reason, she argued that it was reasonable to equate these terms.251 
Furthermore, it has been discussed that English courts have been reluctant to recognise 
the term ‘accident’ as a unifying factor.252 By contrast, US courts have repeatedly 
241 Comment 4 to Article 5.1 PRICL.  
242 For more details, see paras 4.140 ff, 4.146 ff.  
243 See paras 4.151 ff.  
244 Comment 4 to Article 5.2 PRICL.  
245 See para 4.12.  
246 Environment Agency (formerly National Rivers Authority) v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd (1998) 
2 AC 22 (HL) 31 (Lord Hoffmann).  
247 Caudle v Sharp (n 3) 648 (Evans LJ).  
248 See paras 2.63, 3.59.  
249 See paras 3.79, 4.6.  
250 Deborah Tompkinson, ‘Jabberwocky: Recent Decisions on the Meaning of “Event” and 
“Occurrence” in the English Courts’ (1995) 3 International Insurance Law Review 82, 82.  
251 Tompkinson (n 250) 82.  
252 See paras 3.61 ff. 
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recognised the terms ‘occurrence’ and ‘accident’ as synonymous in the context of the 
aggregation of losses.253 
4.136 In line with this, Article 5.2 PRICL not only applies if the parties have 
used the unifying factor of ‘event’ in their contract of reinsurance. Rather, the terms of 
‘occurrence’, ‘catastrophe’, ‘disaster’, ‘calamity’ and ‘accident’ are considered inter-
changeable with the term ‘event’ under the PRICL. Thus, whenever an aggregation 
mechanism is based on either of these unifying factors, Article 5.2 PRICL is pertinent.254 
4.137 Moreover, it has been discussed that the linking phrases of ‘arising out of’ or 
‘arising from’ are commonly used in the context of event-based aggregation me-
chanisms.255 In English law, linking phrases are said to contribute to the determination 
of the causal requirements inherent in an aggregation mechanism.256 In this regard, it 
has been concluded, however, that it appears to be impossible to deduce abstract and 
meaningful implications as to the causative potencies of the linking phrases of ‘arising 
out of’ and ‘arising from’ in the context of the aggregation of losses.257 For this reason, 
the linking phrase used in the aggregation clause is not considered under Article 5.2 
PRICL. As long as the parties provide for an event-based aggregation mechanism, the 
causal requirements provided for by Article 5.2 PRICL will apply.258 
3 Determination of an event 
4.138 With a view to determining the relevant event for the purposes of the ag-
gregation of losses, there is a reference in Article 5.2 PRICL to the original insurance 
policies and a distinction is drawn between the reinsurance259 of first-party and third- 
party contracts.260 
3.1 Reinsurance of first-party insurance policies 
4.139 First-party insurance policies provide protection against losses suffered by the 
primary insured to his own property or profit from designated perils.261 In other words, the 
253 See, for instance, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co v Edward Wesolowski (1973) 33 NY2d 169 
(Court of Appeals of New York) [6]; Stonewall Insurance Co v Asbestos Claims Management Corp 
(1995) 73 F3d 1178 (United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) 1213; Re Prudential Linse 
Inc v American Steamship Owners Mutual (1998) 156 F3d 65 (United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co v Aetna Casualty and Surety Co (2001) 255 Conn 295 
(Supreme Court of Connecticut) 324; World Trade Center Properties LLC v Hartford Fire Insurance 
Co (2003) 345 F 154 (United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) 188; Appalachian 
Insurance Co v General Electric Co (2007) 863 NE2d 994 (Court of Appeals of New York) 1000.  
254 Comment 1 to Article 5.2 PRICL.  
255 See para 4.7.  
256 See paras 3.24, 3.111 ff.  
257 See paras 3.1114 ff.  
258 For the causal requirements provided for by Article 5.2 PRICL, see paras 4.138 ff, 4.151 ff. 
259 In the case of a retrocession agreement, the distinction still applies to the underlying primary in-
surance policy that was reinsured and subsequently retroceded.  
260 For a distinction to that extent, see, for instance, Newmont Mines Ltd v Hanover Insurance Co (n 5) 
136 f; World Trade Center Properties LLC v Hartford Fire Insurance Co (n 253) 188.  
261 Jon A Baumunk, ‘New York’s Unfortunate Event Test: Its Application Prior to the Events of 9/11’ 
(2003) 39 California Western Law Review 323, 337. 
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primary insurer’s obligation to pay insurance money arises where a designated peril has 
materialised and caused loss to the primary insured. If the primary insurer has bought 
reinsurance cover for losses arising from the materialisation of the said peril, the reinsurer’s 
obligation to reimburse the primary insurer ensues. Consequently, the focus in Article 
5.2(1) PRICL, in respect of the reinsurance of first-party insurance policies, is placed on the 
materialisation of a reinsured peril. 
4.140 More specifically, Article 5.2(1) PRICL provides that an event is the materi-
alisation of a reinsured peril. This is supported by Tompkinson who, as early as in 1995, 
suggested that the term ‘event’ could be ‘interpreted to mean “materialisation of an 
insured peril”’.262 Furthermore, the International Underwriting Association’s model 
aggregation clause IUA 01–019 (NP64) provides that ‘a loss occurrence shall consist of 
all individual insured losses (…) which are the direct and immediate result of the sudden 
violent physical manifestation and operation of one and the same (…) insured peril’.263 
The approach taken under Article 5.2(1) PRICL is also in line with Walker J’s finding 
that that ‘there is light to be gleaned (…) from the nature of the perils insured against 
(…)’,264 with Rix J’s statement that in determining a question of aggregation ‘one may 
properly have regard to the context of the perils insured against’265 as well as Lord 
Hoffmann’s widely accepted view that ‘it is impossible to give an informed answer to a 
question of causation when attributing responsibility under some rule without knowing 
the purpose and scope of the rule’.266 
4.141 This approach appears to simplify each step of Evans LJ’s test.267 First, the 
often controversial question of whether something can properly be described as an 
event268 can be avoided and replaced by the question of whether a peril reinsured 
against has materialised. This latter question is one that must be answered anyway as 
the policy of reinsurance does not provide cover unless a peril reinsured against has 
materialised. 
4.142 In many cases, the challenging question will be whether a peril has materialised 
in one single or multiple instances. Particularly when it comes to natural perils, it ‘is 
expedient to resort to scientific data in order to determine the number of instances a 
peril has materiali[s]ed’.269 For instance, an earthquake and related aftershocks may, in 
geological terms, be classified as one seismic event.270 Further, the question of whether 
a man-made peril, such as a terror attack, has materialised in one or multiple instances 
262 Tompkinson (n 250) 82. It may be noted, however, that Tompkinson distinguished the terms ‘event’ 
and ‘occurrence’.  
263 ‘IUA 01–019 Loss Occurrence (NP64)’ (n 150).  
264 Walker J’s judgment at first instance is transcribed in: Mann v Lexington Insurance Co (n 29) 1411.  
265 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5).  
266 Environment Agency (formerly National Rivers Authority) v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd 
(n 246) 29 (Lord Hoffmann).  
267 See para 3.29.  
268 See paras 3.30 ff.  
269 Comment 9 to Article 5.2 PRICL.  
270 Cf Merkin (n 122) 147. 
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is to be determined from the perspective of reasonable parties at the time the contract of 
reinsurance was concluded.271 
4.143 Secondly, Evan LJ’s second question, ie whether an event is the relevant 
event as it is sufficiently causally linked to each of the individual losses,272 may 
likewise be avoided. While Article 5.2(1) PRICL requires that the individual losses 
are each a ‘the direct consequence’ of the aggregating event, there is no overly vague 
standard of causation involved.273 
4.144 Yet, the approach taken by Article 5.2(1) PRICL seems to conflict with the 
English law position. In fact, the Court of Appeal held in Caudle v Sharp that the unifying 
event does not have to be a reinsured peril.274 Similarly, the Commercial Court noted in 
Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK that ‘[a]n occurrence [was] not the same 
thing as a peril’.275 Yet, in neither of the two cases did the courts explain why an event is 
not the same thing as the materialisation of a peril reinsured against.276 In light of the lack 
of any judicial justification and the simplification that is achieved by Article 5.2(1) 
PRICL, the PRICL create more legal certainty in the industry and may, thus, be pre-
ferred over the current English position. 
3.2 Reinsurance of third-party insurance policies 
4.145 Third-party insurance contracts provide cover for losses resulting from the 
primary insured’s legal liability towards a third party.277 A primary insured’s liability 
may, for instance, be triggered if he injures another person, damages other people’s 
property278 or otherwise causes financial harm to a third party. Consequently, there 
are generally no designated perils at the centre of third-party insurance contracts.279 
Therefore, the focus in Article 5.2(2) PRICL is on the liability triggering wrong-
doing. 
4.146 Article 5.2(2) PRICL provides that the primary insured’s wrongful act, 
omission or fact280 giving rise to his liability is the unifying event. In the same vein, 
Evans LJ noted in Caudle v Sharp that the relevant occurrence was ‘the occurrence out 
of which a claim arises, for loss suffered by the original insured, such as (…) the 
271 Comment 10 to Article 5.2 PRICL.  
272 See paras 3.38 ff.  
273 For details as to the requirement of ‘direct consequence’, see paras 4.151 ff.  
274 Caudle v Sharp (n 3) 648 (Evans LJ). It is to be noted, however, that the Court of Appeal held that a 
unifying event must not be ‘an insured peril under the original contract of insurance’. By contrast, 
Article 5.2 PRICL refers to the perils reinsured against for the determination of unifying events.  
275 Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (n 5). Cf also Mann v Lexington Insurance Co 
(n 29) 1422 (Waller LJ).  
276 Cf Louw and Tompkinson (n 20) 8.  
277 Cf Baumunk (n 261) 332.  
278 Clarke (n 5) para 17-4C1.  
279 Cf Butler and Merkin (n 8) para C–0221.  
280 According to comment 14 to Article 5.2 PRICL, it is not only a wrongful act or omission that may 
trigger a primary insured’s liability. In cases of strict liability, a mere fact may give rise to the primary 
insured’s liability. Therefore, Article 5.2(2) PRICL provides that such a liability triggering fact may 
constitute an aggregating event. 
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negligent act or omission of the insured’.281 In American Centennial Insurance Co v 
INSCO Ltd, the Commercial Court similarly held that an event-based aggregation 
clause was ‘only concerned with events or occurrences which give rise to a liability 
under underlying policies’.282 Under New York law, it has likewise been held that 
‘courts should look to the event for which the insured is held liable, not some point 
further back in the causal chain’.283 
4.147 The approach taken in the PRICL appears to reduce the complexity of 
Evans LJ’s test.284 First, if the event is seen in the act, omission or fact for which the 
primary insured is held liable, the often controversial question of what can properly 
be considered an event can be avoided. Secondly, the very difficult assessment as to 
whether an event is the relevant one as it is sufficiently causative for each of the 
individual losses can equally be avoided if courts need not look further back in the 
chain of causation than the primary insured’s liability triggering wrongdoing or fact. 
While it is required under Article 5.2(2) PRICL that each individual loss is ‘the direct 
consequence’ of the aggregating event, there is no overly vague standard of causation 
involved.285 
4.148 It may be noted, however, that there are English judicial authorities where 
this approach was not followed. In IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co 
Ltd, the Commercial Court dealt with a case where the primary insured triggered its 
liability by installing products containing asbestos over a long period of time.286 In 
this case, the Commercial Court upheld an arbitral tribunal’s finding that the pri-
mary insured’s determination to install products containing asbestos over a 20-year 
period constituted an event.287 The primary insured’s liability certainly did not arise 
from its determination to install such products; it arose from its acts of installing the 
contaminated products. Consequently, it was not the liability triggering act, but 
rather the decision to commit multiple such acts that was considered the aggregating 
event in this case. 
4.149 The situation was similar in MIC Simmonds v Gammell, a case following the 
terror attacks on the World Trade Center that came before the Commercial Court. 
Claims by workers who were at the World Trade Center at the time of the terror 
attacks and were either struck by or became trapped under the debris were made 
against the owner of the land on which the Twin Towers had stood. The owner of the 
land faced further claims by firemen, policemen and volunteers who were engaged in 
the clean-up operations at the site and thereby suffered personal injury because the 
owner of the land had not provided them with adequate protective equipment during 
281 Caudle v Sharp (n 3) 648 (Evans LJ).  
282 American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd (n 5) 413 (Moore-Bick J). It is to be noted, however, 
that the aggregation clause in question referred to events ‘affecting’ the policies issued by the primary 
insurer.  
283 Stonewall Insurance Co v Asbestos Claims Management Corp (n 253) 1213.  
284 Evan LJ’s test is described at para 3.29.  
285 For details as to the requirement of ‘direct consequence’, see paras 4.151 ff.  
286 IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 3) [26] (Burton J).  
287 IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 3) [46] (Burton J). 
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the clean-up operations.288 In this case, the Commercial Court upheld an arbitral 
tribunal’s decision that all individual claims against the landowner were to be ag-
gregated no matter whether they resulted from the attacks themselves or the negli-
gent exposure of the injured to harmful conditions.289 However, the landowner’s 
liability was not triggered by the terror attacks on the Twin Towers. It was triggered 
by failing to protect its workers from being struck by or becoming trapped under the 
debris and by negligently omitting to provide clean-up workers with adequate pro-
tective equipment. Hence, it was the attacks that were not even conducted by the 
landowner, not the liability-triggering omissions, that were considered one unifying 
event in this case. 
4.150 Hence, there seems to be a legal uncertainty under English law as to whether 
only a liability triggering wrongdoing or fact can be the relevant event or whether in 
such cases courts may look farther back in the causal chain for a unifying event. 
Irrespective of this legal uncertainty, the approach taken in Article 5.2(2) PRICL 
appears sensible for three reasons: First and foremost, the provision simplifies event- 
based aggregation mechanisms in the context of the reinsurance of third-party in-
surance policies. Secondly, the approach taken in the PRICL has ample judicial 
support both in English law as well as in New York law. Thirdly, as opposed to 
cause-based aggregation, event-based aggregation is supposed to be a narrow con-
cept.290 By ensuring that courts do not look farther back in the causal chain in the 
search of a unifying event than the liability triggering act, omission or fact, the ag-
gregation mechanism does not become too loose. 
4 The requirement of ‘direct consequence’ 
4.151 Both paragraphs of Article 5.2 PRICL provide that only those losses that 
occur as a ‘direct consequence’ of the relevant event are to be aggregated. This is in 
line with, for example, the International Underwriting Association’s model ag-
gregation clause IUA 01–019 (NP64).291 
4.152 It begs the question, however, what the phrase ‘direct consequence’ means 
and what standard of causation can be deduced from it. In line with English au-
thorities292 on the subject matter of aggregation, it is not required under Article 5.2 
PRICL that an event is the proximate cause of individual losses for these to be 
aggregated.293 
288 MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 3) [6]–[8] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
289 MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 3) [36] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
290 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 3) 1035 (Lord Mustill); Edelman and Burns (n 5) paras 4.59, 
4.61. Cf also Merkin (n 122) 145.  
291 ‘IUA 01–019 Loss Occurrence (NP64)’ (n 150), provides that ‘[f]or the purposes of this Agreement a 
loss occurrence shall consist of all individual insured losses in respect of any single risk which are the 
direct and immediate result of the sudden violent physical manifestation and operation of one and the 
same original insured peril’.  
292 Caudle v Sharp (n 3) 648 (Evans LJ); Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [63] (Rix 
LJ); MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 3) [30], [35] (Sir Jeremy Cooke).  
293 Comment 17 to Article 5.2 PRICL. 
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4.153 More specifically, the relevant event does not necessarily have to be the last 
happening immediately preceding the occurrence of the loss.294 If the materialisation 
of a peril, ie an event, directly results in the materialisation of another peril reinsured 
against, then all individual reinsured losses which directly result from the latter 
materialisation shall be deemed a direct consequence of the unifying event even 
where this event is not their proximate cause. This seems to be in line with the 
International Underwriting Association’s model aggregation clause IUA 01–019 
(NP64).295 In more illustrative terms, imagine that first-party property insurance is 
taken out against the perils of earthquake and tsunami. The peril of earthquake 
materialises and causes multiple separate losses. At the same time, the earthquake 
provokes a tsunami which, in turn, also causes multiple individual losses. As the 
materialisation of the peril of earthquake resulted in the materialisation of the peril 
of tsunami, all losses–no matter whether they arose from the earthquake or the 
tsunami–are to be considered the earthquake’s direct consequences.296 
4.154 Furthermore, the requirement of ‘direct consequence’ in Article 5.2 PRICL 
appears to be much less vague than the causal requirements described in English 
law.297 In fact, as the official commentary in the PRICL states ‘[a] loss may be 
considered an event’s direct consequence if it can be considered an inevitable effect of 
the relevant aggregating event’.298 This would not be the case if an independent 
intervening factor decisively contributes to the occurrence of a loss and thereby 
breaks the chain of causation.299 Hence, as long as the chain of causation between 
each of the individual losses and the relevant event is not broken by a decisively 
intervening factor, the losses are considered the event’s direct consequences. 
4.155 Accordingly, it is important to determine what intervening factors may 
break the chain of causation. In this regard, the official commentary in the PRICL 
sets forth that, where a person was capable of and under the duty to prevent an event 
from resulting in a plurality of losses, a failure to live up to this duty would constitute 
an intervening factor breaking the chain of causation (conditio cum qua non).300 An 
example is provided by applying Article 5.2(2) PRICL to the facts of MIC Simmonds 
v Gammell,301 where a landowner has taken out third-party liability insurance. Two 
aircraft crash into the buildings situated on his land and thereby injure some of his 
employees. In the time after the crashes, the landowner–although under a duty to do 
so–fails to provide workers engaging in the clean-up operations with adequate 
protective equipment which results in bodily harm suffered by these workers. Under 
Article 5.2(2) PRICL, losses suffered by the landowner’s employees who were injured 
294 Comment 19 to Article 5.2 PRICL.  
295 ‘IUA 01–019 Loss Occurrence (NP64)’ (n 150).  
296 See, for instance, illustration 16 to Article 5.2 PRICL. For a case dealing with earthquakes, see Moore 
v IAG New Zealand Ltd [2019] NZHC 1549, [2020] Lloyd’s Rep IR 167.  
297 For the causal requirements in English law, see paras 3.38 ff, 4.8 ff.  
298 Comment 18 to Article 5.2 PRICL.  
299 Comment 18 to Article 5.2 PRICL.  
300 Comment 20 to Article 5.2 PRICL.  
301 MIC Simmonds v Gammell (n 3). 
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at the time of the crashes and losses suffered by the workers engaging in the clean-up 
operations cannot be aggregated. This is because it was virtually impossible for the 
landowner to protect his employees at the site when the airplanes crashed into the 
World Trade Center, whereas it obviously violated its duty to protect the clean-up 
workers by failing to equip them with respirators. Had the landowner equipped the 
clean-up workers with respirators, they would not have suffered bodily harm. The 
landowner’s omission, therefore, constitutes an intervening factor breaking the chain 
of causation and turning the losses suffered by the clean-up workers into merely 
indirect consequences of the landowner’s liability in respect of the aircraft crashes.302 
4.156 An intervening factor breaking the chain of causation may also lie in a 
happening which occurs independently of the unifying event (conditio sine qua 
non).303 For instance, a primary insured takes out first-party property insurance 
against the peril of flood and environmental pollution. A vessel spills a significant 
amount of oil into the sea near the coast. Some days later, a windstorm occurs, blows 
some of the oil into a river and eventually causes a flood. Losses that were incurred 
due to the flood and environmental pollution losses resulting from the oil in the river 
cannot be aggregated under Article 5.2(1) PRICL. Had the vessel not accidently 
spilled oil prior to the materialisation of the peril of flood, the water bursting the 
riverbanks would not have been contaminated and could not have polluted the 
adjacent land. The oil spillage constitutes an intervening factor breaking the chain of 
causation and turning the environmental pollution losses into merely indirect con-
sequences of the flood.304 
4.157 It is to be noted, however, that not every happening that contributes to the 
occurrence of a loss is to be considered an intervening factor. Under Article 5.2 PRICL, 
only happenings that decisively interfere with the occurrence of the losses are regarded 
as relevant interfering factors.305 For instance, common circumstances at the place and 
time where the reinsured peril materialises are not considered as having broken the 
chain of causation even if they may have slightly supported the occurrence of the 
losses. Take for example the case where a primary insured has taken out third-party 
liability insurance. He negligently sets a fire which–due to the common windy 
circumstances–spreads and causes multiple individual losses. The commonly windy 
weather cannot be considered a decisively intervening factor that breaks the chain of 
causation. Therefore, under Article 5.2(2) PRICL, the individual fire losses are to be 
aggregated.306 
4.158 Thus, the requirement of ‘direct consequence’ cannot be said to be an overly 
vague standard of causation. Rather, the requirement simply ensures that individual 
losses cannot be aggregated if their development was decisively influenced by a factor 
302 For the same example, see illustration 20 to Article 5.2 PRICL.  
303 Comment 21 to Article 5.2 PRICL.  
304 For the same example, see illustration 22 to Article 5.2 PRICL.  
305 Comment 22 to Article 5.2 PRICL.  
306 For the same example, see illustration 26 to Article 5.2. 
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extraneous to the materialisation of a peril under paragraph 1 or the primary in-
sured’s liability triggering act, omission or fact under paragraph 2. 
III Summary of the chapter 
4.159 In English law, there is–what O’Neill and Woloniecki call–‘an embarrass-
ment of jurisprudential riches’ on the subject matter of aggregation,307 and sub-
stantial legal uncertainty exists in respect of causal requirements in event-based 
aggregation mechanisms. 
4.160 It is said that both unifying factors and linking phrases contained in an 
aggregation clause contribute to the determination of the standard of causation in-
herent in an aggregation mechanism. Yet, it is not possible to deduce a meaningful 
causal standard from the unifying factor of ‘event’ or from the linking phrases of 
‘arising out of’ and ‘arising from’. 
4.161 In light of the legal uncertainties associated with event-based aggregation 
mechanisms, English courts have held that multiple losses are to be aggregated if the 
circumstances of the losses so justify. In the same vein, it has been stated that the task 
of determining whether multiple individual losses are to be aggregated was essentially 
an exercise of judgment. 
4.162 Furthermore, the unities test is said to assist judges and arbitrators in ex-
ercising their judgment in an analytical fashion. However, conducting the unities test 
itself involves an exercise of judgment. Moreover, it is so vague as to cause addi-
tional, rather than reduce legal uncertainty in the context of event-based aggregation. 
4.163 In order to reduce said legal uncertainty, the parties have resorted to using 
so-called hours clauses and sole judge clauses. There seem to be no English autho-
rities dealing with the interpretation of hours clauses. Yet, it has been demonstrated 
that they involve substantial interpretational uncertainty. By contrast, sole judge 
clauses appear to reduce the need to litigate questions of aggregation. However, by 
agreeing to a sole judge clause, the reinsurer largely puts itself at the reinsured’s 
mercy. Thus, a sole judge clause may not always be a viable means to reduce the 
complexity of event-based aggregation mechanisms. 
4.164 An alternative to the English law position is offered in Article 5.2 PRICL 
where a distinction is drawn between the reinsurance of first-party and third-party 
insurance policies. Paragraph 1 provides that where the reinsurance of first-party 
insurance policies is concerned, an event is the materialisation of a reinsured peril. 
With regard to the reinsurance of third-party insurance policies, paragraph 2 pro-
vides that an event consists of the primary insured’s liability triggering act, omission 
or fact. By so doing, the questions of whether something can properly be described as 
an event and whether it might be the relevant event are avoided by Article 5.2 
PRICL. 
4.165 Furthermore, while the aggregation mechanism described in Article 5.2 
PRICL recognises that multiple individual losses are only aggregated if they have a 
307 O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 217) para 7–013. 
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causal connection with the aggregating event, Article 5.2 PRICL does not provide 
for an overly vague standard of causation. 
4.166 Therefore, if parties to a reinsurance contract wish to have greater legal 
certainty with regard to their event-based aggregation mechanism, they may 
consider–as the case may be–to agree upon the applicability of Article 5.2 PRICL or 
to incorporate Article 5.2 PRICL into their contract of reinsurance.    
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CHAPTER 5 
Cause-based aggregation in focus   
5.1 In this chapter, it will be discussed that, in English law, there is substantial 
legal uncertainty regarding the causal requirements of cause-based aggregation 
mechanisms. Thereafter, Article 5.3 PRICL will be presented. It will be examined 
whether Article 5.3 PRICL is capable of reducing legal uncertainty in the context 
of cause-based aggregation mechanisms. 
I Cause-based aggregation in English law 
5.2 Cause-based aggregation clauses are more common in direct insurance 
policies than in contracts of reinsurance.1 Yet, as Municipal Mutual Insurance 
Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd demonstrates, cause-based aggregation clauses are 
sometimes used in contracts of reinsurance.2 This is particularly so if the primary 
insurance contract’s aggregation clause is incorporated into the reinsurance 
contract.3 
5.3 In any case, the causative requirements inherent in cause-based aggregation 
mechanisms depend on the unifying factor as well as the linking phrase contained in 
the aggregation clause.4 
1 Typical unifying factors and linking phrases 
5.4 Typically, cause-based aggregation clauses provide for the unifying factors of 
either ‘originating cause or source’5 or ‘one source or original cause’.6 Courts have 
treated the two variations as equivalent.7 In Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace 
1 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP, Reinsurance Practice and the Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2009) 
paras 28.38, 28.40.  
2 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd [1998] EWCA Civ 546, [1998] CLC 957 (CA) 
961 (Hobhouse LJ).  
3 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 2) 961 (Hobhouse LJ).  
4 See paras 3.24, 3.45 ff, 3.114 ff, 3.119 ff.  
5 See, for instance, Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd [1995] CLC 671 (CA) 679 (Sir Thomas 
Bingham); Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field [1996] 1 WLR 1026 (HL) 1032 (Lord Mustill); Standard 
Life Assurance Ltd v Oak Dedicated Ltd [2008] EWHC 222 (Comm), [2008] 2 All ER 916 [14] 
(Tomlinson J); Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace European Group [2012] EWHC 104 (Comm), [2012] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 655 [255] (Eder J). Cf also American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd [1996] 
LRLR 407 (Comm) 414 (Moore-Bick J).  
6 Cf Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 2) 959 (Hobhouse LJ); Countrywide 
Assured Group Plc v Marshall [2002] EWHC 2082 (Comm), [2003] 1 All ER 237 [3] (Morison J).  
7 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 2) 967 (Hobhouse LJ). Cf also Countrywide 
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European Group, the Commercial Court noted that ‘the words “or source”’ were an 
‘explicit alternative to “cause”’.8 Yet, there seem to be no legal authorities distin-
guishing between the concepts of ‘cause’ and ‘source’ in cause-based aggregation 
mechanisms.9 
5.5 The unifying factor of ‘cause’ is most typically coupled with the linking phrase 
of ‘consequent upon or attributable to’.10 There appear to be no legal authorities 
distinguishing between the concepts of ‘consequent upon’ and ‘attributable to’, al-
though the latter phrase, in contrast to the former, does not necessarily indicate a 
causal connection.11 The linking phrase of ‘arising from’ has equally been used in the 
context of cause-based aggregation.12 
2 Lack of legal certainty as to the causal requirements in cause-based aggregation 
5.6 It has been pointed out13 that, in English law, the concept of ‘cause’ is much 
less constricted than the concept of ‘event’14 and that the word ‘cause’ describes 
why something has happened, whereas the word ‘event’ refers to what has 
happened.15 An event is something that happens at a particular place, in a 
particular way at a particular time, whereas a cause is not something that ne-
cessarily happens.16 A cause may consist in a mere state of affairs.17 Arguably, 
a unifying cause may further be constituted by a plan,18 a decision,19 a state 
Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 6) [15] (Morison J); Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 1) para 28.49; 
Colin Edelman and Andrew Burns, The Law of Reinsurance (2nd edn, OUP 2013) paras 4.59 ff; Robert 
M Merkin, Laura Hodgson and Peter J Tyldesley, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (Sweet & Maxwell 
2019) para 11–335.  
8 Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace European Group (n 5) [259] (Eder J).  
9 See paras 3.81f.  
10 See, for instance, Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 2) 966 (Hobhouse LJ); 
Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 6) [3] (Morison J); Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v 
Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd [2014] EWHC 2105 (Comm), [2014] Lloyd’s Rep IR 638 [8] (Field J); 
Spire Healthcare Ltd v Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Plc [2018] EWCA Civ 317, [2018] Lloyd’s Rep IR 
425 [3] (Simon LJ). Alternatively, the unifying factor of ‘cause’ is often coupled with ‘arising from or in 
connection with or attributable to’, see, for instance, Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Oak Dedicated Ltd 
(n 5) [14] (Tomlinson J); Beazley Underwriting Ltd v Travelers Co Inc [2011] EWHC 1520 (Comm) [28] 
(Clarke J); Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace European Group (n 5) [255] (Eder J).  
11 It is to be noted, however, that the concept of causation is inherent in the unifying factors of cause and 
source so that where the linking phrase of ‘attributable to’ is coupled with either of these unifying 
factors, the unifying concept would still be one of causation.  
12 Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd (n 5) 679 (Sir Thomas Bingham); Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v 
Field (n 5) 1031 (Lord Mustill).  
13 See paras 3.47 ff, 3.53 ff.  
14 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 5) 1035 (Lord Mustill).  
15 Countrywide Assured Group Plc v Marshall (n 6) [15] (Morison J).  
16 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 5) 1035 (Lord Mustill).  
17 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 5) 1035 (Lord Mustill).  
18 Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance Co Ltd v Heraldglen Ltd and Advent Capital Ltd [2013] EWHC 154 
(Comm), [2013] 2 All ER 231 [20] (Field J).  
19 Cf Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [2003] EWHC 1771 (Comm), [2004] Lloyd’s 
Rep IR 22 [98] (Steel J). 
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of ignorance,20 the mere propensity of an individual to act in a certain way21 or 
the susceptibility of a region to a natural disaster.22 
5.7 Any event from which multiple individual losses arise may be considered the 
losses’ cause. Therefore, an event is always also a cause.23 By contrast, not every 
cause constitutes an event.24 Clearly, there may be causes that provoke an event 
which, in turn, then results in multiple individual losses. For instance, a common 
culpable misunderstanding as to the result of discussions within a group of selling 
agents may be considered a cause upon which each of them subsequently acts and 
triggers their employer’s liability.25 Each act of misselling can be considered an event 
that results in losses. Consequently, each act of misselling can also be considered the 
losses’ cause. By contrast, the selling agents’ misunderstanding is not an event, but it 
is the events’ cause.26 
5.8 In contrast to event-based aggregation mechanisms, cause-based aggrega-
tion mechanisms make it possible to look further back in the chain of causation 
for a unifying factor.27 In Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace European Group, the 
Commercial Court noted that a cause-based aggregation mechanism made it 
possible to trace back losses to wherever a common origin could reasonably be 
found.28 In Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field, Lord Mustill stated that the word 
originating coupled with the word cause opened up ‘the widest possible search for 
a unifying factor in the history of the individual losses that are sought to be 
aggregated.29 
5.9 However, the Commercial Court clarified in American Centennial Insurance Co 
v INSCO that, although an originating cause was a unifying factor of a remote kind, 
there still must ‘be some limit to the degree of remoteness that is acceptable’.30 In 
other words, it is not sufficient that a plurality of losses have a common origin. An 
aggregation of the individual losses is only possible if their common factor is not too 
remote. 
5.10 There seems to be no guidance as to where this limit of remoteness lies in 
English law. Accordingly, the decision as to whether a cause is too remote and, 
20 Caudle v Sharp [1995] CLC 642 (CA) 649 (Evans LJ).  
21 Rob Merkin, ‘The Christchurch Earthquakes Insurance and Reinsurance Issues’ (2012) 18 Canterbury 
Law Review 119, 146; Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 7) para 11–335.  
22 Merkin (n 21) 145 f.  
23 Cf Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 201 (CA) 204 (Waller LJ); Ken Louw and 
Deborah Tompkinson, ‘Curiouser and Curiouser: The Meaning of “Event”’ (1996) 4 International 
Insurance Law Review 6, 9; Merkin (n 21) 146.  
24 Cf Louw and Tompkinson (n 23) 9; Merkin (n 21) 146.  
25 American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd (n 5) 414 (Moore-Bick J).  
26 Cf American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd (n 5) 414 (Moore-Bick J).  
27 Louw and Tompkinson (n 23) 11.  
28 Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace European Group (n 5) [259] (Eder J).  
29 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 5) 1035 (Lord Mustill).  
30 American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd (n 5) 414 (Moore-Bick J). 
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therefore, cannot serve as a unifying cause for the purposes of aggregation is de-
pendent on how judges and arbitrators feel about exercising their judgment. In the 
context of cause-based aggregation, there is, in fact, not even any such thing as a 
unities test that is meant to guide the process of exercising this judgment. This allows 
courts and arbitral tribunals to reach purely result-oriented conclusions. Thus, there 
is substantial legal uncertainty concerning the causal requirements inherent in cause- 
based aggregation mechanisms. 
II Cause-based aggregation under Article 5.3 PRICL 
1 The general concept of Article 5.3 PRICL 
5.11 Article 5.3 PRICL reads as follows:  
1. Where the parties agree on a cause-based aggregation in a contract reinsuring 
first-party insurance policies, all losses that occur as the direct consequence of 
one or multiple events within the meaning of Article 5.2 paragraph (1) shall be 
considered as arising out of one common cause if it was reasonably foreseeable 
that a cause of this kind could give rise to such an event.  
2. Where the parties agree on a cause-based aggregation in a contract reinsuring 
third-party liability insurance policies, all losses that occur as the direct 
consequence of one or multiple events within the meaning of Article 5.2 
paragraph (2) shall be considered as arising out of one common cause if it 
was reasonably foreseeable that a cause of this kind could give rise to such an 
event. 
5.12 It is to be noted that this provision only operates if the parties have agreed on 
a cause-based aggregation mechanism in their reinsurance contract.31 However, 
Article 5.3 PRICL applies not only where the parties have used the unifying factor 
of cause, but equally where their aggregation clause refers to the unifying factor of 
source.32 Thus, whenever an aggregation mechanism is based on either or both 
of these unifying factors, Article 5.3 PRICL is pertinent.33 
5.13 In Article 5.3 PRICL, rules are outlined regarding the question of whether a 
plurality of losses are to be added together for presenting a claim to the reinsurer 
based on a cause-based aggregation mechanism. For the same reason as Article 5.2 
PRICL, a distinction is drawn in Article 5.3 PRICL between the reinsurance of first- 
party and third-party insurance policies.34 
5.14 Moreover, it is acknowledged in the PRICL that a cause-based aggregation of 
multiple individual losses is only possible if there is a causal link between the aggregating 
cause and each of the individual losses to be aggregated.35 As has been demonstrated, the 
linking phrase of consequent upon or attributable to is commonly used in the context of 
31 Comment 5 to Article 5.1 PRICL.  
32 Comment 2 to Article 5.3 PRICL.  
33 Comment 2 to Article 5.3 PRICL.  
34 See paras 4.139 ff, 4.145 ff.  
35 Comment 6 to Article 5.3 PRICL. 
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cause-based aggregation mechanisms.36 It has, however, been concluded that it is im-
possible to deduce a clear standard of causation from this linking phrase.37 Thus, no regard 
is had in Article 5.3 PRICL to linking phrases contained in aggregation clauses. As long as 
the parties provide for a cause-based aggregation mechanism, the standard of causation 
provided for in Article 5.3 PRICL applies. 
5.15 As in English law,38 the concept of cause-based aggregation under the 
PRICL is wider than the concept of event-based aggregation.39 Thus, in the search of 
an aggregating cause, under Article 5.3 PRICL, one is allowed to move farther back 
in the chain of causation than one would be in respect of an event within the meaning 
of Article 5.2 PRICL.40 For the determination of the unifying cause in a specific case, 
Article 5.3 PRICL provides for a three-step analysis. 
5.16 First, where the reinsurance of first-party insurance policies is concerned, the 
instances of materialised perils are to be identified. Similarly, with regard to the 
reinsurance of third-party insurance policies, the liability triggering acts, omissions 
or facts are to be determined. In other words, it is required under Article 5.3 PRICL 
that one or multiple events within the meaning of Article 5.2 PRICL are identified 
and pinpointed on the chain of causation.41 
5.17 Secondly, having completed the first step, one is to move farther back in the 
chain of causation in the search of a unifying cause.42 If no cause can be found to 
have triggered one or multiple events, each instance of materialised peril or liability 
triggering act, omission or fact is to be considered a unifying cause under Article 5.3 
PRICL.43 
5.18 By contrast, if there is a cause that triggered multiple different events 
which, in turn, resulted in a plurality of losses, the third step is to test whether 
said cause is a relevant cause for the purposes of cause-based aggregation. Article 
5.3 PRICL provides that a cause is a relevant cause if, at the time of the 
conclusion of the reinsurance contract, it was reasonably foreseeable that ‘in 
the ordinary course of things (…) a cause of this kind would lead to an event of 
the kind under consideration, ie an instance of materialized peril (article 5.2(1)) 
or an act, omission or fact that triggers the primary insured’s liability (article 
5.2(2))’.44 
36 See para 5.5.  
37 See paras 3.119 ff.  
38 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 5) 1035 (Lord Mustill); Countrywide Assured Group Plc v 
Marshall (n 6) [15] (Morison J); Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 1) para 28.6; Merkin (n 21) 145; Colin 
Edelman and Andrew Burns (n 7) para 4.59.  
39 Comment 5 to Article 5.3 PRICL.  
40 Comment 8 to Article 5.3 PRICL.  
41 Comment 7 to Article 5.3 PRICL.  
42 Comment 8 to Article 5.3 PRICL. Cf Moore v IAG New Zealand Ltd [2019] NZHC 1549, [2020] 
Lloyd’s Rep IR 167 where Dunningham J considered that an earthquake was a ‘cause’ that provoked 
two subsequent ‘events’, ie two aftershocks.  
43 Comment 8 to Article 5.3 PRICL. For more information as to why this is so, see para 5.7.  
44 Comment 13 to Article 5.3 PRICL. 
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5.19 If a relevant cause can be identified in a particular case, all individual losses 
that originate from any event which, in turn, was triggered by this cause are to be 
aggregated. 
2 Reference to the concept of event in Article 5.3 PRICL 
5.20 It has been noted that for the determination of a unifying cause, Article 5.3 
PRICL refers to the concept of event within the meaning of Article 5.2 PRICL.45 In 
the following section, it is to be laid out why it is important to define cause-based 
aggregation mechanisms by reference to the concept of event. 
5.21 Under the PRICL cause-based and event-based aggregation mechanisms, 
both operate on a unifying concept of causation.46 Cause-based aggregation is, 
however, broader than event-based aggregation and makes it possible to look farther 
back in the chain of causation in the search of a unifying factor.47 
5.22 On this basis, parties intending to facilitate the aggregation of individual 
losses are advised to provide for a cause-based rather than an event-based ag-
gregation mechanism in their contract of reinsurance.48 Yet, even if they do so, 
courts and arbitral tribunals would not necessarily apply a broader aggregation 
mechanism than an aggregation mechanism based on an event. As has been dis-
cussed, a cause and an event ‘may well be precisely the same thing’ in some cir-
cumstances under English law, so that favouring a cause-based over an event-based 
aggregation mechanism may not lead to a different conclusion.49 
5.23 More specifically, any event that causes multiple individual losses may be 
considered the losses’ cause.50 As there is no guidance in English law as to the re-
quired degree of causation between the unifying cause and the individual losses to be 
aggregated, courts and arbitral tribunals might or might not find that the materi-
alisation of a peril reinsured against or a liability triggering act, omission or fact, ie 
an event within the meaning of Article 5.2 PRICL, is the losses’ common cause. In so 
doing, a court or arbitral tribunal might deny that a common cause found farther 
back in the chain of causation is the relevant cause within the meaning for Article 5.3 
PRICL. Courts or arbitral tribunals would thereby equate cause-based with event- 
based aggregation mechanisms and potentially disrespect the parties’ choice of a 
‘broader’ concept of aggregation. 
5.24 The aim of Article 5.3 PRICL is to ensure that the parties’ choice in favour of 
a broader aggregation mechanism over an aggregation mechanism based on any one 
event is respected. In pursuing this goal, both paragraphs of Article 5.3 PRICL refer 
to the notion of event within the meaning of Article 5.2 in the process of determining 
45 See para 5.16.  
46 Comment 16 to Article 5.1 PRICL.  
47 Comment 8 to Article 5.3 PRICL.  
48 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 1) para 28.6; Merkin (n 21) 145; Edelman and Burns (n 7) para 4.59.  
49 Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 23) 204 (Waller LJ).  
50 Cf Brown (RE) v GIO Insurance Ltd (n 23) 204 (Waller LJ); Louw and Tompkinson (n 23) 9; Merkin 
(n 21) 146. 
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a unifying cause. More specifically, Article 5.3 PRICL provides that if a cause gives 
rise to one or multiple events which, in turn, trigger a plurality of individual losses, 
all of the individual losses–no matter from which event they arose–are to be ag-
gregated.51 By so doing, Article 5.3 PRICL instructs courts and arbitral tribunals not 
to be satisfied that an instance of materialised peril or a liability triggering act, 
omission or fact is the relevant unifying cause, but to look farther back in the chain 
of causation in the search of a unifying cause. 
5.25 Certainly, there will not always be a cause that triggered multiple different 
instances of materialised perils or liability triggering acts, omissions or facts. In 
such cases, each instance of materialised peril or liability triggering act, omission 
or fact is to be considered a unifying cause within the meaning of Article 5.3 
PRICL.52 Yet, it will often be possible to identify a cause that triggered multiple 
different instances of materialised perils53 or liability triggering acts, omissions or 
facts.54 By instructing courts and arbitral tribunals to look for such a unifying 
cause, Article 5.3 PRICL upholds the parties’ choice for a wide aggregation 
mechanism.55 
5.26 As in English law,56 the situation under Article 5.3 PRICL is that not just any 
cause can be a relevant cause for the purposes of aggregation. Rather, if the causal 
links between the aggregating cause and the instances of materialised perils or lia-
bility triggering acts, omissions or facts are too weak, there will not be any unifying 
cause for the purposes of Article 5.3 PRICL. In order to test whether a cause is too 
remote so as to operate as unifying factor, Article 5.3 PRICL uses the concept of 
‘reasonable foreseeability’. 
3 The requirement of ‘reasonable foreseeability’ 
5.27 By introducing the concept of ‘reasonable foreseeability’, the PRICL 
address the problem of how much farther back in the chain of causation than a 
materialised peril or a liability triggering act, omission or fact one must look in 
order to find a unifying cause.57 In other words, the concept of ‘reasonable 
51 It may be noted that, under Article 5.2 PRICL, individual losses are only to be aggregated if they are 
an event’s direct consequence. The same is true under Article 5.3 PRICL. While Article 5.3 PRICL 
provides for a broader aggregation mechanism, it does not broaden the scope of the aggregation 
‘downstream’ to the effect that individual losses that are only loosely connected with an instance of 
materialised peril or a liability triggering act, omission or fact are aggregated. However, it does 
broaden the scope ‘upstream’ to the effect that a cause further back in the chain of causation that 
triggered multiple instances of materialised perils or liability triggering acts, omissions or facts may 
operate as unifying cause.  
52 Comment 8 to Article 5.3 PRICL.  
53 In other words, an event within the meaning of Article 5.2(1) PRICL.  
54 In other words, an event within the meaning of Article 5.2(2) PRICL.  
55 Cf comment 9 to Article 5.3 PRICL, which states that it was ‘important not to give a court or arbitral 
tribunal the leeway to consider the materiali[s]ation of a peril reinsured against or the liability trig-
gering act, omission or fact as the relevant cause within the meaning of Article 5.3. Otherwise, the 
parties’ choice for a broader aggregation mechanism would be disregarded’.  
56 See, for instance, American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd (n 5) 414 (Moore-Bick J).  
57 Comment 12 to Article 5.3 PRICL. 
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foreseeability’ is used to provide guidance as to whether a cause is too remote so 
as to be acceptable as a basis upon which a plurality of losses are to be ag-
gregated.58 
5.28 In Article 5.3 PRICL, it is stated that ‘a cause may be considered the unifying 
factor for the purposes of aggregation, if it was reasonably foreseeable to the parties 
that–in the ordinary course of things–a cause of this kind would lead to an event of 
the kind under consideration, ie an instance of materiali[z]ed peril (…) or an act, 
omission or fact that triggers the primary insured’s liability’.59 The question of 
whether it was foreseeable that a certain cause would provoke a specific event is to be 
analysed from the perspective of a reasonable person in the circumstances of the 
parties at the time they agreed upon the aggregation mechanism and in light of the 
ordinary course of things.60 
5.29 The commentary on Article 5.3 PRICL elaborates that the concept of 
foreseeability does not correspond with the concept of foreseeability in tort law, 
general contract law or insurance law.61 These branches of law use the concept 
of foreseeability as a limit to liability.62 Under Article 5.3 PRICL, the concept of 
reasonable foreseeability is not necessarily used to limit the reinsurer’s liability. If it is 
not reasonably foreseeable that a particular cause would provoke a certain event, this 
cause cannot be considered a unifying cause under Article 5.3 PRICL. As a con-
sequence, the number of losses to be aggregated may decrease. This is, however, not 
to be equated with limiting the reinsurer’s liability. In fact, this may mean that the 
reinsurer is confronted with multiple claims not piercing the reinsurance cover limit, 
instead of one single claim surpassing the reinsurance policy limit. Depending on the 
circumstances, a narrower aggregation may, therefore, lead to broader liability for 
the reinsurer.63 
5.30 It has been noted that Article 5.3 PRICL uses the concept of reasonable 
foreseeability to limit how much farther back beyond an instance of materialised 
peril or a liability triggering act, omission or fact one may look in the search of a 
unifying factor. Accordingly, the concept of reasonable foreseeability aims at de-
fining a standard of causation. Yet, an exercise of judgment appears to be involved in 
determining whether it was reasonably foreseeable that a particular cause would lead 
to an event of the sort under consideration.64 In this regard, the standard of rea-
sonable foreseeability appears to afford courts and arbitral tribunals with ample 
opportunity to reach result-oriented rather than objectively predictable decisions on 
the question of aggregation.65 
58 Comment 12 to Article 5.3 PRICL.  
59 See also comment 13 to Article 5.3 PRICL.  
60 Comments 15 f to Article 5.3 PRICL.  
61 Comments 17 f to Article 5.3 PRICL.  
62 Comment 18 to Article 5.3 PRICL.  
63 Comment 19 to Article 5.3 PRICL.  
64 Comment 20 to Article 5.3 PRICL.  
65 Comment 20 to Article 5.3 PRICL. 
CAUSE-BASED AGGREGATION IN FOCUS 
140 
5.31 Under Article 5.3 PRICL and by contrast to English law,66 however, a cause 
is defined by reference to an event within the meaning of Article 5.2 PRICL and the 
concept of reasonable foreseeability offers courts and arbitral tribunals some gui-
dance in exercising their judgment. Hence, the operation of cause-based aggregation 
mechanisms governed by Article 5.3 PRICL may be more predictable than cause- 
based aggregation mechanisms subject to English law. 
III Summary of the chapter 
5.32 Traditionally, cause-based aggregation mechanisms use the unifying factors 
of ‘originating cause or source’ or ‘one source or original cause’ and the linking 
phrase of ‘consequent upon or attributable to’. The standard of causation inherent in 
cause-based aggregation mechanisms is said to be defined by the unifying factor and 
the linking phrase used in the aggregation clause. 
5.33 In light of the English authorities on the subject matter, it appears to be clear 
that cause-based aggregation mechanisms are broader than event-based aggregation 
mechanisms. It has been noted that the word ‘originating’ coupled with the word 
‘cause’ ‘opens up the widest possible search for a unifying factor in the history of the 
individual losses’.67 It has, thus, been suggested that a unifying cause has allowed 
tracing back losses to wherever a common origin could reasonably be found.68 Yet, it 
has equally been held that even though an ‘originating cause’ was a unifying factor of 
a remote kind, the degree of remoteness between the unifying factor and the in-
dividual losses to be aggregated still needs to be limited. 
5.34 In English law, however, there appears to be no concept of limitation on the 
acceptable degree of remoteness in cause-based aggregation. The question of whether a 
cause is too remote so as to operate as a unifying factor in a given case seems to be one 
that has been left entirely to the courts’ or arbitral tribunals’ exercise of judgment. As the 
unities test does not apply in the context of cause-based aggregation, courts and arbitral 
tribunals have no guidance in their exercise of judgment, which opens up ample op-
portunity for courts and arbitral tribunals to reach result-oriented decisions. 
5.35 The aim of Article 5.3 PRICL is to reduce the legal uncertainty inherent in 
cause-based aggregation mechanisms. It provides the market with rules that are 
meant to guide courts and arbitral tribunals in determining the required standard of 
causation between the unifying causes and the individual losses to be aggregated. In 
order to ensure that cause-based aggregation is broader than event-based aggrega-
tion, the standard of causation inherent in cause-based aggregation mechanisms is 
defined in Article 5.3 PRICL by reference to the concept of ‘event’ within the 
meaning of Article 5.2 PRICL. In fact, it is ensured under Article 5.3 PRICL that 
one looks farther back than the materialisation of a peril or the liability triggering 
act, omission or fact in the search of a unifying cause. The concept of ‘reasonable 
foreseeability’ addresses the question of how much farther back one is to look. 
66 See para 5.10.  
67 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 5) 1035 (Lord Mustill).  
68 Standard Life Assurance Ltd v Ace European Group (n 5) [259] (Eder J). 
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5.36 Clearly, the determination of whether a cause is acceptable as a unifying factor 
or whether it is too remote so as to justify an aggregation of a plurality of losses is an 
exercise of judgment under Article 5.3 PRICL. Therefore, cause-based aggregation 
mechanisms under Article 5.3 PRICL bear legal uncertainty and provide courts and 
arbitral tribunals with the opportunity to reach result-oriented judgments. Yet, both 
the definition of a unifying cause by reference to the definition of an ‘event’ as well as 
the concept of ‘reasonable foreseeability’ provide courts and arbitral tribunals with 
analytical guidance. Considering this, Article 5.3 PRICL may be capable of reducing 
legal uncertainty in cause-based aggregation.   
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PART II  
AGGREGATION ISSUES IN THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
REINSURER AND THE REINSURED  

CHAPTER 6 
Aggregation and allocation   
6.1 The aim of this chapter is to distinguish between the concept of aggregation of 
losses and the concept of allocation of losses. In the following sections, it will be 
demonstrated that both concepts are used to determine whether a loss is within the 
scope of the reinsurance cover in a specific case. However, they respond to different 
aspects of the scope of cover. Thereafter, the concept of loss allocation will briefly be 
presented before the relation between the concepts of aggregation and allocation 
shall be addressed. 
I Concepts respond to different aspects of scope of cover 
1 Quantitative scope of cover and aggregation 
6.2 As elaborated above, in non-proportional reinsurance, the reinsurer provides 
cover for the amount of a loss exceeding the reinsured’s deductible up to a specified 
cover limit.1 Accordingly, specifying the applicable deductible and cover limit in a given 
case means defining the quantitative scope of a reinsurance cover.2 
6.3 In an aggregation clause, the parties to a reinsurance contract agree that, 
under certain circumstances, multiple individual losses will be aggregated and are to 
be considered as one single loss, which is then tested against the reinsured’s deduc-
tible and the reinsurer’s cover limit.3 
6.4 Hence, the concept of aggregation is used to determine whether a loss falls within 
the quantitative scope of reinsurance cover so as to trigger the reinsurer’s liability. 
2 Temporal scope of cover and allocation 
6.5 Allocating losses means determining which of multiple reinsurance policies 
responds to a specific loss. It is to be tested whether a loss falls within the scope of the 
reinsurance cover of a particular contract. This involves questions such as whether 
the loss results from a reinsured peril,4 whether the reinsurance contract extends to 
1 See para 1.34.  
2 Andreas Schwepcke and Alexandra Vetter, Praxishandbuch: Rückversicherung (VVW 2017) para 858. Cf 
also Klaus Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol 1 (Verlag Versicherungs wirts chaft 
eV 1976) 187; Peter Liebwein, Klassische und moderne Formen der Rückversicherung (3rd edn, VVW 2018) 
184, 191.  
3 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP, Reinsurance Practice and the Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2009) 
para 28.1.  
4 Cf Gerathewohl (n 2) 743. 
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the geographic location where the loss occurred,5 whether the loss occurred within 
the reinsurance period6 and whether the loss triggers the reinsurer’s liability from a 
quantitative perspective.7 
6.6 In practice, however, disputes regarding the concept of loss allocation pri-
marily revolve around the question of the temporal scope of the reinsurance cover.8 
More specifically, it is sometimes difficult to determine when exactly a loss attaches 
to the reinsurance contract. Correspondingly, it is equally difficult to determine 
whether a loss falls within the temporal scope of one reinsurance contract or another. 
The latter question primarily arises where the reinsured has been on risk for multiple 
years and has taken out different reinsurance cover9 over this time.10 
6.7 The extent of a reinsurer’s exposure depends substantially on whether a loss is 
within a given temporal scope of cover. This, in turn, depends on the mechanism of 
allocating losses.11 In fact, different allocation mechanisms have been developed for 
reinsurance contracts. 
II Different mechanisms of allocation in reinsurance 
6.8 In treaty reinsurance, the reinsurance period and the insurance periods of the 
underlying policies are generally not the same.12 Reinsurance treaties are commonly 
taken out per calendar year, whereas primary insurance periods may start and expire on 
any day in the year.13 This begs the question whether a loss under a primary insurance 
policy that was entered into in calendar year 1 is reinsured under a treaty that incepts 
on 1 January of calendar year 2 if the loss has occurred in calendar year 2.14 
6.9 In this regard, Lord Mance noted that excess of loss reinsurance responds 
either to losses occurring during the reinsurance period or to losses occurring during 
the period of policies attaching during the reinsurance period.15 The majority of 
excess of loss reinsurance policies are taken out on a ‘losses occurring during’ basis.16 
5 Cf Gerathewohl (n 2) 766.  
6 Cf Gerathewohl (n 2) 726.  
7 Cf Teal Assurance Co Ltd v WR Berkley Insurance (Europe) Ltd [2013] UKSC 57, [2013] 4 All ER 643.  
8 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 3) paras 27.1 ff; Eberhard Witthoff, ‘§ 15 Schadenbearbeitung in der 
Rückversicherung’ in Dieter W Lüer and Andreas Schwepcke (eds), Rückversicherungsrecht (CH Beck 
2013) para 116; Robert M Merkin, Laura Hodgson and Peter J Tyldesley, Colinvaux’s Law of 
Insurance (Sweet & Maxwell 2019) para 18–089.  
9 As long as multiple consecutive reinsurance contracts exist it is irrelevant whether this is with different 
reinsurers or with the same reinsurer.  
10 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 8) para 18–089.  
11 Terry O’Neill, Jan Woloniecki and Franziska Arnold-Dwyer, The Law of Reinsurance in England and 
Bermuda (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 2019) para 5–126.  
12 Gerathewohl (n 2) 726.  
13 Gerathewohl (n 2) 726.  
14 Gerathewohl (n 2) 726.  
15 Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co [2009] UKHL 40, [2009] 4 All ER 909 
[41] (Lord Mance); Gerathewohl (n 2) 733 f; O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 11) paras 
5–127 f.  
16 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 3) para 27.19; Gerathewohl (n 2) 734. Cf also Liebwein (n 2) 274. 
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The concepts of ‘losses occurring during’ and ‘risks attaching during’ determine the 
temporal scope of the reinsurance cover. However, they do not do so conclusively. 
6.10 In Balfour v Beaumont, it was held that ‘[w]here, (…), the reinsurance [was] on a 
losses occurring basis the reinsurer [was] undertaking to indemnify the reassured in re-
spect of all losses occurring during the specified period of reinsurance (…)’ and that it was 
‘quite irrelevant when the original policy came into effect or when its term expired. The 
only question [was] whether the loss occurred during the period of the reinsurance’.17 By 
contrast, a reinsurance contract on a ‘risks attaching during’ basis provides cover for 
underlying insurance contracts that are entered into during the reinsurance period.18 
6.11 Upon a closer examination, both concepts are primarily used to determine 
the set of primary insurance policies that are reinsured. 
1 ‘Losses occurring during’ and temporal scope of reinsurance cover 
6.12 In order to recover under a reinsurance contract which has been taken out on 
a ‘losses occurring during’ basis, the reinsured must–on the balance of 
probabilities–prove that a loss occurred during the reinsurance period.19 Whether a 
loss can be said to have occurred during the reinsurance period is a question of fact.20 
6.13 This begs the question of whether the losses occurring during basis refers to a 
loss incurred by the original insured under a primary insurance policy or to a loss 
incurred by the reinsured under the reinsurance treaty. In Youell v Bland 
Welch and Co Ltd, it was held that, under a reinsurance contract taken out on a 
losses occurring during basis, the reinsurer was ‘obliged to pay [its] share of the loss 
suffered by the reinsured, if it occurred during the period when the reinsurance 
contract was in force’.21 Hence, in English law, a loss is incurred under a treaty of 
reinsurance when the reinsured’s liability has been established and quantified either 
by judgment, arbitral award or a reasonable and binding settlement.22 Accordingly, 
the Court of Appeal considered in Youell v Bland Welch and Co Ltd that it was the 
point in time when the reinsured’s loss occurred and not when the original loss oc-
curred that was the relevant point in time for allocating a loss to a reinsurance treaty 
taken out on a losses occurring during basis.23 
17 Balfour v Beaumont [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 272 (CA).  
18 O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 11) para 5–128.  
19 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd [1998] EWCA Civ 546, [1998] CLC 957, 969 
(Hobhouse LJ); Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 3) para 27.19; Witthoff (n 8) para 119.  
20 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 19) 969 (Hobhouse LJ); Witthoff (n 8) 
para 119.  
21 Youell v Bland Welch and Co Ltd (No 1) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 127 (CA) (emphasis added). Likewise 
referring to the reinsured’s and not the original loss, Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington 
Insurance Co (n 15) [76] (Lord Collins); Stefan Pohl and Joseph Iranya, The ABC of Reinsurance 
(VVW 2018) 38. Cf also O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 11) para 5–127.  
22 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 8) para 18–062, with further references; John Butler and Robert 
Merkin, Butler and Merkin’s Reinsurance Law, vol 2 (Looseleaf, Sweet & Maxwell) para C–0202.  
23 It may be noted that this conclusion seems to be in line with Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea 
Insurance Co Ltd (n 19) 962, 969, where Hobhouse LJ considered the point in time when the physical 
loss occurred as the relevant loss occurrence for the purposes of allocating a loss under a contract of 
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6.14 Yet, the reinsured’s liability is not necessarily triggered when the primary 
insured incurs the physical loss or damage. This is because the parties to the primary 
insurance contract may specify another trigger for the primary insurer’s (reinsured’s) 
liability. More specifically, the primary insurance policy may provide that the pri-
mary insurer’s (reinsured’s) liability is triggered when a loss is discovered, when a loss 
is reported or when a claim is made.24 In the US long-tail business, in particular, the 
so-called triple trigger theory often applies. Under this theory, a primary insurance 
contract responds to a loss if it was in force either at the time of initial exposure, 
during continued exposure of the insured or a third party to hazardous conditions or 
at the time of the loss manifestation.25 Hence, the point in time when the reinsured 
incurs liability, ie when it incurs a loss, may depend on the trigger provided for in the 
primary insurance contract. 
6.15 Consequently, the phrase ‘losses occurring during’ provided for in a re-
insurance treaty is not necessarily referring to the occurrence of the original physical 
loss.26 The phrase merely defines the set of primary insurance policies that are re-
insured under the treaty. Whenever the reinsured suffers a loss, the reinsurance 
contract is activated. Where, for example, the primary insurance contract uses a 
claims-made trigger, the reinsured suffers a loss only when a claim has been made in 
the primary insurance context.27 Therefore, under the reinsurance contract, a loss 
does not occur when the physical loss occurs under the primary insurance 
contract–even though the reinsurance treaty is taken out on a losses occurring during 
basis–but when a claim is made under the primary insurance contract.28 
6.16 It is to be noted, however, that a contract of reinsurance may define the losses 
to be allocated to it independently of the underlying contract. For instance, the re-
insurance contract interpreted in Caudle v Sharp provided that ‘the reinsurers are 
liable for losses discovered or claims made, by or against the original insured, during 
the period of reinsurance cover, irrespective of the date on which the loss itself may 
have occurred’.29 In this case, the reinsurance contract itself contained a trigger. 
6.17 To sum up, the phrase ‘losses occurring during’ in a reinsurance treaty should 
reinsurance. This is so because the underlying contract provided that the reinsured’s liability would be 
triggered when a physical loss occurred. Similarly, in Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington 
Insurance Co (n 15), the House of Lords stated that the relevant loss occurrence was the reinsured’s 
loss occurrence. In this case, the reinsured became liable to indemnify its primary insured for all the 
environmental pollution damage whenever it occurred. Accordingly, the reinsured’s liability appears 
to have arisen when the physical damage occurred; Butler and Merkin (n 22) para C–0293.  
24 Liebwein (n 2) 278.  
25 Malcolm A Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts (6th edn, Informa Law from Routledge 2009) para 
17-4C2.  
26 Cf Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 3) para 18.11, who note that ‘losses discovered’ or ‘claims made’ 
clauses may be used to determine the date of loss where the reinsurance treaty provides cover on a 
‘losses occurring during’ basis.  
27 Caudle v Sharp [1995] CLC 642 (CA) 651 f (Evans LJ); Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 3) para 18.11. 
Cf also Liebwein (n 2) 275 in connection with 132 and n 759; O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer 
(n 11) para 5–112.  
28 Cf Liebwein (n 2) 275 in connection with 132 and n 759.  
29 Caudle v Sharp (n 27) 652 f (Evans LJ). 
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generally not be considered a trigger. This is because the ‘losses occurring during’ 
basis on its own does not, in general, determine the temporal scope of the reinsurance 
cover. It determines the underlying policies that are reinsured under a contract of 
reinsurance. The reinsurance agreement’s temporal scope of cover, thus, to some 
extent depends on the terms of the underlying insurance policy. 
2 ‘Risks attaching during’ and temporal scope of reinsurance cover 
6.18 If reinsurance treaties are taken out on a ‘risks attaching during’ basis, pri-
mary insurance policies that are entered into (or renewed) during the reinsurance 
period are relevant.30 More specifically, the reinsurance treaty provides cover for 
losses that occur after the reinsurance term has ended if the relevant primary in-
surance contract has been entered into during the reinsurance period.31 By contrast, 
they do not provide cover for losses that occur during the reinsurance period if the 
primary insurance contract has been entered into before the reinsurance period has 
started to run. 
6.19 Consequently, the risks attaching during basis is used to determine the set of pri-
mary insurance policies that are reinsured. By doing so, it defines the reinsurance treaty’s 
temporal scope of application. However, whether a specific loss is covered under the treaty 
equally depends on the primary insurance policy’s temporal scope of application. 
6.20 Where the primary insurance contract uses a claims-made trigger, for ex-
ample, a claim must be made in the primary insurance context in order to activate the 
primary insurer’s (reinsured’s) liability. This may be long after a physical loss has 
occurred. In such a case, the reinsurer’s liability is triggered if the relevant primary 
insurance policy has been entered into during the reinsurance period and a claim has 
been made in the context of the original insurance. 
6.21 In summary, the phrase ‘risks attaching during’ on its own does not determine 
the temporal scope of the reinsurance cover. In order to fully understand the temporal 
scope of a contract of reinsurance, the trigger used in the underlying insurance policy 
must be analysed. The question whether a loss is to be allocated to the reinsurance 
agreement depends substantially on the terms of the primary insurance policy. 
III Relation between aggregation and allocation 
1 Possible conflict between aggregation and allocation 
6.22 With an aggregation clause, the parties to a reinsurance contract agree that 
multiple individual losses are to be aggregated if they all result from a specified 
unifying factor. A reinsurance contract’s temporal scope of cover defines whether the 
timing of the loss was of the kind required to provide cover for the loss under the 
specific contract. 
6.23 A reinsurance contract’s temporal scope of cover is often defined independently 
30 Gerathewohl (n 2) 733 f; Schwepcke and Vetter (n 2) paras 544 ff; O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold- 
Dwyer (n 11) para 5–128; Liebwein (n 2) 129 ff, 273 f. Cf also Marcel Grossmann, Rückversicherung – 
Eine Einführung (2nd edn, Institut für Versicherungswirtschaft an der Hochschule St Gallen 1982) 129.  
31 Liebwein (n 2) 130; O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 11) para 5–128. 
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of the aggregation clause. Basically, the underlying question is whether multiple in-
dividual losses are to be allocated to the correct policy period so that the losses that are 
so allocated can subsequently be aggregated or whether multiple losses are to be ag-
gregated and this aggregate is subsequently to be allocated to the correct policy year. In 
more illustrative words, the question is whether multiple individual losses are to be 
grouped together to one big balloon and this balloon is then to be attached to one 
policy year or whether multiple small individual balloons are to be attached to a policy 
year and only those balloons that are attached to the same policy year may ultimately 
be aggregated.32 
2 Allocation before aggregation 
2.1 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd 
6.24 In Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd, the Court of 
Appeal dealt with a facultative excess of loss reinsurance contract. 
6.25 Cranes left at the port of Sunderland ‘by a company called Concorde were 
vandalised by a succession of individual acts of pilferage’ during a period of some 18 
months.33 Concorde brought action against the Port of Sunderland for not putting in 
place a system to protect its goods that were stored at the port. Municipal insured the 
Port of Sunderland under a primary insurance policy that was renewed annually. Sea 
Insurance Co Ltd reinsured Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd under three consecutive 
facultative reinsurance contracts, each of 12 months’ duration.34 The reinsured, 
Municipal, paid out insurance money to the Port of Sunderland and sought to recover 
a certain amount from its reinsurers.35 
6.26 The reinsurance slips each indicated that the reinsurance period lasted ‘12 
months at 24 June 1986’.36 Further, as the reinsurance contracts were designed to be 
back-to-back with the primary insurance contract, the primary insurance policy’s limit 
of liability clause was incorporated into the reinsurance contracts.37 The provision read: 
[A]ll sums which the insured may become legally liable to pay … for … loss or damage caused 
to property … provided that such … loss or damage is caused by any act of commission or 
omission negligence or error of judgment by the insured or their servants or employees … and 
arises during any period of insurance under this policy.38  
6.27 The contracts of reinsurance contained aggregation clauses providing that the 
limit of liability was to be applied ‘to compensation payable, “in respect of or arising 
32 This illustrative depiction was used by Christian Lang, Swiss Re, at the 5th PRICL workshop, taking 
place in Vienna from 15 to 18 January 2018.  
33 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 19) 962 (Hobhouse LJ).  
34 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 19) 962 (Hobhouse LJ). The three contracts 
of reinsurance, ie the slips, were taken out for 1986–87, 1987–88 and 1988–89, respectively.  
35 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 19) 957 (Hobhouse LJ).  
36 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 19) 958 (Hobhouse LJ). The provisions in 
the second and third contract were adapted according to the respective year of cover.  
37 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 19) 957 (Hobhouse LJ).  
38 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 19) 966 (Hobhouse LJ). 
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out of any one occurrence or in respect of or arising out of all occurrences of a series 
consequent on or attributable to one source or original cause”’.39 
6.28 The Court of Appeal first held that the individual acts of pilferage were ‘attri-
butable to a single source or original cause’, ie the lack of an adequate system to protect 
the cranes from pilferage and vandalism, and were, thus, to be aggregated.40 
6.29 The Court of Appeal then had to make sense of the reinsurance periods. It 
held that ‘[w]hen the relevant cover is placed on a time basis, the stated period of time 
is fundamental and must be given effect to. It is for that period of risk that the 
premium payable is assessed’.41 
6.30 Without directly addressing the conflict between the concept of aggregation and 
the concept of allocation, the Court of Appeal held that, if a contract of reinsurance 
was taken out on a time basis, individual losses had to first be allocated to a policy year. 
Only losses that were allocated to the same policy year could then be aggregated.42 
Hence, if multiple individual losses occurred during different reinsurance periods, they 
cannot be aggregated even if they are attributable to one source or original cause. 
2.2 Caudle v Sharp 
6.31 In Caudle v Sharp, the Court of Appeal dealt with excess of loss reinsurance 
treaties.43 
6.32 Between 1980 and 1982, the managing agent of the Outhwaite syndicate un-
derwrote 32 run-off insurance contracts on behalf of the syndicate. The contracts re-
sulted in enormous losses for the Outhwaite syndicate. These losses were initially borne 
by the syndicate’s members. They subsequently brought an action against the managing 
agent, Mr Outhwaite, for having negligently written the risks.44 Mr Sharp was Mr 
Outhwaite’s professional indemnity insurer. Under this primary insurance professional 
indemnity policy, Mr Sharp paid claims totalling £7,375,891. Some of these claims were 
made in 1985, others in 1987. Mr Sharp then sought to recover this amount under four 
contracts of reinsurance.45 
6.33 The reinsurance treaties contained the following reinsurance period clause: 
This reinsurance covers all losses as herein defined occurring during the period commencing 
with 1 January 1985 and ending with 31 December, 1985 both days inclusive, local standard 
time at the place where the loss occurs.46  
6.34 The reinsurance treaties also contained aggregation clauses defining the term 
‘each and every loss’: ‘For the purpose of this reinsurance the term “each and every 
39 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 19) 966 (Hobhouse LJ).  
40 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 19) 967 (Hobhouse LJ).  
41 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 19) 968 (Hobhouse LJ).  
42 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 19) 967 (Hobhouse LJ).  
43 Caudle v Sharp (n 27) 644 f (Evans LJ).  
44 Caudle v Sharp (n 27) 643 (Evans LJ).  
45 Caudle v Sharp (n 27) 643 (Evans LJ).  
46 Caudle v Sharp (n 27) 645 (Evans LJ). 
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loss” shall be understood to mean each and every loss (…) and/or series of losses (…) 
arising out of one event’.47 
6.35 Moreover, it is to be noted that the primary insurance policy was taken out 
on a claims-made basis,48 whereas the reinsurance treaties were designed on a losses 
occurring during basis.49 
6.36 The Court of Appeal identified two relevant questions. The first was whether 
the original losses incurred under 32 separate run-off policies can be aggregated. If 
this were answered in the affirmative, the second question would be whether the 
losses that occurred50 in 1987 could be aggregated with losses that had occurred51 in 
1985 if they all arose from the same event.52 
6.37 As to the first question, the Court of Appeal concluded that Mr Outhwaite’s 
ignorance in underwriting the 32 run-off policies could not be considered an event 
within the meaning of the aggregation clause. Consequently, the underwritings of the 
run-off policies were considered 32 separate events so that the corresponding losses 
could not be aggregated. 
6.38 On the basis of the court holding that the individual losses could not be ag-
gregated, the second question did not arise in respect of the case concerned.53 
Nevertheless, the court pronounced, obiter, its opinion on the issue. Generally, a 
plurality of losses that arise out of one particular event are to be aggregated. However, 
if–under a primary insurance policy taken out on a claims-made basis–the different 
underlying claims were made in 1985 and 1987 respectively, they may not be allocated to 
the same reinsurance period. Only claims made in 1985 could be allocated to the re-
insurance treaty in question. The Court of Appeal noted that there was ‘no justification 
(…) for (…) extending the reinsurance cover so as to bring within its scope claims made 
or losses discovered after the cover has expired’.54 
6.39 The court arrived at this conclusion even though the reinsurance treaties 
contained an ‘extension of protection clause’. This clause provided that 
[i]f this reinsurance should expire whilst a loss (…) arising out of one event is in progress, it is 
agreed that subject to the other conditions of this reinsurance, the reinsurers shall pay their 
proportion of the entire loss or damage, provided that the loss (…) arising out of one event 
commenced before the time of expiration of this reinsurance.55  
47 Caudle v Sharp (n 27) 644 (Evans LJ).  
48 Caudle v Sharp (n 27) 644 (Evans LJ).  
49 This results from the reinsurance period clause, Caudle v Sharp (n 27) 652 f (Evans LJ).  
50 Under the reinsurance treaties, a loss occurred when for the purpose of the primary insurance policy a 
claim was made.  
51 Under the reinsurance treaties, a loss occurred when for the purpose of the primary insurance policy a 
claim was made.  
52 Cf Caudle v Sharp (n 27) 643 (Evans LJ) where the second question is put slightly differently.  
53 Caudle v Sharp (n 27) 650 (Evans LJ).  
54 Caudle v Sharp (n 27) 653 (Evans LJ).  
55 Caudle v Sharp (n 27) 644 (Evans LJ). 
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6.40 The Court of Appeal reasoned that such a clause could easily be applied to a 
case of physical damage. More specifically, where the primary insurance policy and the 
reinsurance contract were both taken out on a losses occurring during basis, it was 
sensible to aggregate multiple individual losses that resulted from a hurricane even if 
some of them occurred after the expiry of the reinsurance period.56 By contrast, it held 
that the parties may not have intended to apply the clause in the case of professional 
indemnity insurance on a claims-made basis. The Court of Appeal stated that applying 
an extension of protection clause to such cases could ‘have a dramatic effect. The 
reinsurance cover [would be] extended to include all claims arising out of the particular 
act of negligence, whenever they [might] be made, provided that one claim at least [was] 
made during the period of cover’.57 It concluded that ‘entire loss’ meant ‘the whole of 
the loss subsequently established in respect of that claim’, so that there was no justi-
fication for reading the clause as extending the cover so as to bring within its scope 
claims made after the reinsurance cover had expired.58 
6.41 Consequently, the Court of Appeal noted that only losses that occurred59 
during one period of reinsurance might be aggregated.60 The fact that the parties 
had used an extension of protection clause did not, in general, change the si-
tuation where the underlying insurance policy was a third-party liability in-
surance.61 Hence, losses that occur outside the reinsurance period cannot be 
aggregated with losses occurring during the period even if they all arise from the 
same event.62 If the parties wish to aggregate individual losses that are prima facie 
to be allocated to different policy years, this must be expressed in the contract of 
reinsurance very clearly.63 
2.3 Pacific Dunlop Ltd v Swinbank 
6.42 In the Australian case Pacific Dunlop Ltd v Swinbank, the Supreme Court of 
Victoria Court of Appeal was confronted with a primary excess of loss liability in-
surance policy. The insured, Pacific Dunlop (more precisely, its subsidiary), pro-
duced coronary pacemaker leads which were designed to convey electronic signals to 
the patients’ hearts. In 1994, the insured voluntarily recalled all unimplanted devices. 
Subsequently, patients to whom such coronary pacemakers had been implanted 
sought compensation for injury caused by an actual fracture of the device or the need 
to explant the device due to its susceptibility to fracture. 
6.43 The relevant insurance contract contained an aggregation clause as well as an 
insurance period clause. The aggregation provision read: 
56 Caudle v Sharp (n 27) 652 (Evans LJ).  
57 Caudle v Sharp (n 27) 652 (Evans LJ).  
58 Caudle v Sharp (n 27) 653 (Evans LJ).  
59 Under the reinsurance treaties, a loss occurred when for the purpose of the primary insurance policy a 
claim was made.  
60 Caudle v Sharp (n 27) 653 (Evans LJ).  
61 Caudle v Sharp (n 27) 652.  
62 Caudle v Sharp (n 27) 653.  
63 Butler and Merkin (n 22) para C–0206. 
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An Occurrence or series of Occurrences arising directly from a common cause or condition 
shall be deemed to be one Occurrence regardless of the number of persons or organisations who 
sustain Personal Injury Property Damage or Advertising Injury. All such Occurrences shall be 
deemed to have occurred on the day of the first of such Occurrences.64  
6.44 The period of insurance was stated to last ‘from 4.00 p.m. Australian Eastern 
Standard Time on 30 September 1992 to 4.00 p.m. Australian Eastern Standard 
Time on 30 September 1993’.65 
6.45 In the proceedings before the first instance court, the insurer contested that 
the individual third-party claims constitute a ‘series of occurrences’. Before the ap-
pellate court, however, the insurer did not forcefully uphold its contention, so that 
the individual third-party losses were treated as a series of occurrences.66 The ap-
pellate court had to decide whether an individual third-party loss that occurred 
outside the insurance period formed part of the relevant series of occurrences.67 
6.46 The issue before the appellate court basically came down to the question of 
whether the concept of aggregation prevailed over the concept of allocation. In this 
regard, the court emphasised that it was a question of construction of the aggrega-
tion clause and the date deeming provision.68 More specifically, the question to be 
determined was whether by stating that ‘all such Occurrences shall be deemed to 
have occurred on the day of the first of such Occurrences’ the parties intended to 
extend the cover beyond the period of insurance.69 
6.47 The court held that the insurance policy was essentially shaped ‘as one that 
[was] calculated to afford insurance cover to [the insured] by way of indemnity over a 
distinct, limited and finite portion of time, marked out at each end to the very 
minute, and designated as “the Period of Insurance”’. It went on to state that the 
relevant policy insured against ‘liability for the consequences of a particular event 
(called an “Occurrence”) happening within that particularly specified time frame’.70 
The court concluded that ‘the scope of indemnity [was not] “controlled” by the re-
quirements of the aggregation clause’.71 
6.48 In reaching its conclusion, the court was explicitly aware of the fact that its in-
terpretation rendered the sentence ‘[a]ll such Occurrences shall be deemed to have occurred 
on the day of the first of such Occurrences’ nugatory in the context of product liability.72 
6.49 Consequently, the Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Appeal acknowledged 
that the question of whether an aggregation clause controlled an allocation clause or 
64 Pacific Dunlop Ltd v Swinbank (2001) 11 ANZ Insur Cases 61–496 (Supreme Court of Victoria Court 
of Appeal) [11] (Tadgell JA).  
65 Pacific Dunlop Ltd v Swinbank (n 64) [2] (Tadgell JA).  
66 Pacific Dunlop Ltd v Swinbank (n 64) [18] (Tadgell JA).  
67 Pacific Dunlop Ltd v Swinbank (n 64) [19] (Tadgell JA).  
68 Pacific Dunlop Ltd v Swinbank (n 64) [18]–[19] (Tadgell JA).  
69 Cf Pacific Dunlop Ltd v Swinbank (n 64) [19] (Tadgell JA).  
70 Pacific Dunlop Ltd v Swinbank (n 64) [23] (Tadgell JA).  
71 Pacific Dunlop Ltd v Swinbank (n 64) [24] (Tadgell JA).  
72 Pacific Dunlop Ltd v Swinbank (n 64) [26] (Tadgell JA). 
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vice versa was a question of contract interpretation. Hence, it is generally up to the 
parties to extend the insurance period by means of an aggregation clause. However, 
if they intend to do so, this must be expressed very clearly as the court deemed the 
insurance period clause to be defining the essential nature of the policy.73 
2.4 Scholarly opinion on the importance of the allocation mechanism for 
aggregation 
6.50 Gerathewohl agrees with the judiciary findings presented74 in an example:75 
An excess of loss treaty was in place for the year 1976. The reinsured had two pri-
mary insurance policies in place, one that incepted on 1 July 1975 and the other that 
started to run on 1 January 1976. Losses occurred on 2 January 1976 and affected 
both primary insurance policies. 
6.51 If the reinsurance treaty were taken out on a losses occurring during basis, it 
would not matter when the primary insurance policies incepted or when their term 
expired. By contrast, it would be important that both policies were in force at the 
time the losses occurred. As both primary insurance policies were in force on 2 
January 1976, they were both reinsured under the treaty for losses that occurred on 
this day. Consequently, the individual losses would be aggregated. 
6.52 If the reinsurance were, however, taken out on a risks attaching during basis, 
the time when the primary insurance policy incepted would be fundamental. In the 
example, the first policy incepted on 1 July 1975, ie before the reinsurance period 
began. The second policy incepted on 1 January 1976, ie within the reinsurance 
period. Consequently, the losses under the first policy cannot be said to be within the 
temporal scope of the reinsurance cover, whereas those under the second one can. 
Gerathewohl, thus, opines that losses under the first policy cannot be aggregated 
with losses under the second one even if they all resulted from one single event.76 
6.53 In essence, Gerathewohl opines that multiple individual losses must first be 
allocated to a reinsurance period. Only losses that are allocated to the same period of 
reinsurance may be aggregated. 
IV Aggregation and allocation under the PRICL 
6.54 The PRICL follow the English rule on this point. More specifically, ‘[o]nly 
individual losses that are allocated to the same reinsurance period may be aggregated’ 
under the PRICL.77 Consequently, if multiple individual losses are allocated to dif-
ferent reinsurance periods, they cannot be aggregated even if they all arose from the 
same event or cause.78 
73 Butler and Merkin (n 22) para C–0206.  
74 Pacific Dunlop Ltd v Swinbank (n 64) [18]–[19] (Tadgell JA). See also Caudle v Sharp (n 27) 652 f (Evans 
LJ); Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 19) 967 ff (Hobhouse LJ). Contrast, 
Jacques Bourthoumieux, ‘La notion d’événement dans les traités de réassurance en excédent de si-
nistres’ (1969) 40 Revue générale des assurances terrestres 457, 460.  
75 Gerathewohl (n 2) 734.  
76 Gerathewohl (n 2) 734.  
77 Comment 7 to Article 5.1 PRICL.  
78 Comment 7 to Article 5.1 PRICL. 
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V Summary of the chapter 
6.55 The concept of allocating losses and the concept of aggregating losses are 
both used to determine whether a loss is within the scope of the reinsurance cover in 
a specific case. The concept of aggregation deals with the question of whether 
multiple individual losses can be grouped together and presented to the reinsurer as 
one single loss with regard to the reinsured’s deductible and the reinsurer’s cover 
limit.79 This question is essential in determining whether a loss is within the quan-
titative scope of the reinsurance cover. By contrast, the concept of allocating losses is 
used to determine whether a loss can be allocated to a specific policy year, ie whether 
it is within the temporal scope of the reinsurance cover. 
6.56 Where a reinsurance contract contains an aggregation clause that provides 
for the aggregation of multiple individual losses if they result from one common 
unifying factor, there may be situations where these losses are prima facie to be 
allocated to different reinsurance periods. Consequently, the aggregation mechanism 
may conflict with the allocation mechanism. 
6.57 It is a question of contract construction whether multiple individual losses are 
to be aggregated before the aggregated loss is allocated to a policy year or vice versa. 
Yet, English and Australian case law suggests that where the parties take out a 
reinsurance contract on a time basis, the reinsurance period is of fundamental im-
portance. The parties are generally assumed to have agreed that multiple individual 
losses are to first be allocated to a reinsurance period and that only losses that are 
allocated to the same policy year may be aggregated.80 
6.58 In Caudle v Sharp, the reinsurance treaties were interpreted as providing for a 
prevalence of the concept of allocation over the concept of aggregation even though 
they contained an extension of protection clause.81 By contrast to a first-party in-
surance context, in particular, extension of protection clauses in reinsurance con-
tracts reinsuring third-party risks may have no effect. In Pacific Dunlop Ltd v 
Swinbank, the court held that the parties to a reinsurance contract had not provided 
for an allocation of losses subject to prior aggregation by agreeing that ‘all such 
Occurrences shall be deemed to have occurred on the day of the first of such 
Occurrences’ even though the first occurrence was within the reinsurance period.82 
6.59 Consequently, if the parties to a reinsurance contract intend to aggregate 
individual losses first and to allocate the aggregated product to a reinsurance period 
subsequently, they have to make this intention very clear. 
6.60 Gerathewohl’s example illustrates well that because, in general, only losses 
that are to be allocated to the same reinsurance period may be aggregated, the re-
levant allocation mechanism is important. Depending on whether the parties provide 
79 Barlow Lyde and Gilbert LLP (n 3) para 28.1.  
80 Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd (n 19).  
81 Caudle v Sharp (n 27).  
82 Pacific Dunlop Ltd v Swinbank (n 64). 
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for an allocation on a losses occurring during basis or a risks attaching during basis, 
the reinsurance cover may differ substantially in a given case.83 
6.61 In line with the English position, aggregation under the PRICL is only 
possible for losses that are allocated to the same reinsurance period.  
83 Gerathewohl (n 2) 734. 




Aggregation and the principle of back-to-back   
7.1 In this chapter, the relation between the concept of back-to-back cover and the 
concept of the aggregation of losses will be discussed. 
7.2 As Lord Mustill stated in Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field, provisions re-
lating to limits are of cardinal importance in the case of excess of loss reinsurance.1 
Aggregation clauses are such provisions. Aggregation mechanisms may be provided 
for in both the underlying contract and the contract of reinsurance. 
7.3 Therefore, the relation between the aggregation mechanisms in the 
two contracts is essential. According to the principle of back-to-back cover, the 
scope and the nature of cover of the underlying contract and the contract of 
reinsurance are the same. Yet, this principle only applies to proportional re-
insurance.2 The aggregation of losses, however, is primarily relevant in excess of 
loss reinsurance, ie non-proportional reinsurance.3 Consequently, the relation 
between the aggregation clauses in the inward and the outward contracts will be 
discussed. 
I The concept of back-to-back cover 
7.4 As a basis for this discussion, the concept of back-to-back cover will be 
laid out. This includes a presentation of the presumption of back-to-back cover in 
proportional reinsurance as well as ways to rebut that presumption. Further, it will 
be set forth that the presumption of back-to-back cover does not extend to non- 
proportional reinsurance, such as excess of loss reinsurance. 
1 Presumption of back-to-back cover in proportional facultative reinsurance 
7.5 The relation between the reinsurance contract and the underlying contract is 
of fundamental importance.4 In cases of proportional facultative reinsurance, the 
reinsurer covers a portion of the risk that the underlying insurer has assumed.5 Where 
1 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (1996) 1 WLR 1026 (HL) 1035 (Lord Mustill).  
2 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1) 1033 f (Lord Mustill); John Birds, Ben Lynch and Simon Paul, 
MacGillivray on Insurance Law (14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018) para 35–067; Robert M Merkin, 
Laura Hodgson and Peter J Tyldesley, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (12th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2019) 
para 18–060.  
3 See paras 1.38, 1.42, 1.43 ff, 1.58.  
4 Terry O’Neill, Jan Woloniecki and Franziska Arnold-Dwyer, The Law of Reinsurance in England and 
Bermuda (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 2019) para 4–003.  
5 Özlem Gürses, Reinsuring Clauses (Informa Law from Routledge 2010) para 2.82. 
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the reinsured and the reinsurer each cover a portion of the original risk, it is said to be 
commercially sensible that ‘the scope and nature of the cover afforded [by the reinsurance] 
is the same as the cover afforded by the insurance’.6 If the covers provided by the two 
contracts are co-extensive, they are considered to be back-to-back.7 
7.6 Whether the underlying contract and the reinsurance contract are back-to- 
back depends on the construction of the reinsurance contract.8 Consequently, in 
determining whether the reinsurance contract follows the underlying contract is a 
matter of the parties’ intent.9 
7.7 According to Lord Collins, ‘in proportional facultative reinsurance the starting 
point for the construction of the reinsurance policy is that the scope and nature of the 
cover in the reinsurance is co-extensive with the cover in the insurance’.10 In this regard, 
Lord Griffiths in Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher11 noted that: 
[i]n the ordinary course of business reinsurance is referred to as ‘back-to-back’ with the 
insurance, which means that the reinsurer agrees that if the insurer is liable under the policy 
the reinsurer will accept liability to pay whatever percentage of the claim he has agreed to 
reinsure. A reinsurer could, of course, make a special contract with an insurer and agree only 
to reinsure some of the risks covered by the policy of insurance, leaving the insurer to bear the 
full cost of the other risks. [Such a contract would] be wholly exceptional, a departure from 
the normal understanding of the back-to-back nature of reinsurance and would require to be 
spelt out in clear terms.12  
7.8 Consequently, there is a legal presumption under English law that the covers 
provided in the underlying insurance contract and the proportional facultative re-
insurance contract are back-to-back.13 This can be illustrated by the cases of 
6 Groupama Navigation et Transports v Catatumbo CA Seguros [2000] EWCA Civ 220, [2000] 2 All ER 
193; Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co [2009] UKHL 40, [2009] 4 All ER 
909 [58], [60] where Lord Collins stated that this was ‘the normal commercial intention’.  
7 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP, Reinsurance Practice and the Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2009) 
para 16.10; Colin Edelman and Andrew Burns, The Law of Reinsurance (2nd edn, OUP 2013) para 
3.12; Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 2) para 18–050.  
8 Groupama Navigation et Transports v Catatumbo CA Seguros (n 6); Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v 
Butcher [1989] AC 852 (HL) 911 (Lord Lowry); Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington 
Insurance Co (n 6), where it was held that the reinsurance contract could not reasonably be construed 
to be back-to-back with the underlying primary insurance contract. See also Robert M Merkin, A 
Guide to Reinsurance Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2007) 195 ff.  
9 Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher (n 8) 911 (Lord Lowry); Groupama Navigation et Transports 
v Catatumbo CA Seguros (n 6); HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance 
Co [2001] EWCA Civ 735, [2001] 2 All ER 39 [107] (Rix LJ); Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v 
Lexington Insurance Co (n 6) [58] (Lord Collins); Amlin Corporate Member Ltd v Oriental Assurance 
Corp [2012] EWCA Civ 1341; [2013] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 131 [21] (Longmore LJ).  
10 Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co (n 6) [60] (Lord Collins).  
11 Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher (n 8).  
12 Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher (n 8) 895 (Lord Griffiths).  
13 Youell v Bland Welch and Co Ltd (No 1) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 423 (CA), where Staughton LJ stated 
that ‘one can (…) readily assume that a reinsurance contract was intended to cover the same risks on 
the same conditions as the original contract of insurance, in the absence of some indication to the 
contrary’. See also Groupama Navigation et Transports v Catatumbo CA Seguros (n 6); Wasa 
International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co (n 6) [60] (Lord Collins). 
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Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher14 and Groupama Navigation et Transports v 
Catatumbo CA Seguros.15 
7.9 These were both cases where the inward contract and the outward contract 
were governed by different laws. However, the inward and outward contracts con-
tained similar or identical language in both cases. More specifically, the inward and 
the outward contracts contained the same or a similar warranty in both cases. The 
reinsurers argued that the contract of reinsurance was governed by English law and 
that a warranty in the contract of reinsurance was to be interpreted in line with 
section 33(3) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, which provided that: 
[a] warranty (…) is a condition which must be exactly complied with, whether it be material 
to the risk or not. If it be not so complied with, then subject to any express provision in the 
policy, the insurer is discharged from liability as from the date of the breach of 
warranty (…).16  
7.10 By contrast, the inward contracts were subject to Norwegian and Venezuelan 
law, respectively. Under these laws, insurers and reinsurers cannot avoid liability for 
the insured’s or reinsured’s breach of a warranty if such breach of warranty did not 
cause the loss.17 In both cases, the courts dealt with the question whether the effect of 
similar or identical clauses in the inward and outward contracts was co-extensive 
where they are governed by different laws. 
7.11 The courts held that ‘in the absence of any express declaration to the contrary 
in the reinsurance policy, a warranty [should] produce the same effect in each policy. 
The effect of a warranty in the reinsurance policy [was] governed by the effect of the 
warranty in the insurance policy because the reinsurance policy [was] a contract by 
the underwriters to indemnify [the reinsured] against liability under the insurance 
policy’.18 In other words, although the contracts of reinsurance were governed by 
English law, the warranty clauses in the reinsurance contracts ‘took [their] effect 
from the particular original insurance, being shaped in [their] application by the 
provision[s] of’ the Norwegian and Venezuelan law, respectively.19 
2 Rebutting the presumption of back-to-back cover 
7.12 The presumption that the underlying contract and the contract of reinsurance are 
co-extensive is merely a rule of contract construction.20 The presumption that a 
14 Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher (n 8).  
15 Groupama Navigation et Transports v Catatumbo CA Seguros (n 6).  
16 Marine Insurance Act 1907, s 33(3), partially amended by the Insurance Act 2015. It is, hence, to be 
noted that English law has changed in this point. Under the Insurance Act 2015, the insurer is now 
only entitled to avoid the contract for breach of warranty if there was some causative link between the 
loss and that breach.  
17 Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher (n 8) 907 f (Lord Lowry); Groupama Navigation et Transports 
v Catatumbo CA Seguros (n 6).  
18 Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher (n 8) 892 (Lord Templeman). See also Groupama Navigation 
et Transports v Catatumbo CA Seguros (n 6).  
19 Groupama Navigation et Transports v Catatumbo CA Seguros (n 6).  
20 Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher (n 8) 911 (Lord Lowry); Groupama Navigation et Transports 
v Catatumbo CA Seguros (n 6); Gürses (n 5) para 2.95. 
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proportional facultative reinsurance contract is back-to-back with its underlying con-
tract is rebuttable.21 In fact, if either party can demonstrate that when concluding the 
contract, the parties cannot reasonably be taken to have intended to design the re-
insurance contract back-to-back with the underlying contract, the presumption will be 
rebutted.22 
7.13 The presumption can be rebutted by showing that the terms of the underlying 
contract and those of the reinsurance contract are quite different.23 In Gan Insurance 
Co Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd, the Court of Appeal held that ‘where by its 
express terms, the risk presented to underwriters is materially different from that 
assumed by the reinsured, it cannot reasonably be presumed that underwriters in-
tended to afford back-to-back cover’.24 
7.14 Moreover, even in cases where the inward and the outward contracts 
contained similar language, it was held to be possible to rebut the presumption.25 
In Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co,26 the underlying 
cover and the cover of the reinsurance were both taken out for a period of three 
years. The issue before the court was, ‘whether [the] same period of cover should 
receive the same interpretation in both the original insurance and the re-
insurance’.27 
7.15 A US court held that the underlying primary insurance contract was gov-
erned by the law of Pennsylvania.28 Under the law of Pennsylvania, the reinsured 
was obliged to indemnify the primary insured for losses that occurred before, during 
and after the three-year policy period of the underlying insurance contract.29 The 
reinsurer argued that the contract of reinsurance was subject to English law under 
which a reinsurer could not be bound to provide cover for losses occurring before 
and after the actual period of reinsurance.30 
7.16 The House of Lords noted that at the time when the underlying insurance 
contract and the reinsurance contract were concluded, it was by no means foreseeable 
what ‘system of law’ would be applicable to the primary insurance contract. Hence, it 
was uncertain how the cover period in the primary insurance contract would be con-
strued. In this respect, the case before the House of Lords differed from the cases in 
Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher and Groupama Navigation et Transports v 
Catatumbo CA Seguros where the reinsurers were able to ascertain the proper law of the 
21 Gürses (n 5) para 2.95; Birds, Lynch and Paul (n 2) para 35–067.  
22 Gürses (n 5) para 2.95.  
23 Groupama Navigation et Transports v Catatumbo CA Seguros (n 6); Merkin (n 8) 198; Gürses (n 5) para 
2.95; Edelman and Burns (n 7) para 3.21.  
24 Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd [1999] EWCA Civ 1524.  
25 Birds, Lynch and Paul (n 2) para 35–065.  
26 Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co (n 6).  
27 Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co (n 6) [106] (Lord Collins).  
28 Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co (n 6) [3] (Lord Phillips).  
29 Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co (n 6) [58] (Lord Collins).  
30 Cf Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co (n 6) [13] (Lord Brown). 
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underlying contracts.31 For this reason, the law according to which the contract of re-
insurance would–in line with the presumption–have to be construed32 was un-
predictable.33 The House of Lords ruled that it seemed ‘wholly uncommercial and 
outside any reasonable commercial expectation of either party’ to consider the reinsurer 
bound to indemnify the reinsured for losses occurring before and after the reinsurance 
period.34 
7.17 The House of Lords’ judgment in Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v 
Lexington Insurance Co demonstrates that the presumption of back-to-back cover is 
‘no inflexible rule of law that the cover of insurance and reinsurance always mat-
ched’. The presumption ‘may be ousted by (…) relevant circumstances’.35 The House 
of Lords applied the law of contract construction according to which the meaning of 
a contract is to be ascertained at the time when it is concluded, having regard to ‘all 
the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the 
parties’ at that time.36 
3 Back-to-back cover and non-proportional reinsurance contracts 
7.18 The presumption that the inward and the outward contracts are co-extensive 
does not extend to non-proportional reinsurance.37 In this regard, Lord Mustill 
emphasised in Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field that: 
[the] assumption that where a direct insurer takes out reinsurance, and where both policies 
contain provisions enabling the amount of losses to be added together, the parties are likely to 
have intended their effect to be much the same (…) may very well be correct where the 
reinsurance is of the proportionate kind, under which the reinsurer is sharing the risk assumed 
by the direct insurer. (…) But where a reinsurer writes an excess of loss treaty for a layer of 
the whole account (…) of the reinsured I see no reason to assume that aggregation clauses in 
one are intended to have the same effect as aggregation clauses in the other. The insurances are 
not in any real sense back-to-back.38  
7.19 In excess of loss reinsurance, ie non-proportional reinsurance, the reinsurers’ 
and the reinsureds’ interest are not necessarily fully aligned. The bases on which the 
reinsurance premiums are assessed in proportional and non-proportional re-
31 Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co (n 6) [108] (Lord Collins).  
32 Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher (n 8) 911 (Lord Lowry); Groupama Navigation et Transports 
v Catatumbo CA Seguros (n 6), where the courts held that even though the contracts of reinsurance 
were governed by a different law than the underlying contracts, they were to be construed to the effect 
that they mirrored the clauses of the underlying contract under the latter’s proper law.  
33 Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co (n 6) [108] (Lord Collins).  
34 Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co (n 6) [111] (Lord Collins).  
35 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 2) para 18–059.  
36 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwhich Building Society [1997] 1 WLR 896 (HL) 912; 
Edelman and Burns (n 7) paras 3.04 ff.  
37 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1) 1033 f (Lord Mustill); Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v 
Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd [2013] EWHC 3362 (Comm), [2014] Lloyd’s Rep IR 490 [35] 
(Hamblen J); Birds, Lynch and Paul (n 2) para 35–067; Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 2) para 
18–060.  
38 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1) 1033 f (Lord Mustill). 
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insurance differ substantially.39 As the parties do not each share a percentage of the 
same risk,40 there is no reason why the terms of the underlying contract should be 
identical with the terms of the contract of reinsurance.41 
7.20 This does, however, not mean that a non-proportional reinsurance contract 
cannot be designed to be back-to-back with the underlying contract. On the contrary, 
Lord Mustill suggests, the parties may write the two contracts on identical terms in order 
to ensure that the contracts are construed as having the same meaning.42 
II Aggregation and the concept of back-to-back cover 
7.21 If a reinsurance contract is designed to be back-to-back with its underlying 
policy, the aggregation clause in the reinsurance contract is to be construed as having the 
same meaning as the aggregation clause in the underlying policy.43 By contrast, if the 
two contracts are not co-extensive, it may be that they contain different aggregation 
language and consequently provide for different aggregation mechanisms.44 
7.22 Aggregation mechanisms are primarily used in excess of loss, ie non- 
proportional, reinsurance.45 Yet, in quota share and surplus reinsurance treaties in 
particular, which are generally of the proportional type, the parties often provide for 
cover limits per event if they are taken out against natural catastrophes.46 By so 
doing, they introduce a non-proportional element into an otherwise proportional 
reinsurance treaty. Whenever there is a limit or deductible per event, it appears 
apposite to not treat the aggregation mechanisms in the inward contract and the 
outward contract as being co-extensive.47 
7.23 Consequently, there is no presumption that the aggregation mechanisms in 
the inward and the outward contracts are co-extensive.48 This may be illustrated by 
Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field. 
39 For more detail as to the pricing of the different types of reinsurance, see Merkin (n 8) 197; Peter 
Liebwein, Klassische und moderne Formen der Rückversicherung (3rd edn, VVW 2018) 91 ff, 223 ff.  
40 See paras 1.34 f.  
41 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 2) para 18–060.  
42 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1) 1034 (Lord Mustill); Edelman and Burns (n 7) para 3.28; 
Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 2) para 18–060. Whether this holds true where the two contracts 
are governed by different laws will be discussed below, see para 7.45 ff.  
43 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1) 1034.  
44 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1) 1033 f (Lord Mustill). Cf also Robert W Hammesfahr and 
Scott W Wright, The Law of Reinsurance Claims (Reactions 1994) 153, where it is noted that excess of 
loss reinsurance contracts ‘often contain an occurrence definition different from the occurrence defi-
nition in the original insurance policies reinsured’.  
45 See paras 1.38, 1.42, 1.43 ff, 1.58.  
46 See paras 1.28, 1.33.  
47 This is because introducing a deductible or a limit into the reinsurance treaty is the equivalent of 
breaking up the proportional basis of the reinsurance. Consequently, the parties’ interests may diverge 
with regard to the deductible and the cover limit. Therefore, there is no reason to assume that the 
aggregation mechanism in the underlying contract is intended to operate on the same terms as the 
aggregation mechanism in the reinsurance.  
48 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1) 1033 f (Lord Mustill). See also Edelman and Burns (n 7) para 
3.28; O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 4) para 4–079. 
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1 Axa Reinsurance v Field 
7.24 In Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field 49 the issue arose as to whether the 
aggregation mechanisms in the inward and the outward contracts were co-extensive. 
In this case, three insurance underwriters negligently underwrote insurance policies. 
They were insured under professional liability insurance contracts containing the 
following aggregation language: 
(…) the insurer’s total liability under this policy in respect of any claim or claims arising 
from one originating cause, or series of events or occurrences attributable to one 
originating cause [or related causes] shall in no event exceed the sum stated in 3(a) of 
the schedule.50  
7.25 The errors and omissions insurer was covered under an excess of loss re-
insurance treaty which was taken out on an ‘each and every loss basis’ and provided 
for a deductible as well as a cover limit. The contract further contained a definition 
of the term ‘each and every loss’ which read: ‘For the purpose of this reinsurance the 
term “each and every loss” shall be understood to mean each and every loss (…) 
arising out of one event’.51 
7.26 Dealing with the very same primary errors and omissions insurance policy, 
the Commercial Court in Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd held that the losses 
arose from three originating causes as three separate underwriters caused the in-
dividual losses.52 Each of the three had failed to take adequate underwriting deci-
sions.53 The reinsured settled claims under the inward contract on this basis. 
Thereafter, it sought to recover from its reinsurer on the same basis under the re-
insurance treaty.54 
7.27 In this regard, the Court of Appeal, in Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field, 
considered whether ‘the meaning of the [aggregation] clause in the reinsurance 
contract [was] the same as that in the [underlying] insurance contracts’.55 As the 
losses were attributable to three originating causes, the court determined whether 
they correspondingly arose from three events within the meaning of the aggregation 
clause in the reinsurance treaty. 
7.28 The Court of Appeal concluded ‘that there [was] no relevant difference 
between the two clauses’ and ‘that there were three events out of which (…) all the 
[losses] arose’.56 In the House of Lords, Lord Mustill argued that the Court of 
Appeal had reached this conclusion because it had assumed that the aggregation 
49 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field [1995] CLC 1504 (CA); Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1).  
50 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1) 1032 (Lord Mustill; emphasis added).  
51 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1) 1031 f (Lord Mustill; emphasis added).  
52 Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd [1995] CLC 180 (Comm) 205 (Phillips J).  
53 Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd (n 52) 205 (Phillips J); Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 49) 
1512 (Staughton LJ).  
54 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 49).  
55 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 49) 1514 f (Staughton LJ).  
56 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 49) 1515 (Staughton LJ). 
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clauses under the inward and the outward contracts were designed to be back-to- 
back.57 
7.29 Lord Mustill clarified, however, that in the case of non-proportional re-
insurance, there was no presumption that the terms of the inward contract had been 
intended to have the same effect as those in the outward contract. More specifically, he 
deliberated, that he could not see any reason ‘to assume that aggregation clauses in one 
are intended to have the same effect as aggregation clauses in the other [as] [t]he in-
surances [were] not in any real sense back-to-back’.58 
7.30 For procedural reasons, the House of Lords did not have a chance to pronounce 
its opinion about how many events the underwriters’ negligent acts constituted. However, 
Lord Mustill stated that he believed that when interpreting the aggregation clauses in the 
inward and the outward contracts, ‘the only safe course [was] to fall back on the words 
actually used’.59 He further defined the terms ‘event’ and ‘originating cause’ and con-
cluded that the aggregation mechanism contained in the underlying contract had ‘a much 
wider connotation than’ the one provided for in the reinsurance treaty.60 
7.31 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field shows that there is no presumption that 
the aggregation mechanisms provided for in the inward and the outward contracts 
are intended to be back-to-back.61 Consequently, where the aggregation clauses in 
the two contracts differ, the parties are taken to have intended that different ag-
gregation mechanisms apply.62 In such cases, an ‘aggregation gap’–as Merkin calls 
it–opens up.63 
2 Aggregation gap 
2.1 Problem of an aggregation gap 
7.32 It may be that both the underlying contract and the contract of reinsurance 
contain a deductible and a cover limit. In such a case, both provide for a mode of 
calculating the relevant loss to be tested against the deductible and the cover limit. 
Aggregation clauses define a mechanism for adding together individual losses to one 
single loss which is then presented to the insurer or the reinsurer and tested against the 
deductible and the cover limit in the respective contracts.64 
57 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1) 1033 f (Lord Mustill). See the Court of Appeal’s judgment in 
Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 49) 1511, where Phillips J stated that were a different test of 
causation to be applied in the inward and the outward contracts, the consequence would be a con-
fusion which the Court of Appeal tried to avoid in Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc 
[1996] 1 WLR 1239. See also Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and 
Marine Co of Europe Ltd v Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 343 
(CA), [1998] CLC 870, 882 f (Hobhouse LJ).  
58 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1) 1034 (Lord Mustill).  
59 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1) 1036 (Lord Mustill).  
60 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1) 1035 (Lord Mustill).  
61 Rob Merkin, ‘Reinsurance Aggregation’ (1998) 114 LQR 390, 390.  
62 Cf Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1) 1034 (Lord Mustill).  
63 Merkin, ‘Reinsurance Aggregation’ (n 61) 390.  
64 See paras 3.16 ff. 
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7.33 The mode of calculation of the relevant loss, ie the aggregation mechanism, 
ultimately determines the reinsured’s liability under the inward contract and the 
reinsurer’s liability under the outward contract. Furthermore, the part of the loss 
that is ultimately covered by the reinsured depends on the part of the loss that is 
covered by the reinsurer under the outward contract. Correspondingly, the re-
insurance premium is determined with regard to the relation of the reinsured’s po-
tential liability under the inward contract and the reinsurer’s potential liability under 
the outward contract. 
7.34 Consequently, the parties to a reinsurance contract must be able to pre- 
estimate the effects of the respective aggregation mechanisms and to compare them. 
In order to do so, it appears sensible to coordinate the modes of calculation of the 
relevant losses and, thus, the aggregation mechanisms. According to Merkin ‘[i]n an 
ideal world the bases of aggregation in the direct insurance and the reinsurance 
would match’.65 
7.35 As has been set out, however, there is no presumption that the aggregation 
mechanism in the underlying contract is co-extensive with the aggregation me-
chanism in the outward contract. Where the aggregation mechanism in the un-
derlying contract differs from the aggregation mechanism in the reinsurance 
contract, an aggregation gap arises66 and complicates the assessment as to which 
parts of a potential loss are to be covered by the reinsured and the reinsurer 
respectively. 
2.2 Exemplification of the effects of an aggregation gap 
7.36 As mentioned previously, the House of Lords concluded in Axa Reinsurance 
(UK) Ltd v Field67 that there is no presumption that aggregation clauses in the 
inward and the outward contracts are back-to-back where non-proportional re-
insurance contracts are concerned.68 This case was decided on the facts that three 
insurance underwriters negligently wrote insurance policies and thereby triggered 
liability towards Names at Lloyd’s. 
7.37 The extent of the loss and the structure of the inward cover are not fully known. 
Let us assume that the inward contract provided for a deductible of £200,000.00 and a 
cover limit of £1,000,000.00 per originating cause and that each of the three underwriters 
negligently wrote 10 policies causing a loss of £100,000.00 per written policy, so that the 
losses amounted to £3,000,000.00 in total. The losses were settled on the basis that they 
originated from three different causes. Consequently, the primary insured had to bear 
three deductibles. The reinsured was bound to pay three times £800,000.00,69 ie 
£2,400,000.00, under the inward contract. 
65 Merkin, ‘Reinsurance Aggregation’ (n 61) 390.  
66 Merkin, ‘Reinsurance Aggregation’ (n 61) 390; O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 4) 
para 7–018.  
67 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1).  
68 See paras 7.29 ff.  
69 In other words, the difference between the losses stemming from one cause (10 times £100,000.00) and 
one deductible (£200,000.00). 
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7.38 By contrast, the outward contract provided for an aggregation per event. As 
noted above, the House of Lords did not have a chance to decide how many events 
the underwriters’ negligent acts constituted due to procedural reasons.70 Yet, in 
Caudle v Sharp,71 the Court of Appeal dealt with a similar fact pattern as well as an 
aggregation clause similar to the one contained in the outward contract in the case at 
hand.72 The Court of Appeal held that each act of negligent underwriting was to be 
considered a separate event.73 Applying the Court of Appeal’s reasoning to the case 
in Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field where the three underwriters negligently un-
derwrote 10 policies each, this amounts to 30 events in total. 
7.39 Consequently, the reinsured was required to bear the deductible under the 
outward contract 30 times. The outward contract provided for a deductible of 
£500,000.00 per event.74 As the individual losses associated with the negligent under-
writing of each policy only amounted to £100,000.00, the deductible was not exhausted 
in any of the 30 events, so that the reinsurer’s liability was not triggered. 
7.40 The different definitions of what a ‘loss’ means under the inward and the 
outward contracts has led to an aggregation gap. As a consequence of the different 
modes of aggregating losses under the two contracts, the reinsured was bound to pay 
out insurance money totalling £2,400,000.00 and was unable to recover any of it from 
its reinsurer. Had the outward contract provided for the same aggregation mechanism 
as the inward contract, the losses under the outward contract would equally have been 
settled on the basis that three separate causes provoked the individual losses. Under 
this hypothesis, the reinsured would have been able to recover £500,000.00 from its 
reinsurer three times, ie £1,500,000.00 in total. Hence, had there not been an ag-
gregation gap, the reinsured and the reinsurer would have both participated in cov-
ering the original loss. 
3 Strategies to avoid or overcome an aggregation gap 
7.41 As an aggregation gap can have adverse effects on either party, the parties 
may wish to avoid the effects of such a gap. They may either avoid the emergence of 
an aggregation gap by explicitly providing that the same aggregation mechanism 
applies in the outward contract as in the inward contract. Alternatively, they may 
provide for an aggregate extension clause in the reinsurance contract that is said to 
deal with the adverse effects of an aggregation gap.75 Whether an aggregate exten-
sion clause is, in fact, a suitable means to reach that goal will be discussed. 
7.42 Yet, it is to be borne in mind that, in setting the deductible and the cover limit in 
a contract of reinsurance, the parties will generally have regard to the applicable 
70 See para 7.30.  
71 Caudle v Sharp [1995] CLC 642 (CA).  
72 The aggregation clause in this case read: ‘For the purpose of this reinsurance the term “each and every 
loss” shall be understood to mean each and every loss (…) arising out of one event’.  
73 In Caudle v Sharp (n 71) 648, Evans LJ stated that the underwriting of each policy was a separate 
occurrence.  
74 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1) 1031 f (Lord Mustill).  
75 Edelman and Burns (n 7) para 4.76. 
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aggregation mechanism.76 In fact, the broader the aggregation mechanism, the easier it is 
for both the deductible and the cover limit to be exceeded. Thus, where the aggregation 
mechanism is broad, the parties might want to provide for both a higher deductible and a 
higher cover limit. By contrast, where the aggregation mechanism is narrow, the parties 
might want to provide for a lower deductible as well as a lower cover limit. 
7.43 Thus, it is important to note that simply aligning the aggregation mechanism in 
the reinsurance agreement with the one in the underlying contract may not be enough. 
It is essential that the deductible and the cover limit in the reinsurance policy be chosen 
in relation to the aggregation mechanism to be imported from the underlying policy. 
3.1 Back-to-back formulation of the aggregation clauses 
7.44 When the House of Lords gave recognition to the ‘aggregation gap’, it ac-
knowledged that it might have adverse effects on either party.77 Lord Mustill empha-
sised that it was up to the parties to avoid an aggregation gap. ‘The natural way to 
achieve that result is to make sure that the aggregation clauses are the same’.78 
7.45 Yet, since there is no presumption that non-proportional reinsurance con-
tracts are intended to be back-to-back, it is doubtful whether the parties can avoid an 
aggregation gap simply by using the same aggregation language in the inward and 
the outward contracts. As Lord Mustill stated in Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field, 
there was ‘no good reason why the meaning of a clause in (…) the direct polic[y], 
should necessarily fix the outer limits of the aggregation under the reinsurance’.79 In 
fact, where the inward and the outward contracts are not governed by the same law, 
it may well be that the same aggregation language is construed differently under the 
respective contracts. 
7.46 For example, where an inward contract is subject to New York law and 
provides for the aggregation of all individual losses that arise from any one event, 
such an event would be determined in accordance with the ‘unfortunate event test’.80 
By contrast, where a reinsurance contract governed by English law contains the same 
aggregation language, an event would be determined having regard to the ‘unities 
test’.81 Clearly, the New York unfortunate event test and the English unities test are 
different,82 so that an aggregation gap may potentially arise. 
76 Cf paras 2.73 ff, 2.90.  
77 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1) 1034 (Lord Mustill).  
78 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1) 1034 (Lord Mustill). See also O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold- 
Dwyer (n 4) para 7–018.  
79 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1) 1035 (Lord Mustill).  
80 See for instance The Arthur A Johnson Corp v Indemnity Insurance Co of North America (1958) 6 AD2d 
97 (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York); Hartford Accident and 
Indemnity Co v Edward Wesolowski (1973) 33 NY2d 169 (Court of Appeals of New York); National 
Liability and Fire Insurance Co v Itzkowitz (2015) 624 FedAppx 758 (United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit). It is to be noted that the unfortunate event test only applies in cases of third- 
party liability insurance.  
81 For more details as to the unities test, see paras 4.14 ff.  
82 Cf Graydon Shaw Staring and Dean Hansell, Law of Reinsurance (Thomson Reuters Westlaw 2018) 
s 15:4. 
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7.47 As there is no presumption that non-proportional reinsurance contracts are 
intended to be back-to-back with their underlying contracts, the reasoning of the 
House of Lords in Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher83 and the Court of 
Appeal in Groupama Navigation et Transports v Catatumbo CA Seguros84 does not 
apply.85 More specifically, if the inward and the outward contracts are not presumed 
to be back-to-back, the construction of the aggregation clause in the reinsurance 
contract does not necessarily follow the construction of the aggregation clause in the 
underlying contract. Indeed, there is no reason to assume that the parties intended 
the aggregation mechanisms in the respective contracts to produce the same effects in 
each policy even if they used similar or identical language. 
7.48 Thus, when construing the aggregation clause in the reinsurance contract, 
the general English rules of contract construction apply.86 In Investors Compensation 
Scheme Ltd v West Bromwhich Building Society, Lord Hoffmann held that 
‘[i]nterpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would 
convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would 
reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the 
time of the contract’ conclusion.87 Consequently, when construing the aggregation 
clause in the reinsurance contract in light of the parties’ background knowledge, it is to 
be determined whether they intended the aggregation mechanism contained in the 
reinsurance contract to produce the same effect as the one contained in the underlying 
policy. There is no legal presumption that the parties intended the aggregation clauses 
in the two contracts to be back-to-back, nor that they did not. 
7.49 In summary, where the parties ensure that the aggregation clauses in the 
inward and the outward contracts are the same–as Lord Mustill suggested–they will 
also have to ensure that the two contracts are governed by the same law in order to 
avoid an aggregation gap. Otherwise, it may be that the aggregation clauses in the 
inward and the outward contracts are construed differently, each according to its 
governing law. 
7.50 In order to avoid an aggregation gap, the parties should, therefore, expressly 
provide in the reinsurance contract that the aggregation mechanism in the re-
insurance policy is intended to produce the same effect as the one in the underlying 
contract, irrespective of the law applicable to the reinsurance contract. A clause to 
this extent might be termed ‘follow the aggregation clause’. If the parties choose to 
provide for a follow the aggregation clause, they should bear two things in mind. 
First, they should abstain from explicitly providing for an aggregation clause in the 
reinsurance contract that deviates from the one in the underlying policy. In including 
a follow the aggregation clause, the parties should agree to incorporate the ag-
gregation mechanism contained in the underlying contract into the reinsurance 
83 Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher (n 8).  
84 Groupama Navigation et Transports v Catatumbo CA Seguros (n 6).  
85 In respect of this reasoning, see paras 7.21 ff.  
86 Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd (n 37) [28] (Hamblen J).  
87 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwhich Building Society (n 36) 912 (Lord Hoffmann). 
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agreement. Secondly, the parties should ensure that the deductible and cover limit in 
the reinsurance policy is set by having regard to the aggregation mechanism to be 
imported from the underlying contract. 
3.2 Aggregate extension clauses 
7.51 Aggregate extension clauses are said to adjust the aggregation mechanism in 
the outward contract to the aggregation mechanism in the inward contract, provided 
that the inward contract is taken out on an aggregate basis.88 Before discussing 
whether an aggregate extension clause can be a means to overcome the adverse ef-
fects of an aggregation gap, the basic concept of an aggregate extension clause will be 
laid out. Furthermore, the significance of aggregate extension clauses in treaty re-
insurance will be discussed. 
a Basic concept of aggregate extension clauses 
7.52 Aggregate extension clauses have existed for more than 80 years.89 Barlow, 
Lyde and Gilbert point out that it was ‘misleading to talk about “the” aggregate 
extension clause (…), because there is a large number of such clauses and not one 
standard clause’.90 It has been acknowledged by the Court of Appeal that there are 
‘varying forms’ of aggregate extension clauses. In one relevant case, however, it 
opined that, in particular, the opening paragraph of most aggregate extension clauses 
appeared ‘to follow a standard wording’:91 
As regards liability incurred by the reinsured for losses on risks covering on an aggregate basis, 
this agreement shall protect the reinsured excess of the amounts as provided for herein in the 
aggregate any one such aggregate loss up to the limit of indemnity as provided for herein in all 
any one such aggregate loss.92  
7.53 Consequently, the Court of Appeal emphasised that the standard wording 
should have an effect which does not vary from one contract to another unless the 
parties’ intention suggested otherwise.93 The court pointed out that aggregate ex-
tension clauses fulfil two purposes. 
7.54 First, an aggregate extension clause is designed to ensure that reinsurance cover 
is in place where the reinsured is covering ‘aggregated losses exceeding certain limits’. 
88 Edelman and Burns (n 7) para 4.75.  
89 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 879 (Hobhouse LJ). The Court of Appeal said in 
1998 that aggregate extension clauses had existed for more than 60 years, ergo such clauses have now 
(2020) existed for more than 80 years. For a history of aggregate extension clauses, see John Butler and 
Robert Merkin, Butler and Merkin’s Reinsurance Law, vol 2 (Looseleaf, Sweet & Maxwell) paras 
C–0314 ff.  
90 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 7) para 28.58.  
91 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 879 (Hobhouse LJ).  
92 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 873 (Hobhouse LJ).  
93 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 879 (Hobhouse LJ). 
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This is particularly important in cases of product liability.94 In such cases, large numbers 
of sold products may each involve a relatively small product liability risk. Consequently, 
none of the individual losses exceeds the deductible, so that the insurance cover is not 
triggered.95 In such a case, a producer may want to take out product liability cover 
which protects him against the risk of having to pay a very large number of such small 
claims. Where the original insurance is taken out on an ‘aggregate basis’, the producer is 
protected against ‘the risk of having to pay out more than a certain sum in the aggregate 
in respect of such claims’.96 Under this type of cover, the original insurer becomes liable 
to indemnify the original insured for every loss that the latter sustains once the aggregate 
of such losses has exceeded the relevant deductible. For such small losses to be ag-
gregated they do not have to arise from the same event or cause, ie they do not have to 
be related, but they must accrue within the same period of insurance.97 
7.55 An aggregate extension clause entitles the primary insurer to pass on the 
losses covered under the primary insurance contract in the aggregate.98 In other 
words, an aggregate extension clause extends the underlying policy’s ‘aggregate 
basis’ into the reinsurance contract.99 
7.56 Secondly, providing for different mechanisms of aggregation in the under-
lying contract and in the contract of reinsurance results in an aggregation gap with 
potentially adverse effects for either party.100 Aggregate extension clauses are said to 
be means to overcome such adverse effects.101 
b Aggregate extension clause as a means to overcome the adverse effects of an 
aggregation gap 
7.57 It has been suggested that one purpose of an aggregate extension clause is to 
avoid the problems associated with an aggregation gap.102 More specifically, where 
the underlying cover provides for a broader aggregation mechanism than the one in the 
94 Klaus Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol 2 (Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft 
eV 1979) 325; Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 7) paras 28.59 ff; Edelman and Burns (n 7) para 4.75; 
Birds, Lynch and Paul (n 2) para 35–073; O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 4) para 7–017.  
95 Merkin, ‘Reinsurance Aggregation’ (n 61) 391.  
96 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 879 f (Hobhouse LJ). See also Birds, Lynch and 
Paul (n 2) para 35–073.  
97 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 882, where Hobhouse LJ stated that the issue to be 
assessed in the two cases concerned ‘unrelated claims’ rather than ‘claims’ or losses which have some 
causal relationship; Gerathewohl (n 94) 325; Merkin, ‘Reinsurance Aggregation’ (n 61) 391. Cf also 
Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 7) paras 28.57, 28.62.  
98 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 880 (Hobhouse LJ).  
99 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 880 (Hobhouse LJ).  
100 See paras 7.32 ff.  
101 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 880 (Hobhouse LJ).  
102 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 880, 882 (Hobhouse LJ). 
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reinsurance contract, an aggregate extension clause is said to entitle the reinsured to 
treat the losses that were aggregated in line with the aggregation mechanism in the 
underlying contract as an aggregated loss for the purpose of the reinsurance contract.103 
7.58 In Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd, it was held that a 
typical aggregate extension clause only applied where the underlying contract was taken 
out on an aggregate basis.104 Generally, a contract is considered to have been taken out 
on an aggregate basis if the individual losses are aggregated not because they are related, 
ie have some causal connection, but because they occurred during the same policy 
period.105 Where ‘each and every loss’ must be tested against the deductible and the cover 
limit individually, there is no aggregation whatsoever. This, the Court of Appeal stated, 
was the ‘antithesis of providing cover on an aggregate basis’.106 
7.59 In Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd, the Court of Appeal 
considered whether the underlying contract had been taken out on an aggregate basis. 
Hobhouse LJ clarified that the contract under consideration did not provide for an 
aggregation of related claims, ie for an aggregation based on a common causal con-
nection.107 In other words, Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd was 
not a case where the aggregate extension clause had been used to avoid the adverse 
effects of an aggregation gap. Rather, the issue before the court was whether unrelated 
claims were to be aggregated because they had been paid under the original policies 
during the same policy year.108 In this regard, the Court of Appeal concluded that the 
underlying contract had been taken out on an ‘each and every loss’ rather than on an 
aggregate basis, meaning that the contract of reinsurance was triggered only if a single 
claim exceeded the deductible.109 
7.60 Accordingly, the Court of Appeal’s decision is not pertinent to the issue 
under scrutiny here. This is because the Court of Appeal did not examine whether a 
contract taken out on a per event or per cause basis, ie a contract that provides for an 
aggregation of related claims, can also be considered to have been taken out on an 
aggregate basis enabling the application of the aggregate extension clause. Yet, 
Hobhouse LJ noted, obiter, that: 
103 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 882 (Hobhouse LJ).  
104 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 874, 879 f (Hobhouse LJ); Merkin, ‘Reinsurance 
Aggregation’ (n 61) 392.  
105 Deborah Tompkinson, ‘Jabberwocky: Recent Decisions on the Meaning of “Event” and 
“Occurrence” in the English Courts’ (1995) 3 International Insurance Law Review 82, 84. See also 
Gerathewohl (n 94) 325; Stefan Pohl and Joseph Iranya, The ABC of Reinsurance (VVW 2018) 36.  
106 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 884 (Hobhouse LJ).  
107 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 884 f (Hobhouse LJ).  
108 Cf Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe 
Ltd v Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 882 (Hobhouse LJ).  
109 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 886 (Hobhouse LJ). 
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[w]here there is no each and every claim provision, or where there is some other provision 
which expressly provides for the aggregation of claims in one respect or another or in one 
situation or another, then such further enquiry will probably rapidly lead to the conclusion that 
the cover has been provided on an aggregate basis.110  
7.61 In Edelman and Burns’ view, an aggregation based on any one event or cause 
would be such a case.111 In the context of aggregate extension clauses, contracts 
providing for an aggregation of causally related claims are, under this view, considered 
to have been taken out on an aggregate basis. Hobhouse LJ stated, obiter, that it was 
undisputed among the parties in the case before the court that an aggregate extension 
clause was applicable to overcome the problems of an aggregation gap,112 in that the 
aggregation mechanism provided for in the underlying contract was carried through 
into the reinsurance policy.113 
7.62 This appears remarkable for two reasons. First, the notion of ‘aggregate 
basis’ generally refers to an aggregation mechanism that is not based on the unifying 
factors of ‘event’ or ‘cause’.114 Thus, it seems odd to apply the aggregate extension 
clause despite the fact that the underlying contracts have not, strictly speaking, been 
taken out on an aggregate basis. Secondly, if the aggregation mechanism imported 
from the underlying contract governs the aggregation of individual losses in the 
reinsurance contract, this means that the imported aggregation mechanism prevails 
over the aggregation mechanism expressly stated in the reinsurance agreement. It is 
doubtful that this can be said to be in line with the parties’ intention. In general, 
where a clause expressly contradicts an express provision in the reinsurance contract, 
it cannot be incorporated into the reinsurance contract.115 
7.63 In summary, the statement in Denby v English and Scottish Maritime 
Insurance Co Ltd that an aggregate extension clause was capable of overcoming the 
adverse effects of an aggregation gap must be taken to be obiter dictum.116 It appears 
doubtful that a typical aggregate extension clause will be applied where the contract 
provides for an event- or cause-based aggregation mechanism. Furthermore, it seems 
questionable whether the aggregation mechanism incorporated from the underlying 
contract into the contract of reinsurance will prevail over the aggregation mechanism 
expressly provided for in the reinsurance contract. In this regard, O’Neill and 
Woloniecki opine that using an aggregate extension clause to overcome an ag-
gregation gap was ‘surely something of a verbal sledgehammer being used to crack a 
110 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 885 (Hobhouse LJ).  
111 Edelman and Burns (n 7) para 4.79.  
112 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 884 f (Hobhouse LJ).  
113 Cf Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe 
Ltd v Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 880 (Hobhouse LJ).  
114 Tompkinson (n 105) 84. See also Gerathewohl (n 94) 325; Pohl and Iranya (n 105) 36.  
115 Edelman and Burns (n 7) para 3.44. There is no indication that this is different where a reinsurance 
contract contains an aggregate extension clause.  
116 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 882, 884 f (Hobhouse LJ). 
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semantic nut’.117 Consequently, there remains substantial legal uncertainty as to 
whether the parties can avoid the adverse effects of an aggregation gap by providing 
for an aggregate extension clause of the type discussed above.118 
7.64 If they want to avoid such effects, they are well advised to expressly state in 
their reinsurance agreement that the aggregation mechanism in the reinsurance 
contract is intended to produce the same effect as the one in the underlying contract, 
irrespective of the law applicable to the reinsurance contract. Such a clause might be 
termed ‘follow the aggregation clause’. When including such language into the re-
insurance contract, the parties will incorporate the aggregation mechanism contained 
in the underlying contract into the contract of reinsurance. Consequently, they 
should avoid providing for an aggregation mechanism in the reinsurance agreement 
that deviates from the one to be incorporated into it. Further, the parties are well 
advised to set the reinsurance agreement’s deductible and cover limit by having re-
gard to the aggregation mechanism to be imported.119 
c Aggregate extension clauses in treaty reinsurance 
7.65 In treaty reinsurance, multiple underlying insurance policies may be re-
insured under one contract.120 Generally, under a reinsurance treaty the reinsured 
takes out reinsurance for a whole book of business,121 for example for all motor 
insurance policies underwritten by the reinsured during a specified period of time. 
Consequently, the risks of multiple different original insureds may be covered in a 
reinsurance treaty. 
7.66 The fourth paragraph of the aggregate extension clause transcribed and 
addressed in Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd122 and also 
discussed in Barlow, Lyde & Gilbert LLP123 deals with the situation where one event 
or originating cause affects more than one underlying policy: 
Furthermore, in circumstances in which one event or occurrence or series of events or occurrences, 
originating from one cause, affects more than one policy or contract issued to different assured[s] or 
reinsureds, then in such circumstances a series of polices or contracts so issued shall be deemed to 
constitute one aggregate risk for the purposes of this agreement, provided that each original policy or 
contract has incepted during the period of this agreement (…).124  
117 O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 4) para 7–018.  
118 For the wording of the clause, see para 7.52.  
119 See also para 7.50.  
120 For more details, see paras 1.11 ff.  
121 Gerathewohl (n 94) 2; Andreas Schwepcke and Alexandra Vetter, Praxishandbuch: Rückversicherung 
(VVW 2017) para 641.  
122 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 889 f, where the aggregate extension clause is 
transcribed and addressed.  
123 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 7) para 28.65.  
124 Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 57) 889 f, where the different paragraphs of the 
aggregate extension clause are transcribed. 
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7.67 This paragraph appears to have the effect that individual losses sustained by 
different original insureds are to be aggregated if they all arose from one unifying 
event or cause.125 It suggests that where a reinsurance treaty does not contain this or 
a similar paragraph, losses sustained under different underlying policies cannot be 
aggregated even if they arose out of the same event or cause. 
7.68 It is uncontroversial that aggregate extension clauses were developed in order 
to extend aggregation mechanisms in third-party liability insurance contracts to the 
respective contracts of reinsurance.126 In such cases, it appears less likely that losses 
covered under different underlying policies will be aggregated under the reinsurance 
treaty.127 However, aggregation gaps may arise where first-party insurance policies 
are reinsured under a reinsurance treaty. In catastrophe excess of loss reinsurance 
treaties, in particular, the risks of multiple different original insureds are reinsured 
under one contract. In such cases, it appears self-evident that the losses suffered by 
multiple different primary insureds may be aggregated under one treaty if they result 
from the same event or catastrophe.128 To this extent, Merkin affords the example of 
the Christchurch earthquakes. In his paper, he opines that a plurality of losses that 
was reinsured under an excess of loss catastrophe treaty may be aggregated where the 
losses arise out of the same event or cause.129 
7.69 Thus, it is submitted that individual losses incurred by different original 
insureds under different primary insurance policies may be aggregated under an 
excess of loss reinsurance treaty if they are connected by the unifying factor desig-
nated in the treaty. This is so, regardless of whether the excess of loss reinsurance 
treaty contains the fourth paragraph of the aggregate extension clause as mentioned 
above.130 
d American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd 
7.70 The fourth paragraph of the model aggregate extension clause131 was discussed 
in American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd.132 This case was about a D&O 
policy covering 14 directors and officers as well as a third-party liability policy cov-
ering the company’s auditors. INSCO was reinsuring the D&O insurers and, at the 
125 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 7) para 28.65.  
126 Cf Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 7) paras 28.56 ff; Denby v English and Scottish Maritime Insurance 
Co Ltd; Yasuda Fire and Marine Co of Europe Ltd v Lloyd’s Underwriting Syndicates no 209, 356 (n 
57) 879 f (Hobhouse LJ).  
127 This appears to be the case at least if an event-based aggregation mechanism is contained in the 
reinsurance treaty. This is because, as held in Caudle v Sharp (n 71), the liability triggering act or 
omission is to be considered the relevant event. Hence, losses resulting from different wrongful acts or 
omissions each covered under a different underlying policy are not to be aggregated. 
128 Jacques Bourthoumieux, ‘La notion d’événement dans les traités de réassurance en excédent de si-
nistres’ (1969) 40 Revue générale des assurances terrestres 457, 459; Rob Merkin, ‘The Christchurch 
Earthquakes Insurance and Reinsurance Issues’ (2012) 18 Canterbury Law Review 119, 144.  
129 Merkin, ‘The Christchurch Earthquakes Insurance and Reinsurance Issues’ (n 128) 144 ff.  
130 For the wording of the fourth paragraph of the aggregate extension clause, see para 7.66.  
131 For the wording of the fourth paragraph of the aggregate extension clause, see para 7.66.  
132 American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd [1996] 1 LRLR 407 (Comm). 
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same time, issued a direct policy to the company’s auditors. INSCO then retroceded or 
reinsured these two policies respectively with American Centennial Insurance Co 
under two excess of loss reinsurance contracts.133 
7.71 The Commercial Court mainly dealt with the interpretation of the notion of 
‘event’. It concluded that an event consisted of an act or omission that triggered the 
directors’, officers’ and auditors’ liabilities.134 As the fourth paragraph of the ag-
gregate extension clause contains the words ‘one event or occurrence (…) originating 
from one cause’, the court briefly discussed whether multiple events might have 
ensued from one originating cause on the basis of which multiple individual losses 
were to be aggregated.135 
7.72 The Commercial Court held that, in the arbitral award, there were ‘no 
findings (…) about the nature of the acts or omissions of [the] directors and officers 
which gave rise to the claims against them, and nothing to indicate that those acts or 
omissions’ resulted from one originating cause.136 Consequently, the court did not 
have a chance to decide whether the 14 individual losses were to be aggregated under 
the contract of reinsurance on the basis that they all originated in the same cause. 
7.73 It is, in fact, remarkable that the Commercial Court even considered an 
aggregation based on the fourth paragraph of the aggregate extension clause. The 
wording of this paragraph suggests that it only applies ‘in circumstances in which one 
event (…) affects more than one policy or contract issued to different insureds or 
reinsureds’.137 However, the question before the court was whether the 14 individual 
losses that occurred to 14 different directors who were insured under one single 
underlying policy were to be aggregated.138 
7.74 Thus, American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd was not a case where 
the operation of the fourth paragraph of the above discussed aggregate extension 
clause139 could be tested. The Commercial Court could not give any guidance on the 
effect that such a clause has in cases where multiple individual losses are covered 
under more than one underlying contract issued to different insureds or reinsureds. 
Further, there is no indication that the Commercial Court considered aggregating 
the losses caused by the 14 directors with the loss caused by the auditors across two 
excess of loss reinsurance contracts. Indeed, there is no reason to aggregate losses 
across multiple reinsurance contracts. 
4 Aggregation and the principle of back-to-back cover under the PRICL 
7.75 The PRICL follow the English position on this point. Under the PRICL 
‘[t]here is no presumption that aggregation clauses in reinsurance contracts are to be 
133 American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd (n 132) 408 (Moore-Bick J).  
134 American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd (n 132) 413 (Moore-Bick J).  
135 American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd (n 132) 413 f (Moore-Bick J).  
136 American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd (n 132) 414 (Moore-Bick J).  
137 American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd (n 132) 409 (Moore-Bick J; emphasis added).  
138 See American Centennial Insurance Co v INSCO Ltd (n 132) 409 (Moore-Bick J).  
139 For the wording of the fourth paragraph of the aggregate extension clause, see para 7.66. 
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interpreted in compliance with the primary insurance policies’ aggregation 
clauses’.140 Consequently, where the aggregation language in the underlying contract 
differs from the wording in the contract of reinsurance, each aggregation clause 
merits an autonomous construction under the PRICL.141 
III Summary of the chapter 
7.76 The underlying contract and the contract of reinsurance are back-to-back if 
the scope and the nature of the covers afforded by the two contracts are the same.142 
In fact, there is a presumption that a proportional reinsurance contract is to be 
construed back-to-back with its underlying contract. This presumption does not, 
however, extend to non-proportional reinsurance contracts. 
7.77 As the subject matter of the aggregation of losses is primarily relevant in 
excess of loss reinsurance, ie in non-proportional reinsurance, there is no presump-
tion that the aggregation clause set out in the reinsurance contract is to be construed 
in line with the aggregation clause contained in the underlying contract.143 
7.78 If the aggregation mechanisms in the two contracts are not co-extensive, an 
aggregation gap arises. Such a gap can have adverse effects on either party. 
Therefore, the parties may seek to avoid the emergence of an aggregation gap or to 
overcome the adverse effects of an existing aggregation gap. 
7.79 Lord Mustill suggested that an aggregation gap could be avoided by using 
the same aggregation language in the inward and the outward contracts. If the two 
contracts are governed by the same law, the parties may well avoid an aggregation 
gap by using the same language in both contracts. However, where the underlying 
contract and the contract of reinsurance are governed by different laws, it may be 
argued that the aggregation clauses under the inward and the outward contracts 
should be construed in accordance with the respective governing law. If this happens 
and the clauses are not construed identically under the two laws, an aggregation gap 
will arise. 
7.80 It is said that an aggregation gap may be overcome by means of an aggregate 
extension clause contained in the contract of reinsurance. This would entail the ag-
gregation mechanism contained in the underlying contract being extended to apply in 
the outward contract even if the outward contract expressly provides for a different 
aggregation mechanism. It appears questionable whether an aggregate extension 
clause in the reinsurance contract has the power to incorporate or integrate the un-
derlying contract’s aggregation mechanism into the reinsurance policy in cases where 
the reinsurance contract expressly provides for a different aggregation mechanism. 
Moreover, it appears to be uncertain whether an aggregate extension clause applies 
140 Comment 36 to Article 5.1 PRICL.  
141 Comment 36 to Article 5.1 PRICL.  
142 Groupama Navigation et Transports v Catatumbo CA Seguros (n 6); Wasa International Insurance Co 
Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co (n 6) [58], [60] (Lord Collins) where the House of Lords held that this 
was ‘the normal commercial intention’.  
143 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 1) 1033 f (Lord Mustill). 
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where the underlying contract is taken out on a per event or per cause basis rather than 
an aggregate basis. 
7.81 Therefore, if the parties wish to avoid the adverse effects of an aggregation gap, 
they are well advised to expressly provide in the reinsurance contract that the ag-
gregation mechanism in the reinsurance policy is intended to produce the same effects as 
the one in the underlying contract, irrespective of the law governing the reinsurance 
contract. Such a clause could be termed ‘follow the aggregation clause’. 
7.82 In line with the English position, it is not presumed under the PRICL that 
the aggregation mechanism in the reinsurance contract is the same as the one in the 
underlying contract.  




Aggregation and the principle of follow the settlements  
8.1 In this chapter, the relation between the principle of follow the settlements 
and the aggregation of losses will be discussed. As a starting point, the need for 
follow the settlements clauses will be set out. Thereafter, two different well-used 
follow the settlements clauses will be presented and examined. 
8.2 The next step will be to put the different follow the settlements clauses into 
context with the concept of the aggregation of losses. In so doing, the fact that 
aggregation clauses may be encountered in underlying contracts1 as well as in re-
insurance contracts2 will be considered. Before closing the chapter with a summary, 
the relation between the subject matter of aggregation and the concept of follow the 
settlements in more complicated settings will be presented. 
I The concept of follow the settlements 
1 Starting point 
8.3 As a general rule, in order to recover from its reinsurers, the reinsured ‘must 
prove the loss in the same manner as the original assured must have proved it against 
[it], and the reinsurers can raise all defences which were open to the [reinsured] 
against the original assured’.3 In Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc, 
Lord Mustill noted that: 
[t]here are only two rules, both obvious. First, that the reinsurer cannot be held liable unless 
the loss falls within the cover of the policy reinsured and within the cover created by the 
reinsurer. Second, that the parties are free to agree on ways of proving whether these 
requirements are satisfied.4  
8.4 However, the first rule, in particular, may prove to be very burdensome and 
to some extent inefficient.5 It can be very difficult for the reinsured to prove its legal 
liability towards the original insured as well as the quantum of the original claim.6 
1 In this chapter, the reinsured contract is either termed ‘underlying contract’ or ‘inward contract’. 
2 Having regard to the fact that risks are sometimes covered by multiple levels of reinsurance and ret-
rocession agreements, the relevant contract of reinsurance is sometimes termed ‘outward contract’.  
3 Re London County Commercial Reinsurance Office Ltd [1922] 2 Ch 67 (Ch) 80 (Lawrence J); Wasa 
International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co [2009] UKHL 40, [2009] 4 All ER 909 [35] 
(Lord Mance). See also Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd [2009] EWHC 2787 (Comm), 
[2009] 2 CLC 706 [46] (Gross J).  
4 Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc [1996] 1 WLR 1239 (HL) 1251 (Lord Mustill).  
5 Cf Robert M Merkin, A Guide to Reinsurance Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2007) 237; Özlem 
Gürses, Reinsuring Clauses (Informa Law from Routledge 2010) para 6.04.  
6 Robert M Merkin, Laura Hodgson and Peter J Tyldesley, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (12th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2019) para 18–070. 
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In treaty reinsurance, this can ‘be virtually impossible’.7 Furthermore, due to the 
first rule, the costly investigations of certain issues may have to be conducted twice, 
ie under the underlying policy and under the reinsurance policy.8 
8.5 Yet, as Lord Mustill remarked, the reinsurer has an interest in ensuring ‘that 
the integrity of [its] bargain is not eroded’.9 In fact, it is in the reinsurer’s interest 
that the reinsured only indemnifies the original insured for losses that are covered 
by the original policy and that it pays only the amount contracted for under the 
policy.10 In certain cases, however, the reinsured has no incentive to bear the costs 
of examining or contesting a loss because, for example, the loss will go to an excess 
layer anyway.11 Consequently, there may be good reasons for why the reinsurer 
does not want to be obliged to reimburse the reinsured simply on the basis that the 
latter has accepted liability to pay towards the original insured.12 
8.6 ‘These tensions have [existed] for a century’.13 The reinsurance market 
has tried to ease them by following the second rule stated by Lord Mustill.14 It has 
formulated clauses defining the way in which a reinsured must prove that a loss is 
covered by both the underlying cover and the reinsurance contract.15 This is precisely 
the aim behind so-called ‘follow the settlements’ clauses. 
2 Follow the settlements in treaty reinsurance 
8.7 The question of whether a reinsured that has paid losses pursuant to a set-
tlement under an inward contract may recover from its reinsurer under the outward 
contract is pertinent to treaty reinsurance, just as it is to facultative reinsurance.16 
However, it seems to be controversial whether the concept of follow the settlements 
is used in treaty reinsurance. 
8.8 O’Neil and Woloniecki opine that ‘“follow the settlements” is a concept that 
comes into play in facultative reinsurance’ only.17 By contrast, they argue in relation 
to treaty reinsurance that this question was answered by reference to the ‘scope of 
coverage and [in the performance of which] obligations the reinsured ha[d] to exercise 
7 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP, Reinsurance Practice and the Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2009) 
para 29.2.  
8 Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4) 1251 (Lord Mustill); Merkin (n 5) 237; Gürses 
(n 5) para 6.02.  
9 Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4) 1251 (Lord Mustill).  
10 Terry O’Neill, Jan Woloniecki and Franziska Arnold-Dwyer, The Law of Reinsurance in England and 
Bermuda (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 2019) para 5–001.  
11 O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 10) para 5–001. For further examples, see Hill v Mercantile 
and General Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4) 1252 (Lord Mustill).  
12 Merkin (n 5) 237; O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 10) para 5–001.  
13 Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4) 1252 (Lord Mustill).  
14 Assicurazioni Generali SpA v CGU International Insurance Plc [2003] EWHC 1073 (Comm), [2003] 2 
All ER 425 [29]–[30] (Gavin Kealey QC); Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 7) para 29.3; Gürses (n 5) 
para 6.38.  
15 Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4) 1251 (Lord Mustill).  
16 O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 10) para 5–004.  
17 O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 10) para 5–004. 
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care and skill in [its] management of the portfolio risks that [were] being reinsured’.18 
Gürses points out that in Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc, Lord 
Mustill had said that ‘a follow the settlements clause operate[d] in facultative re-
insurance contracts’.19 
8.9 Barlow, Lyde & Gilbert disagree. They acknowledge that the ‘formula “follow 
the settlements” is largely confined to facultative reinsurances’. However, they see no 
reason ‘why the Court of Appeal’s decision [in The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor] on 
the effect of a follow the settlements clause should not be applied in a case con-
cerning a treaty rather than a facultative contract’.20 
8.10 The Commercial Court dealt with an excess of loss reinsurance treaty in 
Hiscox v Outhwaite (No 3). The treaty provided that it was ‘being understood that 
all loss settlements made by the Reassured whether by way of compromise, ex gratia 
or otherwise [should] in every respect be unconditionally binding upon the 
Reinsurers’.21 In this context, Evans J specifically stated that ‘[t]he leading English 
authority [was] the Court of Appeal’s judgment in The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor 
(UK) Reinsurance Ltd’.22 
8.11 In Baker v Black Sea and Baltic General Insurance Co Ltd, the Commercial 
Court was likewise concerned with a reinsurance treaty which provided that ‘[b]eing 
a reinsurance subject to all terms, clauses and conditions as the original and to follow 
the settlements and agreements of [the reinsured] in all respects’.23 Potter J essentially 
found that the principles developed in The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) 
Reinsurance Co Ltd were applicable where a reinsurance treaty contained a follow 
the settlements clause.24 
8.12 In IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd, the Commercial Court 
dealt with an excess of loss reinsurance treaty. The treaty contained a double proviso 
follow the settlements clause of the type described in Hill v Mercantile and General 
Reinsurance Co Plc.25 Burton J held that in the case of a double proviso follow the 
settlements clause, the reinsured was required to prove on a balance of probabilities 
that the losses fell within the inward and the outward covers as a matter of law.26 
18 O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 10) para 5–004.  
19 Gürses (n 5) para 6.39. This does not, however, mean that follow the settlements clauses cannot be 
found in treaty reinsurance. In fact, Lord Mustill mentioned facultative reinsurance just as an example, 
see Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4) 1251 f.  
20 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 7) para 29.36.  
21 Hiscox v Outhwaite (No 3) [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 524 (Comm).  
22 Hiscox v Outhwaite (No 3) (n 21) (partly italicised by the author).  
23 Baker v Black Sea and Baltic General Insurance Co Ltd [1995] LRLR 261 (Comm) 266 (Potter J). The 
case subsequently went to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. Neither of the courts discussed 
Potter J’s comments on the follow the settlements clause.  
24 Baker v Black Sea and Baltic General Insurance Co Ltd (n 23) 283 ff (Potter J).  
25 IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd [2010] EWHC 974 (Comm), [2010] Lloyd’s Rep IR 
560 [9] (Burton J). For the double proviso follow the settlements clause, see Hill v Mercantile and 
General Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4) 1242 (Lord Mustill).  
26 IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 25) [41] (Burton J). 
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However, where treaty reinsurance is concerned in particular, it is often impossible for a 
reinsured to prove the validity of every individual claim comprised in a settlement.27 
8.13 Consequently, it is to be assumed that the concept of follow the settlements is 
used in treaty reinsurance and that it is subject to the same rules that apply under a 
facultative reinsurance contract. Yet, if multiple primary insurance policies are re-
insured under one reinsurance treaty, it appears even more difficult to determine legal 
liability for each and every loss on an individual basis.28 This may, in fact, imply a 
complication with regard to the subject matter of aggregation.29 
3 Construction of follow the settlements clauses in English law 
8.14 In reinsurance contracts, a variety of different loss settlement clauses may be 
encountered.30 Each different loss settlement clause merits its own construction. Lord 
Mustill argued that he could not see how the decision in The Insurance Co of Africa v 
Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd31 could have any decisive bearing on the issues before 
him in Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc as the loss settlement clauses 
were not identical in the two cases.32 
8.15 In the following section, two different well-used follow the settlements clauses 
will be discussed. 
3.1 Follow the settlements clause as in ICA v Scor 
8.16 In The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd, the Court of 
Appeal dealt with the construction of the so-called ‘full reinsurance clause’, which 
read: ‘Being a Reinsurance of and warranted same…terms and conditions as and to 
follow the settlements of the [reinsured]’.33 
8.17 With this clause, the parties tried to ease the tension between the reinsured’s 
need to efficiently and commercially settle inward claims and the reinsurer’s need to 
‘ensure that the integrity of the reinsurer’s bargain’ is not eroded by [a settlement] 
over which [it] has had no control’.34 
8.18 In the Court of Appeal’s judgment, Goff LJ held that 
[i]n [his] judgment, the effect of a clause binding reinsurers to follow settlements of the insurers, 
[was] that the reinsurers agree[d] to indemnify insurers in the event that they settle[d] a claim 
by their assured, i.e. when they dispose[d], or [bound] themselves to dispose, of a claim, whether 
by reason of admission or compromise, provided that the claim so recognised by them [fell] 
27 Cf IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 25) [30] (Burton J); Merkin, Hodgson and 
Tyldesley (n 6) para 18–078. See also Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [62]–[72] 
(Gross J). For more details on this, see para 8.4.  
28 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 7) para 29.2; Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 6) para 18–078.  
29 See paras 8.29 ff.  
30 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 7) para 29.3.  
31 The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 312 (CA).  
32 Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4) 1252 (Lord Mustill).  
33 The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 31).  
34 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 7) para 29.5. For the quote, see Hill v Mercantile and General 
Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4) 1251 (Lord Mustill). 
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within the risks covered by the policy of reinsurance as a matter of law, and provided also that in 
settling the claim the insurers [had] acted honestly and ha[d] taken all proper and businesslike 
steps in making the settlement.35  
8.19 Hence, Goff LJ argued that, by the use of their follow the settlements clause, 
the parties to the reinsurance contract had agreed upon a way to ease the re-
insured’s duty to prove that a loss fell within the cover of both the underlying 
policy and the reinsurance contract. Under the relevant follow the settlements 
clause, Goff LJ noted, the reinsured’s proof was built on two provisos, outlined 
below.36 
8.20 First, even under the follow the settlements clause, the reinsured is re-
quired to prove that the claim as recognised and settled by the reinsured under 
the inward contract falls within the reinsurance cover as a matter of law.37 It is 
important to note that the reinsured is not required to prove that the original loss 
falls within the outward contract, but only that the underlying loss as recognised 
by the reinsured falls within the outward cover as a matter of law.38 
8.21 Secondly, applying the follow the settlement clause, the reinsured is re-
lieved from proving that the actual loss is covered under the inward contract. 
Rather, the reinsured merely has to show that it has ‘acted honestly and (…) 
taken all proper and businesslike steps in making a settlement’ regarding the 
inward claims.39 According to Merkin, there are two aspects to an honest and 
businesslike settlement:40  
• the reinsured must reasonably interpret the underlying insurance contract 
and determine the chances that the original insured’s claim is within the 
underlying policy and that there are no defences available to it, and  
• the reinsured must investigate the facts in order to determine whether the 
inward claim is justified. If necessary, the reinsured is required to obtain 
expert advice on the matter. 
8.22 As a consequence, the reinsurer is bound by the reinsured’s honest and 
businesslike settlement even if it is later able to prove that there was in fact no cover 
under the inward contract.41 Therefore, the reinsurer may not re-litigate the question 
of whether or not the reinsured was in fact liable under the underlying insurance 
contract.42 The reinsurer is released from its obligation to follow the reinsured’s 
35 The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 31).  
36 Cf Gürses (n 5) paras 6.38 ff.  
37 The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 31); Gürses (n 5) para 6.38.  
38 The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 31); Assicurazioni Generali SpA v CGU 
International Insurance Plc [2004] EWCA Civ 429, [2005] Lloyd’s Rep IR 457 [8] (Tuckey LJ); Gürses 
(n 5) para 6.38.  
39 The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 31).  
40 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 6) para 18–071.  
41 The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 31); Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 7) 
para 29.16.  
42 Assicurazioni Generali SpA v CGU International Insurance Plc (n 38) [18] (Tuckey LJ); O’Neill, 
Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 10) para 5–019. 
THE CONCEPT OF FOLLOW THE SETTLEMENTS 
185 
settlement only if it43 can demonstrate that the reinsured acted in bad faith or in an 
unbusinesslike manner and that but for this conduct there would have been a dif-
ferent outcome.44 
8.23 In summary, where a contract of reinsurance, which is subject to English 
law, contains a follow the settlements clause of the type discussed in The 
Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd,45 the reinsured may 
recover from the reinsurer where it has recognised an inward claim, has deemed it 
capable of cover under the inward policy, has compromised it properly and then 
has proved that the claim so recognised falls within the outward cover. 
3.2 Follow the settlements clause as in Hill v Mercantile 
8.24 In Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc, the House of Lords dealt 
with the construction of a so-called ‘double proviso follow the settlements clause’,46 
which read: 
All loss settlements by the reassured including compromise settlements and the establishment 
of funds for the settlements of losses shall be binding upon the reinsurers, providing such 
settlements are within the terms and conditions of the original policies and/or contracts … and 
within the terms and conditions of this reinsurance.47  
8.25 Lord Mustill divided this clause into two provisos, the first being that ‘such 
settlements are within the terms and conditions of the original policies and/or con-
tracts’, the second being that the settlements are also ‘within the terms and conditions 
of [the] reinsurance’.48 Pursuant to this follow the settlements clause, the reinsured is 
under the burden to prove that it satisfies both provisos to a standard of a balance of 
probabilities.49 
8.26 By contrast to the follow the settlements clause in The Insurance Co of Africa v 
Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd, the follow the settlements clause used in Hill v 
Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc requires stricter proof. Under Lord Mustill’s 
first proviso, it does not suffice that the reinsured proves that it had acted honestly and 
had taken all proper and businesslike steps in making the settlement under the inward 
contract. Rather, the reinsured is required to prove that the settlement is within the cover 
of the underlying contract as a matter of law.50 
43 In fact, the burden is on the reinsurer to prove that the reinsured did not act in good faith and in a 
businesslike fashion when settling the underlying claim, see Charman v Guardian Royal Exchange 
Assurance Plc [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 607 (Comm) 613 (Webster J).  
44 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 6) para 18–072. See also Colin Edelman and Andrew Burns, The 
Law of Reinsurance (2nd edn, OUP 2013) para 4.20.  
45 The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 31).  
46 Edelman and Burns (n 44) para 4.15.  
47 Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4) 1242 (Lord Mustill).  
48 Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4) 1247 (Lord Mustill).  
49 Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [65] (Gross J).  
50 Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [66] (Gross J). Gürses (n 5) para 8.34. See, 
however, IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 25) [13], where Burton J stated that 
‘[g]uidance in respect of satisfaction of the first proviso can and should be drawn from the “single 
proviso” cases, particularly where (…) the settlements by the insurer were pursuant to a compromise 
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8.27 Two further aspects of the judgment in Hill v Mercantile and General 
Reinsurance Co Plc are to be noted. First, the follow the settlements clause was 
held to have ‘draw[n] a distinction between the facts which generate claims under 
[the inward and outward] contract(…) [respectively], and the legal extent of the 
respective covers’.51 Lord Mustill noted that the purpose of this distinction was 
‘to ensure that the reinsurer’s original assessment and rating of the risks assumed 
are not falsified by a settlement which, even if soundly based on the fact, transfers 
into the inward or outward policies, or both, risks which properly lie outside 
them’.52 
8.28 Secondly, Lord Mustill emphasised that the follow the settlements clause 
in the outward contract53 dealt with settlements under the inward contract and 
not any other contract.54 Consequently, if the follow the settlements clause is 
contained in a retrocession agreement, the relevant settlement is the one under-
taken in the reinsured reinsurance contract and not a settlement in the primary 
insurance policy.55 
II Aggregation and the concept of follow the settlements 
8.29 Both follow the settlements clauses, ie the one dealt with in The Insurance Co 
of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd56 and the one interpreted in Hill v 
Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc, embrace Lord Mustill’s first rule that a 
reinsurer cannot be held liable unless the reinsured can prove that the loss falls within 
the cover of the policy reinsured and within the cover created by the reinsurance.57 
Yet, the clauses differ in the proof required of the reinsured.58 
8.30 Aggregation clauses characterise the quantitative scope of the insurance 
and reinsurance cover.59 Under both types of follow the settlements clauses, the 
questions of whether a loss is within the quantitative scope of the underlying 
agreement’. Burton J then quoted Hiscox v Outhwaite (No 3) (n 21). ‘Evans J concluded that “the 
reinsurer may well be bound to follow the insurer’s settlement of the claim which arguably, as a matter 
of law, is within the scope of the original insurance, regardless of whether the court might hold, if the 
issue were fully argued before it, that as a matter of law the claim would fail.” The common ground 
between the parties (…) was that assistance could be drawn in this case (notwithstanding that it is a 
“double proviso” case) from the first instance and Court of Appeal decisions in Assicurazioni Generali 
SpA v CGU International Insurance Plc’.  
51 Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4) 1252 f (Lord Mustill).  
52 Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4) 1253 f (Lord Mustill).  
53 He thereby refers to the retrocession agreement.  
54 Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4) 1246 f, 1253 f (Lord Mustill). See also Equitas 
Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [67] (Gross J).  
55 Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4) 1246 f, 1253 f (Lord Mustill); Equitas Ltd v R 
and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [67] (Gross J).  
56 The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 31).  
57 Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4) 1251 (Lord Mustill).  
58 See para 8.26.  
59 Cf Klaus Gerathewohl, Rückversicherung, Grundlagen und Praxis, vol 1 (Verlag 
Versicherungswirtschaft eV 1976) 187; Andreas Schwepcke and Alexandra Vetter, Praxishandbuch: 
Rückversicherung (VVW 2017) para 858; Peter Liebwein, Klassische und moderne Formen der 
Rückversicherung (3rd edn, VVW 2018) 184, 191. 
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cover and within the cover of the reinsurance may depend on aggregation 
clauses. 
8.31 Furthermore, it is to be noted that the concept of the aggregation of 
losses refers to the losses that are incurred by the primary insured and not to 
losses sustained by any insurance or reinsurance company due to their duty to 
pay insurance money,60 whereas the concept of follow the settlements only deals 
with settlements under the inward contract and not necessarily a settlement 
between the primary insured and the primary insurer.61 Bearing this in mind, 
different follow the settlements clauses may have different implications on the 
aggregation of losses. These implications will be discussed in the next section. 
1 Follow the settlements clause as in ICA v Scor 
8.32 Under a follow the settlements clause of the type discussed in The 
Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd, the reinsured is required 
to prove that it had acted honestly and had taken all proper and businesslike steps 
in making a settlement under the inward contract (second proviso).62 
Furthermore, the reinsured has to prove that its settlement as recognised under 
the inward contract falls within the risks covered by the outward contract as a 
matter of law (first proviso).63 
1.1 Settlement in good faith and a businesslike manner (second proviso) 
8.33 A contract of reinsurance is triggered where a loss falls both within the in-
ward and the outward cover.64 An analysis of the relation between the second 
proviso of the follow the settlements clause as discussed in The Insurance Co 
of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd and aggregation clauses must be under-
taken against this background. 
a Aggregation under the inward contract is relevant for determining whether 
the inward contract is triggered 
8.34 As has been mentioned, a reinsurer is required to indemnify its reinsured only 
where a loss is covered under the inward contract.65 Under the second proviso of the 
follow the settlements clause as discussed in The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) 
Reinsurance Co Ltd, the reinsured must, therefore, act in good faith and in a 
60 For more detail, see paras 2.19 ff.  
61 Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4) 1246 f, 1253 f (Lord Mustill); Equitas Ltd v R 
and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [67] (Gross J). See, however, Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd 
v Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd [2014] EWHC 2105 (Comm), [2014] Lloyd’s Rep IR 638 [23]–[32], 
where in respect of a retrocession agreement, Field J discussed whether a settlement between the 
primary insured and the primary insurer had been made in good faith and in a businesslike fashion.  
62 The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 31).  
63 The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 31).  
64 Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4) 1251 (Lord Mustill); Edelman and Burns (n 44) 
para 4.01.  
65 Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4) 1251 (Lord Mustill); Edelman and Burns (n 44) 
para 4.01. 
AGGREGATION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF FOLLOW THE SETTLEMENTS 
188 
businesslike fashion in determining whether a loss falls within the cover of the inward 
contract.66 
8.35 This comprises two aspects. First, the reinsured is obliged to determine the 
inward contract’s scope of cover by interpreting the policy.67 This, for example, 
entails determining the inward contract’s quantitative scope of cover as well as the 
operation of an aggregation mechanism which may be contained in the inward 
contract. 
8.36 Secondly, the reinsured is required to ascertain the facts of the case and 
determine whether the inward policy has been triggered and the amount claimed is 
justified in a specific case.68 The aggregation mechanism contained in the inward 
contract is to be applied to the facts at hand. The resulting (aggregated) loss is then 
to be tested against the inward contract’s deductible and its cover limit. Under the 
inward contract, a loss is only covered if the (aggregated) loss exceeds its deductible. 
8.37 Where the reinsurer can prove that the reinsured has acted in bad faith or in 
an unbusinesslike manner in determining whether the inward claims were within the 
inward contract’s quantitative scope of cover, the latter loses its prerogatives flowing 
from the follow the settlements clause.69 
b Reinsurer bound to follow the reinsured’s good faith identification of 
individual losses 
8.38 As mentioned previously, the concept of aggregation of losses refers to the 
losses that are incurred by the primary insured and not to losses sustained by any 
insurance or reinsurance company due to its duty to pay insurance or reinsurance 
money.70 Consequently, the aggregation mechanisms of both the inward and the 
outward contracts are based on the primary insured’s original losses. Hence, the 
identification of these individual losses is of crucial importance. 
8.39 This begs the question of whether, under the second proviso of the follow the 
settlements clause as discussed in The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) 
Reinsurance Co Ltd, the reinsurer is bound by the identification of the individual 
losses as recognised in the settlement of the inward contract. There appears to be no 
case law dealing with this question. Yet, the nature and the quantum of the in-
dividual losses sustained by the primary insured are factual matters and it is likely 
that a reinsurer will not be allowed to second-guess a settlement of relating issues 
under the inward contract. 
66 Cf Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [29], where Gross J stated that ‘the question 
arises whether but for the erroneous aggregation (…), the underlying layers would have been properly 
exhausted’. It may be noted, however, that the court was not faced with a follow the settlements clause 
of the type discussed in The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 31). The issue 
exists irrespective of the type of the follow the settlements clause.  
67 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 6) para 18–071.  
68 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 6) para 18–071.  
69 Cf Charman v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Plc (n 43) 613 (Webster J); Edelman and Burns (n 
44) para 4.20.  
70 For more detail, see paras 2.19 ff. 
AGGREGATION AND THE CONCEPT OF FOLLOW THE SETTLEMENTS 
189 
8.40 Therefore, it is likely that, under a follow the settlements clause of the type as 
discussed in The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd, the reinsured 
must act in good faith and take all businesslike steps in identifying the individual losses 
incurred by the primary insured and covered under the inward contract.71 In fact, the 
reinsured is required to act in good faith and in a businesslike manner in classifying an 
individual loss, in determining its quantum as well as in identifying where and when it 
occurred. The individual losses identified and recognised in good faith and in a busi-
nesslike manner under the inward contract will then form the basis for applying the 
outward contract’s aggregation mechanism (first proviso). 
8.41 In order to be able to examine whether the reinsured acted in good faith and 
in a businesslike fashion, the reinsurer has a right to be provided with information 
and documents evidencing how a claim was settled.72 The reinsurer may claim and 
prove that the reinsured acted in bad faith or in an unbusinesslike fashion in re-
cognising the individual losses covered under the inward contract. For instance, the 
reinsurer may prove that an individual loss recognised by the reinsured as a fire loss 
was an excluded flood loss rather than a fire loss and that the reinsured was aware of 
this. If the reinsurer succeeds in so proving, it will not be bound to follow the re-
insured’s settlement on this point.73 This is to say that the reinsured will lose its 
prerogatives flowing from the follow the settlements clause, so that it is required to 
prove the existence and the quantum of each individual loss under the inward 
contract as a matter of law.74 
8.42 Yet, where the reinsured has acted in good faith and taken all businesslike steps 
to identify the individual losses suffered by the primary insured and covered under the 
inward contract, the reinsurer has no right to second-guess whether the individual losses 
recognised by the reinsured in its settlement under the inward contract were truly within 
the cover of the inward contract as a matter of law.75 Rather, the reinsurer is obliged to 
accept that the recognised individual losses incurred by the primary insured fall within 
the cover of the inward contract. On this basis, the reinsured is then required to prove 
that the individual losses as recognised are within the cover of the reinsurance as a matter 
of law (first proviso).76 
8.43 For example, where a reinsured acting in good faith and in a businesslike 
manner recognises an individual loss as a fire loss in the amount of £10,000 that 
occurred in London on 1 January 2020, the reinsurer may not second-guess this 
71 Cf Assicurazioni Generali SpA v CGU International Insurance Plc (n 14) [36]–[40] (Gavin Kealey QC); 
Edelman and Burns (n 44) para 4.23. Both sources deal with the first proviso rather than the second.  
72 Charman v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Plc (n 43) 614 (Webster J); Edelman and Burns (n 44) 
para 4.20.  
73 Cf Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 6) para 18–071.  
74 Cf Edelman and Burns (n 44) para 4.12.  
75 This is precisely the prerogative provided to the reinsured under the follow the settlements clause of the 
type discussed in The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 31). Cf also 
Assicurazioni Generali SpA v CGU International Insurance Plc (n 38) [8], [18] (Tuckey LJ).  
76 Cf The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 31); Assicurazioni Generali SpA v 
CGU International Insurance Plc (n 38) [18] (Tuckey LJ). 
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settlement. Rather, the reinsurer must accept that the presented loss is a fire loss in 
the said amount that occurred in London on 1 January 2020. Under the first proviso 
of the follow the settlements clause, the aggregation clause in the outward contract 
will then be applied to this loss as recognised.77 
8.44 In summary, it is likely that a reinsurer will be bound to follow a reinsured’s 
good faith and businesslike identification of individual losses under the inward 
contract. The aggregation mechanism provided for in the outward contract will be 
applied to the individual losses as recognised under the inward contract. 
c Aggregation under the inward contract is no basis for aggregation under the 
outward contract 
8.45 As has been mentioned, it is the individual losses suffered by the primary 
insured that are the subject of aggregation under both the inward and the outward 
contracts.78 Therefore, the aggregation mechanism under the outward contract is not 
based on an aggregated loss that was added together in compliance with the ag-
gregation mechanism provided for in the inward contract. Rather, the aggregation 
mechanism under the outward contract is applied directly to the individual losses 
suffered by the primary insured.79 
8.46 Where the question of how a loss is calculated under the outward contract is 
concerned, the mode of operation of an aggregation mechanism under the inward 
contract, thus, appears wholly irrelevant. Therefore, the reinsured’s conduct in settling a 
point of aggregation under the inward contract should not have any bearing on the 
operation of an aggregation clause under the outward contract. 
8.47 This may be illustrated by Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field.80 In this 
case, the relation between a follow the settlements clause in an excess of loss 
treaty and the concept of aggregation was discussed. Three insurance under-
writers were held liable for the negligent underwriting of insurance policies. The 
underwriters were insured under errors and omissions professional indemnity 
insurance contracts. In Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd,81 where the same 
clause and the same facts were under scrutiny, it was held that the underwriters’ 
liability arose from three originating causes. In Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v 
Field, the reinsured settled claims under the inward contract on this basis and 
sought to recover from its reinsurers under the outward contract.82 
8.48 At first instance, Phillips J dealt with the question of whether, by reason of 
the follow the settlements clause in the outward contract, the reasoning of Cox v 
Bankside Members Agency Ltd, based as it was on the aggregation clause in the 
77 This is, of course, provided that the individual loss is within the outward contract’s geographical and 
temporal scopes of cover and is not otherwise excluded.  
78 See paras 2.19 ff.  
79 See paras 2.19 ff.  
80 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field [1995] CLC 1504 (CA).  
81 Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd [1995] CLC 671 (CA).  
82 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 80). 
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inward contract, applied to the aggregation clause contained in the outward con-
tract.83 The parties and Phillips J agreed that where the aggregation clause under the 
inward contract and the one in the outward contract were not back-to-back, the 
reinsured could not rely on the follow the settlements clause.84 In other words, a 
follow the settlements clause does not affect the relation between the mode of op-
eration of an aggregation mechanism under the inward contract and the operation of 
the aggregation mechanism under the outward contract where the aggregation 
clauses are not co-extensive. 
8.49 However, even in cases where the aggregation mechanisms under the inward 
and the outward contracts are back-to-back, the settlement of an issue of aggrega-
tion under the inward contract does not dictate the operation of an aggregation 
mechanism under the outward contract by reason of a follow the settlements clause. 
8.50 In Assicurazioni Generali SpA v CGU International Insurance Plc, it was held 
that ‘where the contracts are back to back any proper businesslike settlement by the 
[re]insured’ did not dictate that it was entitled to an indemnity from its reinsurer. 
Rather, where the claim as recognised by the reinsured did not fall within the risks 
covered by the reinsurance as a matter of law, it would follow that the reinsured was 
not required to follow the reinsured’s settlement.85 
8.51 Where aggregation clauses are concerned, the claims as recognised do not 
refer to the aggregated loss under the inward contract. They refer to the individual 
losses sustained by the primary insured.86 Accordingly, testing whether the claim 
recognised under the inward contract is within the cover of the outward contract 
means applying the aggregation clause contained in the outward contract to the 
individual losses suffered by the primary insured as recognised under the inward 
contract.87 
8.52 In summary, as the aggregation mechanism provided for in the outward 
contract is not based on the aggregation undertaken in the inward contract, the 
83 See Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (1996) 1 WLR 1026 (HL) 1032, where Lord Mustill presented 
the case’s procedural history.  
84 Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field [1995] CLC 1504 (Comm) 1505 ff (Phillips J; transcribed in the 
Court of Appeal’s decision). The case went on to the Court of Appeal which approved this conclusion. 
It further held that the aggregation mechanism in the inward contract and the one in the outward 
contract were back-to-back which was why the reinsurer was bound to follow the settlement of the 
aggregation point in the inward contract, Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 80). The House of 
Lords disagreed on the latter point, holding that the aggregation mechanisms in the inward and 
outward contract were not back-to-back and, thus, merited an autonomous interpretation, Axa 
Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field (n 83) 1034 ff (Lord Mustill).  
85 Assicurazioni Generali SpA v CGU International Insurance Plc (n 38) [9] (Tuckey LJ). See also Hiscox v 
Outhwaite (No 3) (n 21) 530 (Evans J).  
86 See paras 8.38 ff. See also paras 2.19 ff.  
87 See, however, IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 25) [46], where Burton J agreed 
with the arbitrators that ‘in any event (…) there was a finding of fact that “in the context of the excess 
of loss (…) reinsurance written by IRB the claim was settled by CX Re as a single loss”’. It seems that 
the Commercial Court thereby expressed that IRB was bound to follow CX Re’s settlement with 
regard to the number of losses as the aggregation clauses under the inward and the outward contract 
were back-to-back. 
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settlement of an aggregation issue under the inward contract does not affect the 
operation of an aggregation mechanism under the outward contract by reason of a 
follow the settlements clause. 
1.2 Within the terms of the outward contract as a matter of law (first proviso) 
8.53 Under the first proviso discussed in The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) 
Reinsurance Co Ltd, the reinsured is not required to prove that the original loss falls 
within the risks covered by the reinsurance agreement, ‘but rather that the [loss] so 
recognised by [the reinsured] falls within the risks covered by the policy of re-
insurance as a matter of law’.88 
8.54 This is to say that the reinsured does not have to prove that the original loss 
was in fact covered under the outward contract. It is solely required to show that the 
basis on which it settled the inward claim was one which fell within the terms of the 
reinsurance as a matter of law.89 
8.55 It has been submitted that the individual losses suffered by the primary 
insured and recognised by the reinsured under the inward contract are crucial for 
applying the aggregation mechanism under the outward contract.90 They are, 
consequently, ‘the basis on which [the reinsured] settle[s]’ an issue of aggregation 
under the inward contract.91 Under the first proviso, the individual losses as re-
cognised under the inward contract must, therefore, fall within the cover of the 
reinsurance as a matter of law. Where the individual losses as recognised by the 
reinsured in the settlement of the inward contract are generally92 within the cover 
of the outward contract, the latter’s aggregation mechanism will be applied to 
them. The product of this aggregation is then to be tested against the outward 
contract’s deductible and cover limit, by virtue of which it is determined whether 
the aggregated loss is within the outward contract’s quantitative scope of cover. 
2 Follow the settlements clause as in Hill v Mercantile 
8.56 Under a follow the settlements clause of the type interpreted in Hill v 
Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc, the reinsured is required to establish two 
things. First, it has to show that a settlement under the inward contract actually falls 
within the cover of the inward contract as a matter of law.93 Secondly, the reinsured 
88 The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 31) (emphasis added); Assicurazioni 
Generali SpA v CGU International Insurance Plc (n 38) [8] (Tuckey LJ).  
89 Assicurazioni Generali SpA v CGU International Insurance Plc (n 38) [18] (Tuckey LJ).  
90 See paras 8.38 ff, 8.45 ff. See also paras 2.19 ff.  
91 For the quote, see Assicurazioni Generali SpA v CGU International Insurance Plc (n 38) [18] (Tuckey 
LJ). By contrast, the mode of operation of the aggregation mechanism under the inward contract or its 
product of aggregation is irrelevant for testing whether a loss is within the quantitative scope of cover 
provided by the outward contract. 
92 This concerns the outward contract’s geographical and temporal scopes of cover and also its exclu-
sions.  
93 Expressly dealing with the follow the settlements clause discussed in Hill v Mercantile and General 
Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4), see Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [66] (Gross J). 
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also has to prove that the settlement falls within the cover of the outward contract as 
a matter of law.94 
8.57 In fact, the reinsured is required to separately determine the scopes of cover 
of the inward and the outward contracts. This includes determining the quantita-
tive scope of cover of each contract. In so doing, the reinsured is required to 
identify possible aggregation clauses in the inward and the outward contracts and 
to assess their modes of operation. Further, it must ascertain the facts of the case at 
hand and separately determine whether the inward contract and the outward 
contract have been triggered. As the concept of aggregation of losses deals with 
losses incurred by the primary insured,95 this latter task entails the determination 
of the individual losses sustained by the primary insured. 
8.58 In determining whether a loss is within the quantitative scope of cover of the 
inward contract, the reinsured has to determine the individual losses sustained by the 
primary insured and apply the aggregation mechanism contained in the inward 
contract to these losses. The aggregated loss must then be tested against the inward 
contract’s deductible and cover limit. 
8.59 The situation is similar in respect of determining whether a loss is within the 
outward contract’s quantitative scope of cover. The reinsured, first, has to determine 
each individual loss suffered by the primary insured that is covered under the inward 
contract. Secondly, it must be examined whether the individual losses suffered by the 
primary insured are generally within the cover of the outward contract.96 Thirdly, the 
aggregation mechanism provided for in the outward contract is to be applied to these 
individual losses. In order to determine whether the reinsured’s claim is within the 
outward contract’s quantitative scope of cover, the aggregated loss must then be tested 
against the outward contract’s deductible and cover limit. 
3 Aggregation and follow the settlements clauses in more complicated settings 
8.60 In particular, where there is a chain of direct insurance, reinsurance and retro-
cession agreements, it is more difficult to cope with the relation between aggregation 
clauses and follow the settlements clauses. Moreover, challenges may also arise where a 
global settlement has been reached under insurance or reinsurance contracts down the 
chain. In the following section, these situations shall be discussed. 
3.1 Multiple levels of reinsurance and retrocession 
8.61 With particular regard to multiple levels of reinsurance and retrocessions, it 
may prove difficult to determine whether the underlying layers have been properly 
exhausted.97 Where an aggregation mechanism is applied erroneously at an under-
lying layer, this layer may faultily be perceived to have been exhausted when it has in 
94 Expressly dealing with the follow the settlements clause as interpreted in Hill v Mercantile and General 
Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4), see Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [65] (Gross J).  
95 For more detail, see paras 2.19 ff.  
96 This is to say that it is to be examined whether the individual losses are within the outward contract’s 
geographical and temporal scopes of cover and are not otherwise excluded.  
97 Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [1] (Gross J). 
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fact not been. Where an underlying layer has not been exhausted, all the layers above 
that layer will not have been triggered. Hence, whether aggregation mechanisms have 
been applied correctly may be crucial at every level of the chain of contracts, as this 
may have an impact on whether any particular contact of reinsurance in the chain 
has been triggered. 
8.62 In Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd, the Commercial Court 
dealt with various retrocessional excess of loss contracts.98 The facts of the case were 
as follows: in August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and seized 15 aircraft and spares 
owned by Kuwait Airways Corp (KAC) at Kuwait International Airport. At this 
time, a British Airways (BA) aircraft was also at that airport,99 which was un-
planned. Subsequently, the KAC aircraft and spare parts were flown to Iraq, while 
the BA aircraft was left at Kuwait International Airport. In February 1991, the BA 
aircraft was eventually destroyed by allied forces during ‘operation “Desert 
Storm”’.100 
8.63 The KAC fleet, together with the BA aircraft, had been reinsured. In the 
London Market excess of loss spiral, these risks had been retroceded multiple 
times.101 Equitas was a retrocedent and R and Q was a retrocessionaire at a higher 
level within the spiral.102 The reinsurance contracts contained an aggregation clause 
of the following type: ‘“Loss” under this contract means loss, damage, liability or 
expense arising from any one event (…)’.103 
8.64 In the London Market excess of loss spiral, the KAC losses and the BA loss 
were all considered to have arisen from the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, ie from one 
single event. Consequently, the individual losses were presented and paid as one 
single loss under the applicable aggregation clauses.104 In fact, ‘the market operated 
on that basis in relation to inwards and outwards claims for a period of about five 
years’.105 
8.65 However, in Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd, the ag-
gregation of KAC losses with the BA loss was questioned. In this case, the Court of 
Appeal held that the BA loss had not resulted from the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi 
forces. Consequently, the KAC losses and the BA loss had not arisen from the same 
event and ought not to have been aggregated with the KAC losses.106 After the 
98 Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [1] (Gross J).  
99 ‘[F]or simplicity’, this was not explicitly dealt with in Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co 
Plc (n 4) 1241 (Lord Mustill).  
100 Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [9] (Lord Mustill).  
101 For more details regarding the London Market excess of loss spiral, see Deeny v Gooda Walker Ltd 
[1994] CLC 1224 (Comm) 1231 f (Phillips J).  
102 Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [1] (Gross J).  
103 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 688, [2003] 2 All ER 190 [6] 
(Rix LJ).  
104 Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [11] (Gross J).  
105 Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [11] (Gross J).  
106 Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 103) [83] (Rix LJ). 
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judgment in Scott v The Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd, it was clear that 
the individual losses had wrongly been aggregated under the reinsurance and 
retrocession agreements further down the spiral. Thus, the question arose as to 
whether Equitas as retrocedent further up the spiral was required to present to R 
and Q as retrocessionaire correctly aggregated losses upwards through the entire 
spiral.107 
8.66 As the retrocession agreement between Equitas and R and Q contained a 
follow the settlements provision of the type discussed in Hill v Mercantile and 
General Reinsurance Co Plc,108 Equitas was required to prove that the losses settled 
under the inward contract were covered by the inward contract and the outward 
contract as a matter of law.109 
8.67 As Equitas was required to prove that the losses fall within the cover of the 
inward policy as a matter of law, R and Q argued that Equitas ‘need[ed] to re-present 
correctly aggregated losses upwards through the spiral’,110 ie that the losses were 
covered under every underlying contract throughout the London Market excess of 
loss spiral.111 The root of this reasoning was arguably that a loss cannot possibly be 
covered by the inward contract if it was not covered by the chain of contracts in the 
spiral leading up to the inward contract.112 
8.68 Yet, the Commercial Court held that ‘[a]s a matter of logic it [did] not follow 
that because at some much lower level in the spiral a claim may have been paid out 
with the cover furnished at that level’, a retrocedent at a higher level cannot satisfy its 
burden to prove that a settlement was within the inward contract as a matter of 
law.113 Gross J argued that ‘regardless of the errors at the lower level/s of the spiral, 
nonetheless the attachment points at higher levels may be reached by properly re-
coverable losses’.114 
8.69 Gross J does not seem to have suggested that an individual loss that had been 
wrongly aggregated at a lower level of the spiral and would not have been covered by 
a reinsurance contract at that level could be regarded as covered under a reinsurance 
contract at a higher level of the spiral.115 Rather, he appears to have stated that those 
losses that were not affected by the wrongful aggregation and that are, hence, 
107 Cf Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [44] (Gross J).  
108 See Hill v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc (n 4) 1242 (Lord Mustill).  
109 Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [65]–[66] (Gross J).  
110 Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [44] (Gross J).  
111 Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [65] (Gross J).  
112 Cf Hiscox v Outhwaite (No 3) (n 21); Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 7) para 1.102; Merkin, Hodgson 
and Tyldesley (n 6) paras 18–062 f; O’Neill, Woloniecki and Arnold-Dwyer (n 10) para 8–002.  
113 Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [67] (Gross J).  
114 Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [67] (Gross J).  
115 This was, in fact, contrary to the principle that ‘if the reinsured is not legally liable to pay a claim, 
such a claim would not be binding and would not fall within the reinsurance agreement’. See Barlow 
Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 7) para 1.102. Cf also Hiscox v Outhwaite (No 3) (n 21). 
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properly recoverable, flowed through the spiral and may reach the attachment points 
at higher levels.116 
8.70 In a manner compatible with this understanding of Gross J’s reasoning, the 
follow the settlements clause of the type discussed in Hill v Mercantile and General 
Reinsurance Co Plc provided that Equitas was required to prove that its settlements of 
aggregation issues under the inward contracts were within the cover of the inward 
contracts upwards through the spiral as a matter of law. However, the clause did not 
set out the manner in which a loss should be proven on a properly aggregated basis.117 
More specifically, ‘Equitas [was] entitled to seek to discharge the legal burden resting 
upon it (…) by the use of the best evidence it [had] available; should such evidence 
prima facie suffice to discharge that legal burden, Equitas [did] not need to undertake a 
process of regression’.118 
8.71 In conclusion, it appears that the Commercial Court found that only in-
dividual losses that were covered under all of the insurance and reinsurance con-
tracts throughout the spiral could be covered under the inward contract. Therefore, 
the reinsured was required to prove that the losses were properly aggregated 
throughout the spiral and that each layer of the chain of contracts was properly 
exhausted. Under the standard or proof of a balance of probabilities, however, it 
was not necessary to strictly prove that the aggregation of losses was properly 
undertaken at each level of the spiral. Rather, applying an actuarial model was 
considered as sufficient to discharge the burden of proof resting upon Equitas.119 
3.2 Global settlements and treaty reinsurance 
8.72 Under an excess of loss reinsurance treaty, the reinsured cannot recover from 
its reinsurer unless the aggregated loss reaches an excess point specified in the treaty.120 
As IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd shows, it may be very difficult, 
in respect of treaty reinsurance in particular, to determine the individual losses suffered 
by the primary insureds.121 The Commercial Court, therefore, held that the reinsured 
was able to discharge its burden of proof by showing that a global settlement had been 
reached and that on the balance of probabilities ‘the arguable claims which were 
settled by the compromise agreement fell within the terms of the insurance agreement 
and that the claims so compromised fell within the terms of the reinsurance 
agreement’.122 
8.73 Yet, how can an aggregation clause in the outward contract be applied if the 
individual losses suffered by the primary insured are unknown? Where the individual 
116 Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [67] (Gross J).  
117 Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [69] (Gross J).  
118 Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [70] (Gross J).  
119 Equitas Ltd v R and Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd (n 3) [208] (Gross J).  
120 Cf Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 6) paras 18–076 ff.  
121 Merkin, Hodgson and Tyldesley (n 6) para 18–078.  
122 IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 25) [41] (Burton J). Also see Merkin, Hodgson 
and Tyldesley (n 6) para 18–078. 
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losses cannot be determined, the aggregation clause–just like the follow the settle-
ments clause–must be applied on the basis of an approximation of the individual 
losses. 
8.74 In IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd, the Commercial 
Court dealt with an appeal from an arbitral award in a case where the primary 
insured manufactured and produced products containing asbestos. By 1998, the 
manufacturer was faced with approximately 318,000 claims as a result of its op-
erations. The primary insurers who provided insurance cover to the manufacturer 
had taken out reinsurance cover. The reinsurers were, in turn, protected under ret-
rocession agreements. 
8.75 The claims under the outward contract were subject to an aggregation as per 
‘any one event’ clause.123 It was argued that the ‘single event [was] the determination 
of the company to engage in the insulation business and to install (…) insulation 
products (…)’ containing asbestos.124 The arbitral tribunal found that ‘the loss each 
year stemmed from a single [event], being [the manufacturer’s] liability arising from 
[its] installation activities’.125 The Commercial Court held that the arbitral tribunal 
was entitled to so conclude.126 
8.76 As mentioned previously, this case involved approximately 318,000 in-
dividual losses. Tracing back each individual loss and determining whether it ag-
gregated with other losses appears highly impracticable. It is perhaps for this reason 
that the Commercial Court stated that the arbitrators’ findings regarding the ag-
gregation of losses was compliant with the decision in Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v 
Field and met the unities test as cited in Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co 
SAK.127 
8.77 It is not entirely clear, however, how a company’s determination to engage 
in the insulation business and to install products containing asbestos or a com-
pany’s overall insulation activities could be considered a single event. In fact, in 
Caudle v Sharp, the Court of Appeal held in respect of third-party liability that the 
relevant event was the triggering of the primary insured’s liability.128 In IRB Brasil 
Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd, the primary insured’s liability was 
not triggered by its determination to engage in the insulation business or by its 
insulation activities as such, but rather by each instance of installing its con-
taminated products.129 It is, furthermore, unlikely that all the 318,000 losses oc-
curred in spatial and temporal proximity. Therefore, both the arbitrators’ and the 
123 IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 25) [26] (Burton J).  
124 IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 25) [26], Burton J quoting the arbitral award.  
125 The arbitral tribunal’s findings are quoted by Burton J in IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance 
Co Ltd (n 25) [46].  
126 IRB Brasil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Co Ltd (n 25) [46] (Burton J).  
127 For more information as to the unities test, see paras 4.14 ff.  
128 Caudle v Sharp [1995] CLC 642 (CA) 649 (Evans LJ).  
129 For decisions to that effect, cf Caudle v Sharp (n 128) 649 (Evans LJ); Seele Austria GmbH Co v Tokio 
Marine Europe Insurance Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 441, [2009] 1 All ER 171 [57] (Moore-Bick LJ). 
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Commercial Court’s decision were arguably influenced by the difficulty and im-
practicability of determining the 318,000 individual losses. 
8.78 Consequently, it may be concluded that it is difficult to determine the in-
dividual losses incurred by the primary insureds in cases of global settlements where 
a substantial number of losses are settled together. This translates into a challenge in 
applying an aggregation clause. 
III Summary of the chapter 
8.79 In reinsurance contracts, a variety of different follow the settlements clauses 
may be encountered.130 It is not sensible to lay down general principles with regard 
to the operation of follow the settlements clauses.131 Hence, the interaction between 
a follow the settlements clause and an aggregation clause depends on the specific 
language used by the parties. 
8.80 In this chapter, the two well-used follow the settlements clauses of the types 
discussed in The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd and in Hill v 
Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc were presented. Furthermore, the in-
teraction between such follow the settlements clauses and aggregation clauses was 
examined. 
8.81 It has been established that under the second proviso of a follow the 
settlements clause of the type discussed in The Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) 
Reinsurance Co Ltd, the reinsured must in good faith and in a businesslike 
manner determine the inward contract’s quantitative scope of cover. This in-
cludes studying the operation of an aggregation mechanism, if included. The 
reinsured is further under the duty to act in good faith and in a businesslike 
fashion when identifying the individual losses to be aggregated. The reinsurer is 
prevented from second-guessing such a good faith settlement. Under the second 
proviso of the follow the settlements clause, the reinsurer is bound by the re-
insured’s identification of the individual losses as far as they are within the out-
ward contract’s scope of cover. 
8.82 Under a follow the settlements clause of the type interpreted in Hill v 
Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Plc, the reinsured is required to prove 
that the loss is within the underlying contract’s quantitative scope of cover as 
well as within the quantitative scope of the reinsurance agreement. Under such a 
clause, the reinsurer is not bound by a good faith settlement of the claims under 
the inward contract. Rather, the reinsured must prove that the inward and the 
outward contracts have been triggered. This includes identifying the individual 
losses to be aggregated and applying the inward and the outward contracts’ 
aggregation mechanisms to them respectively. The reinsured is required to 
show that the loss aggregated in accordance with the inward contract is within 
the inward contract’s quantitative scope of cover. Similarly, it must demonstrate 
that the loss aggregated in compliance with the aggregation mechanism under 
130 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 7) para 1.101.  
131 Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (n 7) para 1.101. 
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the outward contract is within the outward contract’s quantitative scope of 
cover. 
8.83 Furthermore, in case of a chain of reinsurance and retrocession agreements 
or in case of global settlements where it is difficult to determine the individual losses 
sustained by the primary insured(s), the requirements of proof may be eased for the 
reinsured.  
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as means to determine individual losses 
2.39, 2.40, 2.41 
as unifying factor 3.26, 3.69–73 
aggregate excess of loss 1.48, 1.52–53 
aggregate extension clause 
aggregate basis 7.52, 7.55, 7.58, 7.59, 7.60, 
7.61, 7.62 
concept 7.52–56 
incorporation from underlying contract 
7.62 
as means to overcome an aggregation gap 
7.57–64 
reinsurance treaty 7.65–74 
aggregation clause 
elements 3.23 
impartial feature 3.2–4 
individual losses/individual claims 2.18–42, 
3.23 
linking phrases 3.111–129, 4.11, 4.137, 5.5, 
5.14 
no implication 3.5–10 
purpose and scope 3.16–22 
significance 2.2 
ultimate net loss 2.11–17, 2.31, 2.74, 2.75, 
2.88, 2.90, 3.23, 4.92 
unifying factor 3.23, 3.25–110, 4.5, 4.8, 
4.11, 4.17, 4.18, 4.88, 4.108, 4.136, 5.4, 5.8, 
5.12, 5.26, 5.28, 5.30 
aggregation gap 
aggregate extension clause 7.41, 7.51–74 
back-to-back formulation of aggregation 
clauses 7.44–50 
effects and exemplification 7.41–43 
allocation 
conflict with aggregation 6.22–53 
extension of protection clause 6.39, 6.40, 
6.41 
losses occurring during 6.12–17 
risks attaching during 6.18–21 
temporal scope of cover 6.5–7 
arising out of/arising from 3.112, 3.114–118 
attachment point, see also excess point 2.73, 
2.74, 8.68, 8.69 
attributable to 3.112, 3.119–121, 4.96, 5.5, 
5.14, 7.24, 7.27 
back-to-back cover 
aggregate extension clause 7.51–74 
aggregation gap 7.32–70 
and aggregation 7.21–75 
back-to-back formulation of the 
aggregation clauses 7.44–50 
concept 7.4–20 
no presumption in non-proportional 
reinsurance 7.18–20 
presumption in proportional 
reinsurance 7.5–17 
calamity 3.74–80, 4.6, 4.136 
catastrophe 3.74–80, 4.6, 4.88, 4.89, 4.90, 
4.92, 4.94, 4.95, 4.96, 4.97, 4.100, 4.101, 
4.103, 4.135, 4.136, 7.22, 7.68 
causation/causative link 
aggregation mechanisms 2.18, 3.11, 3.18, 
3.19, 3.20, 3.23, 3.26, 3.29, 3.37, 3.38–44, 
3.53–56, 3.59, 3.68, 3.70, 3.71, 3.72, 3.73, 
3.79, 3.82, 3.89, 3.92, 3.111, 3.112, 3.114, 
3.115, 3.116, 3.117, 3.118, 3.119, 3.120, 
3.122, 3.123, 3.124, 3.125, 3.128, 3.129, 4.1, 
4.4, 4.6, 4.8–13, 4.16, 4.18, 4.21, 4.23, 4.25, 
4.26, 4.27, 4.28, 4.29, 4.30, 4.57–64, 4.81, 
4.82, 4.84, 4.86, 4.101, 4.102, 4.126, 4.133, 
4.134, 4.137, 4.140, 4.143, 4.146, 4.147, 
4.150, 4.152, 4.154, 4.155, 4.156, 4.157, 5.1, 
5.3, 5.5, 5.8, 5.14, 5.15, 5.16, 5.17, 5.18, 
5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.26, 5.27, 5.28, 5.30, 7.58, 
7.61 
arising out of/arising from 3.20, 3.23, 3.63, 
3.111, 3.112, 3.114–118, 4.7, 4.8, 4.11, 4.15, 
4.18, 4.45, 4.90, 4.100, 4.111, 4.132, 4.137, 
5.5, 5.11, 6.26, 6.39, 7.25 
203 
cause-based aggregation 3.18, 3.45–56, 
3.81, 3.119, 4.106, 4.108, 5.1–31, 7.63 
concept in general 3.13–15 
consequent upon or attributable to 3.23, 
3.58, 3.96, 3.97, 3.11, 3.119–121, 4.106, 
4.109, 5.5, 5.14, 6.27 
event-based aggregation 3.20, 3.30, 3.39, 
3.40, 3.43, 4.1–158 
exercise of judgment 3.43, 3.107, 3.110, 4.1, 
4.13, 4.20, 4.28, 4.81–86, 4.119, 4.120, 
4.162, 4.162, 5.10, 5.30, 5.31 
hours clauses 4.88–110 
in connection with 3.111, 3.122–125 
lack of certainty of causal requirements 
3.1, 3.44, 3.56, 3.86, 4.2, 4.8–13, 4.64, 
5.6–10 
linking phrase 3.23, 3.24, 3.111–129, 4.1, 
4.4, 4.7, 4.8, 4.11, 4.137, 5.3, 5.5, 5.14 
PRICL 4.133, 4.134, 4.137, 4.140, 4.143, 
4.146, 4.147, 4.150, 4.151–158, 5.14, 5.15, 
5.16, 5.17, 5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.26, 5.27, 5.30 
shall result from 3.126–129 
unities test 4.1, 4.13, 4.14–71, 4.82, 7.46, 
8.76 
unifying factors 3.11, 3.23, 3.25–110, 3.114, 
3.115, 3.117, 3.119, 3.120, 3.124, 3.125, 4.1, 
4.4, 4.8, 4.11, 5.4, 5.5, 5.8, 5.9, 5.21, 5.26, 5.30 
unity of cause 4.27, 4.57–64 
cause, see also unifying factor ‘original/ 
originating cause’ 
distinction from event 3.47, 3.48, 3.52, 5.6, 
5.7, 5.8, 5.15, 5.20–26 
PRICL 5.11–31 
same thing as event 3.52, 5.7, 5.17 
cause-based aggregation 
English law 3.45–56, 5.2–10 
PRICL 5.11–31 
claim(s), see also ‘individual loss’ 
in aggregation clauses 2.47–54 
in general 2.43–46 
consequent upon or attributable to 3.111, 
3.119–121, 4.109, 5.5, 5.14 
cover limit 2.86–90, 2.91, 2.99, 2.100, 2.101, 
3.3, 5.29, 6.2, 6.3, 7.22, 7.32, 7.42, 7.43, 
7.50, 7.58, 7.64, 8.36, 8.55, 8.58, 8.59 
damage 2.34, 2.40, 2.41, 2.42, 2.56, 2.57, 2.58, 
2.61, 3.78, 3.88, 4.15, 4.24, 4.34, 4.61, 4.63, 
4.90, 4.107, 6.14, 6.26, 6.39, 6.40, 6.43, 8.63 
deductible, see also ‘retention’, ‘priority’  
2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.13, 2.15, 2.16, 2.65–85, 
2.100, 2.101, 3.3, 3.16, 6.2, 6.3, 7.22, 7.32, 
7.37, 7.39, 7.42, 7.43, 7.50, 7.64, 8.36, 8.55, 
8.58, 8.59  
destruction of property 2.28, 3.31, 4.32, 
4.50, 4.107 
direct consequence 4.132, 4.143, 4.147, 
4.151–158, 5.11 
disaster 1.45, 3.26, 3.31, 3.74–80, 4.6, 4.44, 
4.90, 4.135, 4.136, 5.6 
each and every loss 2.28, 2.30, 2.59, 3.23, 
3.74, 4.111, 4.112, 6.34, 7.25, 7.58, 
7.59, 8.13 
earthquake 2.91, 2.97, 3.31, 3.51, 3.77, 4.90, 
4.101, 4.142, 4.153, 7.68 
event 
distinction from cause 3.47, 3.48, 3.52, 5.6, 
5.7, 5.8, 5.15, 5.20–26 
dormant omission 3.34 
examples 3.31 
pure omission 3.34 
same thing as cause 3.52, 5.7, 5.17 
PRICL 4.138–150 
unifying factor 3.26, 3.27–44, 3.59, 3.79, 
3.114, 3.117, 4.5–7, 4.8–13, 4.18, 4.25, 4.26, 
4.27, 4.28, 4.29, 4.30, 4.32, 4.33, 4.37, 4.42, 
4.45, 4.45, 4.50, 4.54, 4.57, 4.58, 4.59, 4.60, 
4.61, 4.62, 4.64, 4.66, 4.70, 4.81, 4.82, 4.83, 
4.84, 4.85, 4.86, 4.89, 4.95, 4.105, 4.111, 
4.112, 4.113, 4.115, 4.117, 4.118, 4.132, 
4.133, 4.134, 4.135, 4.136, 4.138–150, 
4.151, 4.152, 4.153, 4.154, 4.155, 4.156, 
6.34, 6.36, 6.37, 6.38, 6.41, 6.47, 6.54, 7.25, 
7.27, 7.28, 7.30, 7.38, 7.39, 7.46, 7.62, 7.67, 
7.68, 7.71, 7.73, 8.63, 8.64, 8.65, 8.75, 8.77 
event-based aggregation 
English law 3.27–44, 3.114–118, 4.4–123 
PRICL 4.132–158 
excess of loss ratio 1.49–51 
excess point 2.65, 2.73, 8.72 
exercise of judgment 
cause-based aggregation 5.10, 5.30, 5.31 
event-based aggregation 3.43, 3.133, 4.1, 
4.13, 4.20, 4.28, 4.81–86 
PRICL 5.30, 5.31 
series clauses 3.107, 3.110, 3.133 
sole judge clause 4.119, 4.120 
unities test 4.20, 4.28, 4.82 
explosion 3.67, 4.27, 4.41 
facultative excess of loss contract 1.37–39, 
1.57, 2.73, 6.24 
facultative reinsurance 
follow the settlements 8.8, 8.9, 8.13 
non-proportional facultative 1.37–39 




failure of putting in place adequate system to 
protection 3.32, 3.49, 6.28 
faulty installation 3.31, 4.45, 4.50, 8.75 
fire 2.37, 2.91, 2.95, 2.96, 2.97, 3.8, 4.101, 
4.157, 8.41, 8.43 
follow the settlements 
double proviso 8.12, 8.24–28 
full reinsurance clause 8.16–23 
global settlements 8.72–78 
identification of individual losses  
8.38–44 
treaty reinsurance 8.7–13, 8.47, 8.72–78 
happening 2.62, 2.64, 4.6, 4.74, 4.90, 4.153, 
4.156, 4.157 
hijacking of an aircraft 2.27, 3.31, 4.27,  
4.32, 4.41, 4.42, 4.53, 4.61, 4.62, 4.67, 
4.70, 4.85 
hours clauses 
catastrophe 4.88, 4.89, 4.90, 4.92, 4.94, 
4.95, 4.96, 4.97, 4.100, 4.101, 4.103, 4.105 
causal link 4.101, 4.102 
named peril 4.93, 4.94 
problems 4.98–104 
purpose 4.88–91 
relation to cause-based aggregation 
mechanism 4.105–110 
unnamed peril 4.93 
hurricane 3.31, 3.78, 4.90, 6.40 
impartial feature 3.2–4 
implication of aggregation clause 3.5–10 
in connection with 3.122–125 
individual loss 
allocation 6.22, 6.23, 6.30, 6.41, 6.51, 6.53 
delimiting 2.26–42 
follow the settlements 8.38–44, 8.45, 8.51, 
8.55, 8.57, 8.58, 8.59, 8.64, 8.65, 8.69, 8.71, 
8.72, 8.73, 8.76, 8.77, 8.78 
insured unit 2.27–31 
peoples’ action 2.32–42 
primary insured 2.19–25, 8.57, 8.58, 8.59 
installation of insulation material 3.31, 4.45, 
4.50, 8.75 
invasion of a country 3.31, 4.54, 8.64, 8.65 
inward contract 7.3, 7.9, 7.10, 7.14, 7.18, 
7.22, 7.23, 7.24, 7.26, 7.28, 7.29, 7.30, 7.31, 
7.33, 7.36, 7.37, 7.40, 7.41, 7.45, 7.46, 7.46, 
7.49, 7.51, 8.7, 8.12, 8.17, 8.20, 8.21, 8.22, 
8.23, 8.26, 8.27, 8.28, 8.31, 8.32, 8.34–37, 
8.37, 8.39, 8.40, 8.41, 8.42, 8.44, 8.45–52, 
8.54, 8.55, 8.56, 8.57, 8.58, 8.59, 8.64, 8.66, 
8.67, 8.68, 8.70, 8.71 
issuance of speed restrictions 4.44, 4.49, 
4.63, 4.68 
lack of legal certainty 3.1, 3.44, 3.56, 3.80, 
3.86, 4.2, 4.8–13, 4.38, 4.47, 4.56, 4.64, 
4.76, 5.6–10 
lack of proper training 3.32, 3.48, 3.52, 
3.87, 4.83 
legal certainty, lack 3.1, 3.44, 3.56, 3.80, 3.86, 
4.2, 4.8–13, 4.38, 4.47, 4.56, 4.64, 4.76, 5.6–10 
limit, see cover limit 2.86–99 
linking phrase 
arising out of/arising from 3.114–118 
consequent upon or attributable to 
3.119–121 
in connection with 3.122–125 
shall result from 3.126–129 
loss 
deprivation of insured subject matter 2.9 
financial detriment 2.6, 2.8, 2.9, 2.12, 2.31, 
2.39 
individual loss 2.18–42 
total or partial loss 2.7, 2.8 
ultimate net loss 2.11–17 
loss occurrence 3.58, 4.90, 4.92, 4.94, 4.97, 
4.105, 4.140 
losses’ circumstances 4.15, 4.29, 4.46, 4.48 
materialisation of a peril 2.6, 2.44, 4.132, 
4.139, 4.140, 4.141, 4.142, 4.144, 4.153, 
4.156, 4.157, 4.158, 5.16, 5.17, 5.18, 5.23, 
5.24, 5.25, 5.26, 5.27, 5.28, 5.30, 5.35 
misselling of products 3.48, 3.87, 3.91, 3.96, 
3.99, 5.7 
misunderstanding as to the result of a 
discussion 3.32, 3.50, 5.7 
monitoring of employees 3.87 
natural disaster 1.28, 1.33, 1.56, 3.31, 4.88, 
4.90, 4.142, 5.6, 7.22 




no presumption of back-to-back cover 
7.18–20 
per event excess of loss treaty 1.36, 1.38, 
1.43–46, 1.57 
per risk excess of loss treaty 1.36, 1.40–42, 
1.57 
premium calculation 1.35, 1.37, 2.68, 2.99, 
6.29, 7.19, 7.33 




in the sense of individual loss 2.4, 2.56–60, 
3.58, 3.75, 3.78, 4.9 
in the sense of a unifying factor 1.45, 2.20, 
2.21, 2.61–64, 2.93, 3.27, 3.34, 3.35, 
3.57–60, 3.63, 3.77, 3.79, 3.97, 3.98, 3.115, 
4.5, 4.6, 4.15, 4.17, 4.18, 4.20, 4.24, 4.31, 
4.44, 4.70, 4.100, 4.135, 4.136, 4.144, 
4.146, 7.66 
omission 3.27, 3.33, 3.34, 3.69–73, 4.146, 
4.147, 4.149, 4.150, 4.155, 4.158, 4.164, 
5.16, 5.17, 5.18, 5.23, 5.24, 5.25, 5.26, 5.27, 
5.28, 5.30, 5.35, 7.71, 7.72 
original cause/originating cause 3.23, 3.26, 
3.45–56, 4.106, 4.107, 4.109, 5.4, 6.27, 
6.28, 6.30 
outward contract 7.3, 7.9, 7.10, 7.14, 7.18, 
7.22, 7.23, 7.24, 7.28, 7.29, 7.30, 7.31, 7.33, 
7.35, 7.36, 7.38, 7.39, 7.40, 7.41, 7.45, 7.47, 
7.49, 7.51, 8.7, 8.12, 8.20, 8.23, 8.27, 8.28, 
8.32, 8.33, 8.38, 8.40, 8.43, 8.44, 8.45–55, 
8.57, 8.59, 8.64, 8.66, 8.73, 8.75, 8.82 
per event excess of loss treaty 1.34, 
1.43–46, 1.57 
per risk excess of loss treaty 1.36, 
1.40–42, 1.57 
peril 2.6, 2.44, 2.77, 2.81–85, 2.91, 2.95, 3.42, 
4.11, 4.12, 4.60, 4.89, 4.90, 4.92, 4.93, 4.94, 
4.100, 4.105, 4.132, 4.139, 4.140, 4.141, 
4.142, 4.144, 4.145, 4.153, 4.156, 4.157, 
4.158, 5.16, 5.17, 5.18, 5.23, 5.24, 5.25, 
5.26, 5.27, 5.28, 5.30, 5.35, 6.5 
PICC 4.128, 4.129 
plan 3.32, 3.51, 4.70, 5.6 
premium calculation 1.6, 1.8, 1.21, 1.22, 1.24, 
1.26, 1.30, 1.35, 1.37, 1.56, 2.68, 2.99, 6.29, 
7.19, 7.33 
PRICL 
aggregation and allocation 6.54 
aggregation and back-to-back cover 7.75 
cause-based aggregation 5.11–31 
description 4.124–131 
determination of event 4.138–150 
event-based aggregation 4.132–158 
liability triggering act, omission or fact 
4.145, 4.147, 4.148, 4.150, 4.158, 5.16, 5.17, 
5.23, 5.24, 5.25, 5.27, 5.30, 5.35 
materialisation of a peril 4.139, 4.140, 
4.144, 4.153, 4.156, 4.158 
reinsurance of first-party insurance 
4.139–144 
reinsurance of third-party insurance 
4.145–150 
requirement of ‘direct consequence’ 
4.151–158 
requirement of ‘reasonable foreseeability’ 
5.27–31 
primary insurance 
back-to-back cover 7.3, 7.9, 7.10, 7.14, 
7.18, 7.22, 7.23, 7.24, 7.26, 7.28, 7.29, 7.30, 
7.31, 7.33, 7.36, 7.37, 7.40, 7.41, 7.45, 7.46, 
7.49, 7.51 
follow the settlements 8.7, 8.12, 8.17, 
8.20, 8.21, 8.22, 8.23, 8.26, 8.27, 8.28, 
8.31, 8.32, 8.34–37, 8.37, 8.39, 8.40, 8.41, 
8.42, 8.44, 8.45–52, 8.54, 8.55, 8.56, 8.57, 
8.58, 8.59, 8.64, 8.66, 8.67, 8.68, 8.70, 
8.71 
individual loss 2.18, 2.19–25, 7.15, 8.31, 
8.38, 8.39, 8.40, 8.42, 8.45, 8.51, 8.55, 
8.57, 8.58, 8.59, 8.72, 8.73, 8.78, 8.83 
Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts 4.128, 4.129 
Principles of Reinsurance Contract Law, see 
PRICL 1.6, 2.95, 4.3, 4.124–158, 5.1, 
5.11–31, 6.54, 7.75 




presumption of back-to-back cover 7.4, 
7.5–11, 7.12–17 
proportional facultative reinsurance 
1.24–25, 1.56, 7.5, 7.7, 7.8, 7.12 
quota share treaty 1.23, 1.26–28, 1.56, 7.22 
surplus treaty 1.29–33 
related series 3.83, 3.85, 3.88–95, 3.107, 
3.126, 3.127 
related matters or transactions 3.83, 3.84, 
3.85, 3.86, 3.101–110 
remoteness, see causation 3.39, 3.53, 3.56, 
3.116, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 59, 5.10 
retention, see also deductible, priority 1.25, 
1.29, 1.30, 1.32, 1.50, 2.65–85 
seizure of property 3.31, 4.33 
series clause 3.83–110, 3.128, 4.111, 6.45 
shall result from 3.126–129 
sole judge clauses 4.111–120 
source 3.23, 3.45, 3.55, 3.58, 3.81–82, 3.96, 
3.97, 3.122, 3.123, 4.106, 4.108, 4.109, 5.4, 
5.12, 6.27, 6.28, 6.30 
state of affairs 3.32, 3.47, 3.51, 3.66, 5.6 
state of ignorance 3.32, 3.34, 3.51 




surplus treaty 1.23, 1.29–33 
susceptibility to earthquakes 3.51, 5.6 
terror attack 3.31, 4.42, 4.61, 4.83, 
4.142, 4.149 
treaty reinsurance 
allocation 6.8, 6.13, 6.15, 6.17, 6.18, 6.19, 
6.38, 6.50, 6.51 
aggregate extension clauses 7.65–74 
concept 1.11–15 
follow the settlements 8.7–13 
global settlements 8.72–78 
per event excess of loss treaty 1.43–46 
per risk excess of loss treaty 1.40–42 
quota share treaty 1.26–28, 1.56, 7.22 
surplus treaty 1.29–33 
stop loss treaty 1.47–53, 1.57 
triple trigger theory 6.14 
tsunami 2.95, 2.96, 2.97, 3.31, 4.90, 
4.101, 4.153 
ultimate net loss 2.11–17, 2.18, 2.31,  
2.61, 2.74, 2.75, 2.88, 2.90, 2.100, 3.23,  
4.92 
underlying cause 3.90 
unfortunate event test 4.126, 7.46 
unifying factor 
accident 3.26, 3.61–68, 4.6, 4.135, 4.136 
act or omission 2.47, 2.61, 3.26, 3.69–73, 
3.88, 3.89, 3.90, 3.93, 3.101, 3.126, 3.127, 
4.146, 7.71 
calamity 1.45, 3.26, 3.74–80, 4.6, 4.136 
catastrophe 1.56, 3.74–80, 4.6, 4.89, 4.90, 
4.92, 4.94, 4.95, 4.96, 4.97, 4.100, 4.101, 
4.103, 4.105, 4.135, 4.136, 7.68 
disaster 1.45, 3.26, 3.74–80, 4.6, 4.135, 
4.136 
event 3.26, 3.27–44, 3.59, 3.79, 3.114, 
3.117, 4.5–7, 4.8–13, 4.18, 4.25, 4.26, 4.27, 
4.28, 4.29, 4.30, 4.32, 4.33, 4.37, 4.42, 4.45, 
4.45, 4.50, 4.54, 4.57, 4.58, 4.59, 4.60, 4.61, 
4.62, 4.64, 4.66, 4.70, 4.81, 4.82, 4.83, 4.84, 
4.85, 4.86, 4.89, 4.95, 4.105, 4.111, 4.112, 
4.113, 4.115, 4.117, 4.118, 4.132, 4.133, 
4.134, 4.135, 4.136, 4.138–150, 4.151, 
4.152, 4.153, 4.154, 4.155, 4.156, 6.34, 6.36, 
6.37, 6.38, 6.41, 6.47, 6.54, 7.25, 7.27, 7.28, 
7.30, 7.38, 7.39, 7.46, 7.62, 7.67, 7.68, 7.71, 
7.73, 8.63, 8.64, 8.65, 8.75, 8.77 
occurrence 1.45, 2.20, 2.21, 2.61–64, 2.93, 
3.27, 3.34, 3.35, 3.57–60, 3.63, 3.77, 3.79, 
3.97, 3.98, 3.115, 4.5, 4.6, 4.15, 4.17, 4.18, 
4.20, 4.24, 4.31, 4.44, 4.70, 4.100, 4.135, 
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